30 Conn. App. 454 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1993
The defendants, the planning and zoning commission of the city of Torrington (commission) and Joseph J. Ficca, appeal from a decision of the trial court sustaining the plaintiffs’
The following facts, either found by the trial court or not disputed by the parties, are relevant to this appeal. On April 12, 1990, Ficca applied to the commission for a change of zone of land owned by him from R-15 residential to RCC restricted residential community. Notice of a public hearing on Ficca’s application, which hearing was scheduled for May 23, 1990, was published in accordance with the applicable statutory provisions. Notice of this hearing was sent to the Litchfield Hills Council of Elected Officials, the regional planning agency for Torrington and New Hartford, on May 3,1990, twenty days prior to the hearing. On the same date, notice of the public hearing was also given to the neighboring municipality of New Hartford. The public hearing commenced on May 23,1990. After evidence was taken on that date, the hearing was con
In light of the trial court’s disposition of the matter on the grounds of improper notification to the regional planning agency, it made no findings as to whether a copy of the proposed zone change map was filed with the city clerk prior to the public hearing. At the hearing before the trial court, Addo Bonetti, the Torrington city clerk, testified that no map of the proposed zone change was ever filed in his office. Candi Deleppo, an employee of the Torrington planning and zoning office, testified that she brought the map to the office of the city clerk for filing on May 30, 1990.
I
In Edelson v. Zoning Commission, 2 Conn. App. 595, 481 A.2d 421 (1984), this court held that the failure to give notice to the regional planning agency as required by General Statutes § 8-3b; see footnote 2, supra; constitutes a jurisdictional defect that renders the actions of the commission null and void. Subsequently in Lauer v. Zoning Commission, 220 Conn. 455, 459-65, 600 A.2d 310 (1991), our Supreme Court held that failure to give notice to an adjoining municipality as required by General Statutes § 8-3h; see footnote 4, supra; does not implicate a commission’s subject matter jurisdiction, involves only personal jurisdiction, may be waived, and may be raised only by the one to whom notice must be sent. Lauer drew the distinction between statutorily required published notice to the general public and statutorily required personal notice to specific entities
We are persuaded that the reasoning in Lauer, decided in 1991, effectively overrules Edelson, decided in 1984. Although Lauer dealt with General Statutes § 8-3h, its reasoning applies with equal vigor to the requirements of General Statutes § 8-3b. Both General Statutes § 8-3h and § 8-3b require notice to a specific entity. In the case of § 8-3h, it is an adjoining municipality; in the case of § 8-3b, it is a regional planning agency. In neither case is the notice designed to inform the general public. Indeed, as the dissent in Lauer points out, § 8-3h provides that “[n]o hearing may be conducted on any application, petition, request or plan unless the adjoining municipality has received the notice required under this section,” language that the Lauer majority refused to give subject matter jurisdiction status. No such language, or anything similar thereto, appears in § 8-3b. In fact, § 8-3b
II
This court may, however, rely on alternative grounds supported by the record to sustain a judgment. Where a trial court reaches the correct result, but has based that result on mistaken grounds, we will sustain the trial court’s action if proper grounds exist to support it. Kelley v. Bonney, 221 Conn. 549, 592, 606 A.2d 693 (1992); In re Jennifer G., 29 Conn. App. 689, 692-94, 617 A.2d 921 (1992). We now turn to the first alternative ground to uphold the trial court’s judgment urged by the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs claim that the commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider Ficca’s application because a map of the proposed zone change was not filed in the city clerk’s office at least ten days before the public hearing. General Statutes § 8-3 (a); see footnote 3, supra; which delineates the requirements for published notice preceding a public hearing on a proposed change of zone, provides in pertinent part that “a copy of such proposed regulation or boundary shall be filed in the office of the town, city or borough clerk, as the case may be, in such municipality ... for public inspection at least ten days before such hearing . . . .” The published notice in this matter appeared in the local newspaper as follows:
*461 “Applicant: Joseph J. Ficca
Location: Torrington Street
Proposal: Zone change from R-15 Residential to R.R.C. Restricted Residential Community on 163.5 acres.
“As shown on map entitled Land Use Plan, Torringford Hills Estate, Torrington St., Torrington, CT. dated 4/12/90, prepared by Richard E. Couch, P.E. St. of Ct. Lie. 15480
“Time of hearing: Immediately following the close of the first hearing.
“Copies of the application and map are on file in the Planning & Zoning Office and the City Clerk’s Office, 140 Main St., Torr., CT. for inspection prior to the hearings.”
The underlying reason for the publication requirements of General Statutes § 8-3 (a) is to not “permit changes, exceptions or relaxations [in zoning matters] except after such full notice as shall enable all those interested to know what is projected and to have opportunity to protest, and as shall insure fair presentation and consideration of all aspects of the proposed modification. . . .” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Timber Trails Corporation v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 222 Conn. 374, 379, 610 A.2d 617 (1992).
It is quite obvious that if the map referred to in the published notice of the public hearing in this matter was not in fact on file in the office of the city clerk, as required by § 8-3 (a), it would be impossible for all those interested to know with any degree of intelligence exactly what was proposed in this application for a change of zone. Bombero v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 17 Conn. App. 150, 153-55, 550 A.2d 1098 (1988). “ ‘Compliance with the statutory procedure [for
The trial court made no finding as to whether a copy of the proposed zone change map was filed with the city clerk prior to the public hearing. “Ordinarily it is not the function of . . . the Appellate Court to make factual findings, but rather to decide whether the decision of the trial court was clearly erroneous in light of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record.” State v. Reagan, 209 Conn. 1, 8, 546 A.2d 839 (1988). There are times, however, when the undisputed facts or uncontroverted evidence and testimony in the record make a factual conclusion inevitable so that a remand to the trial court for a determination would be unnecessary. See State v. Copeland, 205 Conn. 201, 208-209 n.3, 530 A.2d 603 (1987). This is just such a case.
A thorough review of the briefs of the parties, the record below, and the transcript of the testimony before the trial court makes it clear either that the map referred to in the published notice of the public hearing was never filed in the office of the city clerk or that, if it was in fact filed, it was filed on May 30,1990, some seven days after the public hearing commenced. There was no evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that the map was filed “at least ten days before such hearing.” General Statutes § 8-3 (a).
While we do not agree with the trial court’s analysis, we do agree with its ultimate conclusion that the commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction to act on the zone change application. Therefore, the trial court’s decision is correct, but not for the reason stated. This court is not required to reverse a ruling of the trial court that reached a correct result, albeit for a wrong reason. New London v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 29 Conn. App. 402, 409, 615 A.2d 1054 (1992).
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The plaintiffs own land on Torrington Street in Torrington, which abuts the land of the defendant Ficca.
“[General Statutes] Sec. 8-3b. notice to regional planning agency of proposed zone or zone use change. When the zoning commission of any municipality proposes to establish or change a zone or any regulation affecting the use of a zone any portion of which is within five hundred feet of the boundary of another municipality located within the area of operation of a regional planning agency, the zoning commission shall give written
General Statutes § 8-3 (a) provides in pertinent part: “No . . . [zoning district] boundary shall become effective or be established or changed until after a public hearing in relation thereto ... at which parties in interest and citizens shall have an opportunity to be heard. Notice of the time and place of such hearing shall be published in the form of a legal advertisement appearing in a newspaper having a substantial circulation in such municipality at least twice at intervals of not less than two days, the first not more than fifteen days nor less than ten days, and the last not less than two days, before such hearing, and a copy of such proposed . . . boundary shall be filed in the office of the town, city or borough clerk, as the case may be, in such municipality, but, in the case of a district, in the offices of both the district clerk and the town clerk of the town in which such district is located, for public inspection at least ten days before such hearing, and may be published in full in such paper. . . .”
“[General Statutes] Sec. 8-3h. notice to adjoining municipalities. The zoning commission of any municipality shall notify the clerk of any adjoining municipality of the pendency of any application, petition, request or plan concerning any project on any site in which: (1) Any portion of the property affected by a decision of such zoning commission is within five hundred feet of the boundary of the adjoining municipality; (2) a signifi
Because we affirm the judgment of the trial court on the basis of the plaintiffs’ first alternative ground in support of the judgment, we do not need to reach the other grounds urged in support of the judgment. We note, however, that the plaintiffs’ claim that the commission was without jurisdiction to act on the zone change application because it failed to notify the neighboring municipality of New Hartford properly, is without merit. Lauer v. Zoning Commission, 220 Conn. 455, 459-65, 600 A.2d 310 (1991).