73 Iowa 53 | Iowa | 1887
II. The position of counsel for defendant and of the court below is to the effect that an unconditional promissoiy note may be defeated by establishing a contemporary contract to the effect that the note shall be paid only upon an event which may .never happen. In this view, the note is a conditional promise to pay. This position is in conflict with the familiar rule of the law which declares that written contracts shall not be changed, varied, or contradicted by contemporary or prior oral agreements. Parol proof, therefore, is not competent to alter the terms of a promissory note, and show that it is payable upon conditions not therein expressed. Atherton v. Dearmond, 33 Iowa, 353; Barhydt v. Bonney, 55 Id., 717; Dickson v. Harris, 60 Id., 727; Atkinson v. Blair, 38 Id., 156; Farmer v. Perry, 70 Id., 358.
III. It is plain that the parol agreement pleaded as a defense, and supported by proof, did not pertain to the consideration of the note, but went to its validity, and the obligation of defendant to pay it only upon the happening of certain conditions. It presented a different contract than the one expressed in the note. In our opinion the district court erred in sustaining defendant’s motion in arrest of judgment.
For error in the order sustaining the motion in arrest, the judgment of the district court is Reversed.