58 N.H. 5 | N.H. | 1876
This is a proceeding instituted by the court on the question whether Delano should be allowed to retain the office of attorney. The facts have been found by a commissioner appointed by an order of the circuit court, in the usual form, at the February term, 1875.
Delano was admitted to practice as an attorney, in 1870, on evidence of age and good moral character, under Gen. St., c. 199, s. 2. In 1871, 1872, and 1873, he was collector of taxes of the town of Farmington. Being engaged in the business of buying, fitting, and running a mill for the manufacture of bobbin lumber, and not having sufficient funds of his own for that business, he used the money of the town, received by him as collector of taxes, to the amount of $8,000 or $9,000, a large part of which the town has lost by this violation of his official duty. As is usual in such cases, he expected, when he appropriated the money to his own use, to be able to restore it without the misappropriation being discovered. He intended to restore it, and was guilty of much less than the usual amount of falsehood and fraudulent artifice. He and his wife and family did what they could to make good the loss to the town, but with only partial success.
We have no doubt that, in the absence of all statutory regulation of the matter, the court would be authorized to suspend this attorney from practice, or remove him from office. Cooley Const. Lim. 337; Sanborn v. Kimball,
The temptation to which Delano yielded is one to which he would be constantly exposed in the practice of his profession. The money he misapplied was not the money of a client; but his situation as collector of taxes was, in substance, the situation of an attorney receiving money for a client. And when it appears that he could not be safely trusted in the former case, it thereby appears that he cannot be safely trusted in the latter. If his defalcation had occurred before he was admitted to the office of attorney, that fault should have *6 prevented his admission; and, being enough to prevent his admission, it is enough to require his removal. This would clearly be so if the subject of removal were regulated solely by the common law of this state.
"The court shall inquire in a summary manner into any charge of fraud, malpractice, or contempt of court, against an attorney, and, upon satisfactory evidence of his guilt, shall suspend him from practice, or may remove him from office." Gen. St., c. 199, s. 7. If this statute affords a remedy only for misfeasance in the office of attorney, it does not apply to this case. We think the true construction is given in Mill's Case,
Mr. Delano is removed from the office of attorney.