delivered the opinion of the Court.
We grant Robert C. Black’s motion for rehearing in part. We withdraw our opinion of June 26, 2003 and substitute the following in its place.
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978(ADA) provides that states “may not enact or enforce a law ... related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier....” 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1). This case concerns the scope of this preemption provision, specifically, its application to state breach of contract and misrepresentation claims challenging an airline’s ticketing and boarding procedures. The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of Delta Airlines, Inc. and its gate supervisor, A1 Perez, without specifying the grounds. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the ADA did not preempt Black’s claims, and remanded the case for trial. — S.W.3d-,-. We granted Perez and Delta’s petition for review to decide whether the ADA preempts a passenger’s state law claims for an airline’s alleged failure to honor a confirmed first-class seat. 46 Tex. Sup.Ct. J. 14 (Oct. 10, 2002). We hold that it does and accordingly reverse the court of appeals’ judgment in part and render judgment that Black take nothing on his claims against Delta and Perez.
I
BACKGROUND
On June 23, 1995, Robert Black purchased two Delta airline tickets for travel from Dallas/Fort Worth to Las Vegas leaving that afternoon and returning on June 25. The invoice from Black’s travel agent showed two first-class reservations for Black and his wife. Although the invoice assigned Black first-class seats for both directions, his wife had an assigned seat only for the return flight. Black’s travel agent and manager of Smith Travel & Limousine, Melissa Shinn, suggested that Black ask the Delta gate agent if he and his wife could sit together in first class for the Dallas to Las Vegas flight.
Upon arrival at the departure gate, Black requested adjacent seats in first class. The gate agent said that he would “see what [he] could do.” As other passengers boarded the plane, a Delta gate supervisor, A1 Perez, appeared and informed Black that he and his wife did not have two confirmed first-class seats for the flight. While Delta had a confirmed first-class seat for Mr. Black, it only had a confirmed coach seat for his wife, whom Delta placed on a priority waiting list for first class. Perez told Black that, unless a first-class passenger relinquished a seat, Black’s wife would be seated in coach for the three-hour flight from Dallas to Las Vegas. This would not, however, affect her first-class seat for the return flight. At Black’s request, Perez spoke by telephone with Shinn. Shinn told Perez that her computer showed two confirmed first-class seats from Dallas to Las Vegas. Delta’s computers, however, did not show a confirmed first-class seat for Black’s wife.
Unable to provide Black’s wife with first-class accommodations, Delta offered several alternatives: (1) the Blacks could sit in coach on their scheduled flight, (2) they could fly separately on the scheduled flight, one in coach and one in first class, (3) they could fly first class on a later flight to Los Angeles and then connect to Las Vegas, or (4) they could take a direct flight later that day to Las Vegas with confirmed first-class seats. Each of these alternatives included free travel vouchers, which Black asserts could be used only for *748 coach seats. Black declined Delta’s offers. Instead, the Blacks drove to Love Field airport and chartered a private jet to and from Las Vegas at a cost of $13,150, which included the aircrew’s expenses in Las Vegas for two days.
Black sued Delta for breach of contract and intentional and negligent misrepresentation, and sued Perez for misrepresentation only. 1 Delta and Perez moved for summary judgment on four grounds: (1) preemption under the ADA, (2) Black’s failure to mitigate damages, (3) lack of causation, and (4) lack of an agency relationship between Smith Travel and Delta. The trial court granted summary judgment for Delta and Perez, without specifying the grounds. Black appealed the judgment.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for trial. The court of appeals held that fact issues precluded judgment as a matter of law on the causation, mitigation, and agency issues. — S.W.3d at-. As to the key issue before this Court, the court of appeals held that Black’s claims were not preempted by the ADA because “federal airline regulations allow passengers whose reservations are not honored due to overbooking to seek recovery for damages ‘in a court of law or in some other manner.’” Id. at -. We granted Perez and Delta’s petition for review to decide the single issue Perez and Delta (collectively, Delta) presented — preemption.
II
APPLICABLE LAW — PREEMPTION
Federal preemption of state law is grounded in the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, which provides that “the Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2. Under the Supremacy Clause, if a state law conflicts with federal law, the state law is preempted and “without effect.”
Maryland v. Louisiana,
“The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone” in every preemption case.
Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n. v. Schermerhorn,
We begin our analysis with a discussion of the relevant federal statute and the United States Supreme Court cases that control this area.
A
Statutory Framework
Before 1978, the Federal Aviation Act of 1958(FAA) authorized the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) to regulate the interstate airline industry. 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 40101);
Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens,
In 1978, Congress amended the FAA by enacting the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), which deregulated the industry. 49 U.S.C. § 40101(a)(6), (a)(12)(A) (formerly codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(4), (a)(9)). In enacting the ADA, Congress determined that “ ‘maximum reliance on competitive market forces’ would best further ‘efficiency, innovation, and low prices’ as well as “variety [and] quality ... of air transportation services.’”
Morales,
Except as provided in this subsection, a State, political subdivision of a State, or political authority of at least 2 States may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other 'provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier_
49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(l)(emphasis added). 2 Thus, to determine the propriety of the court of appeals’ judgment, we must ascertain whether Black’s state law claims fall within the ADA’s express preemption provision. If they do, Black’s claims fail.
B
Morales and Wolens
The Supreme Court has discussed the scope of the ADA’s express preemption clause on two occasions. It first considered the ADA’s preemptive scope in
Morales,
Although the Court warned that “ ‘some state actions may affect [airline fares] in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner’ to have preemptive effect,” it concluded that the obligations imposed by the guidelines would impact airlines’ ability to market their product and the fares they charged.
Id.
at 390,
The only other time the Court has addressed the scope of the ADA’s preemption provision was in
American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens,
The Court then turned to the plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims.
Id.
It held that the ADA’s preemption clause did not shield airlines from “suits alleging no violation of state-imposed obligations, but seeking recovery solely for the airline’s alleged breach of its own, self-imposed undertakings.”
Id.
at 228,
*751 C
Kiefer
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Morales
and
Wolens,
lower federal and state courts have struggled with determining when the ADA preempts state law claims.
4
This Court considered the scope of the ADA’s preemption clause in
Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Kiefer,
In reaching this conclusion, we acknowledged the difficulty in differentiating between claims that are preempted and those that are not.
Id.
at 281. We noted that, unlike the state consumer protection legislation at issue in
Morales,
negligence actions do not “carry the same ‘potential for intrusive regulation of airline business practices_’”
Id.
at 282 (quoting
Wol-ens,
Rather than declare categorically that personal injury claims are always excepted from preemption, we focused on the extent to which the claims in Kiefer threatened to encroach on the congressional objective of airline deregulation. Id. Because preemption depends on the nature of the particular claim, we observed that the ADA’s preemptive effect on other state law claims would require a “closer working out.” Id. at 281. With respect to breach of contract claims, we noted that the “very strict limitation” Wolens puts on permissible contract claims “demonstrates the breadth of ADA preemption.” Id. Like Wolens, we recognized that the ADA allows breach of contract claims only if they involve contract terms voluntarily undertaken by the parties. Id. at 281-82. And we noted that voluntary contractual undertakings do not “effectuate purposes that could have a prohibited regulatory effect on airlines.” Id. at 282.
With this framework in mind, we turn to a “closer working out” of the ADA preemption clause with respect to Black’s claims.
Wolens,
*752 III
ANALYSIS
Black contends that Wolens and Kiefer shield his breach of contract claim from preemption. He argues that, by refusing to provide his wife a first-class seat on the flight from Dallas to Las Vegas, Delta breached a self-imposed contractual obligation. Because his claims arise from Delta’s own undertakings, as opposed to an obligation imposed by state law, Black argues that there is little risk similar state claims would undo federal deregulation. Thus, according to Black, his claims are not subject to preemption under the ADA.
Delta, on the other hand, contends that Black’s claims are preempted by the ADA because they relate directly to the airline services Delta provides. Delta argues that ticketing and boarding procedures are fundamental to airline services and are far removed in character from the voluntary frequent flyer program at issue in Wolens. Specifically, Delta contends that because Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations define and control the procedures for denied boarding, Black’s state law claims are preempted. For the reasons discussed below, we agree with Delta.
A
Related to an Airline’s Services
To answer whether a claim is preempted by the ADA, we first determine whether the claim is related to an airline’s prices or services within the meaning of the ADA’s preemption provision.
Kiefer,
The Fifth Circuit’s more expansive interpretation of airline services includes “ticketing, boarding procedures, provision of food and drink, and baggage handling, in addition to the transportation itself.”
Hodges,
*753
In this case, Black’s claims relate to Delta’s boarding procedures and seating policies. Although several courts have fashioned different tests to determine whether a state law action relates to an airline’s services, most courts generally agree that state law claims involving seating and boarding procedures relate to services.
5
This approach is consistent with both the Fifth and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ conclusions that an airline’s boarding procedures are an integral part of the services that an airline provides.
See, e.g., Somes v. United Airlines, Inc.,
Unlike the frequent flyer program in
Wolens,
seating policies and boarding procedures are not peripheral to the operation of an airline, but are inextricably linked to the contract of carriage between a passenger and the airline and have a definite “connection with, or reference to” airline services.
Morales,
We next consider whether the ADA prohibits enforcement of Black’s claims.
B
State Enactment or Enforcement
The second step in the preemption analysis involves determining whether Black’s claims, if allowed, would constitute enactment or enforcement of a state law within the meaning of the ADA’s preemption clause.
Kiefer,
In
Wolens,
the Supreme Court determined that a frequent flyer program was a self-imposed undertaking between private parties and was therefore too tenuous or peripheral to constitute state enforcement.
When Black purchased the airline tickets, a binding contract of carriage was created between Black and Delta.
See Woodard v. Tex. & P. Ry. Co.,
Section 250.5 requires airlines to pay compensation to any passenger who is involuntarily denied boarding caused by an oversold flight. Id. § 250.5. A passenger who is involuntarily denied boarding, however, is not required to accept this compensation and can instead “decline the payment and seek to recover damages in a court of law or in some other manner.” Id. § 250.9. The federal regulations also provide that under certain circumstances, a passenger denied boarding involuntarily from an oversold flight is not entitled to receive compensation from the airline. Id. § 250.6. In particular, if a passenger “is offered accommodations or is seated in a section of the aircraft other than that specified on the ticket at no extra charge,” then that passenger is not eligible for denied boarding compensation. Id. § 250.6(c).
Black contends that, pursuant to section 250.9, he had the option to decline compensation under the federal scheme and instead “seek to recover damages in a court of law.” Id. § 250.9(b). The court of appeals agreed and held that, although Black was not entitled to denied boarding compensation, he could forego the remedies provided by the DOT regulations and seek damages in court. — S.W.3d at -. The court of appeals based its decision on the DOT regulations relating to *755 passengers that are involuntarily denied boarding. Id.; see also 14 C.F.R. § 250.9. But Black and the court of appeals misread these regulations. Black was not denied boarding, as that term relates to section 250.9.
The passenger option of declining payment from the airline and instead seeking recovery in a court of law is reserved for those passengers who are involuntarily denied boarding and thus eligible for denied boarding compensation. 14 C.F.R. § 250.9. Because Delta offered Black’s wife another seat on the same flight, she was not denied boarding. Even if we considered Black’s wife to have been involuntarily denied first-class boarding, the Blacks do not have a valid claim for “denied boarding compensation.” This is so because they fall within one of the eligibility exceptions to qualify for compensation — a passenger is not eligible for denied boarding compensation if the airline offers the passenger accommodations in another section of the aircraft at no charge. Id. § 250.6. Because Delta offered Black and his wife various accommodations, including coach seats, Black and his wife were ineligible for denied boarding compensation. Id. And because Black and his wife were not eligible to receive the denied boarding compensation from Delta, they could not possibly decline this compensation and “seek to recover damages in a court of law.” Id. § 250.9. Accordingly, Black cannot rely on section 250.9, which, as a prerequisite to recover, requires the party to be eligible to receive denied boarding compensation.
As discussed above, the parties’ contract incorporated the DOT regulations on denied boarding compensation. Black, however, seeks to enlarge Delta’s obligations to him. He attempts to modify the contract terms to allow him and his wife to forego the regulatory remedies and instead sue in court. This Court, however, is confined, “in breach-of-contract actions, to the parties’ bargain.”
Wolens,
Even were the contract silent about the federal regulations, other courts have applied similar reasoning to preempt breach of contract claims that relate to price or service and seek to impose state laws or policies. 6 As the court of appeals in this case correctly noted:
*756 [W]e cannot overlook the fact that the alleged contractual violation at issue in this appeal involves a common condition unique to the airline industry — the failure to seat an allegedly confirmed ticket holder because of overbooking — and that unlike the frequent-flier agreements at issue in Wolens, specific federal regulations govern compensation for air passengers who are involuntarily prevented from boarding a flight due to overbooking.
— S.W.3d at—. These “specific federal regulations” have a national purpose in that they provide a uniform system of compensation to passengers. If passengers were permitted to challenge airlines’ boarding procedures under state common law, the airline industry would potentially be subject to regulation by fifty different states.
Smith,
We conclude that Delta’s boarding and seating policies relate to the services it provided to Black, and that Black’s claims can only be adjudicated by reference to laws and policies external to its contract with Delta. Accordingly, we hold that 49 U.S.C. section 41713(b) preempts Black’s contract claims.
We now turn to Black’s remaining claims for misrepresentation and fraud, which he argues survive ADA preemption. We disagree. Because Black’s misrepresentation and fraud claims are premised on Delta’s ticketing and boarding procedure, they are directly related to Delta’s services.
See
discussion
supra
Part III.A. The court
of
appeals concluded, however, that because Black’s misrepresentation claims did not turn on any requirement imposed by a Texas legislative body, they were not preempted. — S.W.3d at -. To the contrary, state tort actions can be state enforcement under 49 U.S.C. section 41713(b)(1).
See, e.g., Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs Legal Comm.,
Moreover, both
Wolens
and
Kiefer
suggest that state misrepresentation and fraud claims are preempted by the ADA.
Wolens,
IV
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment in part and render judgment that Black take nothing on his claims against Delta Airlines, Inc. and A1 Perez.
Notes
. Black also sued Abe Haddad d/b/a Smith Travel & Limousine for breach of contract, intentional and negligent misrepresentation, violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and negligence. Haddad moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The court of appeals reversed that summary judgment and remanded Black’s claims against Haddad for trial. Haddad does not challenge that judgment in this Court.
. The Blacks base their claims in part on the ADA’s savings clause, which provides that "a remedy under this part is in addition to any other remedies provided by law.” 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c). This clause, however, has been dismissed as a relic of the FAA and does not supersede the specific substantive preemption provision in the ADA.
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
. 49 U.S.C. section 1305(a)(1) is the previous version of the ADA preemption clause. The current version, the one at issue in this case, 49 U.S.C. section 41713(b)(1), was recodified into the Federal Aviation Administration Act in 1994 without substantive change.
Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Kiefer,
.
See, e.g., Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines Inc.,
.
See, e.g., Smith v. Comair,
.
See, e.g., Lyn-Lea Travel Corp. v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,