174 S.W.2d 929 | Tenn. | 1943
This suit was brought by Harvey E. DeLay, a resident of the State of Georgia; Joe N. Hunter, a resident of Hamilton County, but a nonresident of the City of Chattanooga; *318 and E.E. Carter, a resident of the City of Chattanooga, in the Chancery Court of Hamilton County under the Declaratory Judgments Law, against the City and others.
The question presented is the validity of an ordinance of the City imposing a license fee of five dollars per annum on passenger automobiles using the streets of the City. In the original and amended bill the appellants alleged that the ordinance is null and void: (1) Because of the lack of legislative authority on the part of the City to enact same; (2) that the ordinance is in direct conflict with Section 3336.4 of the Code of Tennessee; (3) is violative of Article 2, Section 28, of the Constitution of Tennessee; (4) that as to nonresidents of the State of Tennessee it impedes and places an additional burden on interstate commerce in contravention of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution of the United States, article 1, sec. 8, clause 3; (5) that as to the residents of Georgia it is in conflict with a reciprocal agreement entered into by the Commissioner of Finance and Taxation with officials of the State of Georgia, said agreement having been made pursuant to Section 1152.7a of the Code of Tennessee; and (6) that the funds derived from the license fees are to be used by the schools of the City of Chattanooga and not for streets and highways of said City.
The chancellor was of opinion that the ordinance was a valid enactment and dismissed the bill except as to the complainant DeLay, and this ground was sustained on the idea that it placed a burden on interstate commerce, resulting in this appeal.
We are of opinion that the ordinance is within the legislative power of the City to enact. Rutherford v. City *319 of Nashville,
The question raised by the appellant Hunter has been decided adversely to him by this Court in the case of Fox v. Mayor andAldermen of Morristown, Hamblen Law, October 11, 1930,
This would be true, of course, of the complainants Joe N. Hunter and E.E. Carter. The reason underlying the decisions in the cases cited above is the fact that motorists enjoy the benefits of the streets and highways in the particular municipality. McKelley v. City of Murfreesboro, supra; Cityof Memphis v. Battaile Co.,
In the case of Marshall v. State,
Neither do we think that the ordinance offends the interstate commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. The Supreme Court of the United States since the decision in Hendrick v. Maryland,
It results that the judgment of the lower court as to Hunter and Carter will be affirmed, but as to DeLay it will be reversed. *321