Albert Kinkle appeals a judgment dismissing his civil suit against the Social Security Administration
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge, ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge, DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge.
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Albert Kinkle appeals a judgment dismissing his civil suit against the Social Security Administration as frivolous or for failure to state a claim. We affirm.
In 2014 Kinkle sued the Social Security Administration, alleging that the agency cut off his benefits after trumping up fraud charges against him. The district court at screening,
On appeal Kinkle continues to suggest that the agency is improperly deducting funds from his monthly benefits to satisfy an overpayment. But Kinkle still does not allege that he has exhausted his administrative remedies as he must do before he may challenge the recoupment of the overpayment in federal court. See Rodysill v. Colvin, 745 F.3d 947, 949 (8th Cir.2014) (applying
AFFIRMED.
Delia WEBSTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC, Defendant-Appеllee.
No. 15-1396.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued Sept. 17, 2015. Decided Oct. 21, 2015.
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Before JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge, DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge, DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge.
Syed Ali Saeed, Attorney, Saeed & Little, LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Beth Ellen Terrell, Attorney, Terrell Marshall Daudt & Willie PLLC, Seattle, WA, for Plaintiff-Appellant. Andrew Glass, Attorney, Gregory N. Blase, Attorney, Jennifer Janeira Nagle, Attorney, K & L Gates LLP, Boston, MA, for Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER
Delia Webster sued Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, asserting claims under the
After the district court dismissed Webster‘s individual claims as moot, this court issued its decision in Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783 (7th Cir.2015), wherein we held that a defendant‘s offer of full compеnsation does not moot the plaintiff‘s lawsuit. Id. at 787. Accordingly, based on Chapman, we reverse the dismissal of Webster‘s individual claims, vacate the denial of Webster‘s Motion for Leаve to File an Amended Complaint and Motion for Class Certification, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this order.
I.
Delia Webster defaulted on a mortgage due to BAC Home Loan Servicing, which defendant Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC (“Bayview“) began servicing in 2012. Webster later received a discharge in bankruptcy on that debt. Nonetheless, Bayview continued to call her cell phone, using an automatic telephоne dialing service. After the bankruptcy discharge, Bayview also sent a letter to Webster regarding the debt. On December 13, 2013, Webster filed a cоmplaint against Bayview, alleging claims under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA“) and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA“). Webster‘s complaint sought only individual relief (as opposed to class relief), and requested actual and compensatory damages, an order enjoining Bayview from committing any future violations of the FDCPA and TCPA, and a declaratory judgment that Bayview violated the FDCPA and TCPA.
On May 13, 2014, Webster filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint. She attached the proposed amended complaint to the motion: The proposed amended complaint included not just Webster‘s individual TCPA and FDCPA claims, but also added class claims under the TCPA. That same day, Webster also filed a Motion for Class Certification, requesting that the court certify the class she proposed in her amended complaint.
In response, Bayview first requested an extension of time to respond to the Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint, but before responding to that motion, Bayview tendered relief to Webster for her individual claims. Webster rejected Bayview‘s tender. Bayview then moved to dismiss Webstеr‘s individual complaint for lack of jurisdiction, and also moved to strike Webster‘s Motion for Class Certification because the currently pending complaint only asserted individual claims. The district court granted Bayview‘s Motion to Dismiss Webster‘s individual complaint. It then denied Webster‘s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint and her Motion for Class Certification as moot. Webster appeals.
II.
On appeal, Webster initially argued that dismissal of her complaint was inappropriate because she had filed a Motion for
However, we note, as did the court in Chapman, that “[r]ejecting a fully compensatory offer may have consequences other than mootness.” Id. at 787. While Bayview advocates for this court to impose those consequences now, such as by finding that Webster has waived her claims or is estopped from presenting them, those questions are best left to the district court in the first instance. Id. at 788.
Because we reverse the district court‘s dismissal of Webster‘s individual claims, we must also vacate the district court‘s dismissal of Webster‘s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint and her Motion for Class Certification. In doing sо, however, we take no position on the propriety of granting those motions. It is still within the district court‘s discretion to decide whether to grant a motion for leave to amend, United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 788 F.3d 696, 706-07 (7th Cir.2015), and then further to determine whether to certify a class and whether Webster would be an appropriаte class representative. Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 799 (7th Cir.2008). Those questions are also left to the district court to consider.
III.
The district court‘s order granting Bayview‘s Motion to Dismiss is reversed because Bayview‘s tender of relief did not moot Webster‘s individual claims. The district court‘s order dismissing Webster‘s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint and Motion for Class Certification is vacated, and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order.