273 A.2d 725 | Conn. Super. Ct. | 1971
This is an action in which the plaintiff seeks to recover money damages for personal injuries arising out of an automobile collision allegedly *108
caused by a malfunctioning traffic light. The defendant city of Norwalk, by way of a demurrer, attacks the legal sufficiency of the third and fourth counts of the complaint on the ground that they are based on the defective highway statute, General Statutes §
An exhaustive search of the Connecticut Reports, both by counsel and the court, indicates that this specific issue has not been decided by the Supreme Court. Nor has any Superior Court decision been cited or found. The authorities are sharply divided on the question at hand. See 18 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d Ed. Rev.) § 53.42, p. 234.
Section
Since the definition uses the words "obstruct" and "hinder," it may be well at this point to define them. The word "obstruct," according to Webster's Third New International Dictionary, means "to block up . . . or close up: place an obstacle or fill with obstacles or impediments to passing." The word "hinder" means obstruct or impede.
If we apply the above rules and definitions to the situation at hand, it becomes quite apparent that in the course of events leading up to the injury the particular roadway became defective when the traffic light began to malfunction. Certainly the defective traffic light then became an obstacle or an impediment to the right of the general public freely and safely to pass over the roadway in question just as much as did the overhanging branches of the tree described by way of obiter dictum in Hewison v.New Haven, supra, or a silent policeman after it had toppled over and while it lay displaced on the highway. See Aaronson v. New Haven,
The demurrer is overruled.