121 So. 845 | Miss. | 1929
As proof of title by adverse possession, the appellees offered testimony to show that they made one sale of timber growing on this quarter section, and that they had cultivated several disconnected patches thereon, amounting to, in the aggregate, from three to ten acres, according to the varying estimates of the several witnesses, and that they had paid the taxes assessed thereon. Neither Daniel Hubbard, now deceased, nor any of the appellees, ever lived on the land or on land adjacent thereto; there was no building on this quarter section of land, and no part of it was ever fenced, and, while there was evidence that a large part of the land was susceptible of cultivation, none of the appellees cleared any of it except to cut the briers from certain small patches. The appellees offered in evidence a deed dated October 23, 1901, from N.A. Childs to Daniel Hubbard, which *873 purported to convey "a fractional part of the southwest quarter or southwest quarter of Section 20, Township 9, Range 18 East, containing thirty-five acres more or less, being in Kemper county, Mississippi." There was an objection interposed to the introduction of this deed on the ground that the description of the land sought to be thereby conveyed was void for indefiniteness, and the court held that this deed was void and excluded it from the evidence.
On appeal, counsel for the appellees seems to contend that this deed was admissible as color of title, and that with this deed in evidence as color of title the appellees' actual possession of a part of the land gave them constructive possession of the entire tract to the extent of the boundaries attempted to be described in the deed.
It is settled law in this state that a void deed may operate as color of title, an that one claiming under such a deed who is actually in possession of a part of the land described therein has constructive possession to the extent of the boundaries described in the deed (Hammer v. Yazoo Delta Lumber Co.,
The deed here in question was manifestly void for indefiniteness or uncertainty of description, and without the aid of extrinsic evidence which would add to, enlarge, or change it, the description therein could not be fitted to the land claimed by the appellees in their bill, and therefore the alleged deed was insufficient to operate either as a conveyance or as color of title, and was not admissible in evidence for any purpose. Appellees then have no color of title to the quarter section of land, and could only acquire title by adverse possession to such part of the land as was actually held in possession and continuously occupied for the statutory period. This rule is announced in Dedeaux v. Lumber Co.,
The proof in this record wholly fails to show what, if any, particular parts of this tract of land were actually and continuously in the possession of the appellees, and therefore no relief could be awarded on the bill of complaint. The decree of the court below will therefore be reversed and a decree will be entered here dismissing the bill.
Reversed and dismissed.