21 Barb. 85 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1855
If Potter was not too much intoxicated when he sold out his stock in trade and demands to the plaintiff, to have any intent whatever, it was a fair question for the jury to determine from the evidence, whether the sale was not made with intent to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors in the collection of their debts. The wholesale nature of the transaction—selling goods then but recently purchased and not yet received—including debts not examined or inventoried : the inadequacy of consideration agreed to be paid, and the secret removal of property immediately after the sale, emphatically indicate a dishonest purpose.
Undoubtedly the jury so regarded the case, and intended by their verdict to pronounce the sale fraudulent and void as to Potter’s creditors. It is not surprising that his friends should have made an effort to protect his property, fearing he might-squander it during his debauch, but the effort should have been conducive either to the benefit of his family or of his creditors; yet the latter was spurned by the plaintiff when approached in regard to their claims against him, and it does not appear that the former were to receive any advantage from the plaintiff’s interference. Indeed this suit was prosecuted on the theory that by the sale the plaintiff became fairly, honestly and absolutely the owner of the property.
The trial, too, was conducted on the theory of title in the plaintiff by virtue of the bill of sale, which released Potter from the mortgage; and the mortgage was by an indorsement declared foreclosed. If the sale was fraudulent as to Potter’s creditors, the verdict of the jury was correct; and there being evidence of this fact, it must be regarded conclusive. Perhaps it should be observed in regard to the mortgage, that if it was the purpose of the parties to it, to permit the' mortgagor to retain the possession of the mortgaged property, and sell and dispose of the same as he pleased and as his own, then the mortgage was fraudulent and void as to Potter’s creditors. (Griswold v. Sheldon, 4 Comst. 580.) The evidence showed clearly that such was their purpose, and that it was practically carried out, The mortgaged goods were placed in the store of thp
The plaintiff, therefore, could claim nothing by virtue of the mortgage, as against Potter’s creditors. The plaintiff’s possession under a void security gave him no right to the property. It was the same, as against any of Potter’s creditors, as if he had obtained his possession by a trespass. Therefore, admitting that the plaintiff had the possession under the mortgage, granting it to be void as against those who deny its validity, the property remained Potter’s, and liable to seizure and sale under execution against him.
It is hardly necessary, perhaps, to consider the case in this view, for the plaintiff evidently claimed title on the trial only under the pretended purchase of July 7th. But if we take the alleged mortgage lien into consideration, it is difficult to see how even two sales, both of which were' fraudulent, hence void, could pass to the plaintiff any title to the property. A person can secure no right from any number of transactions which are void.
It was not error to admit the evidence that Potter was intoxicated when the bill of sale was executed by him. The defendant had a right to inquire into his state and condition, as a part of the transaction. Perhaps he was the more ready to consummate a fraudulent design when partially bereft of reason, and when incapacitated for the proper exercise of his judgment. Mor can it be deemed error, that Orin Delaware was permitted to be examined in regard to his purchase of debts against Potter. He was on a cross-examination. He had assigned the mortgage to the plaintiff, and had become identified with, and had greatly interested himself in the affairs of Potter and of the plaintiff. It was not inappropriate for the defendant to inquire into the extent of his interest and connection with the transaction under examination.
The,defendant justified the taking of the property under four executions issued on as many judgments. The judgments were
In Reid v. Clark et al. decided at the last May general term of this court, this point was subtantially determined. In that case the statement alleged that the “ indebtedness arose on account of goods purchased, consisting of cloths, trimmings and tailor’s furnishing goods.” This was held to be a sufficient compliance with the requirements of the code. The object of this allegation in the statement is to prevent frauds, by giving all who have an interest to learn the facts, notice of the consideration of the judgment. On obtaining this information the inquiry could be pushed with certainty, and generally with effect, in case of any unfair practice. It was said in Reid v. Clark et al. that the old form of declaring for goods, wares and merchandise sold and delivered was no more specific than this form of statement; and unless a bill of particulars must be inserted, this mode of statement on confession should be deemed sufficient. The case is widely different from those where the indebtedness is alleged to have arisen on promissory notes, without giving their consideration. In those cases there is a wide field open for fraud ; and besides, the note is but the-evidence of debt, and the code requires the facts out of which the debt arose to be concisely stated.
The case of Schoolcraft v. Thompson, (7 How, 446,) holding a different doctrine from that above suggested, was reversed on appeal. (9 How. 61. See also Post v. Coleman, Id. 64.)
It is further objected, that the verification in each of the cases
It is insisted that the objections to the statements and verifications raise only questions of regularity, which can only be urged by the defendant in the judgments. But the conclusion at -which I have arrived renders a discussion of this suggestion unnecessary. I will however add, that this is not a case, like that of Chappel v. Chappel, 2 Kernan, 215,) where the party attacking the judgment had obtained rights by the entry of a
The motion for a new trial must be denied.
0. L. Allen, J., concurred.
James, J., dissented. New trial denied.
C. L. Allen, Bockes and James, Justices.]