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Delores Simmons, Administratrix of the Estate of Daniel La Friscoe Simmons v. The City of Philadelphia Police Officer A. Panati, Badge No. 2587
947 F.2d 1042
3rd Cir.
1991
Check Treatment

*1 employees, the had no generally tributors hearing before in the developed record a fee were more like exacted proper- payments Board judge, the law administrative distributorship than evi- present to obtain order the distributors ly concluded repre- bargaining agree- not of a true collective meeting were dence May 1987 of conditions bargaining governing multi-employer ment terms of a sentatives bargain on behalf employment. authorized association Jersey distributors. the New Therefore, conclusion that the Board’s during bargaining association did presented multi-employer evidence was No Jersey from New Jer- to a New distributors the distributor bind the hearing that not May picketing 1987 meet- that the 1989 present in 1987 and who was contract sey authority any actual to force those dis- designed possessed therefore was intent” from oth- “unequivocal Incorpo- bargain through the evidence tributors Dry distributors Jersey supported Canada substan- er New rated Association only testi- behalf. their negotiate on as a in the record whole. tial evidence authority came from his regarding mony agent implied who 812 business Local III. possessed Jersey distributor New that in Accordingly, we conclude Febru- he was a director authority because violated ary Local 812 and March which, in the busi- Association Incorporated 8(b)(4)(A) by picketing of the Act section view, authorized to bar- agent's ness Dry’s distribution centers three Canada But Jersey distributors. the New gain for by halting deliveries Jersey and New (1) that: hearing record reveals Dry’s plant Canada unionized drivers from even was not Incorporated Association Point, York to the centers. College New cer- 1987 when the September until formed We, therefore, Board’s orders enforce (2) filed; and incorporation was tificate and direct immediate against Local 812 ex- Incorporated Association even compliance therewith. not for multi- it was formed May, isted pur- bargaining purposes but

employer and to deal auto

chasing group insurance mutual interest. problems of business

with

Furthermore, provide Local 812 could agree- bargaining any collective

copies Jersey binding distributors SIMMONS, the New ments Administratrix Delores meeting, despite re- following La Friscoe Estate Daniel during six Simmons, requests for them Appellees, peated attempted transfer to prior to the months Local 125. PHILADELPHIA; Police OF CITY a 1987 argues that Local 812 also Panati, Badge No. A. Officer bargaining agreement was collective Appellants. of New conduct because later reached 90-1118. No. paying union welfare Jersey distributors seeking mod contributions pension Appeals, Court United States in the fund contribution welfare ifications Circuit. Third payments But these proves adoption. rate Argued Sept. required distributors were because arose 18, 1991. Decided Oct. pay quasi-premium Dry by Canada Dry’s effort to Canada Local 812 Rehearing In Banc Rehearing and pay exclusively one union. The deal 21, 1991. Denied Nov. technically pursuant to the so- ments were agreement bargaining collective called agreements. in the distributor

mentioned Jersey dis-

However, New given *6 Lillie, Solicitor, Norma

Charisse S. Claims, Weaver, Deputy Charge Chief (argued), B. Divisional Miriam Brenaman Deputy Charge Appeals, City of Phila- Pa., Dept., Philadelphia, delphia, Law for appellants. Frost, (argued), B. DeMes-

Mark Frost Rudow, Pa., Philadelphia, ap- quita & pellees. SLOVITER, Judge, and

Before Chief WEIS, Judges. BECKER and Circuit THE ANNOUNCING THE JUDGMENT OF COURT OPINION TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 1049 I. THE BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY FACTUAL 1049 Background A. The Factual 1049 Proceedings B. The Trial TO PLAIN- THE ENTITLED TO J.N.O.V. WITH RESPECT II. WAS CITY 1055 FEDERAL TIFF’S CLAIMS? 1983 Ver- Inconsistency Objection its A. Did the Waive § 1055 dicts? 1048

PAGE Verdicts; Requisites for Estab- Inconsistency of the Alleged B. Policy and a Liability for a or Custom Direct Municipality’s lishing a On) 1058 (More Waiver Train; and Failure to 1058 Inconsistency of the Verdicts Alleged 1. The Liability Policy, for a Municipality’s Direct Predicates to 2. The 1059 Custom, Failure to Train 1065 on Waiver 3. More 1066 Sufficiency of the Evidence C. Determining Breached Consti- Whether Standards Potentially Detainees Suicidal Duty to Intoxicated tutional Respect to Plaintiff’s Sufficiency the Evidence With 2. The Allegation Policy Municipal Custom or Respect to Plaintiff’s of the Evidence Sufficiency With 3. The Theory Failure to Train PLAIN- RESPECT TO ENTITLED TO J.N.O.V. WITH THE CITY III. WAS STATE CLAIMS? TIFF’S PENDENT Allege and Argument that Plaintiff Failed to A. Did the Waive any Pendent State Claims? Establish Jury Alleged Errors in the Instructions B. The Permitting Jury to Consider Alleged

1. The Error of Lockup Facilities Condition *7 Jury Directives Instructing the that Police Alleged 2. The Error of Duty 1079 Statutory a or Common Law Establish Duty Lower a Prisoner’s The Instruction that Intoxication Can 1079 Due Care to Exercise Jury the Precon- Failing to Instruct Alleged 4. The Error of Relationship 1080 Duty Arising Special from a ditions to a Liability Respect to Plaintiff’s State City Immune from With C. Is the 1084 Claims? UNDER RULE ENTITLED TO DELAY DAMAGES THE PLAINTIFF IV. IS 238? V. CONCLUSION emotionally dis-

BECKER, trix of the estate of Judge. Circuit hung himself in a young man who turbed judgment of the appeal This is an from a lockup Philadelphia station house after large jury ver- district court entered on a and administra- diet favor of the mother This are respon- arrested for intoxication. sober or can be released to a

having been party. recesses sible requires exploration of the appeal as it rights federal civil law insofar of the Simmons, When detained who municipalities and liability on the bears heavily intoxicated, grew agitated, he municipal under these cir- police officers quite arrest, became concerned his about particularly, appeal this cumstances. More began cry. to The arresting and officers requires predicates of the to a examination attempted to calm him and transported him municipality’s liability policy, for a a cus- District, Police Sixth where tom, employees to train or a failure they placed custody him in the of the facili- Supreme a trio of Court decisions ex- ty’s turnkey, Officer Albert Panati. The municipal panding prerequisites arresting officers informed Panati Depart- liability established Monell v. crying upset Simmons was at the time Services, 658, ment 436 U.S. Social custody. Following that he was taken into (1978). L.Ed.2d 611 This S.Ct. facility, his arrival at the district detention prediction appeal also necessitates of how confused, emotional, Simmons became Supreme de- Pennsylvania Court would deeply concerned about his arrest and its concerning prerequisite to a cide issues consequences. The district court deter- protect an intoxicated and suicidal spite condition, mined of his “[i]n prisoner and the effect of the state’s Tort offense, minor nature of his and his inabili- municipal validity Act on the Claims ty family,” to call his no one at the deten- ordinances, Philadelphia’s, waiving such as facility placed tion a call on Simmons’s immunity liability police negli- from Philadelphia, behalf. Simmons v. gence. Finally, because in a number of F.Supp. (E.D.Pa.1990). In- instances counsel for the defendant of deed, prac- Panati testified that it was his arguably preserve Philadelphia failed to place telephone tice not to calls on behalf appeal, good a points raised on devote permit intoxicated detainees and such explanation deal of attention to an place phone only a detainee call if application principles of waiver and their was, request detainee made

this case. For the reasons that follow judgment, sufficiently officer’s sober. opinion sepa- and in Sloviter’s Panati removed Simmons’s and sun- belt opinion, deny- rate the district court’s order dry personal required belongings of his motions, City’s post-trial judg- by City police placing directive before verdict, delay ment on the and its award of Panati, however, him alone in a cell. did damages will be affirmed. directive, presum- comply with a second ably attempts, to forestall suicide intended I. THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND “[wjhenever possible, provides AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY persons placed minimum of two are *8 Notwithstanding a cell/detention room.” Background,1 A. The Factual directive, customarily attempted Panati this separately, early morning In the hours of the of to house intoxicated detainees 19, 1985, Philadelphia (“City”) po- prevent in order to altercations. Because October Simmons, empty at the time that lice officers took Daniel who was the cell block was Simmons, Panati could not years age prior and had no convic- he incarcerated tions, prison- another custody public into for intoxication. have housed Simmons with directive, er, departmental to a even had he decided Simmons Pursuant in a cell. The City police ordinarily charges do not file should not be left alone determined, however, that against persons, merely intoxicated but district court jails City protective custody they them in until “there were other hold evidence, testimony case are related in the I have set forth the record 1. The facts this also opinion, City greater district court’s see Simmons v. plaintiffs experts in detail somewhat (E.D.Pa.1990). Philadelphia, F.Supp. than did the district court. weighing sufficiency purposes For mons, rights action, instituted this civil totally empty” to which Simmons were not Panati, against taken. Id. U.S.C. Officer could been § City, City Gregor and Police Commissioner ap- cell to returned Simmons’s Panati alleged Sambore. Plaintiff that these de- he first after fifteen minutes proximately fendants had violated various of Simmons’s point, be- At this him there. placed had rights, including rights constitutional his his shoe laces had untied cause Simmons life, process liberty, and due of law under around, Panati re- flopping they and were the fifth and fourteenth amendments and City police a di- step that moved them—a addition, penumbral privacy rights. his immedi- taken instructs should be rective cognate pendent plaintiff asserted tort The district ately upon incarceration. against claims each of the defendants. Pri- “[ajside from remov- court determined however, trial, moved and laces, steps no other were ing the shoe granted permission her was withdraw protect Simmons.” Id. taken to against action Police Commissioner Sam- separated by a wall was Panati’s desk bore. cell which Simmons was from the block held, block turnkey and a had to enter the Proceedings B. The Trial happen- in order to see what was physically log given cell. Panati’s book within plaintiff presented numerous Whereas that, during the time that Simmons showed City’s liability theories of the section 1983 incarcerated, inspected the the officer complaint, attempted in her she to establish precise minute inter- cell block at fifteen City’s liability at trial based on two vals, police directives. in accordance with First, conjoint plaintiff sought theories. admitted, however, that he Panati recorded establish, by expert testimony means of log inspected he had the cells this concerning the state of detention facil- facility exactly every quarter of an processing rules ities and hour, actually regardless when he did so. detainees, violated Simmons’s during right process through

For at least one hour of the time constitutional due custody, he remained policy amounting which Simmons was or custom inattention periodically rattled the quite upset and bars indifference to the serious deliberate Panati, According of his cell. Simmons potentially medical needs of intoxicated and “glassy eyes,” stupor,” was “in a As suicidal detainees. a concomitant respond him to sit did not when Panati told overarching theory, plaintiff sought, down and relax. Panati described Sim- second, to establish that the violated mons’s reactions continued incarcera- to his process rights through due Simmons’s varying hys- tion as between confusion deliberately train indifferent failure to teria. officers to detect and to meet those serious needs.

Slightly more and one-half than one hours after he first had locked Simmons trial, plaintiff At called as a witness Ser- cell, into his Panati discovered Simmons geant Heran of the Police De- John hanging from from the bars of the cell Unit, Planning partment’s Research and from noose that he had made his trousers. which serves the Police Commission- cut and called for a Panati Simmons down responsible drafting depart- er and is medical rescue team. Panati himself made policies procedures. Sergeant mental attempt no to revive Simmons. A rescue *9 years Heran that between the testified approximately team seventeen min- arrived individuals, 1980 and 15 whom utes after Panati had discovered Simmons’s intoxication, public had detained for been death, body. autopsy An revealed City lockups. in Accord- committed suicide .24, alcohol Simmons’s blood level was Heran, year ing to in 1985—the in which legal lim- more than twice the blood-alcohol (including Simmons died—four detainees operating it for a motor vehicle. Simmons) in committed suicide lock- suicide, all killed

Following ups; her son’s all were intoxicated and Simmons’s administratrix, early in hours of the morn- mother and Delores Sim- themselves testimony that all 20 al. ing. qualified revealed The district court Heran’s the first of witnesses, in Rowan, suicide Joseph the individuals who committed these as an ex- did pert and 1985 so City lockups concerning between 1980 in data jail suicides and in articles by hanging police training themselves with techniques prevent- aimed at years prior Sim- clothing. In the five ing them.3 Rowan testified a survey that suicide, had occurred in mons’s no suicides jail completed suicides in 1981 showed lockup.2 the 6th District persons that intoxicated comprised two- police thirds of all suicides in lockups and 20 suicides in Heran testified that jails; of the suicides 75% occurred 1980 and City lockups between 1985 oc- cells, when individuals were isolated in jail 428,000 total of among curred from ar- opposed to housed with one or more rests, 97,141 public for of which were intox- inmates; other jail that most suicides oc- stated, however, ication. He the Re- curred between hours of 12:00 a.m. and Planning compiled search and Unit no a.m.; 6:00 and that most of the individuals statistical information number of who committed in lockups suicide were attempted suicides had occurred in young. five-year in that City lockups period. Nei- ther, Heran, according to had the Research Rowan further testified that this 1981 compiled Planning any psychologi- and Unit survey, widely which was used in training attempted cal data on individuals who had jailers in the monitoring identification and City lockups. or committed suicide in Her- detainees, of suicidal had been made avail- depart- an further testified that none of the police lockups able to all country. mental directives drafted the Research He stated that the statistics on the Planning promulgated by Unit and occurring in jails suicides between 1980 Police Commissioner either dealt with train- particular, and 1985—in the statistic that ing prevention in suicide or set forth warn- 15 of the 20 individuals who committed ing signs of suicide in the of in- behavior (or 75%) comport- suicide were intoxicated — toxicated or otherwise disturbed detainees. ed with the results of survey both the 1981 subsequent survey jail and a on suicides. testimony

Officer Panati’s trial tended to any specific corroborate the fo- absence surveyed jail safety Rowan also stan- prevention cus on suicide con- prior dards issued suicide Simmons’s tinuing education of its officers. Pa- organizations such as the Commission on that, although nati stated he believed Agen- Accreditation for Law Enforcement might training in he have received some (CALEA)4 cies and the American Medical prevention at the suicide Police Acade- Association. Rowan testified that these my nearly twenty years prior to Simmons’s standards directed that intoxicated detain- suicide, having he could not recall received ees, they high because are at a risk of specialized training additional su- sudden death from suicide and other prevention during icide his time as a mem- causes, should be under constant observa- Department. ber of the Police and, lockups possible, tion if while trans- eliciting According ferred to treatment facilities. testimony In addition to Rowan, Heran, additionally Sergeant Panati and of the standards directed Officer expert jail personnel called two tri- witnesses at should be trained trial, however, Testimony consulting agencies. charge 2. indicated one Rowan also was in may compiling or more suicides have occurred in the 6th the 1988 National Suicide Preven- lockup prior Lockups District to 1980. tion Manual for and Jails and has training “keys” identifying two authored managing persons police lockups suicidal qualifications having Rowan’s include served the International Association of Chiefs of Police. survey as co-director of a national on su- jails police lockups, icides in as Director of organization compris- the American Medical Association Standards 4.CALEA is an umbrella Program jails, and Accreditation as Commis- the International Association of Chiefs of Association, Police, sioner of Minnesota’s Youth mission, the National Sheriff's Conservation Com- *10 Organization, Director of Law Enforcement Florida’s Division of Black National Services, prison Youth and as the head of three and the National Police Forum. have averted tendencies, prevention, in could as intoxi- suicide such signs of suicidal suicide. Simmons’s swings from a cation, and mood agitation, intros- of silent anxiety to one high state of Rowan, cross-examining counsel for may the detainee signifying pection, emphasized extremely small City suicide. to commit decided among de- of suicides intoxicated number in had occurred tainees —.00015%—that various deten- testified Rowan Despite City jails between 1980 and 1985. effect at the time in facility standards tion probability extremely small statistical further directed that suicide of Simmons’s any particular intoxicated detainee lockups pre- staffing should be officers suicide, opin- commit was Rowan’s would four minutes to respond within pared to during years each suicide those ion that Be- safety threats to inmates. and health obligation to train offi- increased re- recommended four-minute of this cause It prevent to still another suicide. cers observed, time, these stan- sponse Rowan that each suicide Rowan’s view was also provided that various frequently dards obligation develop to increased monitoring sys- or visual types of audio procedures implementing for specific jail in facilities to be installed tems should ensuring prisoner safe- global directives on supervision staff supplement direct changes physical in the ty and to make that, opinion Rowan voiced members. facilities, as “suicide- jail features of such practic- and the of these standards installing proofing” cells and audio or vis- City police departments, es of other devices, deter monitoring ual that would checking Department’s system of Police future suicides. and oth- particularly intoxicated inmates— erwise called, expert, Dr. Plaintiff as her second by means potentially suicidal ones— Guy, psychiatrist a forensic Edward “grossly checks was sub- fifteen-minute Program of Mental Health Director standard.” Philadelphia System Prison Services survey and the vari- Based on the 1981 Guy the mid-1960s. Dr. testified since time, existing Rowan ous standards that, years prior in the to Simmons’s su- was both opined that Simmons’s suicide icide, Depart- Police officials product negligence and the predictable knew, prison system ment and from a indifference on the and deliberate prison system study carried out within City. faulted Panati Panati and the Rowan police pre- of suicides in and from series failing realize that Simmons was lockups, to that a correlation existed be- cinct himself, likely failing occurring harm to monitor intoxication and suicides tween that, failing respond among Guy detainees. stated as a closely, more Simmons result, participate minutes, he was asked 1981 to hanging four within Simmons’s Academy training program in a Police failing to administer C.P.R. to him. group turnkeys.5 City, chiefly Rowan With training pre- the lack of suicide faulted Although it is unclear whether he direct- received officers. vention and detection policymak- ly imparted this information testimony, on Panati’s Rowan as- Based Depart- Police officials within “[ajbsolutely the officer had serted ment, Guy discussed testified that he training detecting not” received turnkeys profile that he had devel- potential suicides that the preventing type likely most oped of the of detainee provided turnkeys. should have for all Guy’s high at a risk of suicide. re- suggested because Simmons Rowan majority of suicid- search revealed that the profile school, psychological high fit the of a suicidal completed had al detainees training that had been derived for occupational detainee records than aver- better survey, City, inmate, although purposes age from the 1981 and tended be— According necessarily through training turnkeys such as Panati were not —white. training turnkeys Guy’s testimony many who received in suicide how 5. It is unclear from training pro- turnkeys participated prevention. in the 1981 Panati, however, among gram. clearly was not *11 procedures suicide have instituted to ensure that likely to commit Guy, detainees showing kind of emotional some intoxicated detainees received medical at- “be would observable,” that would be disturbance tention. shouting, and crying, agitation, such as stepbrother, Reginald Simmons’s Rose- that he in- Guy stated rattling cell bars. mond, testified that detective such detainees turnkeys that formed family who notified the su- Simmons’s constantly monitored means be should icide told him that his brother had been or television moni- one-on-one interaction acting in peculiarly while detention. Ac- and, necessary, physically restrained if tors Rosemond, cording to the detective stated prevent from harm- them with handcuffs police had taken Simmons’s shoe ing themselves. him for this reason. laces from Rosemond testimony that in Guy’s further indicated also that the officer him testified had told in participated in he year which people high are intoxicated are who training turnkeys, he com- course jail. risk to commit suicide while City Police officials within the municated to evidence, plaintiff’s At the close of design of Department his belief that City moved for a directed verdict on the lockup prevented prop- typical precinct grounds set forth its trial brief. In this Guy of detainees. stated er observation brief, (1) argued that: design encouraged he had premised could not establish a claim on turnkeys de- changes to enable to observe process violations of Simmons’s due or oth- closely made lock- tainees more be rights er she could constitutional because According Guy, specifically had ups. he lockups evidence of deliberate indiffer- staff members at adduce no advised that the City; stationed within cell areas. ence of Panati or the be on (2) plaintiff’s pendent state claims should Simmons, although Guy concluded special dismissed because no relation- black, displayed “all of those otherwise law, ship, as defined state existed be- high- signs put have him in the that would In a tween Simmons the defendants. persons to group est risk of incarcerated counsel, colloquy with the district brief Guy’s opinion that commit suicide.” It was grounds on court denied the motion suicide, Simmons, at the time of his was that sufficient evidence existed to submit suffering from an emotional disturbance jury to the the issues of Panati’s and the seriously impaired judgment. Accord- negli- either deliberate indifference and Guy, Simmons therefore constant gence. should have been under observa- expe- have been transferred

tion or should City then called as witnesses Officer The lockup in he have ditiously to a could on Panati and a second officer who was It placed in a cell with other inmates. been lockup precinct at the at the time opinion negli- Guy’s that Panati was he suicide. Panati testified that Simmons’s deliberately failing gent and indifferent signs of suicidal tendencies had seen no Guy take either measure. also attrib- behavior, which had not seemed Simmons’s indifference negligence uted and deliberate to him for an intoxicated detain- abnormal failing, many face of to the officer testified to the ee. The second lockups, years precinct of suicides in speed which the rescue team arrived the clear risk of steps take to diminish following discovery that Simmons had Guy opinion future suicides. was of the hung himself. City, among steps, other should The case then was submitted redesigned lockup permit areas to interrogatories.6 jury speci- special monitoring of detainees and should closer jury, interrogatories, completed were as follows: you of Title 42 U.S.Code the find that under section 1983 1. Indicate whether or not authority Pennsylvania deprive the decedent acted under color of the defendant officer rights. of his constitutional No X Panati Yes Officer A. *12 damages punitive no plaintiff liable to awarded find Panati that it did

fied against the officer. depriving 1983 for section under plaintiff law, state Simmons, color of under arguments, Advancing numerous found, rights. jury The his constitutional judgment notwithstanding for City moved had committed torts however, Panati and, alternative, for a the verdict Pennsylvania law. under against Simmons determined trial. The district court new the further “Yes” to jury responded The failing City, by to raise them City liable un- questions whether 50(a) motion for a di- support of its Rule violating Simmons’s 1983 for der section verdict, these had waived most of rected rights had committed constitutional (1) including: that in order for arguments, Pennsylvania under against Simmons torts against City under section a verdict that the actions jury also found law. stand, jury must first have 1983 to City legal were Panati and of both Panati; (2) against a verdict returned jury harm to Simmons. causes of Panati vio- only jury if the had found that $10,000 wrongful plaintiff awarded rights under lated constitutional Simmons’s $990,000 in survival damages and validly death could it have the color of state law responded legal “No” to the damages. Having City’s actions were a found that the death; (3) recklessly had or question whether Panati cause of Simmons’s Simmons, allege and establish generally had failed injured maliciously Pennsylvania you the defendant officer find that under the law of whether or not 2. Indicate against the decedent. committed torts No_ X Panati Yes Officer A. you find that under section 1983 of Title U.S.Code or not

3. Indicate whether custom, policy, regulation deprived Philadelphia had a defendant rights. decedent of his constitutional No_

Yes _X_ you Pennsylvania that under the law of the defendant whether or not find 4. Indicate against Philadelphia torts the decedent. committed No_ _X_ Yes Question Question you have answered “Yes”in 1 or the defendant officer [if] 5. Indicate for Question city you Question whether or not such answered "Yes” in 3 or or the if have legal any decedent. cause of harm to the defendants’ actions were (a) No_ A. Panati Yes X Officer (b) City Philadelphia No_ Yes X 5(a) "yes” Question you whether or officer if have answered 6. Indicate for the defendant oppressively maliciously, wantonly, done. were not such defendant’s actions No X Yes_ A. Panati Officer any Question (A) you more defendants in make answered “Yes” for one or If damages plaintiff. compensatory here for award of total 10,000 damages Wrongful $ death 990,000 damages $

Survival Question (B) you “Yes” in regard defendant officer if have answered With damages plaintiff. punitive award of for indicate - Officer A. Panati $ guished Philadelphia, Melendez v. negligence under of action for

any causes (1981), (4) although Pa.Super. 466 A.2d 1060 law; Pennsylvania setting prerequisites case out state-law its immu- waived ordinance relationship misconduct, special giving rise to a liability nity from *13 protection special that differ from the of legislature, as by the state statute enacted relationship prerequisites announced in De- Pennsylvania Supreme by the construed Shaney. F.Supp. 728 at 359-60. Properties Upset in In re Sale Court (1989), 230, (Skibo), 560 A.2d 1388 522 Pa. Following district court’s the denial of invalidated that ordinance effectively had trial, City’s j.n.o.v. or a the motion for new immunity from City’s the and reinstated plaintiff damages under Penn- moved for court fur- negligence. The district suit for sylvania 238. The Rule of Civil Procedure properly pre- if even ther concluded plaintiff court these dam- district awarded served, arguments lacked mer- all of these ages, rejecting City’s arguments the that F.Supp. 728 at 354-55. it. plaintiff not entitled to them. was court determined City timely appealed, raising ple- The district The had, directed ver- City in its motion for a arguments reversing thora of for the dis- granting dict, arguments for preserved two denying trict court’s decisions its motion (1) j.n.o.v.: plaintiff had granting its motion for j.n.o.v. for or a new trial and to meet evidence sufficient plaintiff’s request delay damages. failed to adduce for We for indifference standard jurisdiction, pursuant the deliberate to 28 U.S.C. City municipal liability established City’s appeal from the over § v, Harris, 378, 109 S.Ct. 489 U.S. judgment. Canton district court’s final (1989); (2) 103 L.Ed.2d II. THE CITY ENTITLED TO WAS “special relationship” existed no because WITH RESPECT TO PLAIN- J.N.O.V. police, and the Panati Simmons between TIFF’S FEDERAL CLAIMS? City no state-law to Sim- and the had could not be held liable mons and therefore City A. its Inconsisten- Did the Waive F.Supp. at negligence. for cy Objection to the 1983 Ver- § dicts? appeal on that we Supreme Court’s contends analyzing After denial of Canton, must reverse the district court’s holding City in tandem with jury’s testimony j.n.o.v. and the its motion because the statistical evidence respect to Panati con- section 1983verdicts with plaintiff’s experts, the district court fatally inconsistent. The reasonably and the are jury that the could have cluded court erred in failing City argues that the district City, at least found that the inconsistency jury’s failing find properly, had shown train its officers (1) merely negli- was that Panati to the serious medi- verdicts deliberate indifference Simmons, (2) gent in his treatment of but potentially sui- cal needs of intoxicated constitu- detainees, violated Simmons’s thereby violating Sim- cidal City’s con- rights. The crux of the rights.7 at 355-57. tional process due Id. mons’s section the district court’s rejected City’s tention is that court also The district stand in judgment against it cannot reasoning that in De- 1983 argument, state-law in- jury’s finding that Panati light of the County, 489 U.S. Shaney Winnebago v. upon harm Sim- (1989), flicted no constitutional 103 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. City grounds argument mons. The Supreme Court established Chester, Borough relationship and a West custody special Williams creates (3d Cir.1989), in which we duty to detainees. concomitant municipality cannot be concluded that The district court distin- F.Supp. at 359. however, pri- j.n.o.v., court focused jury tion for as to court instructed 7. The district theory municipal policy marily plaintiff’s plaintiffs or custom theo- failure to train both ry theory train weighing sufficiency and her failure to of the evidence. denying liability. opinion mo- In its verdict, general judgment violating ent with the 1983 for section liable under held entered, of a the court shall rights as a result not be but civil shall- individual’s an unless practice one municipal policy for further consideration return primarily employees “is municipality’s or shall order its answers and verdict 1983 itself.” section liable under trial.” new however, plaintiff, According to preserving the prerequisites inconsistency object to required to objection to the right appeal raise on the district jury’s responses to in the under inconsistency of verdicts rendered time interrogatories at the special court’s 49(a) 49(b) subject are the Rules read, responses were so disagreement among the considerable any defect have cured judge could Most, all, although appeals. courts of *14 dismissing jury. to slip prior verdict interpreted pro- appeals courts of have pro- her does not frame Although plaintiff 49(b) resubmitting an in Rule vision terms, in in these she argument cedural interrogatories to inconsistent verdict and prior objection an contends that substance any objection to the jury require to required jury is the dismissal of to findings grounds on the of inconsist- jury’s Rule of Civil Procedure either Federal ency else waived—before the be made—or interrog- 49, special verdicts and governing jury discharged. is 5A J. Moore & J. Lu- atories, construing jurisprudence our 149.04, cas, Moore’s Federal Practice this rule.8 (2d 1991) (compiling ed. 49-62 to 49-64 with provides the district courts Rule 49 cases). agreement among There is far less general jury to the alternatives two basic however, circuits, party on whether a 49(a), governing special ver- Rule verdict. must, 49(a), object prior to the under Rule dicts, may jury a provides that a court perceived inconsisten- jury’s dismissal to a in the form of written return its verdict special cy jury’s responses in the verdict concerning responses separate questions Jean, interrogatories. v. See Bates 49(b) dispute.9 in Rule the factual issues 1146, (7th Cir.1984) (generally F.2d may employ court the some- provides that a circuits); Note, among noting conflict Re- procedure requesting what different Special solving Inconsistencies in Federal jury general return a verdict that a both Verdicts, L.Rev. 1100-01 53 Fordham interrogatories con- respond to written (1985)(surveying conflicting circuit law cerning upon determinations the factual preserving requirements an ob- rests.10 Whereas Rule which that verdict rendered un- jection to inconsistent verdicts 49(a) subject of inconsisten- is mute on the 49(a)). der Rule verdicts, 49(b) cy jury’s special Rule circuit, probably In is neces “[wjhen in- provides the answers [to circuits, majority of the sary, as it is terrogatories] are inconsistent with each jury’s prior ineonsist- to raise to the dismissal and one or more is likewise other might properly appears special findings concluded several 8. The district court to have evidence; pleadings objection putative under the waived its be made that the inconsistency may jury's method of submit- verdicts or it use such other section 1983 requiring ting find- failed to the issues and the written for the different reason that the appropriate. objection ings a di- thereon as it deems most reference this in its motion for pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil rected verdict 49(b) provides: 10.Fed.R.Civ.P. F.Supp. at As I Procedure 50. See 728 infra, jurisprudence Rule it is our under may jury, together discuss submit to the The court opposed my opinion verdict, to Rule that in general appropriate a with forms for governs waiver in this instance. interrogatories upon written one or more is- necessary of which is sues of fact the decision 49(a) provides pertinent part: 9. Fed.R.Civ.P. give expla- such to a verdict. The court shall may necessary only may require jury a nation or instruction as court a to return jury special special enable the both to make answers to the in the form of a written verdict general interrogatories dict, finding upon and to render a ver- each issue of fact. In that event jury ques- may jury and the court shall direct the both submit to the written the court general susceptible categorical make answers and to render or other brief written tions may verdict. written forms of the answer or submit finding upon each special written issue inconsistency of the “a on objection based contrast, findings the written of fact.” supporting interrogatories answers 49(b). requested from the that the district court under Rule rendered general verdict Co., jury example, “Indicate whether or Refining v. Walker Sinclair See —for Cir.1963) you Pennsyl- that under the law of (3d (holding that find 302, 305 F.2d Philadelphia vania the defendant judgment court’s reversal of district against torts the decedent”— unwarranted, notwithstanding possible con- committed answers, require combining seem to conclusions interrogatory be- tradiction law, thereby constituting spe- with raised before facts was not cause contradiction verdict. The district general cies of court’s appeal); or on Scott district court cf however, (3d Cir.1981) jury, questions to the do not seem Plante, 124-25 49(b), strictly comprise, under Rule object to form of (where defendants did not interrogatories upon ... issues ver- “written interrogatories either before or after request general for a they together fact” argue appeal dict and did not verdict, commonly responses at least as that term thereby, jury’s prejudiced were whereby defined as verdict read with a view interrogatories must be “[a] reconciliation), plaintiff or for the finds either for the vacated on their toward general terms.” Law 102 S.Ct. defendant Black’s 458 U.S. grounds, other *15 (6th 1990). clear, (1982). Dictionary 1560 ed. 3474, It is 73 L.Ed.2d 1362 that, however, preserve in order posed by juxtaposing the The conundrum necessary in it is not objection appeal, on 49, Rule district court’s verdict sheet with party, prior to the district circuit for a this however, apparent more than real. We is jury, lodge an of the court’s dismissal held, explicitly, implicitly if not special verdicts inconsistency objection to 49(a) may, like special verdicts under Rule 49(a). Malley- under Rule See rendered by jury in this findings rendered Insur Associates v. Crown & Life Duff case, findings of fact that actual- constitute 133, (3d Cir.) Co., 144-45 F.2d ance 734 legal conclusions. ly factual with blend rendered under (distinguishing verdicts 3, See, at 144 n. Malley-Duff 734 F.2d e.g., 49(a) under from verdicts rendered Rule interrogatories (jury’s responses 145 that, 49(b) in the case of a holding Rule party example, whether one asking, for 49(a), appel Rule rendered under verdict contractual “tortiously interfered” with the precluded absence late review is not “conspired with the rights another or discharge jury), cert. objection before injury upon the intent to inflict specific 1072, 564, denied, 83 105 S.Ct. 469 U.S. gov- special verdicts plaintiff” constituted (1984). to ascertain 505 In order L.Ed.2d 49(a)); Scott, F.2d at 124 erned Rule asserting correct plaintiff is whether interrogatories con- responses to (jury’s inconsistency City has waived its example, proximate causation cerning, for necessary to deter objection, it therefore deprived of plaintiff been and whether jury’s verdict was ren mine whether the in- “special verdict process constituted due 49(a) 49(b). or under Rule dered Brodin, Accuracy, also terrogatories”); see Accountability in the Lit- juxtaposing Efficiency, Unfortunately, simply the Fact Case jury igation in this Process—The to the verdict sheet submitted for 15, (discuss- Verdict, 85-87 U.Cin.L.Rev. case, at 1053 n. supra see Nugget Hotel & v. Golden little on Simone language Rule 49 sheds Cir.1988), (3d Casino, as F.2d 1031 questions court’s whether the district special verdicts 49(a) employing example of case under Rule special verdicts frame facts, each “ultimate” dispute into general to divide interrogatories accompanying a requires legal, as well 49(a) actually 49(b). Rule de- which under Rule verdict determination).11 factual, permits as as a special verdict that scribes the the drafters 49(a) porates distinctions drawn Although appears prescribe Rule among nature, “three Rules of Evidence the Federal findings purely one that are factual 'ultimate, intermediate categories facts: analyst that it incor- of the Rule has concluded j.n.o.v. prior decisions it is clear contention that it was entitled to our Under determining ground. verdict has this 49(b), opposed Rule as rendered under been Alleged B. The Inconsistency 49(a), need not limit its a court to Rule Verdicts; Requisites Estab- interrog specific form inquiry to the lishing a Municipality’s Direct Lia- the four corners of within atories framed bility Policy or Custom and my opinion, prior In our sheet. the verdict Train; (More On) Failure to look, must make clear that we decisions Waiver rather, totality of the district court’s instructions, determining Alleged Inconsistency whether the court 1. The jury, verbally instructed the either or in of the Verdicts writing, general finding make a for the contending, Williams, based on defendant, in addition to or the jury’s F.2d at section 1983 See, findings ultimate facts. of actual or inconsistent, verdicts must be viewed as Shaper e.g., McLaughlin v. Fellows Gear argues employ- in essence that an (in Co., (3d Cir.1986) F.2d n. 2 primary liability ee’s for a constitutional determining jury rendered verdict un prerequisite municipal liability tort is a 49(b), der Rule court looked to district for a arising constitutional violation either expressed jury intent that the con court’s policy from a or custom or from a failure to form its verdict to the framework of Rule train. The district court concluded that 49(b)); by Brooks v. Astra Phar Stanton argument, properly preserved, even if Products, maceutical 574-75 groundless. In arriving at this conclu- (3d Cir.1983) (in concluding ren sion, emphasized the district court the Su- 49(b), opposed dered verdict under Rule preme holding Monell, Court’s 436 U.S. instructions, 49(a), district court’s 2037-38, gov- 98 S.Ct. at that local *16 49(b), cohered with the mandate of Rule bodies, erning although subject not to re- determinative). were spondeat superior liability, may be sued case, interrogatories directly sub under section 1983 for constitution- jury strikingly injuries arising mitted to the are similar to al implementation from the interrogatories that municipal policies this court has decided of or customs. In the comprised special view, interrogatories verdict jury separately district court’s 49(a). Compare supra under Rule at 1053 ascertained Panati’s City’s and the section 6, Malley-Duff, n. with 734 F.2d at 144 liability although n. 1983 and concluded 3; Scott, important F.2d negligently 641 at More Panati served as a causal con- however, ly, I expressed can discern no duit of injury, City, through Simmons’s custom, intent on the of the district court—in policy, training proce- its own or jury dures, its directly instructions or otherwise—that the with deliberate indif- —and jury should conform the verdict in this case ference—violated Simmons's constitutional 49(b). conclude, therefore, to Rule rights. F.Supp. at 357. The district special governed rendered verdicts court thus concluded that suffi- 49(a) and that the ciently need not Rule established the section 1983 objected, prior liability have to the dismissal of the showing without that Panati —or jury, any inconsistency in these any municipal verdicts other pri- actor—was also preserved, in order to appeal, marily have liable under section 1983. id. See ” Brodin, evidentiary.’ Comment, supra (quot- tiary questions at 85 n. 323 fact and of law.” ing Advisory Special Committee’s Note to Fed.R.Evid. Verdicts: Rule 49 the Federal Rules 401, 183, (1973)). Procedure, 483, According (1965). 56 F.R.D. to a Civil 74 Yale LJ. have, Thus, practice 49(a), second commentator on Rule courts in current under Rule inception, special from its read into typically the Rule the dis- verdict ... is ”[t]he used to "evidentiary" ‘ultimate,’ actual, tinction between dispute and “ultimate” divide the facts,” into facts, "guarantees only such that Rule 49 constituting, with each “ultimate fact” right questions verdict, general directed to the impenetrable latter”— "like the its own is, Brodin, constituting intermingling to the “ultimate” facts "the supra, of law and fact.” (footnotes questions omitted). zone of transition between of eviden- at 85 subject liability to section 1983 as a result appeal with re- reasoning on Plaintiff's policy an official or custom. 436 U.S. at City’s consistency to the merits spect S.Ct. at 2037-38. The Monell from that diverges somewhat contention municipal policy defined a as a Court urges Plaintiff court. the district ordinance, “statement, regulation, or deci municipality’s section predicating adopted officially promulgated by sion municipal employee’s primary liability on a officers.” Id. at body’s governing] local [a statute would contravene liability under 690, 98 S.Ct. at 2036. The Court character in terro- argues, Plaintiff policy. public custom, municipal which lacks the ized rem, adopt Court were that “[i]f “ approval policy, prac ‘such formal rationale, in- any municipality could per tices of state officials ... so [as are] failing liability by merely itself from sulate manent and well settled as to constitute a employees.” Plaintiff’s conten- train its ” usage” “custom or with the force of law.’ bottom, tion, appears to be that no form at Ad Id. (quoting at 98 S.Ct. at 2036 liability under section 1983 municipal Co., Kress ickes S.H. & 398 U.S. liability primary may be conditioned 167-68, 1598, 1613, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 S.Ct. municipali- acting on the individual (1970)). explicating Further the elements ty’s behalf. municipal liability direct under section court’s, plain- City’s, the district 1983, the Monell concluded that “it Court jury’s section varying views of the tiff’s government’s policy is when execution of a symptomatic of their 1983 verdicts are custom, whether made its lawmakers concerning the ele- deeper divergences fairly may or acts those whose edicts in order to that must be established ments represent policy, official inflicts be said municipality liability under sec- subject a entity injury government as an policy or tion 1983 for an unconstitutional Id. responsible.” 98 S.Ct. employees. to train its custom and a failure 2037-38. the verdicts In order to determine whether plaintiff, Monell requires therefore consistent, is, my opinion, neces- are her claim that the in order to establish survey jurisprudence concern- sary to rights by process due violated Simmons’s municipality’s direct predicates to a ing the municipal policy of deliberate means of liability under section 1983. medical needs of indifference to the serious detainees, shown that suicidal must have *17 Municipality’s 2. The Predicates to a either from a de- this indifference resulted Custom, Liability Policy, Direct for a officially adopted promulgated and cision Train or Failure to prac- permanent and well-settled or from a noted, argued trial at As have holding suggests also that tice. Monell’s City Simmons’s constitu- violated establishing the plaintiff, an element of as policy cus- rights by means of its or tional indif- City’s policy custom of deliberate or poten- tom with to intoxicated ference, presented evidence of must have prove In order to tially suicidal detainees. part of lawmakers indifference on the such establish, sought to theory, plaintiff her authority officials with or other have, she must I conclude municipal policy. make infra evinced deliberate indiffer- policy or custom Harris, City Canton 489 U.S. In of medical to these detainees’ serious ence (1989), 378, 1197, 412 103 L.Ed.2d 109 S.Ct. section needs. The elements of Court, relevant in a decision Supreme liability theory under this are rooted 1983 municipal policy or cus- plaintiff’s to both Supreme decisions both in the Court’s train theories tom and failure to City Monell Canton. of municipality’s liability, held that give Monell, can empha- police court officers as the district to train its failure only when sized, al- violation Supreme held that a constitutional Court rise to indiffer- held to deliberate though governments cannot be that failure “amounts local whom rights persons with theory of ence to the of section 1983 on a liable under Id. 109 S.Ct. into contact.” respondeat superior, they may directly come City Court, Canton expand on Monell’s re- how- decisions 1204. The at of establishing direct munici- quirements ever, elements articulated the only partly liability single in the context of a mu- pal indif- necessary the deliberate to establish nicipal to take unconstitutional ac- decision it enunciated. Rath- standard that ference City Can- at 1205. The tion. 109 S.Ct. City of er, emphasizes, City as the of ton Court reasoned only when a mu- Canton in the the standard Court defined by a nicipality’s failure to train is tainted municipality’s de- holding that a negative, to constitutional deliberate indifference train is failure to liberately indifferent to the level rights can that failure rise (1) evidence of presenting established “ is, municipal policy ‘a or custom —that individual; (2) prov- shortcomings of choice to follow a course of ac- deliberate training pro- sound an otherwise among alterna- tion ... made from various negligently adminis- occasionally gram Id. (quoting by city policymakers.” tives’ more, tered; (3) showing, without or Pembaur, 483-84, 475 U.S. at 106 S.Ct. enabled an offi- training would have better 1300). merging the in- Further deliberate injury-causing conduct. cer to avoid the difference standard with Monell’s munici- Id. at 1206. pal policy requirement, or the Court custom the bones of the Placing flesh on some a failure to train “[o]nly held that where City Canton standard, emphasized the reflects a or ‘conscious’ choice ‘deliberate’ by municipality ‘policy’ as defined indifference nexus between deliberate —a prior city our cases —can a be liable custom on municipal policy or which Id.13 1983.” such a failure under the Monell Court § conditioned the direct governmental entity un liability of a local Monell, Canton, City similarly Canton did so der section 1983. require plain- appears therefore that a decision in quoting plurality from the tiff, in order to meet the deliberate indiffer- Cincinnati, 475 U.S. Pembaur v. directly subjecting ence standard for a mu- 469, 106 (1986)— 1292, nicipality liability, 89 L.Ed.2d must S.Ct. to section present trio of scienter-like evidence of indiffer- Supreme in the Court’s first 1292; mind, deliberation, Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 106 S.Ct. at state of definite, reflective, Praprotnik, very St. Louis v. 485 U.S. and even connotes a (1988); Jett v. S.Ct. 99 L.Ed.2d 107 Dallas willful state of mind. District, Independent U.S. School essentially Judge Chief Sloviter asserts that I (1989). "deliberate," S.Ct. 105 L.Ed.2d 598 given weight have “scienter,” undue yoked uneasily element of these judgment, 13. In her concurrence in the Chief Indeed, Judge goes terms. Chief Sloviter so far passage emphasizes an Sloviter additional acknowledge as to claim that I nowhere "that Canton, 1073-74, from discussed infra (i.e. city's liability may policy- be based on the in which the Court observed: maker's) reckless refusal or failure to take ac- may contrary It seem to common sense to count of facts circumstances which re- [of] actually municipality assert that a will have a sponsible individuals should have known." Id. taking steps policy of not reasonable to train *18 reading at I believe that a fair of the 1090. employees. may happen But it its light text, pains following in which I take to distin- assigned specific of the duties to officers indifference, guish by acqui- marked deliberate employees need for more or or training different custom, longstanding practice or escence in a obvious, inadequacy is so and the so decisionmaking from the clear that attends the likely in the violation of to result constitution- municipal policy, simply does formulation of rights, policymakers city al of the can support claim. Whereas I do not think deliberately reasonably be said to have been suggest any point that I at that deliberate indif- indifferent to the need. may disregard a ference not constitute reckless 109 S.Ct. at 1205. circumstances, constitutionally of ever, violative how- agree Judge I with Chief Sloviter that this my opinion my Canton, discussion makes clear passage passages City like the from of Monell, Canton, above, the Pembaur quoted conceptual difficulty marks the of of compel particular- trio the conclusion that it is a thinking municipal policymakers in terms of a conscious, ly type that is inherent in "having policy being wilfull of recklessness a intentional of the deliberate indifference standard. For this reason, deprivations ‘indifferent’ to of constitutional Judge rights.” Judgment I conclude that Chief Sloviter’s De- Concurrence in at 1089. reading emphasizes virtually oxymoron— “indiffer- of Canton liberate of indifference — indifference, uneasily yokes heedlessness, ence” to the exclusion of the word "deliberate” which connotes yoked. thoughtlessness, and the absence to which it is

1061 that, although purposes policymak- determined of particular a of ence on requirement liability municipal a 1983 Such section Monell’s policymakers.14 or er City’s conten- support the policy requirement tend to or custom “was intend would Williams, primary tion, on distinguish municipality based acts of the ed to a mu- person namely, actual liability of an employees,” from acts of unconstitutional — holding to predicate a nicipal employee diffusely actions cannot be attributed a —is under section 1983. It municipality liable a municipality entity. as an abstract 475 Supreme Court’s necessary to look to is 479, (emphasis 106 at 1298 U.S. at S.Ct. Pembaur, beginning with trio of cases Instead, original). “expressly Monell envi Monell, however, as to determine municipal liability sec sioned” that under suggest, in opinion and Canton both that predicated would on official tion 1983 be present scienter- requires a fact by legislators or policies established specific mu- like evidence with may or edicts “other officials ‘whose acts ” an element of es- nicipal policymakers as fairly represent policy.’ said to official be deliberately policy, indifferent tablishing a 480, (quoting Mo Id. at 106 S.Ct. at custom, to train. or failure 694, 2037-38). nell, 436 U.S. at 98 S.Ct. at trio, plurality concluded that Pembaur, in this The Pembaur the first case Court, authority has the plurality opinion, whether an official Supreme tion, excluding plaintiffs argue judgment, where Chief those In her concurrence in the 14. my Judge defendants should have known of it." Id. issue with Sloviter takes considerable analy- Judge and in the I note that Chief Sloviter use of the term "scienter" here Judgment, grounds equation See this fear in the of "scienter” sis that follows. Concurrence 1089, Following infra, careful re- 1089-91. with "intent” in the discussion of tortious mis term, however, flection, Keeton, representation to use the be- I chose actions in Prosser & 107, generally (5th 1984), some cause I believe that it connotes Law Torts at 741-43 ed. § of " culpable al, asserting suggests of mind of an identified individu- state ‘scienter’ this basis ... diffusely opposed an attitude attributa- prove as an intentional course of ac the need entity distinction Judgment ble to an abstract social that, This tion.” Concurrence in at 1089. —a infra, reading "scienter," believe that as I discuss view of the semantics of narrow however, of the Pemb- Monell and Canton in is controverted the considerable compels. aur trio range meanings to the term in our attributed CBS,Inc., See, jurisprudence. e.g., Berda v. own my specifically, I believe that consistent More 20, (3d Cir.1989) (to claim “like,” maintain 881 F.2d qualification well as of “scienter" with Pennsylva misrepresentation for tortious under contextually my attempt to cabin constant establish, law, alia, plaintiff must inter meanings, nia "‘scienter, range possible makes of the term’s may be either actual knowl by my usage intend to ex- clear that I do not edge falsity representation, meaning truth of of the scope of the clude from the of scienter’s matter, ignorance falsity deliberately reckless municipal policymaker’s indifferent to know is policy mere false information where acquiescence a custom or of inade- special though imposed circum training employees, "the ... reason quately even omitted), stances’”) (emphasis training [very] added and citation more or different need for obvious, 879, denied, 1062, likely U.S. 110 S.Ct. inadequacy [quite] rt. and the ce (1990); Eisenberg Gagnon, rights.” 107 L.Ed.2d 962 violation of constitutional result in the (3d Cir.) ("[A] showing Canton, 109 S.Ct. at 1205. 489 U.S. at context, Indeed, my is sufficient to establish scienter use of recklessness read in I think Exchange Securities Act of obviously comprehends a claim under [the "scienter-like” denied, 10(b).”), 474 U.S. cert. meaning 1935] § Chief “ of "scienter” that shade of (1985); wit, In re Com S.Ct. 88 L.Ed.2d 290 rightly emphasizes ‘the defen- Sloviter —to Co., plaint F.2d Bankers Trust knowledge cause which previous dant’s 1984) (whereas of, (3d of es scienter element injury complained rather his Cir. led to the may tablishing misrepresentation fraudulent knowledge previous of a state of facts which *19 showing or proven “either intent guard against, in India duty and his omission to was his representations expect will be that the injury complained reason to which has led to to do ” person they upon by were infra, to whom Judgment, at 1090 acted Concurrence in of.’ made,” satisfy (5th can scien- mere false information Dictionary 1207 ed. (quoting Black’s Law Pennsylvania component in where 1979)). ter clearly imposed). we my Because know acknowledged use of "scien- I therefore also believe may encompass that "scienter" Sloviter susceptible, as Chief is not ter” fears, indifference, types as well as actual of reckless misreading would limit section a entirely justified knowledge, I believe that I am plaintiffs can show where cases "to those 1983 using context. depriva- the term in this in knew of the constitutional defendants 1062 materials, including positive and local policy is state municipality’s official

formulate a ‘ law, usage” at 106 S.Ct. as well “custom or hav- Id. a matter of state law. [as] ” ing the force of law.’ Id. 109 S.Ct. at at 1300. (citation Second, omitted). once the 2723 Praprotnik, 485 U.S. City St. Louis court has identified the relevant district (1988), L.Ed.2d 107 108 S.Ct. policymakers, must determine trio, in the confirmed the second decision have, through whether these individuals on Pembaur’s conclusion expanded decisions, deprivation their “caused the municipal policy cannot be estab- that a rights by policies which affirma- issue attending evidence of scienter lished absent tively by acqui- command that it occur or decisionmaking particular officials. in longstanding practice escence a or cus- Court, Supreme once Praprotnik, In operat- tom which constitutes ‘standard opinion, noted that Mo- again plurality a ing procedure’ governmental the local is animated the awareness nell (citation omitted). Jett, entity.” In Id. only through can act “governmental bodies therefore, Supreme Court held that and reiterated Pemb- persons” natural plaintiff alleges even when a that a munici- directly subjecting a mu- aur ’s criteria for pal practice, opposed custom or liability.15 nicipality to section 1983 Id. municipal policy, a constitutional worked Praprotnik plurality The S.Ct. at 923. deprivation, plaintiff identify must both firmly rejected argument that munici- policymaking officials with ultimate author- broadly pal policymakers should be defined ity question in the and adduce scien- area other than those on include officials acqui- this case ter-like evidence—in specifically policy- confers whom state law them. escence—with making authority in the area at issue. Id. plurality emphasized also reading my opinion, In Monell and juries it should be left to to decide Canton of the Pembaur trio re subject which officials’ decisions should inconsistency in solves the ostensible liability. municipality to section 1983 Id. jury’s section 1983 verdicts this case and court’s, City’s, reveals that the district Independent In Jett v. Dallas School plaintiff’s differing perspectives on District, 491 U.S. 109 S.Ct. employee liability prerequisite is a (1989), L.Ed.2d the final in the case establishing municipality’s section 1983 trio, positions in plurality Pembaur and liability, although ultimately incomplete, Praprotnik finally acquired the status of a complementary, mutually are rather than Jett, majority opinion. In which was decid- exclusive. I believe district court shortly ed judice before case sub went reasoning are correct trial, majority Supreme Court plaintiff need not have established deliber approved foregoing teachings of Pemb- part ate indifference Panati. Praprotnik aur and and held that there Further, I believe that the is correct preconditions municipality’s are two to a plaintiff, First, insofar as it contends that in or liability ultimate under section 1983. prove municipal policy der to either her identify the district court must the officials governmental theory, custom or her failure to train must poli- bodies that have final cymaking authority govern- for the local have adduced evidence of scienter on the assertedly municipal my opinion, ment for a of a actor. liable constitutional however, trio, by “[rjeviewing legal violation the relevant under the Pembaur and Jett Third, 15. Praprotnik plurality succinctly particular whether a official has "final summa- rized Pembaur’s criteria as follows: policymaking authority” question is a of state First, Fourth, may challenged municipalities ... be held liable law. action must have only § under municipality for acts for which the pursuant policy adopted been taken to a actually responsible, itself is responsible the official or officials under state is, municipality "that acts which the has offi- city’s making policy law for in that area of the Second, only cially sanctioned or ordered." business. municipal poli- those officials who have “final (citations Id. S.Ct. at omitted and em- cymaking authority" may by their actions sub- phasis original). *20 ject government liability. to § 1983 case, scienter-type evidence particular, municipality’s in alleged unconsti- a adduced with policy must have been tutional or custom of inadequately caring the district high-level official determined for suicidal detainees and its deliber- court, law, in with to have accordance local ate indifference in failing to train officers in policymaking authority final the areas dealt who with them. The issue in Panati, question.16 Because a low-levelem- plaintiffs Williams pro- could ployee, primary is not the actor whose ceed to trial on their section 1983 claim liability section 1983 must have been estab- against municipality in the face in- predicate subjecting lished as a substantial evidence of any violation of the liability policy to section 1983 for a or cus- rights decedent’s constitutional train, tom or a failure to I find no inconsist- hands of police the defendant officers or ency in jury’s section 1983 verdicts in plaintiffs otherwise. Id. this case.17 plaintiff Williams—in contrast to in this alleged case—neither nor adduced evi- analysis prereq- I believe that this of the dence to establish that the municipality, establishing municipal policy uisites for a through policies or its deliberate indif- comports or custom and a failure to train ference, directly violated their decedent’s think, jurisprudence. with the relevant I rights.18 constitutional With the first, Id. case foregoing analysis that the is consist- posture, we determined that Williams, ent with our conclusion in based municipality summary judg- was entitled to Heller, Angeles Los 475 U.S. ment, emphasizing the Supreme (1986) Court’s S.Ct. 89 L.Ed.2d 806 holding in curiam), Heller that the (per constitutionality primary liability that the of a police department’s of a regulations municipal employee under is irrel- section 1983—as evant in the opposed primary absence of a liability of an offi- constitutional injury policymaking causally regulations. cial related to authority a those —was Id. prerequisite to liability the section 1983 municipality itself. See 891 F.2d at think, moreover, I my analysis 467. think that our conclusion in the establishing municipal elements of expresses Williams substance our es- policy or custom deliberate indiffer sential determination here absent the ence coheres with our reasoning An conscious decision or deliberate indiffer- Philadelphia, drews v. person, municipali- ence of some natural (3d Cir.1990), which we decided short ty, entity, as an abstract cannot be deemed ly Supreme after the Court announced its engaged in to have a constitutional viola- opinion Andrews, in Jett. In female offi policy, custom, tion virtue of a or a City’s police department cers in the failure to train. brought against a section 1983 action moreover, Williams, posed problem Commissioner, others, among alleg Police distinct from that in this case. department policy had a Williams, plaintiffs predicated a mu- custom of sexual harassment that violated nicipality’s liability, plaintiff as does right equal protec their constitutional intimate, however, 16. I do not intend ence of several officers and officials of actor, municipal liability by may Chester, who Borough be insulated from they of West whom al- immunity, actually some form of leged knowledge had actual of the decedent's must be held liable under section 1983. prior suicidal tendencies as a result of his su- attempts. Although icide 891 F.2d at 465-66. municipali- 17. Because I have concluded that a plaintiffs they submitted an affidavit that ty's liability section conditioned on the expert testimony also would introduce liability municipal high-level of a actor who is a defendants’ deliberate indifference in policymaker, ee, opposed employ- as to a low-level jail the national minimum standards for suicide danger I note that there is no that a munici- prevention, they prior able, contended, adduced no evidence pality will be as has Borough’s jails, theory in the and their suicides liability through failing insulate itself from Borough’s liability plain- employees. contrast to train its —in theory primarily tiffs in this was vica- case— plaintiffs 18. The Williams based their section rious, opposed to direct. Id. at primarily 1983 claim on the deliberate indiffer- *21 1064 Pembaur, theories, the fol- must have established her applied Id. 1471. We tion. to establish the determining lowing. In order the in and Jett

Praprotnik, theory that Simmons’s liability under unconstitution her establishing an of elements a of a munici- as result rights and were violated custom deter policy or municipal al of deliberate indiffer- pal policy or custom be established ab could neither mined that medical needs of intoxi- acqui ence to the serious decisionmaking or conscious sent detainees, suicidal potentially and prac or cated longstanding custom in a escence that officials must shown the Id. plaintiff have policymaker. part of a tice on court to by the district cases, determined type (“even in ‘custom’ 1481 were of responsible policymakers aware a kick delivery of to on the impossible lockups in and of suicides the number municipality] the head inculpate [or them, preventing for but alternatives policymak foot find no fault with the [or pursue deliberately chose not to either jury had found er]”). Because the acquiesced long- in a or these alternatives Commissioner, whom we determined Police standing policy custom of inaction in or was not relevant policymaker, to be the establishing predicate a to regard.20 As 1983, we concluded under section liable theory that violat- her concomitant granted properly had that the district court rights by means of a deliber- ed Simmons’s in that case. j.n.o.v. motion for train, plaintiff ately indifferent failure to Id.19 policy- similarly have shown that such must Monell, makers, of knowing likewise of the number Can sum, In based on deliberately City lockups, in either ton, Court’s Pembaur suicides Supreme training provide not to officers with trio, chose as well as our decisions on Andrews, acquiesced in a prevention or I conclude that suicide and in Williams provid- custom of longstanding practice or subjected plaintiff, in order to discuss, As I training no this area. liability under each of City to section 1983 Court, regard Supreme my analysis of I note in this that that of the elements 19. I note custom, Seiter,-U.S.-, establishing policy municipal or a v. 111 S.Ct. in Wilson train, that, deliberately (1991), recently failure to well as a indifferent held 115 L.Ed.2d cases, appears comport with our decided also prisoner a for a to establish section order Supreme prior to the Court’s decisions Can of confinement violate claim that conditions Jett, concerning requisites stating of ton and prohibition against eighth cruel amendment’s based on a viable claim under section 1983 a punishment, prisoner must and unusual Upper jailhouse Darby v. suicide. In Colburn possessed culpable prison "a show officials Cir.1988), (3d Township, cert. de 838 F.2d 663 wit, deliberate state of indifference. mind”—to nied, S.Ct. 103 L.Ed.2d 489 U.S. infra, at Id. As I discuss deliberate (1989), suggested we that scienter-like evi de- formulated above indifference standard for decisionmaking policy- dence of making termining City, by poli- means of a an essential officials ele constituted custom, cy a constitutional breached establishing alleg a section 1983 claim ment of from this court’s decisions Simmons is derived municipal policy ing tom, or cus an unconstitutional holding pretrial detainees are entitled to at may policy an official arise and held that “ care as the same of medical least level 'super from the informal or omissions acts prisoners entitled are under which convicted (citation visory municipal omitted). Id. at officials.”’ determining eighth In amendment. Colburn, suggested we further presentation evidence re- with scienter-like in order a section 1983 claim establish specific City spect officials constituted arising jailhouse against municipality, a from plaintiffs ac- section essential element premised provide on the failure to suicide and City, principally against relied I have tion adequate training, employees setting Supreme cases forth trio of Court's policymaker’s present of a must evidence establishing municipal prerequisites constitutionally knowledge of a violative inci think, however, Wil- policy custom. arising pattern from inade dent or of incidents holding eighth amendment son ’s in the context quate training. also Id. at 673. Freedman See my supports conclusion further order Allentown, (3d F.2d 1115-16 deliberately City was indiffer- establish that the Cir.1988) (discussing requirements Colburn’s potentially ent to the needs intoxicated stating claim based on a section 1983 detainees, plaintiff must have adduced alleging suicidal jailhouse suicide and violations con the deliberate municipal poli scienter-like indiffer- rights arising evidence from a stitutional cy train). policymakers. specific ence of and a or custom failure *22 ees, my opinion in failed to plaintiff addi- establish this essential “scien- at infra establish, respect ter” element of her section 1983 tionally must with case. The theories, City ground City’s affirm- did not either its motion for a her that the each of j.n.o.v. directed verdict or its motion to take no for on acquiescent or election ative specific plaintiff’s this on part. failure caused one or prevent measures to suicides City appeal— Neither does the contend on neglect officers to Sim- more of its any specificity least with needs, plain- thereby medical mons’s serious —that tiff’s failure to establish this essential injury. causing his constitutional “scienter” element of her case constitutes 3. More on Waiver grounds reversing for the district court’s judgment jury’s against on the verdict it. plaintiff clear from the record that It is requested the district court to deter- in Brenner v. recently emphasized, never We mine, law, City Carpen Local reference to local United Brotherhood of ters, authority (3d Cir.1991), policymaking officials had final 927 F.2d training procedures over the for and the rule well-established that “failure to raise handling in in City police officers of de- an issue the district court constitutes a lockups City argument.” tainees at the time of Sim- waiver We concluded My reversing judgment mons’s death. examination of of the district plaintiff failed theory record also reveals that court on the basis of a showing plaintiffs adduce scienter-like evidence had failed to raise before would (1) chose, consciously longstanding that such officials: contravene this waiver rule. plaintiffs the face of the Because the number suicides also had failed to lockups preventing theory appeal, and the alternatives for raise the issue on we them, preventive training no institute or further concluded that our consideration of measures; (2) acquiesced prac- theory other or in a vitiate requirement would providing turnkeys training Appellate tice of with no of the Federal Rules of Proce suicides, that, preventing or dure and other means de- our own local rules absent spite knowledge past circumstances, in City extraordinary suicides briefs must lockups consequent presented and the likelihood that of all contain statements issues appeal, together supporting argu future suicides occur. The trial tes- for would with Id. timony plaintiff’s expert (citing ments and other wit- and citations. Fed. nesses, 28(a)(1) (3) implied, directly R.App.P. but did not estab- and Third Rule Circuit — lish, 21(l)(A)(d)); see also Institute Scien decisionmaking such conscious or ac- v. Gordon & Breach Sci quiescence specific respon- tific Information Publishers, Inc., ence policymakers. sible note this connec- (3d Cir.1991) (district plaintiff granted tion that moved and was court’s dismissal of permission against plaintiff’s appealable, to withdraw her action one of claims was not challenged, Police Commissioner Sambore before her because dismissal was not supra 28(a)(2)-(4), See required by Fed.R.App.P. any case went to trial. at 1050.21 brief). plaintiff’s where record, however, It also is clear from the argued argued might never before the dis- It that one or more of en- plaintiff, through neglect- preserved trict court that the issues that the has ing identify responsible policymakers compasses particular contention that provide and to evidence of either their deci- failed to establish the “scienter” sionmaking against acquiescence long- or their in a element of her section 1983 case rendering standing practice City, to the train- thus that contention discussed, turnkeys handling appealable. As and the of detain- we Plaintiff, I do not intimate if the district court him as a defendant however, in the action. had determined the Police Commissioner to be to adduce would at least have had responsible policymaker in the areas in through the Commissioner's testimo- evidence— ny question, plaintiff, subject in order knowledge concerning his otherwise— liability, would have had to obtain a verdict decisionmaking acquiescence. his him, against or even to have to name continued custom, policy, employ- or failure to train issue of the to raise the entitled City was ees, Supreme plu- appeal. I think that the Court’s jury’s verdicts consistency of the sufficiency rality Praprot- in Pembaur and challenging the decisions Through nik, jurisprudence motion in its for a di- as well as our own plaintiffs evidence area, j.n.o.v., amply presaged requirements verdict, and its *23 its motion rected City majority. I brief, properly pre- spelled has out the there- the Jett appellate contention, as well. I do not conclude that the has waived the fore served however, judgment the think, argument that either of these conten- district court’s interpreted jury’s against to have en- section 1983 verdict fairly can be on tions plaintiff thereby preserved, to have must be reversed because and compassed, argument plaintiff failed to establish an essential element particular (scienter) the “scienter” element of of her case. to establish failed City. against 1983 case her section the Evidence Sufficiency C. The specificity requirements

Under the Appellate Rule of Procedure of Federal has have concluded that I 21, passing refer plain and Third Circuit Rule preserved its contention that not suffice to issue in a brief will sup ence evidence to tiff adduced insufficient on bring that issue before this court against to claim it. port her section 1983 Colafella, 885 appeal. Lunderstadt v. See at both trial and of the waiver Cir.1989)(brief (3d mention of issue plain F.2d 66 appellate argument levels of suffice, 28(a)(2) Fed.R.App.P. under did not “scien- tiff failed to establish essential (4), appeal); on present case, & to issue Jackson additionally of her I ter” element University Pittsburgh, 826 F.2d 230 weighing sufficiency conclude (3d Cir.1987) (same). In Frank v. Colt evidence, (1) we must assume: (3d Cir.1990), Industries, more 910 F.2d 90 responsible City policymaker some over, squarely addressed the issue we year each aware of the number of suicides general arguments raised before City lockups availability and of the appeal alternatives, the district court and on were suffi training and other such as specific theory cient to frame a of the case changes specific physical feature su previously officers, the defendant had like icide-prevention directives for that, although presented. (2) concluded them; We ly prevent policy that this to previ was conceivable that the defendant’s makers) deliberately take either chose to incorporated his arguments logically acquiesced ous preventive no measures or in a impor theory, “[particularly where new longstanding practice or custom of inaction complex present issues of law are tant and respect prevention of suicides in with ed, exposition argu a far more detailed I City lockups. believe that were we required preserve an issue.” Id. ment is weigh sufficiency of the evidence as to 28(a)(4)). Fed.R.App.P. (citing at 100 plain these two scienter-like elements of against City, 1983 claim tiff’s section Further, I extraor can ascertain no would, effect, permit City, we under circumstances, Brenner, dinary see challenge of its to the sufficien rubric justify reversing the dis F.2d at evidence, cy of the to raise the issue wheth denial of the motion for trict court’s these elements er has established j.n.o.v., plaintiff’s failure to estab based very theory appealabili of her case—the lish an essential element of her section rejected ty that I have as inconsistent with against City. As I have 1983 case rules of waiver and our well-established noted, 1062, Jett, the final supra see appellate procedure. trio, Supreme case in the Court’s Pembaur my inquiry therefore is shortly before this case went The focus of was decided remaining “duty” If the decision alone was not narrowed trial. Jett plaintiff’s case. put on notice of the “causation” elements sufficient to establishing question essential requirements for a believe that scienter asked, respect plaintiff’s municipal premised section 1983 case on a must be (1991); custom and failure to 115 L.Ed.2d 997 municipal policy or Common- City’s liability, Russell, theories of the wealth Bank & Trust Co. v. train (3d Cir.1987), is sufficient to estab- govern- whether the evidence F.2d a local City policymakers’ chosen entity duty lish that the protect mental has no indi- instituting acquiescent course no suicide custody who are not in viduals from either (1) rose to the prevention measures level self-inflicted violence violent acts of of its constitutional to intoxi- a breach persons who are not acting officials under potentially suicidal cated and detainees that the color of state law. (2) caused Simmons’s suicide. pretrial detainees such as Because The evidence with to these however, custody, Simmons are in it is

remaining plaintiff’s elements of section municipality clear that a has a constitution *24 against City clearly 1983 case must be duty provide quantum al them some with weighed in highly a deferential manner. In protection. of care and In Up Colburn v. determining whether the district court 663, (3d per Darby Township, 838 F.2d 668 denying judg erred in motion for Cir.1988), denied, 1065, cert. 489 U.S. 109 notwithstanding ment the section 1983 ver 1338, (1989) (“Col- S.Ct. 103 L.Ed.2d 808 dict, “we must review the record I”), surveyed jurisprudence burn we non-moving par most favorable to the concerning rights pre the constitutional ty judgment ‘affirm the of the ... and prisoners.22 trial detainees and convicted denying district court unless motion[] This court concluded that detainee is “[a] critically the record is deficient of the mini entitled under the Due Process Clause of quantum mum of evidence from which a to, the Fourteenth Amendment at a mini ” jury might reasonably afford relief.’ mum, protection personal no less for secur Mausoleums, Inc., Kinnel v. Mid-Atlantic ity prisoners than that afforded convicted 958, (3d Cir.1988) (citation 850 F.2d 961 under the Fourteenth Amendment and no omitted); Township v. see also Clark less a level of medical care than that re Falls, 611, Cir.1989) (3d 890 F.2d 617 quired prisoners by for convicted (same). Eighth Amendment.” Id. Our conclusion concerning Colburn constitutional Determining 1. Standards for Whether rights pretrial encompassed detainees Breached a Constitutional determination, see, previous e.g., our Bor Duty Potentially to Intoxicated and Kozakiewicz, 468, (3d 833 F.2d ing v. 471 Suicidal Detainees Cir.1987), denied, 991, cert. U.S. 1298, (1988); inquiry sufficiency of 99 L.Ed.2d 508 into the S.Ct. Inmates Pierce, City, by means of a v. 612 F.2d Allegheny the evidence that the Jail 754, (3d Cir.1979); Frame, municipal policy or custom or a failure ade Norris v. 1183, officers, (3d Cir.1978), quately breached a 585 F.2d that the to train its po imposes duty constitutional to intoxicated and fourteenth amendment on local governmental pro tentially duty such as Sim actors the same suicidal detainees pretrial poses complex questions, because the vide medical care for detainees that mons eighth imposes inflict amendment re injury directly to the victim was not acting spect prisoners: of state to convicted not ed officials under color “[ajcts Supreme engage decision to or omissions sufficient law. Under the Court’s 1005-06, ly as well harmful to evidence deliberate indiffer DeShaney, 109 S.Ct. decisions, ence to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. as our own see Brown v. Gra 292, bowski, (3d Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 S.Ct. 922 F.2d 1113-16 Cir. — U.S. —, (1976). 1990), denied, 111 S.Ct. 50 L.Ed.2d cert. Cir.1991) II"), I, (3d we district court’s 946 F.2d 1017 In Colburn we vacated the CColburn alleging recently dismissing had adduced in- action held order a section 1983 sufficient evidence of either the custodian’s or that deliberate indifference municipality’s indifference to sur- municipality prison caused the deliberate and a custodian summary judg- jailhouse plaintiffs vive the defendants’ motion for decedent. suicide However, Upper Darby Township, ment. in Colburn careful pretrial detainees must be took note of class of I, court In Colburn range reasoning guess wide Partridge v. not to second “[t]he Wisdom’s Houston, calls’ that meet constitutional ‘judgment Police Two Unknown Officers of (5th Cir.1986), 1182, 1187 are con- statutory requirements 791 F.2d [and] “ duty, ‘had at a defendants municipal outside of the Judicial fided to officials minimum, deliberately to be indiffer- Branch of Government.” ” of a serious medical needs ent’ Bell, Supreme Court considered F.2d 663. pretrial detainee. 838 suicidal constitutionality of conditions of psychologi- for that the need concluded We pretrial confine- resulting from restrictions may amount to psychiatric treatment cal determined that when ment. The Court need, particularly when serious medical dep- involve conditions or restrictions such tendencies. from suicidal that need arises liberty under the fourteenth rivations of F.2d at Partridge, 791 (quoting at 669 Id. amendment, restrictions the conditions or Pierce, at 763 1187); see also only they if constitutionally violative are deliber- (holding v. Gamble’s that Estelle punishment of the detainee. constitute applies evalu- standard ate indifference at 1872. The Bell U.S. at 99 S.Ct. psycholog- adequacy of ating constitutional balancing in substance established Court pretrial psychiatric provided care ical or determining whether confinement test *25 suffering prisoners and convicted detainees pretrial punish or restrictions a conditions illnesses). from mental Bell, a court must deter- detainee. Under and the relat light I Colburn or mine a confinement condition whether rights of concerning the jurisprudence ed weighing the evi- punitive by restriction is detainees, I think that the basic pretrial punish, purpose- dence that it is intended to in determin applied that must be standard less, arbitrary against possibility City breached a constitu ing whether the legit- incident of some other that it is “an poten duty tional toward intoxicated purpose,” such as governmental imate by means of a mu tially suicidal detainees pre- “maintaining security and institutional plain is that which nicipal policy or custom 538, 546, at serving internal order.” Id. attempted to meet: whether the tiff has 1873, 1878. S.Ct. at deliberately indifferent to the ser City was conclude, as did the Fifth Circuit needs of this class of detaine ious medical in context of a sec Partridge, in standard, however, applying this es.23 In alleging municipal 1983 action a cus tion necessary that it is to consider I believe policy indifference to tom or of deliberate municipal officials often have to make pre the serious medical needs of suicidal concerning decisions institutional difficult detainees, incorpo necessary it is trial re security, as well as the allocation of rate into the deliberate indifference stan safety great of the sources to ensure the consideration, balancing dard the derived municipal citizens. As the est number Bell, intervening legit from whether “an emphasized in Supreme Court Bell Wolf objective” exists for a 520, 562, 1861, 1886, governmental imate ish, 441 99 S.Ct. U.S. decision, or an act tantamount to a deci (1979), 60 L.Ed.2d 447 a court faced with sion, provide resources to determining municipal not to allocate whether officials duty for the needs of this class of detainees.24 breached a constitutional I, particular response plaintiffs know of the vulnera- know or should 23. In Colburn allegations knowledge cedent, tical, obligation bility individual defendants had to suicide of an inmate ... an tendencies of her de- of the suicidal to that not to act with reckless indifference functionally court arrived at a iden- vulnerability.” F.2d at 669. articulated, differently if stan- somewhat determining individual defen- dard for whether judgment, Chief 24. In her concurrence in the duty have breached a constitutional to- dants reading Judge of Bell— Sloviter criticizes this context, particular detainee. In that we ward balancing Partridge's to Bell's and of reference although cannot be held that placed "custodial officials legitimate countervailing gov- consideration of a position guaranteeing in the that in- Judg- objective. ernmental See Concurrence suicide,” fourteenth mates will not commit ment, infra, at Chief Sloviter 1091-92. imposes amendment on such officials "who Bell, see Partridge, 1187; determining F.2d at standard for whether a munici- (“A pality has at court must breached a duty 99 S.Ct. constitutional U.S. policy a result of a or custom pretrial disability inattention decide whether [of needs, to detainees’ medical is purpose one of delib- imposed for the is detention] City Canton, erate indifference. Under an incident or whether it is but punishment necessary therefore to determine legitimate governmental pur- of some other there is the minimum quantum of pose.”).25 support evidence in the record to overarching theory Like her conclusion of the duties as- rights by violated Simmons’s constitutional signed responsible to officers detaining policy custom with means of a persons, turnkeys intoxicated in partic- potentially needs of suicidal the medical ular, “the need for more or different train- detainees, closely plaintiffs theory related obvious, so inadequacy and the so [was] rights violated Simmons’s likely to result in the violation of constitu- failing through to train officers to de- rights, tional policymakers may implicate tect and to meet those needs city reasonably be said to have been [could] extra-judicial concerning decisions institu- deliberately indifferent to the need.” security, safety municipal tional citi- S.Ct. zens, and resource allocation. I therefore In order for this court to sustain balancing think that the consideration of jury’s section 1983 against verdict intervening governmental interest also must, City, my opinion, the record applied weighing sufficiency must only contain evidence of the breach plaintiff’s evidence that breach- duty of a constitutional toward a class of failing ed constitutional to train detainees, but also must contain evidence its officers. *26 sufficient to establish that the breach of supra see discussed, I As have at 1060- duty causally was related to the violation 61, determining the standard for whether rights. of Simmons’s constitutional With municipality has breached a constitutional plaintiff’s policy or custom theo officers, failing ry, to train its inquiry like the the central is whether believe, therefore, legitimate asserts that "the reference in Bell to I that the distinction be- Bell, petitioning pretrial tween in which ‘governmental objective’ merely was to ascertain detainees claimed that the conditions of their imposed pretrial whether the conditions de- confinement violated their fourteenth amend- ‘punishment.’” tainees amount See id. at case, liberty rights, ment and this in which emphasizes, 1091. As Chief Sloviter al- plaintiff claims that Simmons’s conditions of though the Bell Court concluded that conditions confinement violated his fourteenth amendment punishment of confinement do not constitute if life, rights liberty to both is a distinction "reasonably those conditions are related to only material one difference. That differ- 539, legitimate [governmental] goal,” 441 U.S. at ence, infra, which I discuss at note concerns 1874,1 apply balancing 99 S.Ct. at Bell's consid- weight governmental the possess, that a interest must determining eration in the context of legitimate, order to when the conditions of confinement are tainted delib- deprivation alleged fourteenth amendment erate indifference to a detainee’s serious medi- life itself. However, cal needs. I believe that the Bell Bell, 441 U.S. at S.Ct. at balancing Court’s articulation of this considera- balancing Supreme Court articulated the consid- conclusion, compels my tion in the context of a "legitimate governmental purpose” eration of a challenge similar fourteenth amendment evaluating constitutionality in the context of confinement, constitutionality of conditions pretrial of conditions of confinement "that im- that confinement conditions cannot be con- against plicate only protection deprivation sidered to be tainted deliberate indifference liberty process due Id. at without of law.” if, having considered the serious medical needs added). (emphasis S.Ct. at When pretrial having of suicidal detainees and taken conditions of confinement affect serious medi- needs, steps all reasonable to address those implicate process protections cal needs and against due that,

government policymakers determine due itself, deprivation of life I believe security, discipline, institutional or other governmental purpose, that a in order to be reasons, weighty including prohibitive- fiscal legitimate, may relatively have to be more ness, they simply protect weighty necessary can do no more to would in the context than be liberty. deprivation these unfortunate detainees from themselves. of a in- toward Simmons deliberate indifference quantum minimum contains record Plaintiff, rather, sought to es- dividually. con- jury could which from evidence showed deliber- at trial deliberate or tablish City policymakers’ clude intoxi- toward the class of physical ate indifference to make election not acquiescent pretrial suicidal de- potentially ex- cated and City lockups, for alterations feature belonged and Simmons tainees specific procedures institute ample, or to indifference toward the that this deliberate suicides were averting detainee aimed injury to Sim- a constitutional class caused a violation “moving force” behind Monell, individually. mons rights. constitutional Simmons’s 2038. With 98 S.Ct. at 436 U.S. exemplifies comparison A statistical brief theory, train failure to plaintiff’s respect to in the inherent the error —and the same eviden- inquiry, from central misplaced em- extent the some dissent’s— failure to “the standpoint, is whether tiary probability that an individu- phasis on the training actually ... proper provide will, in the absence intoxicated detainee al Canton, injury. Simmons’s cause[d]” suicide, measures, preventive commit at 1205. S.Ct. by the injury than on the suffered rather potentially suicidal of intoxicated and class Evidence With Sufficiency of the 2. The previously whole.26 As detainees as a Municipal Plaintiff’s Respect to noted, City essentially suggests Policy Allegation Custom municipali- prove can that a that a the seri- deliberately indifferent to question ty was the outset that I note at detainee medical needs of a suicidal the minimum ous record contains whether the showing relatively high only by from which the of evidence quantum that each member of City probability existed conclude reasonably could As I class would commit suicide. to the serious relevant deliberately indifferent City’s argument, even evi- potentially understand the intoxicated and medical needs of among the yearly suicides itself to a mis- dence of lends suicidal detainees 19,500 persons detained approximately of harm probability placed emphasis public intoxication misplaced year each detainee. That individual a constitu- might not suffice to establish exemplified by the seem- emphasis is intoxicated injury tional to an individual compelling argument ingly *27 suicide, probability committed because detainee who extremely small statistical Simmons, no more than a particular intoxi- there would have been 1% (.00015%) I of harm to this detainee. detainee, attempt probability to commit would cated however, evidence, think, constitutionally if that it is suicide, even viewed plaintiff’s could, City without tak- untenable that the deferentially, cannot sufficient to estab- be measures, permit ing preventive 200 indi- deliberately indiffer- City that the lish every each and ar- viduals to kill themselves medical needs. This ent to his serious police however, temporary detention year the mark. Plain- while gument, misses public intoxi- City for the minor infraction not that the showed tiff’s contention is Weis, dissent, City, urges quantum evidence exists to Judge of the like the minimum support 26. In his reasonably jury’s determination that Simmons’s City be found to could not causally policymak- related to deliberately be- suicide was indifferent have been cause, 97,141 persons to the serious medi- arrested ers’ deliberate indifference out of a total of intoxication, potentially suicidal public percentage rate of cal needs of intoxicated "a whether, Dissent, question to be at detainees. I take this committed suicide. .00015” infra Weis, totality injury weighing the constitutional Judge the sufficien- of the 1092-93. detainees, evidence, group by cy similarly questions the entire of such "whether suffered city acquiescent any election of serious the deliberate the decedent had demonstrated Dissent, preven- policymakers other suicide at As I to take no 1094. medical need.” infra follows, instituting directives than I find that this tion measures discuss in the text that length, Judge quotes see apparent— Weis at even from which Dissent, focus on the statistical —or constituted deliberate in- probability particular detain- at 1093 that a intoxicated infra causally contributed to Sim- the fun- difference that ee commit suicide misconceives would determining question mons’s suicide. damental whether the

1Q71 say (1) is it would City policymakers cation. This not to be were aware of constitutionally impermissible City, for the average number of occurring suicides of costs other factors relat- result year (2) each in City lockups, and knew ing legitimate countervailing govern- to a prevention the suicide measures testified to interest, relatively mental to tolerate some by plaintiffs experts. With the ease in this I yearly smaller number of suicides.27 sim- posture, question, therefore, is whether “ ply emphasize that an exclusive focus on ‘critically record is deficient of the ” probabilities of individual harm masks the quantum minimum of evidence’ from that, reality group across the entire of in- which the reasonably could have con- detainees, predictable toxicated number cluded that the City policymakers failure of of actual individuals will kill themselves any preventive take of those measures year each aas result of suicidal tendencies amounted to deliberate indifference to the have been attended to —and that serious medical needs of intoxicated and probabilities individual therefore are a mis- Kinnel, potentially suicidal detainees. leading totality measure of the of the con- F.2d Although at 961. the case is an ex- injury by particular stitutional suffered one, tremely close I do not think that group. record is so deficient of support evidence to jury’s see verdict I the district previously explained,

As court’s supra denying I decision necessary think that it is motion for j.n.o.v. assume that has established must reversed.28 discussed, caution, supra, 27. As I have at note 24 and the steps they deliberate could take it, accompanying subsequently text I mean this statement discover to be ineffective in re- that, However, dressing no more than if the evidence showed that constitutional violations. that, Judge implies had taken into account the serious Weis further notwithstand- knowledge, medical needs of suicidal detainees and initially-cautious poli- had these them, steps protect cymakers taken all reasonable light could avoid constitutional liabili- fiscal, constraints, security, ty wilfully failing and other to take further measures protect could not rights be held to have been deliber- the constitutional of the citi- ately Second, indifferent to those serious medical policy. needs. zens affected the infirm if infra, emphasize legal As I applicable do not intimate formulated as a rule to future cases, analysis appropriate Judge that cost-benefit reasoning, in the dissolving Weis’s thus indifference, spectre constitutional context. of deliberate would municipal policymakers create incentives for dissent, urges In his Weis because meager they take measures that know or should "clearly City, through the record shows that the preventing specific know to be ineffectual in officers, adopted directives to its rights. violations of constitutional policy limit or eliminate suicides that oc- City’s police I therefore conclude that the di- jails,” curred in its cannot be found to checks, concerning rectives fifteen-minute policy have had a custom or a tainted delib- detainees, double-celling of and the removal of erate indifference to the medical serious needs not, themselves, personal articles do in and of potentially of intoxicated and suicidal detainees. preclude liability constitutional for a *28 Dissent, Paraphrasing at 1092-93. the policy infra or custom tainted deliberate indiffer- Eighth opinion Rellergert Cape Circuit's in note, addition, ence. I that I do not read (8th County, Girardeau 924 F.2d Cir. Rellergert proposition they to stand for the that 1991), Judge city Weis asserts that "[a] cannot Rellergert, Eighth do. In Circuit held that a deliberately deliberately be both cautious and deputy defendant sheriff and were entitled to Dissent, Judge indifferent.” at 1096. qualified immunity, notwithstanding the section infra concludes, essence, implemen- Weis that the case, against jail 1983 verdict them in a suicide tation of some measures intended to reduce the because the considerable measures that these City lockups negates pos- risk of suicides in sibility prevent officials took to the suicides of detain- City policymakers that could be found to general particular ees in and of the decedent in anything negligent have been more than in ad- did not demonstrate deliberate indifference. Id. dressing the medical needs of intoxicated and Notably, imple- it was to the defendant officials’ believe, however, suicidal detainees. I that this policy mentation in the decedent’s of a case reasoning proves too much and that in some housing suicidal inmates in common area in may cases deliberate indifference indeed coexist they kept nearly could be under constant deliberate, insufficient, with but caution. general municipal observation—and not to a clearly policy Rellergert Two untenable corollaries attend referred court in as- —that First, Judge logic. Judge serting policy Weis’s under Weis's that could not have been ”[t]he reasoning, municipal policymakers, exercising deliberately both cautious about [the decedent’s] rights process of intoxicated testimony at the due statistical Heran’s

Sergeant that, years preceding pretrial in the and suicidal detainees were at least trial revealed suicide, average number implicated by the manner and conditions of Simmons’s pretrial detain- among intoxicated suicides their detention. 3 from lockups approximately ees — experts testified that Plaintiff’s 19,500 persons de- average of among an variety have taken a of measures could intoxication— public year each tained provide for the serious medical needs extremely was, small. relatively speaking, detainees, thereby intoxicated and suicidal revealed, testimony also how- Heran’s trial future suicides. These mea- preventing ever, average represented number that this costly physical included feature sures occurring regularly had been suicides changes lockups, proof- such as “suicide years five and period of at least over a ing” remodeling lockup facilities cells measures, that, would be preventive absent turnkey’s locate the work area within roughly the likely continue to occur at However, they also included the cell block. Further, future.29 same rate steps, install- relatively inexpensive such as testimony plaintiff’s experts, Rowan and monitoring audio and visual devices and closely monitoring in- Guy, suggested that promulgating enforcing procedural di- detainees, particularly those toxicated specifically preventing aimed at su- rectives depression, showing signs hysteria providing, example, icides —directives prevailing practice nationwide and was the that an intoxicated detainee should under either had at least considered and that no circumstances be housed alone lockup or insti- making changes in facilities precinct empty, if cell is the detain- block provide moni- tuting procedures to for such kept under restraint and ob- ee should be think that toring. I therefore do not pre- processing servation in the area of the critically of evidence record is deficient transported jury could have concluded cinct station until elsewhere.30 from which the deliberately Surveying indifferent (the a considerable number of recent risk as a suicide and 30. suicides, asserts, involving jail Judge about it.” Id Both the central issue defen- Weis cases dissent, qualified "expert dant officials’ entitlement to immuni- evidence of this na- in his ty) and the nature of the deliberate caution support ture does not a claim of deliberate in- distinguish Rellergert Dissent, exercised in that case by municipality." at difference infra from this one. Particularly highly of our defer- 1094. jury’s of review of the deliberate ential standard that, Judge 29. Weis concludes because verdict, supra discussed indifference explanation record contains no for the varia- knowledge part City policy- and the yearly tions in numbers of suicides in lock- court, given makers that I believe that this ups, statistics ... do not demonstrate that "[t]he waiver, established, obligated to take as policy Directives was set out in agree Judge analysis. with Weis’s More I do not training ineffective or that additional was re- specifically, opinions I on which believe Dissent, Although quired." at 1094. infra Judge support conclusion Weis relies do his agree Weis that the record contains case, expert testimony in this in tandem linking evidence the suicides that the statis- no testimony plain- and other with the statistical the directives or tics document violations of witnesses, supply the "minimum tiffs fails jail personnel, I unlawful conduct on the jury quantum from which the rea- of evidence” by no means draw the same conclusion. Rath- City policy- sonably could have concluded that er, some evidence that I believe absent deliberately seri- makers were indifferent preventive more strenuous measures would not potentially needs of intoxicated and ous medical have diminished the numbers of suicides that Kinnel, suicidal detainees. years surveyed, occurred in the reason- urging foregoing expert testimony existing ably could have inferred that the di- *29 could, best, support that at the conclusion sufficiently rectives did not address the serious failing policymakers negligent were to take potentially medical needs of intoxicated and sui- suicides, prevent lockup mind, further measures to my cidal detainees. To this conclusion is Judge quotes from our decision in Weis plaintiffs the elements of case necessitated Williams. In Williams we stated that claims take as established in that the court must municipality had violated the decedent's City’s namely, City policy- that the of the waiver— failing require rights by de- year- to the removal of of makers were aware both of ly alternatives, number belts, occurring City lockups to install visual surveillance tainees' suicides and of the area, directives, equipment in the cell block to allocate in addition to the for preventing of detainees with men- them. funds for the treatment evidence, Although City po- the record shows no example, policy- its required lice directives officers to remove makers physical had determined fea- and, in changes detainees’ belts and shoelaces order ture in lockups were fiscally im- attempts, place possible forestall suicide to de- or necessary that it was to allocate cells, together presented tainees financial resources differently. evidence, legitimate no from which a coun- The City presented also no evidence that tervailing governmental objective might relatively inexpensive preven- suicide inferred, have been to rebut either the effi- tion measures discussed actually above cacy feasibility any of or the of the other proven would have costly to be too prevention suicide plain- measures to which would not have prevent- been effective in experts tiffs testified. City presented among suicides intoxicated detainees.31 problems, sage 1095; tal and to quoted by Judge health train officers in the Weis at em- infra handling phasized jailors such detainees at municipal most amounted to that the had followed allegations negligence. requiring personal F.2d n. directives at 467 14. removal of ef- However, might fects selves, length, injure with have discussed at see which detainees them- 18, Williams, supra nowhere summary & court addressed the 1063-64 n. a issue negated whether the judgment primarily predicated directives deliberate case indif- on the de- ference municipality. on police indifference of the liberate officers who dealt with the decedent and in which we con- cluded, my opinion, only procedural pos alia, plaintiff inter that the had failed to requisite evidentiary ture and the assumptions, any show causal nexus between decedent’s but also the preven nature of the suicide policy municipal suicide and a or custom with measures, distinguish tion this case from Col detainees, respect mentally posed prob- ill Upper Darby Township, burn v. 946 F.2d 1017 lem from distinct that in this case. I therefore (3d Cir.1991) (“Colburn II”), supra discussed find Weis’s on focus our statement note 22. misplaced. to be Williams II, held, alia, In Colburn we inter Further, Cleveland, Molton v. F.2d municipality defendant was entitled to sum- (6th Cir.1988), Popham City Talladega, v. mary judgment plaintiff’s with (11th Cir.1990), Rellergert 908 F.2d 1561 municipality claim that the had an unconstitu- Cape (8th County, Girardeau 924 F.2d Cir. policy tional or custom tainted deliberate 1991), Molton, distinguishable. also are like indifference needs of intoxicated and case, appeal constituted an from the district case, potentially suicidal detainees. As in this city’s denial of the court’s defendant motion for presented the evidence in Colburn II showed j.n.o.v., following verdict deliberate policies governing police that written conduct jail in a suicide case. indifference See provided persons public arrested for intoxi- at 240. The Molton court determined that the arrest, upon cation were be frisked searched city j.n.o.v. primarily was entitled to defendant house, upon arrival at the station relieved plaintiff because had adduced insufficient personal belongings pose danger that could city’s provide evidence that the quate training failure to ade- detainees, and, either to the or to other arrestee police for its bars, officers and to make periodically once behind checked. 946 physical changes jail pre- feature in its cells to F.2d at 1028. In marked contrast to the policy vent case, however, suicides amounted to a or custom. presented evidence in this City, See id. at 246. Because the case sub presented evidence in Colburn II also showed judice, preserve appeal failed to pursuant the issue municipal policies police presented type directives, jailors assigned evi- to monitor detainees necessary duties; municipal policy dence given to establish a were no other detainees were custom, plaintiff’s continuously the element of the case at monitored means of a video precisely television; issue in Molton is the element that we camera and closed circuit detain- provided must as established here. take ees were medical attention Rellergert qualified immunity appeal was a appeared necessary; to be and a crisis concerning officer, whether the evidence was sufficient intervention emergen- trained to handle suicides, cy including establish deliberate of indi- indifference situations was on call Further, Rellergert simply during vidual officers. did not each shift. Id. at 1022. municipality's the issue whether a address fail- Colburn II concluded we that “the custodian’s rigorous prevent ure to implementation municipal policy appears institute a more suicide of the policy acquiescence efficacious, relatively having in a of tak- custom to have been —or ing inadequate preventive something eighteen twenty measures —could con- thwarted like su- years.” stitute deliberate indifference. See F.2d at icides in ten Id. at 1030. last evidence, therefore, Popham, similarly Rellergert, 796-98. in- The statistical and the whether, purposes concerning efficacy volved the issue of sum- evidence the nature and the mary judgment, the evidence tended suicide-prevention to demon- measures that the *30 suicide, prior strate the deliberate indifference of individual had taken set to Simmons’s court, jailors. Popham pas- apart Whereas the in the case Colburn II. from deliberate indiffer- elusion that record showed

Had City intoxi- to the ence to the serious medical needs of measures available preventive might was, costly, as Monell the evidence cated and suicidal detainees quite were all City was requires, “moving to establish force” a vio- behind insufficient serious medi deliberately indifferent lation of fourteenth amendment Simmons’s and suicidal detain of intoxicated undisputed cal needs It rights. is Simmons suggest that the tradi is not to ees. This in hung himself while intoxicated and alone analysis of tort law is tional cost-benefit block, during an Precinct cell the Sixth constitutional context. in the appropriate inspec- periodic Panati’s interval between knowledge However, assuming on suicide was therefore the tions. Simmons’s measures, I of all available City’s part very type preventive suicide that moni- of implement failure to think measures, toring ranging from audio-visual extremely prevent costly measures to instituting procedures to directives devices would yearly of suicides small number are not that intoxicated detainees to ensure City policy strong inference that yield a alone, might prevented. left well have “judg makers had made a constitutional City concerning the allocation ment call” Sufficiency With 3. The Evidence pro safety and to resources to ensure Respect to Plaintiff’s Failure to rights great constitutional tect the Theory32 Train words, In other of its citizens. est number jury have determined that preventive mea that all available evidence I reasonably returned its section costly might justify an infer could have sures were City legitimate against City had a counter 1983 verdict based on ence that electing interest for vailing governmental City conclusion that the violated Simmons’s preven implement additional suicide rights by policy not to a custom or means of measures, might thus render the tion tainted deliberate indifference to the critically of evidence from record deficient detain serious medical needs of intoxicated reasonably could have con jury however, which a think, ees. I also that the record City deliberately indif cluded that the was support contains sufficient evidence of in ferent to the serious medical needs City against section 1983 verdict based detainees. potentially toxicated and suicidal plaintiff’s corollary theory City that the through rights violated a delib Simmons’s That, however, is not this case. train officers erately indifferent failure to concerning relatively light of the evidence responsible detainees in su for intoxicated City might inexpensive measures that the prevention. detection and icide in prevent among suicides have taken to detainees, as well as the absence toxicated extremely Due to the small number legitimate any from which a evidence large number of suicides relative to governmental countervailing interest persons year each intoxicated detained taking preventive no measures could be evidentiary ques- City lockups, it is a close inferred, I cannot conclude that the record whether, tion consistent with Can- crucially lacking evidence on ton, “the need for more S.Ct. jury a determination which the could base training” respon- or different of officers deliberately indifferent was for these detainees would have been sible failing steps to take to meet the serious City policymakers, even as- “obvious” needs of intoxicated and suicidal medical suming, the waiver as must detainees. discussed, they principles I have knew Panati and Ser- evi- of the suicides. Officer I also think that there is sufficient jury geant con- Heran testified that directives support dence in the record to My responses adduced sufficient evi- Weis’s dissent in the section section, concerning sufficiency previous support dence to verdict that the deliberately indif- the evidence with to a failing deliberately train its indifferent to' City, policy ferent apply or custom on the officers. large part my conclusion in this *31 regular belts were in occurrence. testimony officers to remove detainees’ required addition, plaintiff’s tes- of experts suggested In Dr. Rowan that shoelaces. rela- and tively training a suicide- minimal participated profile of a tified that he turnkeys typical detainee, suicidal training program for the known hours prevention however, during occur, likely introduced no suicides were City, in 1981. The and the need for monitoring by to train all officers or that it had undertaken evidence inmates would turnkeys other have prevention. It is clear enabled turnkeys in suicide prevent among suicides intoxicated de- testimony, statistical more- from Heran’s moreover, City, tainees.33 The introduced over, numbers of suicides contin- that small evidence, testimony no such as that this regularly to occur 1980 and ued between unworkable, training proved would have Further, testimony plaintiffs 1985. ineffective, costly, or too from which a experts suggested profiles that statistical countervailing legitimate governmental type likely of detainee to commit electing provide reason for not to the train- widely po- suicide were available ing could have been inferred. commonly departments lice trained officers responsible recognize for detainees to sui- With to whether the record con- preventive and to take cidal tendencies the minimum quantum tains of evidence 1051-52, 1053. I supra measures. See jury from which reasonably could have therefore do not think that the record is inferred that the failure to train offi- utterly deficient of evidence from which prevention cers suicide detection and jurors could conclude that the reasonable “actually injury, Simmons’s cause[d]” to train officers in suicide detection need Canton, 109 S.Ct. at I note that of Panati testified that the prevention apparent should been only training City policymakers. might preven- he have received in suicide twenty years tion prior occurred some question It also a close whether there plaintiff’s suicide. Both of ex- Simmons’s that the failure to was sufficient evidence Simmons, perts testified that with the ex- provide police training officers with in su- race, ception profiles compiled fit the was, prevention icide detection and consist- typical testimony suicidal detainee. This Canton, ent with 109 S.Ct. at suggests training had Panati received likely to in the violation of con- “so result prevention, in suicide detection and he like- reasonably rights” jury stitutional ly danger have realized the would policymakers could conclude that the were and, posed through to himself Simmons deliberately indifferent to the serious medi- monitoring precautionary or some other needs of and suicidal detain- cal intoxicated measure, su- could have averted Simmons’s however, that, think, ees. absent evi- icide. legitimate countervailing gov- dence interest, testimony stepbrother, ernmental could reason- of Simmons’s Rosemond, ably Reginald have concluded that the failure that he was told training family of Sim- provide the relevant to all offi- the officer who notified responsible handling detainees mons’s death that intoxicated detainees are cers likely commit suicide high would result in violations of intoxi- risk candidates to corroborates, incarcerated at least to cated and suicidal detainees’ fourteenth while Panati, degree, rights, amendment based on the record evi- some the inference among continuing some train- dence that suicides intoxicated de- with the benefit of detection, tainees, numbers, prevent- although yearly ing in suicide could have small sent, Judge suggest (quoting appears Burns v. Weis that the train- infra (5th Cir.1990)). Galveston, plaintiffs experts measures testified to view, however, training training medically prison- my in obvious the basic constituted “to screen symptoms tendencies or in the statis ers to detect suicidal tendencies" —a task that of suicidal “ 'require! experienced profile detainee that s the skills of an tical of a suicidal would cry type professional psychiatric training, experts discussed is a far from medical training ability beyond average Weis required sophisticated medical ” rightly rejects. process officers the due clause.’ Dis- *32 it ad- state claims for the reason pendent Based killing himself.34 from ed Simmons support of its evidence, in the district court I cannot vanced this record all of on wit, plaintiff that critically j.n.o.v. defi- is motion the record that conclude —to action under allege reason- causes of the failed both evidence on which cient of sufficient evidence conclusion law and to adduce state ably could have based see noted, failure to them. As I have deliberately support indifferent City’s supra court deter- actual cause of at the district its officers was train argu- City had mined that waived death.35 Simmons’s j.n.o.v. motion for purposes ment for of its foregoing uphold reasons I for the would support it in of its Rule by failing to raise denying the decision district court’s 50(a) for a directed verdict. motion judgment notwithstand- City’s motion argu- only court concluded that district against 1983 verdict jury’s section sup- City preserved ment it. post-trial relief with port of its motion for plaintiff’s state claims was TO ENTITLED III. THE CITY WAS that, pre- the state law argument because PLAIN- TO WITH RESPECT J.N.O.V. relationship special had not requisites for a CLAIMS? TIFF’S PENDENT STATE met, Panati had no and been Argument its Did the Waive A. Pennsylvania tort law. under to Simmons Allege and Failed to that Plaintiff necessary to determine It therefore Pendent State Establish appeal its has waived on Claims? failed overarching contention that Pennsylvania law and to state claims under City contends that we appeal, On support to muster sufficient evidence the district court’s decision must reverse plaintiff’s them. denying j.n.o.v. motion for on its jail on-the-job prevention, concluding custodians received the record contains insuf- 34. In training handling theory intoxicated detainees and support plaintiffs evidence to ficient of self- instructed “to listen for threats deliberate indifference in were demonstrated signs injury adequately, and to watch for of emo- failing inflicted to train its officers addition, instability.” arresting In Id. at 1022. that "neither the officers tional Weis asserts charged monitoring police with detain- the detainee’s actions to be officers nor Panati found ap- apparently detainee they ees knew that "[i]f others had in their different than [those of] Dissent, emotionally upset, peared officers [the to be custody previously.” at 1094. infra believe, however, to clam them talk to them in an effort should] down[,] that this assertion is under- personally more fre- (1) ... visit the cell arresting officers evidence that the mined quently,” contact the trained crisis interven- and crying Simmons was and informed Panati that during every shift. Id. at tion officer on call custody, upset he was taken into at the time that II, Colburn we therefore concluded 1050; (2) 1022. In Reginald supra and Rosemond’s see at requisite to establish the that the evidence failed testimony, supra see that the officer to train and causal nexus between the failure family of Simmons's death who informed that, particularly injury constitutional peculiarly had acted told him that Simmons prevented, the the number of suicides and, intoxicated, in training because while in detention prison had received in custodians high risk to commit suicide. suicide-preven- implementing municipality's relatively policies appeared to have been tion II, supra, discussed at notes 22 In Colburn II, Colburn 946 F.2d at 1029-30. effective. the district court's this court affirmed contrast, presented granting summary judgment in this to the de- the evidence decision suggest plaintiffs Panati and municipality case fails to that Officer claim fendant had, City police responsible for detain- officers the defendant as a result of deliberate other that indifference, were, formally informally, provided police ees failed to train its officers jail prevention. training custodians adequately similar to that which the in suicide detection case, training comports municipality present- in Colburn the defendant received In that II— decedent, training although respects rec- in a number of with the evidence that the intoxi- ed suicide, by plaintiffs experts in this case. she committed ommended Further, at the time that cated relatively symptoms my opinion minimum there is in few of unusual had shown quantum agitation 21, evidence from which a reasonable or distress. See id. 946 F.2d at 1020- municipality presented juror this case conclude that the also could in 1029-30. training provide provide although its officers with such it did not failure to evidence training legal Simmons's suicide. formal in suicide constituted a cause of officers with jurisprudence

It is clear under our seventh amendment concerns that we dis- cannot reverse the district that this court cussed in Mallick v. International Broth- denying decision Rule Workers, court’s erhood Electrical 50(b) (3d the basis of an j.n.o.v. Cir.1981), motion for in the context of a argument City failed to raise in party’s precede failure to a motion for *33 50(a) support predicate Rule j.n.o.v. of its motion timely with a motion for a directed for a directed See verdict. Abraham v. verdict. This court concluded in Mallick 167, Pekarski, (3d Cir.) 172-73 “[ujnless a court has been alerted to 50(b) (“[A] judgment Rule motion for not proof deficiencies in a motion for a withstanding may the verdict not be made directed verdict”—and I think that the mo- grounds that on were not asserted in a tion includes the reasons therefor —“a re- verdict.”), denied, motion for directed quest cert. judgment court enter a con- 467 U.S. 104 S.Ct. 82 L.Ed.2d trary to that of the jury is tantamount to (1984); Pepsi-Cola asking Lowenstein v. the court to re-examine the facts as cf. Pennsauken, Bottling Co. jury,” F.2d 9 found the a reexamination that (3d Cir.) (holding grant may that court mo abridge “would the Seventh Amendment.” j.n.o.v. only tion for on basis of motion for Id.

directed verdict renewed at close of evi requirement dence emphasizing and Alleged B. The Errors in Jury the In- expense avoids tactical at victories of sub structions interests), denied, stantive cert. 429 U.S. complicate matters, To City the has now (1976). 97 S.Ct. 50 L.Ed.2d 334 objection recast as an to the district court’s noted, As I have supra see jury argument instructions the advanced in City the moved for a directed verdict on the support 50(a) 50(b) of its Rule and motions grounds set forth in its trial In brief. its that, because the state prerequisites law brief, trial City argued, the to special for a relationship had not been met claims, plaintiff’s state that it and Panati case, City in this the and Panati had no duty special no to Simmons because no duty Pennsylvania to Simmons under tort relationship, by Pennsylvania as defined addition, City, law. the for the first law, pol existed between Simmons and the appeal, time raises a number of other ice.36 I carefully examined both the purported in jury flaws the district court’s transcript trial brief and the City instructions. The specifically argues proceedings trial to determine whether the that we must reverse the district court’s City any point manner, prior or in to denying decision j.n.o.v. motion for be- j.n.o.v., its motion for challenged otherwise (1) permit- cause the district court erred: in sufficiency plaintiff's the evidence or ting jury the to consider the condition of argued plaintiff had failed to state a facilities, lockup for which City Pennsylvania claim under law on which re Pennsylva- asserts that it is immune under granted. lief could be I can find no indica law; (2) permitting jury nia to con- tion that it did so. sider the directives for officers I determining therefore conclude that City district whether the or Panati correctly City court determined that duty breached a to Simmons under state argument law; (3) waived its statutory instructing failed to tort or allege could, any pendent jury or establish Pennsyl- state that it consistent with reason, law, claims. For that I duty also must con- vania tort find that Simmons’s to clude that the has argu- safety waived this exercise due care for his own was condition; appeal. Although ment on this conclusion lowered his intoxicated may appear unduly harsh, (4) above, suggested failing charge technical or to as required by jury believe that preconditions the same sylvania’s Comparative Negligence 36. The also raised in its trial brief the Act. The argument City subsequently however, argument, that Simmons’s wanton conduct abandoned hanging himself removed the case from Penn- and it is not before us. they jury instructions determine relationship special under aof creation and, preserved properly have been law. tort state contends, grounds either for constitute 51, party, Fed.R.Civ.P. Under deny- court’s decision reversing the district either to objection preserve order pendent state plaintiff’s ing j.n.o.v. as jury on an issue instruct failure alternative, or, for a new trial. in the claims instruct in which manner “object[] thereto before ed, clearly must Permitting Alleged Error 1. The verdict, stat consider its jury retires to the Condition of Jury to Consider objected distinctly the matter Lockup Facilities objection.” See also grounds because, contends Inc., Reynolds, Dean McAdam v. Witter *34 Act, it is Pennsylvania’s Tort Claims under Cir.1990)(declining 750, (3d F.2d 759 896 injuries caused liability for immune from argument con- developed newly consider facilities, jail the district condition of by the party deficiency where charge cerning jury instructing jury the that it court erred clearly object specifically “failed lockup adequacy of the the could consider judg- entry of a charge or the the either liability. determining City’s the facilities charge”); on this ment ... based Waldorf on the frivolous. This contention borders (3d Cir.1990) 723, Shuta, 739-40 F.2d 896 v. jury, I instructed the The district court sufficiently objection, because (holding that adequacy of the correctly, think alleged error preserved specific, had was held lockup facilities in which Simmons objec- an preserved has appeal). party If a considered, plain- respect to with could be actually jury points tion to on which claim, determining tiff’s generally ask charged, “we ourselves was federal policy or City had an unconstitutional evidence, whether, light of the viewed in indifference. tainted deliberate custom fairly adequate charge as a whole con- jury of its instructions In the course in the case to the ly submits issues claims, the district cerning plaintiff's state ‘only if the instruction jury, and reverse lockup of the the condition court mentioned thereby confusing and mis capable of ” characterizing plaintiff’s only facilities Gable, jury.’ Bennis v. 823 leading the address and did not otherwise contentions 723, (3d Cir.1987)(quoting United 727 F.2d jury could or should the extent to which Inc., Moore, 750 Fischbach & v. States lockup facili- the condition consider Cir.1984), denied, (3d 1195 cert. F.2d ties. 84 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. 470 U.S. 105 (1985)); Waldorf, 896 F.2d at 785 see also that it City neither contends The Bennis). timely Absent a (quoting court’s mention of objected to the district however, may we objection, specific characterizing plain lockup facilities in only plain er jury instructions review sought alleges that it claims nor tiff’s state ror, discretionary review that we a form of limiting jury’s considera instruction only to cor sparingly and have exercised I of the facilities. tion of the condition that would “re error rect a “fundamental” record, but inspected nonetheless injustice.” Bowley v. Stot in manifest sult counsel for point find no can (3d Co., Cir.1985); F.2d ler & court’s instruc objected to the City either Acres see also United States 564.54 concerning of the condi the relevance tions Cir.1978) (under (3d Land, F.2d 983 sought such lockup tion of the facilities doctrine, may jury court review plain error limiting I therefore believe instruction. is “fundamental and if instruction error City pre failed that it is clear failure to consider highly prejudicial” and it the district court’s any objection to serve injustice”), result manifest rev’d “would think, not regard. instructions in do U.S. S.Ct. grounds, on other moreover, court’s the district that either (1979). 1854, 60 L.Ed.2d 435 condition of mention of the passing plain with necessary lockup facilities connection opinion, therefore is my to deliver claims or its failure pendent alleged deficiencies in tiff’s

to review limiting provide instruction that the any itself did basis for invoking plain error doctrine. request begin can to amount to the error, type resulting of “fundamental” in a 3. The Instruction that Intoxication injustice,” “manifest that calls for review Can Lower a Prisoner’s Duty to plain under the Bowley, error doctrine. Exercise Care Due 751 F.2d at 652. further contends that the district court reversible committed error in Alleged 2. The Instructing Error of instructing jury that, although it could Jury Police Directives Establish a determine that Simmons’s own willful and Statutory Duty or Common Law wanton conduct relieved the and Pana ti of liability negligence, pris “if a contention, next Ias under- is so oner intoxicated and his mental and it, stand is that the district court erroneous- physical impaired faculties are so that he ly police instructed the conduct care, cannot exercise due then he is not comport that did not police responsible for the consequence of his directives constituted a breach of un- According City, acts.” this instruc der negligence state law. The argues tion is incorrect under McMichael v. Penn directives establish neither a *35 Co., 584, sylvania 586, R. 331 Pa. 1 A.2d statutory common law nor a duty. 242, (1938), in which the Pennsylvania Supreme held, Court respect with to a contention, previous This like the plaintiff got who drunk sitting while one, borders on the frivolous.37 City The defendant’s railroad tracks and subse contend, does and indeed there is no quently by train, was struck that “[v]ol in basis the record for concluding, either untary intoxication justify does not a fail sought it that and was denied a limiting to ure exercise due care” and that “an concerning instruction jury’s the considera person intoxicated who fails to exercise tion objected of the directives or that it to proper care guilty negli caution is of the district suggestion court’s that the con gence, if such failure contributes to the tent of the directives was relevant in deter accident.”

mining City duty the breached a to City argues objected that it suffi- Simmons.38 I therefore that conclude the ciently to preserve this instruction to the nor, City object neither has cause to under allegation of appeal.39 error on Based on 51, preserved objection Rule has record, however, my examination of the the jury district court’s concerning instructions proposed jury to which instruction counsel the directives. Nor do I think that the City the objected was abandoned district court’s in regard plaintiff’s instructions this counsel and not used the jury 37. The district court the City instructed that tions of counsel for the and the advice of withdrew, City’s police could consider the directives in po- the court an instruction that the plaintiffs connection with section 1983 claim. lice officers who dealt Simmons were with "un- claims, respect plaintiffs duty With the state court der a to follow a and that directive” “the jury instructed that it jury police] could consider wheth- consider that if [could] [the violated City directive, against er the had torts negli- committed Sim- that that be considered could directives,” “through policies first gent.” mons its or, second, theory respondeat under superi- jury or. The sepa- district court instructed City argument 39.The bases this on the state- rately duty on state tort law standards of and at colloquy ment of its counsel in the course of the point jury no did the court tell that noncom- jury proposed on that instructions doesn’t “[it] pliance with the directives amounted to a person couldn't make a re- mean decision duty Pennsylvania of a breach of care under garding particular his own life or death at a negligence law. point City in time.” The construes this state- objection approval ment as an court’s Indeed, use, transcript colloquy 38. of the be- and decision to instruction on Sim- care, concerning tween counsel duty language Pennsylva- and the bench from a mons’s proposed jury suggests plain- plaintiff instructions wills and nia estates statute that sought, objec- tiffs counsel but as proposed. a result of the result a “fundamental” error “would point no at which find other I can court.40 necessitating in- discussing proposed injustice,” in manifest review City, either Bowley, plain the court or in the course error doctrine. under structions instructions, in- objected to the jury F.2d at 652.41 by the court adopted district struction regarded could be intoxication Simmons’s Failing Error of In- Alleged due care. lowering duty to exercise his Jury on the Preconditions struct addition, note, City appears Arising Special from a Rela- Duty Supreme Pennsylvania have raised the tionship the first McMichael decision for Court’s argued support Whereas short, having neglected appeal. time on verdict motions for a directed and for distinctly objected matter to “stat[e] allege had failed to j.n.o.v. as re- grounds objection,” and the special prerequisites to a and establish the has, quired Fed.R.Civ.P. forth in Melendez v. relationship set allega- preserve any my opinion, failed to Philadelphia, Pa.Super. at district court’s instruc- tion of error argument, raises this A.2d at care. I also do

tions on Simmons’s solely objection to the appeal, as an court’s instruc- the district not believe jury instructions. duty of care constitute district court’s tions on Simmons’s Hinsdale, See, counsel, Village City suggests, pro- e.g., ed as the harm. 40. Plaintiffs Dezort 710-11, Ill.App.3d N.E.2d posed that would have 35 (1976) (with instruction municipality’s liability "incompetent” adopted in Title the definition of Statutes, Pennsylvania negligence ex Consolidated in suicide of intoxicated and 20 of the estates, detainee, decedents, tremely depressed and fiduciar- decedent’s volun which concerns incompetent negligence per tary states that an se ies. This definition intoxication was “not but *36 who, person person weighed by jury of infirmities simply is "a because to be the a circumstance illness, deficiency care"); age, mental mental of old retardation, the issue of due in its determination of drug inebriety Flint, addiction or ... Mich.App. 39 197 Thornton v. of capacity (1972) lacks sufficient to make or communi- (question plaintiff N.W.2d 485 concerning per- responsible decisions his contributorily negligent inflicting cate was in serious (Purdon § son." 20 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. injuries while in delirium tremens or on himself City argues, Supp.1990). the 1975 & As the negligently jailers whether defendant caused appears a of its counsel to constitute statement summary by failing protective steps injuries those to take objection and an to the use of this Williams, of decide); jury was for to Thomas v. jury comparison language A of in instructions. (1962) (police Ga.App. 124 S.E.2d statutory language foregoing lan- with the charged knowledge officers held that guage of the court's actual instruction concern- heavily prisoner incapable of intoxicated care, however, duty ing Simmons’s reveals safety exercising be due care for his own and to statutory language court did not use the that the duty protect pris measures to under to take counsel, City objected. Plaintiff’s to which incurring setting oner from fire to his cell and moreover, appears pro- to have withdrawn the source, injuries). According to one serious posed instruction. majority holdings represent these rule on Annotation, Liability Civil this issue. See that, I note at all events because the McMi- Injury Prison or Jail Authorities for Self-Inflicted defendant, City, Prisoner, in contrast to the had no chael or Death (1977 79 A.L.R.3d relationship with the custodial or other intoxi- (collecting Supp.1990) and & cases con might given plaintiff a cated rise to cluding generally "the courts have held that him, heightened duty to McMichael is distin- [voluntary] neg does not constitute intoxication Indeed, guishable the issue from this case. se, ligence per inquiry and that the relevant is may whether a detainee’s intoxication lower or state, prisoner, in is whether the his intoxicated duty appears of care to be one of obviate his exercising capable reasonable care for his impression Pennsylvania courts. first for the safety, and whether the authorities know own condition"). that, helpless or should know of his In a number of states have held Courts in jurisprudence, view of this the district court’s voluntary neces- whereas intoxication does not essentially predict that the duty instructions —which sarily relieve a detainee of the to exercise Pennsylvania Supreme jury Court would hold that a safety, due care for his own it is for the to jury may whether an intoxicated de consider determine whether the detainee's intoxication exercising care his incapable tainee was unable to exercise due rendered him and, such care so, may municipal jailers safety own and determine that if whether his knew or should failing incapacity negligent prevent in to a self- have known of his and thus should actors were injury steps protect reasonable. have taken to him from self-inflict- inflicted —seem Melendez, Superior negligence Pennsylvania were erroneous in three re- (1) spects: charging jury in three-pronged test for established Court City’s regarded conduct could special relationship, as the determining whether a proximate cause of Simmons’s if protection, exists death duty rise to a giving negligently conduct increased the group and the risk that or an individual between himself; (2) failing Simmons would harm in Pa.Super. at 466 A.2d at police. 320 that, charge jury Pennsylvania to under requires that a 1060. Melendez concerning special relationships, law special of a relation- ba- claiming the existence duty protect sic to Simmons police could have ship “must demonstrate if (1) only arisen Panati or other partic- officers were: aware of the individual’s status, (2) knowledge had or reason to know that unique Sim- ular situation or danger suicide; in particu- committing mons was knowledge potential for the suffered, (3) failing charge jury lar harm the individual which assumed, specif- order for the to have (3) voluntarily of that incurred duty prevent ic Simmons from commit- knowledge, protect the individual from suicide, ting Panati must have had actual precise harm which has occasioned.” knowledge particularly that Simmons was (emphasis A.2d at Id. at vulnerable to the risk of suicide. original). reject City’s first contention that court’s instructions to the district instructing the district court erred in

jury City’s and Panati’s jury negligence could be were as follows: Simmons regarded causing Simmons’s death if regard prisoners, there are some With negligence increased the risk that he specific give you. rules that I can ... First, would harm himself. this contention prisoner custody Those who hold a tangentially but related to the protect pris- must use care to reasonable argument failing that the court erred in oners from an unreasonable risk of charge prerequi- on the Melendez harm. Therefore, special relationship. sites to a suicide, plain- regard And with City’s general remaining unlike the prove weight fair must tiff[ ] contentions, specific clearly two are preponderance the evidence that Melendez, grounded my it is to mind *37 custody in prisoner those who held the whether this concern- doubtful contention should of the either knew or have known ing the court’s causation instructions has unique prisoner’s particular situation or Second, I preserved. been can find no ba- status, is, particular that of the vulnera- in the actual sis for the contention court’s bility plaintiff[] to suicide. And that respect instructions on causation with to prove that those who held must further Indeed, plaintiff’s appears it state claims. custody prisoner the in either knew or likely that the has mistaken the potential for should have known charge plaintiff’s court’s causation as to present harm that was because of this claim for the court’s causation federal vulnerability. charge on state law.42 based general objection City’s remaining general to the to the and In addition to a As jury specific objections the to the district court’s court’s failure to instruct on Me- special charge jury failure the on Melendez’s prerequisites lendez ’s to a relation- to relationship, it prerequisites special to a is ship, City specifically the contends that the concerning necessary to consider as a threshold matter court’s instructions the ligence City’s liability plaintiff only under causation instruction and the to 42. The district court’s enough jury to be risk of harm was state law was as follows: “It is not to the on an increased legal negligence plaintiffs negligent!)] cause, be a claim. The that must to federal factor, causing injury.... jury in the that could determine a substantial court instructed legal injury City policy [Negligence] cause of Simmons’s death if must be a that a caused you responsible for policy of harm” to him. someone in order for to be that "increased the risk injuries.” relating neg- their The court’s causation instruction These concerns are concerns. amendment preserved City adequately whether may party by the fact that a not abated support in of its Rule contending, them 50(a) earlier, Rule motion support in aof motions, 50(b) 50(a) and verdict, point raised the have for a directed prereq- these allege establish and failed alleges the party in later law which a uisites a deficient. Absent jury instructions were su- prevent Simmons’s measures take jury instructions timely objection to argu- raising that through City, icide. law, the court point of again raises the for a direct- its motions support in ment point either very may fail to cover well clearly j.n.o.v., would for and ed verdict on the con- or based through inadvertence appeal, objection on an preserved have raised party earlier who sufficiency clusion Melendez, to the grounded it. has to abandon point decided and evidence. See complaint plaintiffs 50(b); 50(a) also Abra- & see Fed.R.Civ.P. determining In whether However, as I ham, at 172-73. 728 F.2d general specific and two preserved has Rule 51 and our explained, previously have Melendez, grounded objections, impose a dis- that rule under jurisprudence court’s instructions district objec- preserving an requirement tinct care to duty to exercise due Panati’s re- namely, the jury tion to instructions — Simmons, neces I therefore find it protect party object jury to a a quirement that or solely any arguments sary to look to instruct the court’s failure instruction in rela advanced objections jury given issue “before jury on a on this mat the court’s instructions tion to verdict, stating dis- consider its retires to question my opinion, it is a close ter. In objected to and the tinctly the matter objected to City adequately Fed.R.Civ.P. objection.” grounds of the duty charge.43 How the court's state-law 759; McAdam, at 51; 896 F.2d see also ever, Bowley v. I think under Stotler at 739-40. F.2d Waldorf, 896 Co., at it did so. Bow & determined that this Court noted, ley, id. supra at see preserving requirements Rule 51’s the district court to failure to alert party’s read jury must be objection to instruction by a motion for a proof deficiencies unnecessary concerning of Rule by the supported reasons verdict directed is suffi provides that “it exceptions, which seventh amendment raises serious therefor ruling party, the time j.n.o.v. cient that requesting a I think concerns. sought, made or order of court jury instruction that depends on the action which known to the court makes objected to or was never either was court to take or party desires the to func- asks the court requested essence the court objection to the action of party’s finding new facts tion as Fed.R.Civ.P. grounds therefor.” equally serious seventh implicates thus *38 court the district my reading tion to the instruction adopted of the record that from 43. It is clear objecting duty to issue. After jury prereq- City sought instruction on the a the language in known” "knew or should have the plaintiff’s duty protect Simmons from his to a to uisites instruction, City explicit- proposed the directly have would em- tendencies that suicidal language no com- ly agreed and made to this three-pronged spe- test for a ployed Melendez’s rejected the third when the court ment district relationship. is clear to me that also cial It for the the test. Counsel element of Melendez objected, City points at at several counsel for the however, objec- City, subsequently renewed his informally, court’s decision to em- to the least adopt to to the court’s tion refusal Melendez's duty set standard than that ploy a more liberal instructions, stating "You prerequisites in its jury instruct the and thus to forth in Melendez know, actually, Judge, know if we're don't that, City liable for to the the in order hold proposed in- going with [the to come to terms prevent measures to take failure to reasonable why explained it then The court struction].” suicide, determine that those must Simmons’s instructing prerequisites in not use these would custody or should him in "knew who held there was jury whether the and asked counsel arising potential for harm from known" of the City did not "anything for the further." Counsel vulnerability particular to suicide. his duty and objection instruction renew his to concerning however, question a record, sugges- responded some instead contains The objec- instruction. City may different have withdrawn its that the tion special relationship in interpreted Rule 46 to sites to a the context Bowley, In we alleging that, litigant fully Philadelphia to of an action if a endeavors mean position, Department duty his in Police had breached a to identify to the district court court, protect neighborhood on an issue the residents of a opposition to that of instruction, litigant by recurring racial jury to a troubled violence. 320 pertaining pre- Pa.Super. 466 A.2d at 1060. requirements met Rule 51’s has granted summary judg- F.2d at 647. Melendez court serving objection. an City, holding municipal- ment for the that a City did not Although counsel for the ity duty provide police protection has a to following expla- formally object the court’s particular group only individual or incorporate the Me- nation of its refusal to special relationship when the test for a set jury duty, lendez test instructions forth its decision had been met. Id. unmistakably issue whether he raised the appropriate Pennsylvania Supreme stan- provided Melendez Court has not, determining yet, and decided dards for whether Melendez’s whether duty prerequisites special take measures to of a Panati had existence expressed relationship giving duty protect suicide and rise to a prevent Simmons’s apply City’s position on that matter. I there- when an individual is in state custo- preserved dy.44 The court fore conclude that the has district thus was called on specific objections, predict Pennsylvania Supreme general its and two Melendez, grounded holding formulating and review the in- Court’s on this issue in jury concerning at issue to determine whether instructions Panati’s structions evidence, City’s duty charge, light and the to Simmons. the court’s “fairly adequately” and submitted to The district court deter- substance and the jury the issue whether Panati prerequisites mined that Melendez’s are duty to Simmons under Penn- breached application restricted in their to the deter- sylvania arriving law. In at this determi- police mination whether officers breached a nation, I am mindful that reversal is war- duty protect an individual who has sus- “ ‘only capa- if the instruction was ranted injury tained an- in a con- noncustodial misleading confusing thereby ble text.45 In of the uncertain state of ” Bennis, (cita- jury.’ 823 F.2d at Pennsylvania duty protect, law on the omitted). tion we think that the district court’s instruc- concerning in dis- tions Panati’s and the As the district court noted both duty duty protect due care to cussing negligence instructions on to exercise Sim- and, a mini- opinion denying generally in its motion mons were sound mum, distinguishable “fairly adequately” submitted to j.n.o.v., Melendez is Melendez, Pennsyl- the issue whether these defen- from this case. prerequi- duty.46 dants had Superior vania court set forth the breached court, interpreted by Philadelphia district Melen- 44.The Common Pleas Court of 45. As however, special relationship supplant, ’s test serves to County, has on two occasions held dez under the circumstances in which met, it is prerequisites apply in determin- Melendez’s rule absent some more harsh common-law duty protect have a relationship, an individual form of custodial custody. they individual whom have taken into protect generally another, is under no to aid Club, Inc., Specialty Holsworth v. 20 Phila. See though the individual realizes or even (1990); Philadelphia, Kluska v. protection that such aid or should realize necessary (1985). Although Phila. 45 I conclude infra *39 safety to ensure the of the other. See reasonably op- the district court arrived at the (Second) (1965). Torts 314 § Restatement of posing apply does not conclusion Melendez custody, I note that the Com- in the context of City correctly that the district 46. The contends mon Pleas Court in both instances determined opinion denying the court erred in its prongs special the three of rela- Melendez’s j.n.o.v. conclud motion for insofar as the court tionship holding test had been met as a result of the Supreme Court’s in DeSha ed that the relationship concerning custodial between ney, the constitu 109 S.Ct. at detainee, custody. provided duty had been the the individual who taken into owed to a tional 529; Holsworth, Kluska, duty negligence applicable the 20 Phila. at 20 standard of See clear, F.Supp. at It is See 728 359. Phila. at 45. context. 1084 in court’s that the right I think district court that the district

I think Supreme duty to a detain Pennsylvania on a custodian’s structions ly predicted that individual way an when were no Pennsylvania hold that would ee law Court47 under for deter rule applicable custody, and, misleading in the absence confusing is or custodian individual’s mining whether by Pennsylva controlling decision aof prevail is the protection duty of breached Court, adequately fairly Supreme nia rule, sec as formulated ing common-law jury the issue whether submitted (Second) Restatement tion 314A of of duty of breached Panati and three-pronged test to Torts, opposed as reject I therefore protection to Simmons. in Me relationship set forth special for a is entitled ei contention that 314A of Restatement Section lendez. the basis of a new trial on j.n.o.v. ther or required law who is specifies that “[o]ne jury instruc in the district court’s flaws cir another under custody of ... to take tions. other of deprive as cumstances such protection” is for opportunities his normal Notwithstanding from its Po- protect City, the individual duty to C. Is the

under a physical Ordinance, harm” risk of “unreasonable Immune lice Waiver if he care for individual provide Respect and to Liability With from injured. ill or is State Claims? Plaintiffs in- district court's with the Consistent appeal City additionally The contends fur- duty, the Restatement structions on granted court should have district that the not liable that a defendant is provides ther plain- j.n.o.v. for its motion know knows nor should he neither “where immune it is tiff’s state claims because ill- or of unreasonable [an] of risk[] [an] liability any Pennsylvania law from under required is ness,” a defendant and that negligently injuring Simmons. for has “he knows or only when take action Pennsylvania’s Political City argues that plaintiff is endan- to know reason PSTCA), (the Tort Claims Act Subdivision f. e & ill.” Id. comments gered[] or is (Purdon 8541-64 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. §§ interpreted this com- generally have Courts the waiver Supp.1990),48 overrides & jail authorities require mon-law rule Phila- 21-700 of the liability in Section of prisoner, that a should know who know or Code, that “the provides delphia himself, forestalled, likely to harm unless immunity as governmental plead shall not to ensure reasonable care must exercise commenced any civil a defense action Annota- does not occur. See that the harm injury sustaining bodily any person 1214, 1216-17 tion, A.L.R.3d at supra, 79 by negligence or unlawful caused death in a (collecting decided courts cases the lat- any police while of officer conduct that this concluding number states scope of his office acting rule). ter is within general is the Co., Pa. however, jury years.”); v. Black Brothers the court did instruct Azzarello (1978) (continuing ap- DeShaney’s A.2d 1020 apply standard in that it should 402A, (Second) prove § Torts Restatement determining whether Panati and products, liability concerning defective strict duty state law. to Simmons under breached a "unreasonably discuss, although holding phrase Instead, court derived the as we dangerous” section from this Restatement it instructed on which standard instructing jury). (1965). (Second) used in not be should Torts from the Restatement Pennsyl- codifies Pennsylvania first section Act Supreme Court I note that 48. sovereign im- prior common-law rule strong historically Restatement vania’s has been a provided Kamrin, munity, stating: “Except otherwise See, e.g., v. 526 Pa. court. Mitzelfelt any ..., agency be liable (1990) (holding local shall no that Restatement A.2d person any injury damages to a 323(a) (Second) provides on account standard for § Torts agen- by any the local property performance caused act determining negligent person.” Bashline, employee other cy thereof or or an injury); Hamit services caused (1982). As we dis- (“Sec- 256, 268, (1978) § 8541 42 cuss, Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. 392 A.2d Pa. *40 eight subsequently sets forth infra, 323(a) the Act been Restatement of has tion of the Torts immunity. general of many rule Pennsylvania exceptions to law of of the employment.” City emphasizes immunity under the PSTCA as a defense to governmental police negligence liability does not fall within cannot be waived as procedural a result of eight statutory exceptions the to the error. sovereign general rule of immuni- PSTCA’s Given this conflict between fed ty. also contends that the Penn- procedure eral holding Skibo’s that an sylvania Supreme Court’s decision in In re immunity waived, defense cannot be it is (Skibo), Upset Properties Sale 522 Pa. necessary to determine which ap controls 230, (1989) 560 A.2d 1388 stands for the pealability of City’s immunity argu proposition legis- that the overrides PSTCA ment. It is well established although immunity, municipal lated waivers of such governs state law the decision of substan City. that of the tive issues diversity federal actions and pendent claims, state the Federal Rules The district court concluded that of Civil Procedure control the resolution of by failing City, immunity argu- to raise the procedural Plumer, issues. Hanna v. support 50(a) inment of its Rule motion for 460, 1136, 14 U.S. 85 S.Ct. (1965); L.Ed.2d 8 verdict, argu- a directed had waived that Yohannon v. Corp., Keene 924 F.2d 1255 grounds granting ment as a its Rule (3d Cir.1991). settled, It equally is how 50(b) post-trial motion for relief. It there- ever, that “choices between state and fed outset, necessary, fore is at the to deter- eral law are to by application be made not preserved mine whether the has any automatic, criterion,” paper’ ‘litmus argument appeal. Based on our exami- but rather principles reference to the nation of the trial brief and of the outcome determination and the deterrence transcript proceedings, of the trial the dis- of forum shopping that underlie Erie Rail correctly trict court determined that Tompkins, 64, road Co. v. 304 U.S. 58 S.Ct. City neglected immunity argu- to raise its 817, (1938). Hanna, 82 L.Ed. 1188 any point prior ment at to its motion for U.S. at at S.Ct. 1141. In determin post-trial jurisprudence relief. Under our Pennsylvania Supreme whether construing prerequisites 50(b) to a Rule procedural Court’s rule prohibiting waiver j.n.o.v, motion for supra see at governmental immunity of a defense to appear thus would to have waived liability is purposes, substantive for Erie appellate consideration immunity of the is- prevail therefore must over our waiver sue. precepts 50(a) 50(b), under Rule however, precepts, Our federal waiver inquiry relevant is Pennsylvania conflict with concerning law application of the rule [state] City’s right immunity argu- to raise its important would make so a difference to appeal. Although ment on raised litigation the character or result of the solely Skibo merits unfairly that failure to enforce it would immunity argument, the decision has against discriminate citizens of the fo- important appellate ramifications as to con- State, application rum or whether City’s possible immunity. sideration of the important rule would have so an effect Skibo, Pennsylvania Supreme Court upon the fortunes of one or both governmental immunity held that is “an litigants that failure enforce it would absolute defense” that cannot be waived likely plaintiff to cause a to choose negligence agreement and that “is [not] the federal court. subject any procedural device that could Hanna, at 468 n. U.S. 85 S.Ct. governmental agency render a liable be- 9; 1142 n. see also Fauber v. KEM Trans- yond exceptions granted by legisla- Co., portation Equipment & ture.” 522 Pa. at 560 A.2d at 1389. (3d Cir.1989) (quoting proper same as Although the City’s argument merits of the inquiry). municipal PSTCA overrides a waiv- immunity certain, er of are unlikely Pennsylvania far from It see 1083-84, supra clearly Skibo stands for would choose federal court for proposition argument that an raising litigation diversity action—or *41 1086 municipal ordinances waiv- validity of combining federal the one as this such action immunity. The district ing substantive claims— negligence state rights with civil that, if it even concluded court therefore a mu probability that on the small based waived, the been procedurally had not raise the fail to would nicipal defendant immunity lacked merit. contention in the immunity under PSTCA of defense motions, thereby 50(b) 50(a) and agree its Rule with the dis- Judge Sloviter concerning argument an

waiving appeal does not that Skibo determine trict court could have immunity that overridden governmental the PSTCA has munici- whether appellate courts. sovereign the state waiving in immuni- pal raised been ordinances gov rule that emphasized, see of Skibo’s district court application ty. As the proce 360, is not ad- immunity defense the court F.Supp. at Skibo ernmental 728 however, waivable, quite likely to counsel for a is issue whether durally dressed of claim unit had waived municipal and the outcome tax influence character immunity by rais- governmental and to of it is relevant defense appeal to which an ap- for the first time on prevailing. defense of litigant’s chances each affect 230, A.2d at Pa. at 560 peal. See 522 agreement in reason, panel is For this agency “a governmental held that Skibo Supreme Court’s Pennsylvania put mercy negligent at the of cannot be for regarded as substantive must rule of a substantive waiver counsel agreed in applied must be purposes and Erie very exist- designed protect its right of consideration appellate permit case (empha- at 560 A.2d at 1389 ence.” Id. Yohan immunity argument. Cf. court, added). referring to The Skibo sis (holding similar non, 1265 for 924 F.2d at Park, 511 Industrial v. Creek delay Pennsylvania law on Gulf Leflar reasons that (1986), held A.2d further Pa. 515 875 for Erie is substantive damages tort governmental immu- that the “[d]efense procedural un although deemed purposes, defense, directly analo- nity is an absolute Brown, law); F.2d at 1106-07 922 der state compen- holding in workmen’s gous to our that, Erie, quali a claim (holding under Id. The and is waivable.” sation cases appealable law is immunity state fied under Leflar, court’s reference Skibo underlying sub conferred only if state has based on the Work- held that a defense suit). immunity from stantive Act, if Compensation even raised man’s fashion, subject to untimely the dis is not waiv- conclude that We therefore er, procedural fo- the limited holding because underscores trict court erred holding. Id. Slovi- immunity argu cus Skibo’s its City failed raise I therefore conclude Skibo ter directed support its motion for a ment in procedural terms waivers confined verdict, argument had waived immunity governmental of the defense j.n.o.v. With motion for purposes of its mistake, inadvertence, through the City’s immuni respect to the merits and that we must agreement of counsel court, however, ty argument, district legislative and its histo- to the PSTCA look distinguished holding, Skibo an alternative to determine whether stat- ry order applies decision basis City’s ordinance that nullifies the ute counsel, not immunity by waivers of liability immunity from waives municipalities. In addi enacted waivers negligence. tion, considered deci the district court detail, decided the two courts sions of and Borenstein As Middleton nullify began history served to the PSTCA has an involved PSTCA Supreme ab- Philadelphia police Pennsylvania waiver ordinance Court’s same Philadelphia sovereign immunity v. as a common- issue olition here— of Philadelphia v. Middleton, Ayala 492 A.2d defense 89 Pa.Cmwlth. law Education, Pa. (1985); Public Philadel Board Borenstein (1973). Middleton, 89 (E.D.Pa.1984) See 305 A.2d phia, F.Supp. —and 764-65; A.2d at of Pa.Cmwlth. persuaded by the determination The Penn- Borenstein, at 858. F.Supp. affect does not courts that statute both

1087 legislature sylvania legislature’s enacted the PSTCA in main concern was to sovereign immunity 1978 to reinstate the possible avoid the devastating effects Borenstein, Ayala had abolished. unpredictable See which an number of law- F.Supp. (citing 858 Carroll v. Coun- suits would have on municipal budgets. York, ty Pa. 437 A.2d 394 indication, There is no however, that the (1981); Note, eight exceptions The Political Subdivision listed in the Act were Pennsylvania’s Tort Claims Act: Re- intended to be exclusive or that local sponse Municipal to the Problems Tort municipalities were forbidden to waive (1980)). Liability, 84 Dickinson L.Rev. 717 immunity granted the by the Act.... PSTCA, City emphasizes, as the [Tjherefore, con- ... the of Philadelphia eight exceptions general tains to its rule of powers acted well within the derived sovereign immunity,49 by none of which from its Home Rule deciding Charter in encompass municipal police their terms that it would inbe the best interest of its waiver, City, implement- such as that of the governmental citizens to waive immunity prior ed to the PSTCA’s enactment.50 in cases bodily injury where or death has resulted from negligent or unlawful whether, We must determine in ad police conduct of its officers. eight exceptions dition to the codified 89 Pa.Cmwlth. at 492 A.2d at 765. general sovereign the PSTCA’s rule of im Judge Sloviter and I find analysis this munity, exceptions legislat that have been persuasive. note, addition, We governments ed permissible local are primary reason that the Joint State under the 'provision statute. No in the Government Sovereign Commission on Im- PSTCA resolves this issue. As the Boren munity gave in proposed legislation noted, however, stein court statutory state retaining sovereign immunity was that municipal legislative limitations on powers, required Commonwealth will not be (1957 see 53 Pa.Stat.Ann. Supp. & § process litigation defend various 1990), “have consistently interpreted been brought against it in areas where risk Pennsylvania place very courts to management totally uncertain at this legislative few restrictions on the authority e.g., exposure radiation strong time — —or of ‘first class cities’ such Philadelphia.” public policy suggests that a continuation F.Supp. at 858. The Borenstein court sovereign of the immunity litiga- bar emphasized also Report of the e.g., tion be arising claims continued — Joint State Government Commission on out possession against of adverse Sovereign Immunity, on which the PSTCA Commonwealth, improper assessment of based, states that the Commission taxes, licensing procedures, etc. agreed that exceptions additional Sovereign Immunity Litigation at 10. general sovereign immunity might rule of arising municipal from a waiver immuni- be added to the statute in the future. Id. ty conduct is not of (citing at 858-59 Joint State Government type. Commission, Report to the Assembly Gen. Pennsylvania, Commonwealth of acknowledge Sloviter and I Sovereign 1978)). Immunity, (May at 10 neither this factor nor the factors reviewed Middleton, Court, the Commonwealth clearly Borenstein Middleton estab- relying Borenstein, thus concluded: lishes that the PSTCA was not intended to walks; care, provides (8) agency custody, 49. The PSTCA that a local or its or control of 8522(b). employees may damages arising animals. 42 Pa.Stat.Ann. § be liable for (1) vehicle; (2) operation from of a motor Philadelphia City originally 50. The Council en- care, custody, personal proper- or control of immunity acted the ordinance in 1962 to waive care, (3) ty; custody, or control of real negligence for the or unlawful conduct of all (4) trees, property; dangerous condition of City employees; the ordinance was amended in signs signals, light- traffic control or and street City's liability arising 1971 to limit the waiver to (5) ing; dangerous utility condition of ser- negligence from the police conduct unlawful facilities; (6) dangerous vice streets; condition of Borenstein, F.Supp. officers. See (7) dangerous condition of side- 857. uniformity destroy interest such would ordinances municipal waiver abrogate cases, rights civil Rule damages federal of a City. In the absence as that damages awarded apply to Pennsylvania Su- does controlling decision at 1206-07. action legislative under section Court preme *43 however, however, Assembly, clearly applicable is to Rule, General The Pennsylvania considered above pendent state claims. the factors damages that we think awarded interpreta- this of in favor n. 21. thus would balance 1207 Savarese tip the id. at See legislative histo- its delay and the statute that the amount of require tion of appear to that the PSTCA hold to ry.51 We therefore in the case reduced damages awarded City’s nullify ordinance to the serve jury’s did not verdict portion of the only cover that negli- the liability arising from waiving plaintiff’s state that is attributable officers. its gence of claims. the failed to raise Because TO ENTITLED PLAINTIFF IV. IS reducing the grounds for as Savarese UNDER DAMAGES DELAY damages in this delay awarded of amount 238? RULE conclude, however, on the case, we based entry of court’s Following district the previously have that we principles waiver verdict, as we plaintiff, on the judgment City has length, the that discussed delay damages un- noted, for moved reduction. right to such We waived the Rule of Civil Procedure Pennsylvania der however, Savarese, have discussed plaintiffs in cer- that 238, provides which cases, that, counsel and the hopes future bodily injury or involving tain civil actions applica of its will take note courts district delay damages be may request that death advisability of re as of the bility, as well damages. compensatory of to awards added ques on federal separate verdicts questing (Pur- Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann., 238 Pa.R.Civ.P. as to facili pendent so claims tion state district court The Supp.1990). don 1987 & damages. delay of the tate calculation damages in delay granted plaintiff $104,687.51 jury’s on the entire amount of V. CONCLUSION $1,000,000. The of damage award 238 on of Rule challenges application sum, my opinion although it is In none of which has grounds, of number the essential to establish plaintiff failed merit.52 her section 1983 ac- of “scienter” element required by City, as against court, tion this argument before At oral trio of cases Supreme Pembaur Court’s of question raised panel sponte sua circuit, this jurisprudence of and the Agriss, v. of Savarese applicability any objection to this failure. Savarese, Cir.1989). waived (3d we In F.2d 1194 of thus falls out The issue scienter application of state that, held because Applying this case, at 1067. supra prejudgment see providing for law substantive appeared that, conflicting although standing statute in this connection 51. We note city immunity, sovereign of provide Middleton, a decision intermediate having pay Pittsburgh from not immune Pennsylvania, was appeals does con- court of issue, City’s damages. delay The second contention it nonetheless is trol the resolution damages delay has of Rule 238 regard” "indicia how award as an entitled to "due precluded Southwestern Rail- highest decide the mat- Monessen court been the state’s would 1837, Ltd., 330, Mines, Morgan, Carey way 486 U.S. 108 S.Ct. Co. v. Canadian ter.” Ciccarelli Cir.1985). (1988), (3d which the United 100 L.Ed.2d 349 prejudgment Supreme Court held States pursuant to Rule not be awarded interest could possesses sover- contention that 52. brought under the Federal action delay damages in an liability 238 Employers' immunity eign from Act, Liability Monessen because Pittsburgh, fails by Pivorotto v. is defeated Pivorotto, City's clearly distinguishable. final con- (1987). is In Pa. 528 A.2d guarantees 238 violates tention Rule Supreme Pennsylvania construed the Court equal protection under the process opera- suspend due Pennsylvania Constitution Pennsylvania Constitutions Court-promul- and United States that conflict with tion of statutes Knight v. rules, disposed our recent decision procedural Rule 238. The gated such as Cir.1991). (3d Inc., Tape, F.2d 627-30 notwith- therefore Pivorotto court held highly opinion, deferential standard of re- er’s as well as in Court’s footnotes 28- weighing whether the evidence 32-34, view represent Judge Beck- support jury’s sufficient to section 1983 response Judge er’s Weis’s dissent.1 against City, I conclude that the verdict Although I agree with analy- some of the at least quan- record contains the minimum Judge thoughtful sis of Becker’s opinion, I necessary of evidence to sustain the tum separately write because of some funda- verdict. jury’s mental differences with Judge addition, I City, by conclude that the Becker’s discussion of the liability. failing preserve objections as re- centers underpinnings One quired the Federal Rules of Civil Proce- analysis regarding proof Becker’s dure, has plain- waived its contention that *44 a plaintiff section 1983 must adduce as to a allege tiff failed to or of establish causes policymaker’s state of mind order to law, action under state and also has waived municipal liability. establish Specifically, I exceptions a of number to the district Judge believe that jury Although emphasis court’s instructions. I Becker’s be- on City preserved objection lieve that the an to production by plaintiff of “scienter-like evi- the court’s instructions on the state-law dence” when charging municipality a with prerequisites special relationship giv- deprivation deliberate indifference to of duty rise to a on Simmons the rights may impose plaintiffs on a heavier police, of the I conclude that the court’s burden than Supreme mandated the fairly instructions on this issue and ade- prior Court or decisions My of this court. quately submitted issue to the other Judge substantial concern is Becker’s Further, jury. although Judge Sloviter treatment of the issue of cost of mini- and have determined that the had mizing eliminating or policies effecting un- right appeal argument to raise on deprivation, constitutional an issue I would it is any liability immune from not reach in this case.2 police negligence Simmons, toward we con- argument clude that lacks merit.

Judge Sloviter judg- has concurred I. ment for the reasons set sepa- forth her conceptual difficulty applying opinion. rate deliberate indifference standard stems denying The district court’s order principle municipalities from the can motions, City’s post-trial judgment its on only policies ap- be liable or customs verdict, delay damages and its award of (who proved by policymakers are defined $104,687.51 in the amount of will af- law). policies state The formulation of firmed. generally regarded is as an intentional act. SLOVITER, Judge, concurring Chief in Therefore, it is anomalous to think in terms judgment. conscious, municipality having of a inten- policy being depri- tional judgment I concur in “indifferent” to join in Part I, III.C, Judge Part and Part rights. IV of Beck- vations of constitutional As the join Judge opin- light phrasing jury interrogatory 1. I do not Part II.A of Becker’s of the (as my ion because in ultimately view of the case he merely required which it to decide whether the concludes) custom, verdict can be policy, regulation "had a or upheld City's liability on the basis of inde- deprived the decedent of his constitutional Therefore, pendent culpability. of Panati’s nei- rights,” Op. see Becker at 1053-54 n. I do not jury's alleged responses ther the inconsistent conceptual discuss whether there ais distinction City's possible nor the with waiver municipal between an unconstitutional custom my them is relevant to agree, vote to affirm. I do policy, Judge opinion or discussed in Becker’s however, Judge with Becker's conclusion II.A.2, train, City's Part and the failure to dis- in Part III.B.l that the waived its claim that they cussed at Part II.A.3. Even if constitute a identify responsible policy- failed to unitary recovery, I believe the evi- claim for charge training. agree holder in I also jury’s support dence is sufficient to verdict Judge analysis Becker’s of the distinction be- on that claim. tween this case and Colburn II as set forth in footnotes 31 and 35. plaintiffs can to those where v. 1983 cases Canton noted Supreme Court of the constitutional 378, 390, defendants knew show S.Ct. Harris, 489 U.S. excluding cases (1989), those may deprivation 1205, 103 L.Ed.2d “[i]t argue that defendants plaintiffs sense to assert where common contrary to seem my it. Nor are known of actually should have will have municipality that a allayed by Judge Becker’s attach- concerns taking steps to reasonable policy of “like” to “scienter.” ment of the suffix neverthe- The Court employees.” train its guidance how to determine provided less opinion Becker’s Nowhere custom. policy there is such liability acknowledgement there the duties that in may happen “[I]t (i.e., City's policymak- may be based employees assigned specific officers er’s) take refusal4 or failure to reckless training is different for more or the need of facts or circumstances which account likely obvious, inadequacy so so known. responsible individuals should have violation constitution- to result in the precedent Nothing in the current city policymakers rights, that al liability suggests Supreme Court been delib- reasonably be said can municipality may not be based on against a (em- need.” Id. erately indifferent the relevant cir- disregard reckless *45 added). phasis cumstances. a munici- recognizes that Judge Becker has been defined as con- Recklessness “acqui- may liable based on pality be of, disregard or indif- duct that “evince[s] longstanding in a of the officials escence” to, under circum- consequences, ference at 1063. Op. Becker practice or custom. involving danger safety to life or stances Nonetheless, identifiable his focus on an intended,” others, or although no harm was “scienter” —a term Su- policymaker’s regard pays that “either no a state of mind in preme City never used Canton Court injurious conse- probably possibly to its of suggests trio of or the Pembaur which, foreseeing though such quences, or cases3 — intentional course of prove need to an spite of such consequences, persists Keeton, The Law action. Prosser & 1142-43. Failure of a knowledge.” Id. at of Cf. 107, (5th 1984) (gen- at 741-43 ed. Torts duty guard § municipality to fulfill a “intent” in erally equating “scienter” with against harm when its offi- a foreseeable actions). misrepresentation tortious knowledge of circumstances cials have likely clearly making harm is reckless purposes “scien- Admittedly, for some culpable conduct. in- may encompass action other than ter” Township Dictionary Upper Darby v. Black’s Law Colburn tentional action. 663, (3d I), (Colburn F.2d 670 Cir. including “the defen- 838 the term as defines 1988), yet had not noted that we knowledge of the cause we previous dant’s between, define, of, distinguish nor injury complained or occasion to led to the indifference,” as “deliberate knowledge a state of such terms previous his of rather indif- disregard,” and “reckless guard his “reckless facts which it was 1983 civil ference” in the context of section omission to do which has against, and his repeated We that state- rights litigation. injury complained of.” Black’s led to the (5th 1979). Borough v. West ed. ment Williams Dictionary 1207 Law of 458, (3d Chester, F.2d 464 n. 10 Cir. Nonetheless, equa- 891 because of the common 1989), action, decided after I which was with intentional tion of “scienter” of Supreme trio of and the Pembaur Becker’s use of Canton am concerned Although these observations limiting section Court cases.5 be misread as the term will Dist., 701, distinguished from what he denominates Indep. U.S. 4. As v. Dallas School 491 3.Jett type 2702, “particularly willful of recklessness.” (1989); S.Ct. 105 L.Ed.2d 598 109 112, Praprotnik, U.S. 108 S.Ct. Louis v. 485 St. "gross negli- 5. We need not decide 915, (1988); Pembaur v. L.Ed.2d 107 liability gence" because is itself a standard Cincinnati, 106 S.Ct. 475 U.S. event, is, evidentiary significance. any See (1986). L.Ed.2d 452 I, (quoting Doe v. F.2d at 670 n. 4 Colburn made in the context of individual offi- (a were 109 S.Ct. at city may be found to be suicides, liability jail cers’ rather than deliberately indifferent if “the need ... liability, municipal the context of there is obvious, ... and the inadequacy ... likely proof why no reason the standard of to result in the violation of constitutional “deliberate indifference” should dif- rights”). ferent for the latter. rely would not on the City’s waiver of Eighth context, Amendment In the the absence of scienter-like sup- evidence to where the deliberate indifference standard port Instead, affirmance. using the City used, prerequisite is also as the albeit to a standard, Canton I would hold that the punishment, of cruel unusual claim jail evidence of 20 suicides Philadelphia plaintiff can demonstrate that the defen prisons 1980-85, between of whom 15 were deliberately dant was by prov indifferent intoxicated, the City’s possession of knowl- deprivation either intentional edge before 1981 that intoxicated detainees “by rights showing that he acted in presented high suicide, risk of its aware- disregard reckless of those rights”; published ness of standards pre- for suicide can be showing established vention, and its failure implement faced pervasive “was with a of harm risk experts, recommendations of including its and that failed to reason [the defendant] director of mental health services for the ably respond to that Bailey risk.” v. prison system, was sufficient basis for the Wood, (8th Cir.1990); 909 F.2d jury to have found that unnamed officials also Penfold, see Richardson 839 F.2d responsibility over prisons (7th Cir.1988); 394-95 Berg v. Kinche acted recklessly or with deliberate indiffer- loe, (9th Cir.1986). ence, thereby contributing depriva- nothing I find Canton or the tion of rights constitutional plaintiff’s *46 Pembaur trio of cases that calls on us to decedent. If city a cannot be held liable our jurisprudence revise established hold- policymakers when had prob- notice of a ing that deliberate can indifference be act, lem and failed to then it difficult is to proven by demonstrating the defendants’ posit a set of on which city facts a could be

reckless conduct. In Jett v. Indep. Dallas held to have deliberately been indifferent. Dist., 701, School 737, 491 U.S. 109 S.Ct. 2702, 2723, (1989), 105 L.Ed.2d 598 for in- II. stance, the Court stated that once official policymakers are identified by the trial I have a por- similar concern about the judge, “it is for to determine Judge tions of opinion Becker’s referring to whether their decisions have caused the balancing City of officials’ decisions deprivation rights of at by acqui- issue ... concerning “resource allocation” deter- in a longstanding practice escence or cus- mining whether the breached a consti- tom which constitutes the operat- ‘standard See, duty. e.g., tutional Op. Becker at ing procedure’ governmental of the local agree 1069-70. I “municipal While entity.” acquiescence Proof such might of officials often have to make difficult deci- be reckless as as well intentional conduct. sions concerning security, institutional as Supreme suggested Court has not as the well of allocation resources” to en- actual knowledge of the conditions safety, citizens’ sure id. at I do not municipal a policymaker is a condition of believe that Wolfish, Bell v. 441 U.S. municipal liability. Such a would (1979), standard upon 99 S.Ct. 60 L.Ed.2d 447 put premium a Judge on blinders. If relies, Beck- Judge Becker made a munici- emphasis er’s is scienter read to exclude pality’s decisions about resource allocation liability for conditions that City officials or cost efficiency a central factor for con- known, have should it would be inconsist- sideration in determining the courts Canton, ent with at U.S. a municipality’s whether indif- deliberate of Services, New York Dep't Social strong presumption creates a indif- deliberate (2d Cir.1981) (“gross ference")). negligent conduct 528-29, 99 sleeping. Id. at S.Ct. signed needs safety the medical ference hold- Simmons, This is far different from culpable. at 1868-69. is detainees, such officials’ discretion- administrative condi- Bell, held that the Court In concerning alloca- ary resource decisions de- pretrial to which of incarceration tions depriva- legitimate excuse for are a tion pro- due violate subjected may be tainees rights. question of constitutional tions “punish- they constitute only when cess constitutionally “toler- city can whether 535-37, at 441 U.S. of the detainee. ment” relatively number smaller ate some provided The Court at 1871-73. 99 S.Ct. (em- suicides,” Op. at 1071 yearly Becker inquiry: guidance for added), from is different phasis disabili- whether the decide A court must into account the seri- City has taken “the purpose punish- for the imposed ty is detainees and needs suicidal ous medical it an incident of is but ment or whether steps protect all reasonable taken pur- legitimate governmental some other them, security, fiscal and other showing of an ex- pose_ Absent Op. Becker at 1071 n. constraints.” part of punish on the pressed intent case, plain- jury’s for the verdict officials, facility that determi- detention jury’s determination that tiffs reflects will turn on “whether generally nation do all it could reason- did not re- purpose which an alternative [the ably done. those circum- Under connected is may rationally be striction] stances, opinion in this I see no need it, appears whether it assignable prece- Supreme Court decide whether in relation alternative excessive signifies Becker relied on dent Thus, if a ... assigned purpose it].” [to high cost of of the con- consideration pre- or restriction of particular condition may used as a compliance stitutional reasonably related to trial detention for a violation. justification constitutional objective, legitimate governmental cynical merely that it would be note more, not, “pun- amount does without just how much inquiry indeed to ascertain ishment.” saving City justifies its “tolera- cost Thus, 538-39, 99 S.Ct. 1873-74. Id. death of one preventable tion” “legitimate gov- in Bell to a the reference public only man detained because young merely to ascer- objective” was ernmental intoxication. *47 pre- imposed on whether the conditions tain Although I differences with have other “punishment.” amount to trial detainees opinion, rely princi- on the Judge Becker’s may justifi- there be noted that The Court my decision pal set forth above for reasons other detention cations conditions judgment in the of the court but to concur at presence insuring the detainee’s than opinion. Becker’s my joinder limit government’s from the trial. These stem facility manage to which need WEIS, Judge, dissenting. Circuit detained, require may is which individual my approach points are Two critical security order at “steps to maintain First, the committed decedent case. weap- no and make certain the institution injured or killed suicide—he was not as well drugs illicit reach detainees” ons or charged against The sin is police. necessary to effective as other “the actions Second, commission, not but omission. facility.” Id. management the detention fails to deliberate indif- evidence establish 1874. S.Ct. City of Philadel- ference Bell was The context this discussion in phia. legitimacy for and the need to evaluate plaintiffs the custodial restrictions I. i.e., receipt prohibitions on challenged, demonstrate indif- record does not food and as well as magazines books and clearly shows contrary, items; body cavity after ference—to personal searches po- City, through to its directives visitation; inspection procedures; and that the room officers, adopted policy to limit had not de- lice bunking detainees areas safety or eliminate suicides that occurred its prisoners of officers and is paramount.” jails. policy That the had not been com- successful, through pletely non- “Appendix Department C” to Police Di- negligence paucity actionable or a of re- rective 82 is dated November 1983. It sources, does not make out a case delib- undisputed is Appen- Directives 82 and erate indifference. dix in effect in C were Custody persons intoxicated not a “Appendix “Policy” C” lists as the admo- matter of isolated incidents in the of nition contained the 1982 training bulle- Philadelphia. year In the five responsible statistical tin that those for custodial care period precautions that the chose to are to take establish to ensure pris- case, 97,141 oners do not injury for her there were inflict on arrests for themselves or others. During repeated Also are period, intoxication. that same fif- the instruction “any property remove persons may teen of those committed suicide be used ... personal injury pris- custody, while in percentage rate of inflict ” oner [emphasis or others in original] and .00015. That is not to minimize the seri- “belts, ties, reference to such items as life, point ousness of loss of but to out that addition, shoelaces.” In “Appendix [and] imposition of a deliberate indifference states, C” possible, “Whenever a minimum test as municipality is not unreason- (2) prisoners of two are to placed in a able in the circumstances here. cell/detention room.” Two exhibits in evidence show that Phila- Moreover, the Directive contained in- delphia policy did have an affirmative inspection structions for of cell blocks: protect prisoners. A bulletin dated March “1. inspection The time of each is to be 11, 1982 entitled “Assist Officer” issued recorded Log (75-297) on the Prisoner Philadelphia Department Police Train- and will be conducted as follows: ing Bureau “pris- addressed the matter of a. Lieutenant ranking supervi- or other stated, safety” oner personnel “Police inspect sor will the cell block at least responsible for the custodial care of defen- during duty. twice the tour of dants take necessary precautions will all Operations Supervisor inspect b. will prisoners ensure that do not inflict harm to every the cell block hour. themselves or others.” Turnkeys c. inspect and/or trainees will Under “Removal of Articles” the bulletin the cell blocks at 15-minute intervals as requires arresting both the officer and the Operations scheduled Supervisor.” turnkey prisoner to search the and “re- These conclusively documents refute move all prisoner articles with which the suggestion police department may injure himself or others while custo- adopted precautions safeguard dy_ Particular giv- attention should be *48 prisoners from self-inflicted harm. To the following: en to the contrary, the had taken deliberate a. Ties steps to reduce the risk of detainee su- b. Belts icides. Laces_” c. Shoe A review of the suicide record is reveal- say: The bulletin went on to ing. people 1980 four arrested for in- “There have prison- been incidents when city jails; toxication in committed suicide attempted pants ers have to use one; two; 1983, 3; 1984, one; hang shirts to themselves. Officers will 1985, significant drops four. There were not limit their observations to the above. years the 1981 and 1984 and an increase in Suspects in a cell should be considered explanation 1985. The record contains no capable causing harm to themselves or variations, for these nor does the evidence despite others precautions. the above reveal the whether deaths were occasioned Therefore, imperative it is for all officers by negligence part jail personnel, involved to be comply familiar and with or whether Directives were violated. D, statistics, Inspections. therefore, Directive Cell Block The do not demon- argues that based liability. She 1982 basis in the policy set out that strate prior prisoner solely on statistics addition- or that ineffective was Directives suicides, not should have known required. training was al only that the decedent was suicidal but that obligation City had jailer, the hisAs inadequate. policies its were seri- decedent’s indifferent not be Essentially, position her is that the question is needs, first but ous medical deliberately it did was indifferent because demonstrated had the decedent existing policy its in the supplement not record is need. The any medical serious frequency a suicide for intoxicated face of no knowl- police had that unequivocal That is at a tenu- of .00015. best detainees history had decedent edge that the prepared I argument that am not ous Indeed, his instability. illness mental accept. any symptoms never noticed family had completely silent on the is the record Darby Upper v. This Court Colburn the time he health. At mental decedent’s II”), (“Colburn Township, District custody of the into the Sixth came Cir.1991), (3d that “several observed result of the Jail, as a he intoxicated was recently pointed our circuits have sister consumption of alco- voluntary, excessive ‘reckless or deliber- requirement out conduct, Pa- according to Officer hol. His must implies that there ate indifference’ nati, markedly differ- turnkey, was not likelihood, a mere rather than strong ‘a persons who had intoxicated ent than other will oc- possibility, that self-inflicted harm ” previously. committed been Maloney, 923 also Torraco v. cur.’ See Cir.1991). (1st suicide F.2d where quite unlike those case is This detainees of intoxicated frequency of, knowledge jailers had actual individual to establish that as a “class” .00015 fails suspect tendencies reason to suicidal or had “strong such a presented these detainees In those specific detainees. on committing suicide likelihood” of turnkey cases, of a defendant the conduct taking in not addition- City was indifferent under deliberate measured has been II, at 1026 precautions. al Colburn Cf. purposes of sec- standard for indifference (the unwilling was on record Court here to remem- important It is tion 1983. equate intoxication with case liability determining the ber that suicide”); vulnerability “particular City, question is not whether Officer (4th Oliver, F.2d Belcher (the deliberately indifferent Panati Cir.1990). not), whether the he was but jury found adopted or policymakers Philadelphia had majority’s position here is inconsist- indiffer- policy of deliberate followed to dis- attempt ent II The with Colburn unper- ence.1 tinguish points case on minor address basic suasive because it fails to argue not does Plaintiff opinion. thrust of prisoners it protect those failed to policy Moreover, if the suicidal, the fact remains urges rather she were knew department policy unprecedented followed the a far broader and this Court theory appropriate time. The waiver of accept Becker’s conclusion that do A, however, argument way right argue theory has waived no because plaintiff to establish the element of scien- theory failed B puts evidence to defeat into the record *49 ter, necessary prove element of the facts (which waived). A void in record not the was plaintiff’s case must be assumed to be estab- the evidence. cannot filled non-existent be logical sequitur a non to conclude It is lished. Therefore, right argue the even if it waived legal theory argument based waiver of a theory judgment lack of for scienter, n.o.v. on the of thereby the establishes existence facts certain City example, concede the did not argument defeat an on another facts to of those theory. (non-produced) the of existence evidence way, points party if a Put another theory be used to defeat its could in the certain evidence is not the fact that record, produce establish failed to sufficient evidence to argues that absence that theo- and from City imple- inadequacy the the of the measures may ry applies, fail on that he nevertheless A 29, e.g., page legal to raise the mented. See n. because of failure contention

1095 in some- extra surveillance in cases where suicide decedent a cell with placed attempts else, anticipated. Although District Jail could at the Sixth be one location, likely City suicides, suicide history had a of detainee or some other the Court occurred. decided that would not have directives policymakers showed that had taken opined that plaintiffs experts steps prevent such incidents. Even if variety of mea- City could have taken had undertaken its negli- initiative in- potentially suicidal provide sures to gently, that fact did not establish deliber- suggested mea- prisoners. toxicated indifference, ate nor did the failure to build plexiglass place screens sures included suicide-proof cell. bars, monitors,2 of some cell audio or video in Popham City v. turnkeys Similarly, of the desk to an area Tallade relocation of block, ga, calling police 1561, (11th Cir.1990), within the cell 908 F.2d personnel from street to assist con- procedures Court held that the standard prison- officials, by jail stant observation when intoxicated followed “removal of shoe laces, belts, socks, put not in a cell with other pocket ers could be contents persons. demonstrate an effort pris to assure [the safety and a lack of deliberate indif oner’s] and other Opinions of this Court Courts case, ference.” In that the intoxicated expert evidence Appeals have held that prisoner hung himself a corner of the support not a claim of of this nature does cell not viewed a closed circuit television by municipality. deliberate indifference camera. Chester, Borough v. West Williams In Pa., (3d Cir.1989), 458, F.2d 467 & n. 14 Rellergert Cape County, v. Girardeau of the Mo., allegations 794, the Court concluded (8th Cir.1991), 924 F.2d was Borough’s require that detainees’ failure to yet jail Rejecting another suicide case. equipment belts removed or to install contention that the evidence established de surveillance of the cell block for visual indifference, the Court remarked liberate area, funds for han- appropriate failure to “[ijndifference apathy or uncon dling prob- detainees mental health prisoner cern.” That the there was able to lems, train in han- and failure to officers eyes jailer evade the cautious of the for a dling prob- mental health detainees with time, change period brief “does not most, lems, amounted, negligence import policy value and to the con not indifference. deliberate trary.” Although cautionary measures prescribed failed and the actions of the Upper contrast, Darby v. In Colburn jailers might negligent, “no have been view I”), (“Colburn Township 838 F.2d support of the evidence can conclusion (3d Cir.1988), presented allegations that the deliberately policy indiffer of the detainee’s suicidal tend- knew Id.; Stigers, see also Bell v. ent.” attempts, previous encies and failed but did 1340, 1343 (8th Cir.1991) (“The F.2d deliber against proper steps protect her take only ate standard is met if there were a herself. likelihood, possi mere ‘strong rather than a Appeals have reached Other Courts bility,’ of harm would that self-infliction the same result as we did Williams. In result.”). Cleveland, Molton short, denied, undisputed evidence is that cert. (6th Cir.1988), 489 U.S. positive Philadelphia did take 103 L.Ed.2d 814 109 S.Ct. It had a (1989), promulgated steps prevent prisoner suicides. directives Directives to the requiring policy expressed of detainees’ belts and removal Indeed, may heighten depersonaliz- publications expert, 2. One of the cited their use Lindsay Hayes, having ing aspects M. And Darkness ClosesIn ... A confinement —the inmate Suicides, Study & National Jail 10 Crim.Just. a disembodied monitor or loud- to ‘relate’ to "Isolation, (1983), Behav. comments: speaker.” The article also describes several in- *50 systems television monitors and intercom are despite this where suicides occurred stances jail designed more for the convenience of often technology. personnel, for the benefit of the inmate. and not Gilbert, (11th 867 F.2d Cir. from self destruc- v. inmates protect 1989) (“The require jail not offi- could have law does policy Whether tive acts. City keep up with the latest literature whether cials more effective or been sciences.”); to the Beddingfield resources the social v. more have devoted should cf. Pulaski, Tenn., bearing on wheth- 861 F.2d may City some problem negligently (6th Cir.1988). acted municipality er the —it of deliberate make out a case does not Concluding that there was insufficient be both deliber- cityA cannot indifference. liability establish evidence to deliberately indifferent. ately cautious and 1983, I enter under section would (defendant at 797 F.2d Rellergert, judgment in its favor on that count. policymaker). sued as Sheriff (whose experts rec- testimony of the II. agreed respects in some ommendations ques- agree Becker that the with Directives), by the aided with City’s immunity from state tort tion of the by hindsight, was wisdom endowed differ, properly us. I how- claims before deliberate indifference. enough to establish ever, majority with the result the reaches. suffice to allow the did the evidence Nor Act The Political Subdivision Tort Claims City’s decision to allo- jury to override the by Pennsylvania legisla- was enacted among prob- its limited resources cate to a decision of the state ture reaction pressing perhaps more lem and other Supreme abolishing sovereign immu- Court needs. nity Ayala as a defense in tort actions. positive City policy, In the face of the Educ., Pa. Philadelphia Bd. Pub. alleged little need be said address (1973). provides 305 A.2d 877 The Act train, accurately give more failure to or “Except provided otherwise in this that: training. Panati had re- Officer better subchapter, agency no local shall be liable training concededly years some be- ceived any damages any injury on account of fore, years had the benefit of but in recent property by any act person to a or caused published and directives bulletin agency employee an of the local thereof in 1982. person.” other Pa.Cons.Stat. the decedent here exhibited some That agency” Ann. “Local is defined as 8541. § agitation confined to the cell does not while government “A unit other than the Com- that his conduct was demonstrate either government.” 42 monwealth Pa.Cons.Stat. or a need in intoxicated individuals unusual Ann. § Likewise, training. the ex- for additional “exceptions” grant of munici- testimony symptoms that the exhibit- pert’s pal immunity permit tort actions to be pro- ed decedent were consistent with vehicles, brought motor based on the use of is of little value in file of suicidal detainees lights, dangerous or on conditions of traffic determining City’s liability. No su- streets, lights, municipal utility sys- street at that station so far as icides had occurred per- Additionally, tems. claims related to arresting the record reveals and neither the possession property sonal or real Panati found the detainee’s officers nor may brought. not be political subdivision they had actions to be different than others custody previously. undisputed It is of Philadel- in their agency” phia is a “local and that none of Moreover, city required was not statutory exceptions grant medically prisoners train officers to screen immunity applicable. The issue is are latter to detect suicidal tendencies. “The Philadelphia has the experienced skills of an medi- requires the provisions of the Act power to waive the training, professional psychiatric cal municipal pre-existing ordi- means of beyond required of the ability aver- nance. age police process the due officer Galveston, Tex., specific It is fundamental that absent clause.” Burns v. (5th city may not Cir.1990); provision a en- Edwards constitutional

1097 contrary leg- Relying reasoning to state ordinance the Boren- act a valid case, municipal corporation is but stein divided Commonwealth islation. Court of, by, Pennsylvania created in City Philadelphia and subservient of subdivision of Middleton, 362, 89 Pa.Commw. 492 to the state. A.2d (1985), 763 sustained the ordinance. The Philadelphia city has been denominated a pointed 802(c) dissent out that section of legislature first class of the the Torts Act as originally Claims enacted granted powers by certain a Home Rule provided that “all other parts acts or of 53, Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 13101- Charter. §§ repealed acts are any extent of in- despite provides 13157. Section 13133 consistency.” 492 A.2d at In conferred, city grant powers of “no event, the dissent felt that a local ordinance to, contrary powers shall exercise could not be sustained when it contradicted of, enlargement powers grant- limitation or state law. Assembly which ed acts of the General are— recognize that the decision of the Com- Pennsylvania

monwealth of Court is enti- great nevertheless, respect, tled to I am (b) every part Applicable of the Com- by opinions convinced Supreme of the monwealth. Pennsylvania Court of that it would decide (c) of the Applicable to all cities Com- question immunity of in a manner con- monwealth.” trary to Borenstein and Middleton. applicable The Tort Act Claims Supreme upheld The state Court the con- throughout the state and extends to all stitutionality of the Tort Claims Act Car- scope municipalities. It has a broad York, 363, County roll v. 496 Pa. 437 clearly implements policy. statewide (1981). A.2d 394 There an inmate of a Nevertheless, Chapter an ordinance at 21- detention center committed suicide. The Code, Philadelphia 700 of the enacted be- conferring Court commented that “the effect, Act came fore the Tort Claims into upon immunity political tort subdivisions is purports to allow the to waive scope Legislature’s within the au- governmental immunity for defense of Further, thority.” Id. 437 A.2d at 396. by police officers. torts committed said, “Manifestly, Court is within Philadelphia, In Borenstein v. province Legislature to determine (E.D.Pa.1984), F.Supp. 853 the district 595 are, judg- that certain to suit in its bars court concluded that the could choose ment, operation needed for the of local immunity despite language to waive of government.” Id. at 397. the Tort Claims Act. The court reasoned Center, Study In Mascaro v. Youth give up immunity decision 351, 1118, 1123(1987), Pa. A.2d another particular defense in a class of cases awas case, detention center the Court reversed “peculiarly matter of local concern” and the Commonwealth Court and held that Supreme noted that the state Court had Philadelphia immune. Section “Since imposed legislative few restrictions on the proviso] exception real is an estate [the authority Philadelphia. The cases cited immunity, the rule of we believe that its support the district court of that given narrowly interpreted extent must be proposition, Zoning Dist. v. Bd. School expressed legislative intent to insulate 277, Adjustment, 417 Pa. 207 A.2d 864 political liability.” from tort subdivisions (1965); Philadelphia, 387 Ebald v. (1957); Rigid adherence to the Tort Claims Act is Pa. A.2d 352 In re Addi son, (1956), ap forcefully Upset 122 A.2d 272 demonstrated In re 385 Pa. dismissed, (“Skibo”), A.2d 1388 peal 522 Pa. U.S. S.Ct. Sale (1957), (1989), again reversed the 1 L.Ed.2d 316 were concerned with where the court case, zoning personnel management, topics Court. Commonwealth County may Hampton North well be classified as matters of tax claim unit of question immunity purely local interest. first raised the *52 taxpayers, Philadelphia taxpayers, just refused not Supreme Court appeal. The state by immunity.3 stating: are affected a waiver of waiver find an effective Supreme state far has their immu- The thus here is one reason Court “Perhaps waived; application consistent in its governmental been nity cannot be mercy immunity by of conferred put at the the Tort Claims agency cannot be persuaded this case to agreed by waiver counsel of Act. am were negligent or to that Court it hold right designed protect presented would a substantive be existence_ gov- Philadelphia super- ordinance was Defense of very According- de- Act. immunity is an absolute seded the Tort Claims ernmental holding fense, analogous judgment to our should be entered favor of directly ly, and is claims.4 compensation cases on the state tort in workmen’s waivable, In- Le Fiar v. Creek Gulf 574, Park, A.2d 875 511 Pa. dustrial (1986), subject any procedural nor is governmental render a

device that could beyond exceptions

agency liable legislature.”

granted 1389; see also Gardner v.

560 A.2d at SEPTA, Corp. Pa. Rail Consolidated MUTUAL INSURANCE NATIONWIDE (1990) (the 1016, 445, 1018 n. 4 573 A.2d COMPANY, Appellant, again repeated its admonition Court once immunity exceptions grant to the v. construed). narrowly were be Anne Marie BUDD-BALDWIN. Upset In re: cannot be dismissed Sale No. 91-1171. procedural holding. It’s admonition a mere Appeals, States Court of United governmental agency may not that a Third Circuit. immunity agreed deprived through strong counsel is a indication waiver 12(6) Under Third Circuit Rule Submitted not countenance a the Court would July 1991. by a council either. waiver Decided 1991. Oct. immunity municipalities Tort is not a purely local Philadel- matter of concern for

phia the cases discussed in Boren- as were Philadelphia’s precarious financial

stein. pleas for aid from the

condition and its legislature make it obvious that state

state therefore, asking interesting years it be after the decisions I assume is not 3.It Middleton, City finally applied in Borenstein to this case. repealed the waiver ordinance on October preamble repealer The to the stated that legislature permitted 4.In cases where the has intentional, however, waiver was not "[s]uch since the cause the municipalities, brought against suit to be Act, predated ordinance and be- $500,- damages capped amount of has been has not re-examined this issue 8553(b); Smith § 129, 000. See 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. passage legislatively since the Tort [the City Philadelphia, A.2d 306 512 Pa. further, Claims And continued ex- Act].” “[t]he dismissed, (1986), appeal U.S. waiving immunity, ordinance istence of a (1981). repealed S.Ct. 94 L.Ed.2d general governmental enacted at a time when city purports only prevent city ordinance immunity prevailed, anomaly is an pleading governmental immunity as a de- from judicial governmental immunity abolition of fense, says nothing with but Assembly's subsequent and the General creation damages might be recovered. amount of governmental immunity carefully craft- legislature Clearly, intended to limit exceptions.” ed exposure municipalities where it did in cases Although repealer applies that it states damages. city has not allow a suit for actions," pending "all civil did not ad- point appeal. raised that on this and, vise this Court of the Council's action

Case Details

Case Name: Delores Simmons, Administratrix of the Estate of Daniel La Friscoe Simmons v. The City of Philadelphia Police Officer A. Panati, Badge No. 2587
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date Published: Nov 21, 1991
Citation: 947 F.2d 1042
Docket Number: 90-1118
Court Abbreviation: 3rd Cir.
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