403 S.E.2d 866 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1991
This appeal arises from the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion for substitute counsel, brought by appellant after the denial of his motion for new trial on the grounds that his court-appointed attorney, who represented appellant at trial and at the hearing on his motion for new trial, was ineffective.
Appellant, represented by a court-appointed attorney, was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit murder and violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. His attorney filed a motion for new trial on appellant’s behalf and represented appellant at the hearing on the motion for new trial. The trial court denied appellant’s motion for new trial and extraordinary motion for new trial on May 29, 1990. In a letter dated June 4, 1990, to his attorney, appellant discharged his attorney from all further representation in matters relating to appellant’s case. In another letter, also dated June 4, 1990, appellant informed the trial judge that he was dismissing his attorney and that he was filing motions for assignment of substitute counsel and an amended motion for new trial. The trial judge responded to . appellant by letter dated June 12, 1990, and explained that if appellant discharged his court-appointed attorney, he would have to either employ his own counsel, represent himself, or request another court-appointed attorney and give the reasons for the request. On June 14, 1990, appellant, acting pro se, filed a Motion for Assignment of Substitute Counsel; Motion for Assignment of Substitute Appellate Counsel, and an Amendment to Motion for New Trial; Motion for Evidentiary Hearing. On July 10, 1990, the trial court denied appellant’s motion in an order which stated: “The indigent defendant having discharged his appointed counsel without leave of court and without invoking the court’s discretion on whether a substitute counsel should be appointed and subsequent to the denial of his Motion for New Trial and Extraordinary Motion for New Trial, it is, therefore, ordered and adjudged that his Motion for Substitute Counsel be denied.” Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal from the entry of that order.
We note at the outset that “[a]n indigent defendant is entitled to representation by counsel on appeal as well as at trial. [Cits.]” Cochran v. State, 253 Ga. 10, 11 (315 SE2d 653) (1984). The substance of appellant’s motion for substitute counsel was that his court-appointed counsel was ineffective in violation of the United States and Georgia Constitutions. “[W]here a defendant does not seek new representation on the basis of ineffectiveness of his appointed counsel, it is generally not error to deny the request, the defendant having ‘no right to pick or choose his court-appointed attorney.’ [Cit.] When,
Case remanded with direction.
