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Delores Brown v. Clarence Trigg and Indiana Attorney General
791 F.2d 598
7th Cir.
1986
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*1 only person type where the was the defendant of rebuttal evidence only that Adkins give. who the to which the could rebut could This is strongest Adkins' argu Compare ment, but, Hastings, although state referred. may matter not be (prosecutor doubt, F.2d at 301 said no one free had from we do not believe that his occurred; rapes only defendants silence at trial is the “natural and neces this), Rothman, sary” could do with 567 F.2d at inference to be drawn from these (other could witnesses rebut evidence remarks. is This case like United numbers). telephone Subject as (7th to these Buege, States v. 578 F.2d Cir.), limitations, prosecu- denied, Fifth Amendment cert. 439 U.S. may failings tor comment on the where the unrebutted testimony defense.6 was about the contents of tele phone government call between the witness prosecution’s Adkins divides the and the defendant. isNor it like Hastings, groups: comments three direct into refer supra, where testimony unrebutted testify; ences to his failure to indirect ref rapes that victims that had oc erences; and references to the State’s case curred, Burke, supra, or which involved a group This last unrefuted. consists of prosecution conversation between a wit the prosecutor’s statement that “The ness and the defendant. Unlike those only state’s evidence is the evidence in the cases, it is not hard imagine that others case,” and question, a rhetorical “Ladies might knowledge besides Adkins have Gentlemen, case, if that wasn’t the possession his property, of the especially why say we We rest?”. do not believe that since keeping he was not it at his home at general “naturally these statements would Thus, the time it that, was found. we hold necessarily” jury remind the that Ad although problematic, some were none of testify. kins did not What Adkins refers to prosecutor’s comments to which Adkins as the direct and indirect references relate objects violated his Fifth and Fourteenth piece testimony to one of evidence: that privilege. Amendment possession Adkins was found in property judgment of the district court First, belonging to prosecu the victim. Affirmed. tor noted that this was unrebut ted and said that “the defense should have

put they witnesses on the if stand could

have.” phrase Adkins claims that “if

they “unequivocal could have” refer legal

ence to the infirmity,” defendant’s

fact that he could not without risk ing inculpatory the admission of his state BROWN, Petitioner-Appellant, Delores Appellant’s ment. Brief at 29. We cannot agree. Especially in view of the fact that Attorney Clarence TRIGG and Indiana prosecutor (in said plu-. “witnesses” General, Respondents-Appellees. ral), we think that the natural inference is No. 85-2449. they “if any that she meant had favorable witnesses.” Appeals, United States Court of question

There is a closer with this Seventh state- Circuit. objects ment and another to which Adkins Argued Feb. 1986. explain possession his of the —“[D]oes May Decided 1986. property? explanation, We have heard no put no have witness on the stand to inferentially tell happened.” us what might

These be indirect references to the innocence, supra, prosecutor As may noted prove also Adkins must his it but imply that judge’s the defense jury carries shares the found that the corrections and the proof. burden of the enough The district court found prejudice instructions were clear that no prosecution improperly suggested appealed ruling. resulted. Adkins has not *2 Leatherman, Mehl, Mehl,

Thomas M. Bee- Leatherman, Goshen, Ind., peti- son & for tioner-appellant. Office, Wente, Atty.

Robert B. General’s Indianapolis, Ind., respondents-appel- for lees. COFFEY, CUDAHY

Before Circuit EVANS, Judges, Judge.* District EVANS, TERENCE T. District Judge. of two Delores Brown was convicted felony of murder in the Circuit counts County, of Indiana. The Elkhart Court by the Indiana convictions were affirmed State, Brown v. Court, Supreme (Ind.1983). for petition Brown’s N.E.2d corpus of habeas the issuance a writ States District Court United Northern District Indiana. She for the denial appealing here the district court’s petition. We affirm. appeal: issues us on this Two are before first, improperly whether the state court regarding psychological evidence excluded second, capacity; Brown’s mental improperly admit- trial court whether trial, ted, during testimony that a by at- examiner hired Brown’s polygraph given during juvenile court torney had hearing. hearing That resulted waiver Brown, crimes at the time the * Evans, designation. Judge T. District Honorable Terence Wisconsin, sitting for the Eastern District committed, probability doing to adult that he is being waived so.” I.C. were 35-41-2-2-(b). jury, for trial. convinced that § charged, Brown committed crimes charges against Brown arose out of guilty felony found her of two counts of tragic Septem- that occurred events murder. was 16 1980. At that time Brown ber small child. years old mother of a and the trial, attempted *3 her mother and two She lived with own intelligence other introduce test scores and story in frame younger brothers a two an psychological evidence in effort to show Elkhart, Apparently in Indiana. house know, that she did not at the time she relationship mother was with her Brown’s fire, endanger started the that she would mother and her often not the best. Brown evidence, psychological human The life. Brown’s cur- argued things over such maintains, she would have tended show to boyfriend, and her school attendance rent grade level, at a that she functioned fourth 2, Brown, September On performance. and IQ had an men of was borderline high sophomore, went to who was a school tally retarded. The trial court the excluded per- morning in the but left without school evidence, reasoning that it was irrelevant 5 home at mission at 11 a.m. She returned insanity because Brown had not raised an by her mother p.m., and was confronted defense, because rec Indiana does not regarding her unauthorized absence from capacity ognize a diminished defense. argument An While this school. followed. by excluding Brown evi contends the mother, on, going her to unbeknownst unconstitutionally dence the trial court de plans had made to home with Brown leave opportunity nied the to her demonstrate They boyfriend. planned her child and her not “knowingly.” that she did act Pontiac, to her go Michigan, boy- to where that Indiana the Brown claims law and job had a an In apartment. friend ruling deprived trial her of con court’s her preparation departure, for Brown had right prosecution’s stitutional to rebut the couple with things a of packed suitcases proof on an element of the offense herself and items were baby. for her The charged. review of her Our contention in her stored mother’s car. Israel, guided by v. Muench 715 F.2d approximately p.m. evening, Cir.1983). (7th We held in a Muench that gone her to after brothers mother constitutionally compelled to state is not bed, gasoline brought Brown of into can recognize capaci the defense of diminished intentionally house. She then either in ty. petitioners not Muench were spilled gas or accidentally some poured permitted psychiatric to introduce testimo living carpet. room said that ny purpose proving for of lacked wipe up gasoline, to she tried some of capacity to form intent men because of gas- struck lit the then a match and but tal defect. The rationale for this is the rule carpet. says oline-soaked She she then questionable utility psy of psychiatric and blanket, to smother the fire with a but tried in chological assessing evidence the effect quickly spread There that it out control. (in of a mental condition an Muench it was testimony to that she was also the effect personality”) on “inadequate capacity to sleeping alert her but tried brothers form at the time a com to intent crime is grabbed She then child and failed. her Camp F.2d mitted. 715 at see also house. clothes and ran from the Her some (11th Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1573 bell escaped, her died. mother but brothers Cir.1984); Kepreos, United States — Cir.1985), results, may (1st If person death be F.2d 961 cert. denied —, in murder felony Indiana of for U.S. convicted knowingly why committing proffered arson circum see no reason Brown’s under We evidence, IQ instance, endanger per life. A for human would stances questionable “knowingly” if, utility. he “... en son acts when be similar Were conduct, admitted, might in gages high of a to be one he aware this evidence It is consider that best interests of the would lead. the road where wonder picture safety community and welfare of the are farfetched, example, to for too evidence, generally calling public’s ability served state, rebutting this in obtain information about: who would educator stand an to the IQ being tests as unreliability of (1) alleged to the commission of an act against some members culturally slanted if felony be murder or a com- that would dissent, urging that the society. adult; mitted ... received, notes that the issue be Supreme found that The Indiana Court IQ tests to use of standard is the “... Thomberg’s testimony did not admission psy- intellectual and defendant’s establish public policy statutory violate Indiana level.” We be- function cho-educational place question law. It is not our lieve, however, guilt determining that the of Indiana law. construction proceedings is not phase of criminal argument Brown’s based on attor kind of venture into place where this *4 ney-client privilege work-product and testing academic murky world of counsel hired Thorn- must fail. Brown’s court, pursued. The state we be should polygraph testify berg to administer a and believe, its discretion in ex- did not abuse hearing. juvenile court waiver at cluding psychological evidence that was Thomberg agent was Brown’s attor here. offered ney, protected by and as such was concerns Brown’s con- The second claim attorney-client privilege. United States v. improperly ad- the trial court tention that Nobles, 225, 2160, 422 U.S. 95 S.Ct. Thomberg, testimony of Delbert mitted the (1975). attorney-client attorney to adminis- by hired her who was privilege work-product may, and doctrine examination, to use in con- polygraph a ter course, The facts of be waived. Nobles hear- juvenile with the court waiver nection In are similar to those of the instant case. trial, Thomberg as ing. the state called Nobles, private investiga defendant hired a testified, in He a its case-in-chief. witness By at trial. tor whom he called to hearing, he had done at the waiver investigator as a electing present to during him what Brown told about witness, attorney- his the defendant waived her. The trial course of his interview with privilege as to information collected client circum- all references to the court excluded investigator for the defendant and polygraph of the interview and the stances Here, actions of Brown attorney. his Thomberg’s testimony, examination itself. in attorney resulted a waiver of the her and jury that Brown said in which he told the work-prod- privilege and the attorney-client light small fire to demon- she intended to a doctrine. uct mother, was, quite anger to her strate analogize her situa attempts to Brown damaging naturally, to Brown. by v. presented to that Simmons Unit tion Thomberg Brown claims that 377, 394, States, 390 U.S. ed attorney- protected by the in which the 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 work-prod privilege attorney client and the held a defend Supreme Court that where doctrine. She further contends uct support sup in of motion to ant testifies a use of public policy forbids the Indiana evidence, testimony may not press be juvenile at a testimony developed for use against him at trial on thereafter admitted trial. proceeding in an adult criminal court by guilt. contends that the issue of disposed easily of. This latter contention is trial, Thomberg’s testimony admitting at provides: Ind. Code 31-6-8-1 § placed juvenile court defend court has posi facing in the untenable (c) may grant any ants waiver juvenile court present having to choose between interest in the tion of person having legitimate juvenile court ing information to the particular in case vital the court or work of having prevent in to waiver legal records. In order to the court’s access incriminating introduced discretion, possibly exercising the court shall its trial, presenting 1038, 1045, the evidence at at S.Ct. 35 L.Ed.2d 297 exists, Texas, Washington (1973); this dilemma it does all. While 388 U.S. 17-23, problem. 1920, 1922-25, rise to the level a constitutional S.Ct. 18 L.Ed.2d Simmons, course, presented (1967). In the defendant was Of ques- it is a close surrendering evidentiary one con- tion this with the dilemma whether exclusion right in stitutional order avoid waiv- amounted to constitutional error that was Simmons holding Nonetheless, er of another. not harmless. I would re- spectfully that a defendant cannot forced point. teaches be dissent this rights. between constitutional choose rule, quite obviously, The Simmons does

not extend to witnesses called a defend- Also, pretrial hearing.

ant at a because right to

there is no constitutional the confi- proceedings,

dentiality of

petitioner argument on must lose her

point. COMPANY, SYRIAN ARABIAN OIL In- petitioner’s The district court’s denial of dividually, formerly Menhall d/b/a corpus writ of habeas affirmed. Prospecting Exploitation Compa-

ny, Plaintiff-Appellant, CUDAHY, Judge, concurring Circuit part dissenting in part: *5 REPUBLIC, ARAB SYRIAN quite This different from Muench case Defendant-Appellee. Israel, (7th Cir.1983), 715 F.2d 1124 cert. No. 85-2735. Israel, Worthing sub nom. U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 878 Appeals, United States Court of psychiatric opinion which excluded Seventh Circuit. defendant in that case Argued April 1986. personality suffered from a disturbance incapable forming thus was May 29, the in Decided 1986. necessary tent to commit the crime May 30, As Corrected charged. Here the issue is the use of IQ standard tests to establish defendant’s psycho-educational

intellectual and function

level. These tests would have indicated generally

that defendant functioned five

years level, grade IQ below her mentally borderline retarded.

Certainly such tests are far more widely

recognized probative as reliable and than opinions

are the psychiatrists about the personality

relation of disorders to the for

mation of criminal intent. Because these

tests were ordered purpose admitted into for the

of binding Brown over for trial as an adult

(and competency their relevancy were recognized

thus law), as a matter state have should been admitted on the

subsequent knowledge issue of her of the

possible consequences of her actions. See

Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.

Case Details

Case Name: Delores Brown v. Clarence Trigg and Indiana Attorney General
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Date Published: May 28, 1986
Citation: 791 F.2d 598
Docket Number: 85-2449
Court Abbreviation: 7th Cir.
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