This case was tried on the theory and claim that defendants failed to construct and maintain the building so as to render it safe under the provisions of sec. 101.06, Stats., commonly referred to as the “safe-place statute.” Appellants contend this statute does not apply.
The safe-place statute first became the law of this state by the enactment of ch. 485, Laws of 1911. As enacted it con-cededly applied only to employees and frequenters and places of employment. Sec. 2394-r-48, Stats. 1911, provided that employers “shall furnish a place- of employment which shall be safe for employees therein and for frequenters thereof.” This section was amended by ch. 588, Laws of 1913, by adding the following:
“Every employer and every owner of a place of employment or a public building now or hereafter constructed shall so construct, repair or maintain such place of employment or public building, and every architect shall so prepare the plans for the construction of such place of employment or public building, as to render the same safe.”
This section has been renumbered, and is now sec. 101.06, Stats.
Sec. 2394 — 41 (11), Stats., as originally enacted in 1911, provided:
“The term ‘safe’ and ‘safety’ as applied to an employment or a place of employment shall mean such freedom from danger to the life, health or safety of employees or frequenters as the nature of the employment will reasonably permit.”
This section was amended by ch. 588, Laws of 1913, by adding the words shown in italics so as to read:
“The term ‘safe’ or ‘safety’ as applied to an employment or a place of employment or a public building, shall mean such freedom from danger to the life, health, safety or welfare of em *378 ployees, or frequenters, or the public, or tenants, and such reasonable means of notification, egress and escape in case of fire, as the nature of the employment, place of employment, or public building, will reasonably permit.”
This section was further amended by ch. 133, Laws of 1917, by adding the words shown in italics, as follows:
“The term ‘safe’ or ‘safety’ as applied to an employment or a place of employment or a public building, shall mean such freedom from danger to the life, health, safety; or welfare of employees or frequenters, or the public, or tenants, or firemen, and such reasonable means of notification, egress and escape in case of fire, and such freedom from danger to adjacent buildings or other property as the nature of the employment, place of employment, or public building will reasonably permit.”
Sec. 2394 — 41 (11), Stats., has been renumbered and is now sec. 101.01 (11). Sec. 2394 — 41 was further amended-by ch. 588, Laws of 1913, by adding sub. (12) thereto, defining a public building as follows;
“The term ‘public building’ as used in sections 2394 — 41 to 2394 — 71 shall mean and include any structure used in whole or in part as a place of resort, assemblage, lodging, trade, traffic, occupancy, or use by the public, or by three or more tenants.”
No further amendments material here were made to the sections and subsections heretofore set forth. They continued to be the law of this state at all times after their enactment to the present time. .
Ch. 485, Laws of 1911, created the industrial commission to administer this chapter, and an examination of the history of ch. 101, Stats., shows that the amendments above referred to, and other amendments not material here, were sponsored by the industrial commission. It appears from the material available that there was doubt whether the safe-place statute applied only to equipment used by an employee or whether it also applied to the building in which he was employed. It had been *379 argued in court that it applied to the equipment used by the employee, and not the building. The amendment to sec. 239-1 — 48, Stats. 1911, by ch. 588, Laws of 1913, to include public buildings was for the purpose of clarifying this question. See “The Industrial Commission of Wisconsin” by A. J. Altmeyer.
It also appears that prior to 1913 a series of fires had occurred in public buildings as defined by sec. 2394 — 41 (12) [now sec. 101.01 (12)], Stats., in the states of Ohio, New York, New Jersey, and other states, resulting in the death of a large number of persons, which caused great public alarm. See “Report of Allied Functions, Industrial Commission of Wisconsin” issued August 31, 1914. This prompted the addition of the words “or the public, or tenants, and such reasonable means of notification, egress and escape in case of fire, as the nature of the employment, place of employment, or public building” will reasonably permit. From the material available it is evident the intention was to protect the people within the building. Among other things the definition of the term “frequenter” has not been changed from the time the statute was first enacted, except by adding the words “or public building” in 1917, and provides that it “shall mean and include every person, other than ah employee, who may go in or be in a place of employment or public building under circumstances which render him other than a trespasser.” Sec. 101.01 (5). The use of the words “egress and escape in case of fire” in sec. 101.01 (11), which has remained unchanged since 1913, bears out the other information available on this question. Then in the amendment by ch. 133, Laws of 1917, in order to further protect against fires, the word “firemen” was added to the section, and realizing that in case of fire adjoining buildings were in danger and eyery effort should be made to protect adjoining buildings with fireproof construction, the following words were added: “and such freedom from danger to adjacent buildings or other property” as the nature of employment, place of employment, or public building will reasonably permit.
*380
This, it seems to us, makes untenable the contention of the respondent that the use of the words “public” and “public building” was intended to protect the public wherever they may be. While it was held in
Sadowski v. Thomas Furnace Co.
(1914)
It is noted that the common-law rule was applied in
Majestic Realty Corp. v. Brant
(1929),
*381
A highway is not a place of employment under ch. 101, Stats.
Waldman v. Young Men’s Christian Asso.
(1938)
227
Wis.
43, 277
N. W. 632;
Herrick v. Luberts
(1939),
It is recognized that the legislature intended to place a greater responsibility on employers and owners of public buildings for the protection of employees and the public within *382 "the building beyond that required by the common law, but there is nothing in the language of the statute which brings persons on a street within its terms. It is considered the statute is not that broad.
It follows from the foregoing that this action should have been tried upon issues of common-law negligence and not upon the safe-place statute. Since^common-law negligence is in the case under the pleadings this makes it proper to order a retrial of the case and we have no occasion to make an extensive review of the evidence to determine whether jury questions are present on the issue of negligence because since the case was not tried on this issue all evidence available may not have been introduced. It may be proper to suggest that as the record stands there is sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the question of the negligence of the tenant,
Majestic Realty Corp. v. Brant, supra,
but not enough to warrant submission of whether the work as performed by the contractor and subcontractor constituted a nuisance. The general rule is that an independent contractor is relieved from responsibility to persons for injuries suffered by them after he has completed his work and it has been accepted by his principal. There is an exception to this rule, however, where the work constitutes a nuisance.
Schumacher v. Carl G. Neumann D. & I. Co.
(1931)
By the Court. — Judgment in favor of plaintiff and dismissing defendants’ cross complaints reversed and cause remanded with directions to grant a new trial.