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Delaware River Stevedores Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Edward Difidelto Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
440 F.3d 615
3rd Cir.
2006
Check Treatment
Docket

*2 FISHER, Before SLQVITER, GREENBERG, Judges. Circuit OPINION OF THE COURT GREENBERG, Judge. Circuit

I. INTRODUCTION This matter comes on before this court petition on a disposition review of a (“Board”) the Benefits Review Board awarding benefits to Edward DiFidelto un- der Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation (“LHWCA”), Act 33 U.S.C. 901-950, §§ following his in- sustaining an jury compensable under the LHWCA. The sole issue in proceedings these Stevedores, whether Delaware River Inc. (“DRS”), employer, DiFidelto’s had au- thority LHWCA, under a provision of the (“section § 908(j) 33 U.S.C. 908(j)”), to re- quire report DiFidelto to information re- garding earnings his pay- when it was not ing him compensation at the time of its requests.1 908(j) provides Section that an employer may E. Kawczynski Field, John inform a (argued), employ- “disabled Kawczynski, NJ, Womack & ee” of Amboy, obligation report South his his Stevedores, for Petitioners Delaware River to the employer employment or self- Inc. and Liberty Mutual employment Insurance Com- provides and further if Liberty Company, Mutual Insurance Liberty treat single DRS and Mutual as a DRS, party proceed- insures is also a to these party. ings but aas matter of we convenience will rector”), knowingly adopted Form LS-200 for the report or fails to earnings pursuant his earn- to section reporting or understates willfully,omits right 908(j). his second forms that ings, he forfeits The first and he during which January February 25 and DRS sent report. Knowl- to file the respectively, reporting identified the *3 earn- employee’s of an of the amount edge 7, 2000, period being January from as those may useful to an ings be 21, Thereafter, 22, January April 2002. on or even may it to reduce earnings enable 2002, attorney sent DiFidelto’s a DRS it otherwise obligation eliminate requesting third Form LS-200 information to a dis- payments to make would have earnings about DiFidelto’s between Janu- account of a work-relat- employee on abled 7, 2000, 22, Although 2002. ary April and injury.2 ed requests, DiFidelto received DRS’s he re- report еarnings as he contend- fused his AND PROCEDURAL II. FACTUAL legal obligation ed that he did not have a HISTORY long to do so as as DRS was not histo- procedural material facts and The him compensation. proceedings are regard to these ry with (“ALJ”) judge An administrative law 7, 2000, DiFi- January dispute. On 18, July hearing held a in this case on injury suffered a work-related delto 2002, 2, 2003, on June he following employment his scope course and awarding his “Decision and Order” issued from him to receive benefits entitling DRS 2, In 2003 DiFidelto benefits. his June Initially, DRS the LHWCA. DRS under found, Order, the ALJ inter Decision without voluntarily payments made the alia, though DiFidelto that even was enti- order, but on November аdjudication or compensation tled to reinstatement of his 19, 2001, them as it contro- it discontinued right “forfeited” his payments,' he had to do so on the basis obligation its verted compensation period for the between Janu- had that DiFidelto opinion of a medical 2000, 22, 2002, 8, he ary April because injuries. fully his When recovered from earnings re- report failed to his as DRS claim, DiFidelto’s it re- controverted DRS quested. of the Office the District Director quested result, reaching In the ALJ indicat Programs to Compensation of Workers’ apply if an penalties of Administra- that forfeiture refer the case to thе Office ed DiFi- in surprisingly, respond responds Not fails to or Judges. tive Law rejected position, and thus he In accurately request. delto DRS’s to a Form LS-200 under the prosecuted a claim for benefits considering applicability of the section LHWCA. requirement, the ALJ de reporting factor that “the decisive termined in the requested hearing After DRS sought for earnings whether information longer and at a time that no during employee’s which an earn ‘periods DiFidelto, it sent making payments to liability for ings employer’s could affect attorney, pur- to his three Forms LS-200 ’ (quoting at 56 compensation.” App. 908(j), seeking to section information suant Exch., Ben. Corps v. Marine Plappert earnings employment from about his 13, 17, aff'd, 31 Ben. Rev. Rev. Bd. Serv. Director, Office of self-employment. banc)). (1997) (en (“Di- Inasmuch Bd. Programs Serv. Compensation Workers’ 922; Am., 272 F.3d Stevedoring 2. 33 U.S.C. v. Servs. Steve Deweert see also Metro. See 291, 296-97, 1241, (9th Cir.2001). Rambo, 1247-48 dore Co. 2144, 2147-48, (1995); 132 L.Ed.2d 226 S.Ct. i-equest period pursuant covered a asks for his information as DRS’s LS-200 sought three-judge for which DiFidelto and obtained to section A divided 908®. applied the ALJ the forfei- compensation, panel July issued its “Decision him ture to that and denied com- and Order” which it affirmed the order January pensation April awаrding at a compensation ALJ partial but rate vacated the ALJ’s order on the forfeiture issue and remanded the case timely request DiFidelto then filed a findings to the ALJ to make further re- with the ALJ to reconsider the June garding DiFidelto’s status at support 2003 Decision and Order. requested the time DRS that DiFidelto forfeiture, argument against DiFidelto his complete and return the LS-200 forms. regulation implementing relied on the sec- The dissenting member would have re- 702.285(a), 908®, tion and the *4 versed the outright ALJ on the forfeiture history 908(j), legislative of section as set because, view, issue in her DiFidelto was Representatives forth in a Housе of Con- not a disabled within ‍​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌​​​‍section Report. ference DiFidelto contended that him when DRS sent the LS-200 both authorities describe a “disabled em- 908® forms. ployee” within section as an individ- to employer paying

ual whom the com- 27, 2004, July On the Director filed a pensation requires when it “Motion for Reconsideration and a Motion report. Clearly, though even had DRS to Hold Appeal Abey- [the DiFidelto] paid compensation, DiFidelto it was not ance” with the Board to await its decision doing him so when it sent the LS-200 Marine, Inc., in Briskie v. Weeks 38 Ben. DiFidelto, time, forms and thus at that did Rev. Bd. Serv. 61 appeal another not сonsider himself to be a disabled em- pending then before it concerning the ployee purposes for of section 908®. same issue involved here. DiFidelto and joined in 30, 2003, DRS request. Director’s Be-

On June the ALJ issued a 27, July fore the Board ruled on the 2004 Granting “Decision and Order Claimant’s motion, decided Briskie on 25, it August Request for Reconsideration.” In the 2004. In Briskie the Board concluded that 30, Order, June 2003 Decision and the ALJ section was ambiguous,” corrected technical “somewhat deficiencies the June 908® 2, and thus it looked to imple- 2003 and the section’s respect Decision Order with to menting regulation legislative history periods during time which DiFidelto guidance was to the forfeiture issue. partial entitled total versus com- Ulti- Board held in Briskie ALJ, mately, pensation.3 however, rejected The section applied only during a request DiFidelto’s that the ALJ reconsid- 908® an employer findings compen- er his with to the forfei- sation. ture of benefits as the ALJ adhered his that, according Plappert,

view the re- Briskie, In light of resort DRS’s to for- porting obligation applies any period case, feiture was foreclosed in this during which the claims compen- thus the Board panel upheld DiFidelto’s sation. entitlement to the entire 17, 2003, July On DiFidelto a award. On October filed time- the Board ly appeal argued styled Board. DiFidelto issued its final order in again employee” Reconsideration,” that a “disabled an “Order oh must be Motion for Briskie, receiving compensation which, when the relying on it reversed 3. We are not concerned with these correc- lions.

619 843, statute. Id. at 104 at on the for- S.Ct. Decision and Order the ALJ’s 6, 2004, DRS considering regulation issue. On December When whether the feiture for review with this timely petition filed a complies Congress’s mandate: court.4 regulation We look to see whether the plain meaning harmonizes with the AND III. JURISDICTION statute, origins, pur- its аnd its OF STANDARD long .... pose regulation So as the REVIEW relationship language bears a fair jurisdiction over DiFidel Board had The statute, of the reflects the views of those timely peti he filed his appeal because to’s enactment, sought who its and matches decision. See tion for review of the ALJ’s articulated, purpose they it will mer- 702.393, 921(c); §§ 33 U.S.C. it deference. 802.206(a). timely Director filed E. 54 at Corp., Associated Coal F.3d of the Board’s motion for reconsideration FDIC, 448, (quoting Sekula v. 39 F.3d order, which led to the July (3d Cir.1994)). also must “defer to an We 2004 order issue Board’s October agency’s interpretation consistent of its jurisdiction over have DRS’s here. We regulation plainly own unless it is errone- timely filed it for review as petition regulation.” or inconsistent with the ous Board’s October days within Dir., Mangifest, OWCP v. 826 F.2d *5 See 33 2004 order on reconsideration. (3d Cir.1987) (internal 1323 citations and 802.410(a). 921(c); § § U.S.C. omitted). quotations court, in this as DiFidelto proper Venue is injury in New his work-related suffered IV. DISCUSSION 921(c). § Jersey. See 33 U.S.C. that in It is evident from Chevron of a Board’s decision Our review statutory proceedings dealing these with Dir., plenary. of law is

for an error construction, an initial we must make de Corp., 54 v. E. Associated Coal OWCP and, termination, depending upon our first Cir.1995). (3d we While F.3d determinаtion, possibly make a second de to the Board’s offer minimal deference each might expected, As be termination. statutory regulatory interpretations, 908(j) unambigu argues that section side Director, give judicial deference to the “we the case in ously requires that we decide 147. we Id. at When policymaker.” is a person contends that its favor. DRS of a stat agency’s an construction review 908(j) within section employee” “disabled clear, ute, is we Congress if the intent of i.e., injury, the moment at at the time of Chevron, give effect to that intent. must wages to arises. incapacity which his еarn Resources v. Natural U.S.A. Defense Thus, possible of DiFidelto’s ‍​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌​​​‍regardless Council, Inc., 837, 842-43, 104 that he is recovery, DRS contends medical (1984). If L.Ed.2d 694 S.Ct. 908(j). section employee a disabled within ambiguous with the statute is silent or hand, the Di DiFidelto and On the other issue, must particular to a then we employee” for argue that “disabled rector regulation if it is agency’s defer 908(j) must mean an of section purposes construction of the based on a reasonable course, but the Appeals for the Second Circuit adopted Board 4. Of in Briskie the espouses precedential In that position petition that DiFideltо here. in a not court denied the Inc., Marine, Marine, employer, Weeks case the summary Inc. v. Bri order in Weeks peti- Cir.2006). amicus curiae in this filed a skie, (2d is an Fed.Appx. 178 States Court tion for review with the United “compensation ‘compensation disability’

individual to whom for dis- to whom for is at ability” being paid § is the time being paid pursuant to 908.” Director’s a Form employer sends the individual LS- 24; br. at see DiFidelto br. at 12. But we Congress’s are not convinced that intent is point. regard unmistakable on this In this This division of views is understandable point although we out that the term “dis- 908(j) any inasmuch as neither section nor employee” purposes abled for of section provision other defines LHWCA employee.” necessarily need not be linked to the “disabled LHWCA does “[disability” “incapaci- indicate that means “disability” “employee” definitions of ty injury 902(3) wages because to earn the in sections it would not be receiving which the at the unreasonable to link them an becáuse em- injury time of in the same or other ployer legitimately might want to know 902(10), employment ...33 U.S.C. and whether an employee’s capacity to earn his means, “employee” exceptions not wages impaired though had been even here, germane any person “engaged in employer him compensation. is maritime employment....” Id. all, here, injured After as is the an case 903(3). Nevertheless it is not clear that employee might seek should we combine these two terms to it, employer and, an declining pay if the define employee” purposes “disabled benefits, employer pay 9080") regard section without for whether employee’s earnings could reduce or even paying compensation compensation payments eliminate the him when seeks information employer otherwise obliged would be from the inasmuch as section pay. 908(j) simply point does not address this Yet there is a

explicitly. employ- limitation on er’s need to know amount of an em- application This case involves an of sec- *6 ployee’s earnings at a time that the em- employee’s tion when an actual ployer paying is not compensation because physical changes may condition have even if an employee “knowingly and will- changed initially voluntarily as paid DRS fully any part omits or understates of [his] DiFidelto compensation and then discon- earnings,” 908(j)(2), see 33 U.S.C. doing tinued so when it that asserted he employer may compensation recover it has had recovered injury. Certainly, from his paid only by “a deduction from the com- possible it is that the term “disabled em- pensation payable employee.” to the Id. ployee” 908(j) may within section have a 908(j)(3). Moreover, if it temporal element so that an is determined employee originally may always employee disabled not that an is not thereaf- disabled and is not regarded ter be benefits, as disabled within that entitled to he will not be Indeed, section. it is ironical that al- payments to refund earlier to which he had though DRS asserts that DiFidelto was a entitlеd, not been for in that circumstance employee disabled when it sent him the obligation he has an to reimburse his em- Form requests, thought LS-200 it that he ployer only by deduction ongoing from injury, had recovered from his whereas compensation. §§ 914(j), See 33 U.S.C. DiFidelto claims that at that time he was Thus, 922. if DRS had demonstrated that physically still disabled. had, fact, DiFidelto in not been disabled indicated, making payments when DRS had been

As we have Director and him, argument knowledge DiFidelto make an that a dis- the amount his earn- employee abled “must mean an ings during individual the time DRS had been mak- Nevertheless, though we conclude that оf assis- might not have been ing payments employer might that an the information DRS. tance to from the answers to a Form LS-200 obtain that, Furthermore, out as the point we no use to it if it is not may be of only noted, 908(j) is section has Director Di- compensation, still we believe in LHWCA provisions three one of rector the information’s lack of overstates recoup previ employer to an permitting employer that “an value when he asserts consider all We ously paid compensation. remedy only if has an forfeiture give an they might provisions these effective compensation pаyments it owes future also to seek the Form LS-200 reason employer Forfeiture affords no employee. Thus, 914(j) pro information. 33 U.S.C. otherwise, employer ad relief to an and the “employer has made that if an vides compensation, he shall in futili- payments proceedings would be an exercise vance reimbursed out of to be orig- be entitled ty.” (emphasis Director’s br. at 30 of com or installments unpaid inal). installment may that the answers to While be Additionally, 33 U.S.C. pensation due.” employer a Form are useless to an LS-200 may ob employer that an provides § 922 modifica- payment, in advance retroactive unpaid compen tain reimbursement tion, if misrepresentation cases result proceedings sation if modification making as we employer payments, is not applies rate that a decreased might the answers be valu- explained have But inas retroactively past payments. employer making payments to an not able employ allow an provisions much as these involving disputes employees’ over cases overpayments advances or recoup er to compensation. or future right ongoing of no they are only payments, frоm future acknowledges, “[i]f As the Director long as it is not employer an so use to eventually obtains an award employee Moreover, as we paying compensation. begins paying compensation, employer indicated, that an the information have may request earnings employer then the answers might obtain from the employer concerning any period of dis- information to an is of no use to a Form LS-200 by the award.” Director’s ability covered making payments currently employer Plappert, n. 17. 31 Ben. Rev. br. at See his ear if the had obtained even Bd. Serv. at through misreporting, willful рayments lier that inasmuch as The Director asserts circumstance aggravated in that for even pay compensa- starts to who repayments. not make need em- a statement of the may request tion *7 Transp., 20 See Lennon Waterfront time, it no earnings “gains at that ployee’s (5th Cir.1994); Stevedoring F.3d 661 be- by seeking the information advantage Eggert, 953 F.2d 555- Am. v. Servs. of for it.” Director’s br. fore it has use Cir.1992).5 (9th Indeed, the Director 57 however, are, far from at 33 n.17. We limitation on the that this his brief states obliged to employer an who is certain that from which the of funds source any ben- pay compensation does not obtain even to repayment make extends must earnings employee’s an having efit from at 30. fraud cases. Director’s br. during (1984), compensation paid that 98-570(1) re- amount of H.R.Rep. at 18 No. 2734, 2751, in- com- printed period may U.S.C.C.A.N. be withheld from future in 1984 employee. dicates that: pensation payments due to the paid contemplate already dur- that compensation had been Committee does not If The the ing bring for which action employer the could a cause of the willfully report, and know- to file a or paid past. failed in the to recover earnings, underreported the ingly such 702.285(a) added); § (emphasis -payments before the are due. C.F.R. information 702.286(a).7 regard, reiterate that the an- In this we see also 20 C.F.R. We think in- to a Form LS-200 could reveal regulation hardly swers that the could be clearer. might formation that allow Moreover, legislative history as ex- reduce the amount of or even eliminate the in a plained Representatives House re- Thus, the payments for which it is liable. port, though perhaps not so clear as the to overlook the position Director’s seems regulation, provides: starting stopping difference between ... The Committee does not intend necessary delay and the be- payments, requirement employ- authorize a that all events, starting and not them tween these receiving compensation file ees benefits starting by in a reduced amount them reports earnings. semi-annual Such We, employee’s earnings. reason of an reports by are intended to be a device however, that are of the view this narrow employers may which maintain some possibility, to DRS seems not to payment control over claims in status. briefs, in its should not lead us to refer reports Whether such are to be reach a result than that we different emplоyer’s option. remains the Overall, think reach.6 we that section 98-570(1), No. H.R.Rep. re- 908(j) ambiguous so the intent of Con- printed in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. gress respect clear with to the not issue added). Overall, (emphasis beyond it is Thus, before us. we need to make the question that inasmuch as DRS made its second determination in the Chevron requests report to DiFidelto to his earn- above, methodology that we set forth ings at a it him time when was not if implementing regulation, ascertain compensation, insofar as regulation 702.285(a), is based on a rea- governed requests, DiFidelto construction of section sonable 908®. obliged respоnd. do not think that We our second deter- course, that, recognize, We as we with, mination is difficult. To start there stated, already have regulation must regulation, can be no that doubt on a be based reasonable construction of by supported legislative history of sec- point, the statute. On this for the reasons 908®, tion indicates that the result that that we have set forth the Board reached was correct. fact ambiguity of section that we will not 908® much, though challenges DRS admits as it repeat, we have no that doubt does. validity regulation as it asserts Indeed, example this case is a textbook that it is inconsistent with section 908®. when applies. Chevron deference Accord- regulation on section builds be- ingly, obliged respond DiFidelto was not provides cause section that a “dis- requests to the Form LS-200 so that his employee” report abled must respond failure to did not cause him to upon request, implementing regu- and the suffer a forfeiture. lation states: An employer may require ... an em- *8 V. CONCLUSION ployee to ivhom paying compensa- it is reasons, report foregoing tion to submit a ‍​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌​​​‍For the petition from the employment or self-employment. for review will be denied. suggesting

6. We are thаt Secretary through our result would 7. The of Labor the Director 702.285(a) adopted § have been different if DRS had advanced this and Form possible exercising Secretary's benefit from the an- LS-200 the rule mak- ing authority. 939(a). swers to a Form LS-200. See 33 U.S.C. informative, we should history tive is often FISHER, concurring. Judge, Circuit legislative hesitant to take a statute’s be here should regulation that the agree I itself, dispositive in of as of history, and I separately because I write upheld. be plain textual apparently the statute’s majori- way in which the the disagree with meaning. inference that a statute the ty dismisses thereby defined has dеfines a noun legislative history only But is not the Maj. of that noun. See adjectival form

the to us in this interpretive resource available statutory of definitions (quoting at 620 Op. recognized long case. The courts have in U.S.C. “employee” “disability” and may meaning that the of a statute be 902(3) (10), that “it is holding but and im- partly from the course of its inferred combine these two that we should not clear over time. The seminal plementation ”). ... employee’ define ‘disabled terms to principle remains that of statement of this not so obvious. The the answer is To me Lamar: Justice language of our imperatives grammatical that these facts may argued It be while casually, and disregarded not to be ought they do not rulings prove usage a us than nothing more before there were validity. But government establish its implement- statutory language and the the practical practical a affair intended hard-pressed regulation, I would be ing officers, and cit- men. Both law-makers inconsistency be- linguistic overlook the adjust naturally izens themselves case, there is though, In them. this tween long-continued action of the Executive more, makes the difference. and to me that that Department presumption the—on in view, acquiescence my congressional not have been unauthorized acts would of is evidence agency’s interpretation repeated so often as allowed to be statutory language. ambiguity in the That crystallize regular practice. into a mechanically separate impossible to It is reasoning in a circle is not presumption inter- and “reasonable “plain meaning” rule quieting a wise and but the basis of of the Chevron components pretation” meaning of a determining that in this If tries to do so analysis. one power, of a or the existence statute The stat- faced with a conundrum. one is usage it- given be weight shall “disability,” “employee” ute defines validity prac- when self—even uses the implementing regulation but the subject investigation. tice is the to mean some- employee” “disabled term Co., Midwest Oil States v. United “employee from quite different thing (1915). 59 L.Ed. 673 35 S.Ct. sure, Congress’s at- disability.” To be Oil, question was In Midwest may simply detail tention to definitional authority had the the President whether legisla- regard; been lax have public land to withdraw tracts that the drafters history indicates tive contra- apparent exploration, mineral regula- had in mind a probably the statute for such provided ventiоn of statutes by the adopted sort tory scheme of the that Con- The Court held exploration. by to that advocated opposed agency, in such acquiesced implicitly had gress Rep. H.R. here. See Conf. petitioner the rele- by failing to amend withdrawals 98-1027, reprinted at 33 No. of' decades over a statutes vant Nonethe- 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. had been many withdrawals during which voice less, constitutional “Congress’s at least The Court counted made. enacts,” Szehinskyj of the statutes text thus Congress had States, to which withdrawals the United Attorney Gen. *9 branch, The executive (3d tacitly consented. Cir.2005), legisla- and while F.3d conсluded, the acting Court was as Con- and turned to a purpose; new and dubious gress’ agent, implementing legislative the nor does it “suspension] involve a or re will as its duty. Congress is constitutional peal” duly of legislation. enacted Midwest work, watched the executive at its but at Oil, 505, J„ (Day, U.S. at 35 S.Ct. 309 point “repudiate no did it the action tak- dissenting). It involves instead a popular en”; therefore, “[Congress’] silence was government program which has con been acquiescence. its acquiescence Its sistently just in administered this manner equivalent to consent to continue prac- the inception. since its Congress, And power by tice until the was revoked some has not hesitated to amend the in LHWCA subsequent by Congress.” action 236 U.S. 92-576, past, the see Pub.L. 86 Stat. 1251 481, at 35 S.Ct. 309.8 (1972); Pub.L. 98-426 has not statutory interpretation Of course has thought necessary to do so here. a long way come since but the cen- private Nor have parties objected. The Oil, insight tral of Midwest in the Court’s searches have only revealed two statutory search for meaning, “weight challenges legality to the ‍​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌​​​‍of regulation: this itself,” given usage shall be to the very case, this companion and a brought case much at home in the Chevron era. And Circuit, the Secоnd by both filed the same usage the in this powerful case is evidence Briskie, law firm. See Weeks Marine v. of statutory meaning.9 regulation The (2d Cir.2006) 161 Fed.Appx. 178 (finding- issue here has been in effect for over 20 statutory language ambiguous and defer years. It applied, times, has been not 252 ring to agency interpretation). scope The .66,000 but times in past year the alone. filing requirement the under 20 C.F.R. Longshore and Harbor Compen- Workers 702.285(a) is simply not an issue over Sheet, Program sation http:// Fact which practical women, men and as demo gov/esa/ ivwiv.dol. owcp/dlhwc/lsfact.htm participants cratic practical the (Labor affairs website, Department listing num- of government, have had disagree ber of workers receiving disability benefits ment. 2005).10 very strength “The of this consen under the LHWCA Pursuant ... sus and regulation, congressional to this Department silence after of La- years [agency judicial bor distributes some interpreta million in and] bene- $747 year. fits each Id. tion support[ This case does not ] adherence to the traditional involve a long-dormant provision revived Dynamics view.” Gen. Land Sys. v. lay particular 8.I would stress on two inter- authority executive pur- and executive action First, pretive points: my invocation of Mid- suеd in secret. power In this case the exer- west Oil by Secretary is in no a comment on the cised of Labor was wielded statute, relationship pursuant respective between the openly inherent was wielded magisteria publicly. Congress constitutional and the Second, President. the case at bar involves question congressional acqui- whether unbroken, "systematic, practice, executive shapes meaning escence or is evidence of long pursued knowledge Congress is, meaning though of philosoph- undoubted questioned,” and never before Youngstown interest, practiсal ical of little moment here. Sawyer, Sheet & Tube Co. v. (1952) 72 S.Ct. 96 L.Ed. 1153 66,000 say, 10. That is to in each of those (Frankfurter, L, concurring) (emphasis add- cases, statute, implemented through the ed), opposed practice kept to a secret from regulation, gave injured employ- worker's Congress public. either or the (or cases, er or insurance carrier in some appealing legislative acquiescence itself) Department right Labor request words, in other any way I do not'in reporting by income verification employ- open ee, the twin only cans of worms of inherent but being paid. while *10 1236, Cline, 124 S.Ct. 540 U.S. America, of UNITED STATES (2004).11

157 L.Ed.2d Plaintiff-Appellee, us that come regulations before all Not v. enjoyed have such will interpreted to be EURA, longstanding Carnelius Vincent application consistent Defendant-Appellant. In the ab- acquiescence. congressional evidence, I would be less of such sence America, United States type in ambiguity the to likely find Plaintiff-Appellant, But at work here. alteration grammatical case, con- in this that I am convinced of the statute application historical sistent Eura, Carnelius Vincent varia- that “there is such ample evidence

is Defendant-Appellee. in the words in the connection tion 05-4437, 05-4533. Nos. reasonably to warrant used as are in dif- they employed were conclusion Appeals, Court of United States in- act with different parts of the ferent Fourth Circuit. Inc. v. tent,” Dyers, & Cleaners Atlantic Dec. Argued States, S.Ct. United “given and that 76 L.Ed. 24, 2006. Decided Feb. ‍​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌​​​‍circumstances, a statutory aims and -Congress] would member hypothetical [of in judicial deference

likely wanted have Breyer, Active Stephen

this situation.” (2005).

Liberty 106 majority that agree with the

I therefore it con- statutory language, insofar as in agency practice longstanding

flicts am- history, is legislative

addition to is that deference due

biguous, and interpretation.

agency’s reasonable enough "is rule above reads irony citing lacuna perhaps a certain 11. There here, ambiguity.”) The Dynamics insofar as General claim of General out serious acquies congressional Dynamics appealed difference, though, just be the difference ambigu statutory rejecting a claim cence the two cases. tween the facts interpretation overturning agency’s ity language far probably stretch too it would administered, while here we of a statute requires unambiguously hold that it congressional acquiescence find appeal Marine, reading. su agency’s Accord Weeks ambiguous statutoiy language so as to ing the Fed.Appx. at 619 n. 4. pra, 161 (The interpretation.' text agency’s affirm the

Case Details

Case Name: Delaware River Stevedores Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Edward Difidelto Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date Published: Mar 13, 2006
Citation: 440 F.3d 615
Docket Number: 04-4531
Court Abbreviation: 3rd Cir.
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