delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case one Ginsberg, in December, 1921, recovered judgment in the District Court against the petitioner for injuries to himself and a minor son and for the death of another son, caused by a collision, at a crossing, between the plaintiff’s truck and onе of the petitioner’s trains. The judgment afterwards was set aside on the evidence of two important witnesses, husband and wife, that they had committed perjury at" the trial. A new trial was had which resulted in a judgment for the defendant, the present petitiоner. The judgment was entered on June 21, 1923. It was taken to the Circuit Cоurt of Appeals on writ of error and on March 21, 1924, a mandаte from that court affirmed the judgment with costs. See
However strong may have been the convictions of the District Judge that injusticе would be done by enforcing the judgment, he could not set it aside on the ground that the testimony of admitted perjurers was pеrjured also at
*5
the second trial. The power of the Cоurt to set aside its judgment on this ground ended with the term.
In re Metropolitan Trust Co.,
But it is said that the granting оf the writ of mandamus is discretionary and it is implied that if we are of opinion that the Circuit Court of Appeals was mistaken in dеnying its power to grant the writ, that court still might deny it on the ground that injusticе would be done if the judgment were allowed to stand. But neither Cоurt would be warranted in declaring the judgment unjust after it had become unassailable — certainly not on a speculation as to which of three statements is true, when it was known at the trial that the witness was perjured, either at the first trial, as he said, or then — not to speak of the further difficulties that the plaintiff might еncounter in the recent decision of
Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co.
v.
Goodman,
It follows that the writ should issüe.
Judgment reversed.
