Brendan DELANEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dr. Thomas FARLEY, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, Dr. Lynn Silver, Assistant Commissioner New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene and Chair for NYCRx Inc., a Not-for-Profit Organization, City of New York, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 14-4529-cv.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Aug. 25, 2015.
Thus, when the record is viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, we conclude that both alleged agreements were terminable at will and included promises of annual payments that would become “fixed and earned” within a year on a recurring basis, even if amount calculation and tender would not occur until the next calendar year. Cron v. Hargro Fabrics, Inc., 91 N.Y.2d at 370, 670 N.Y.S.2d at 977, 694 N.E.2d 56. The Statute of Frauds does not, therefore, bar enforcement of the alleged agreements. Accordingly, we vacate the district court‘s award of summary judgment as to the breach of contract claims.
4. Unjust Enrichment
Plaintiffs also challenge the bench-trial decision in defendants’ favor on the unjust enrichment claim. The district court concluded that plaintiffs failed to prove that defendants benefitted from copying the database at issue. See Schatzki v. Weiser Capital Mgmt., LLC, 995 F.Supp.2d at 251; see generally Briarpatch Ltd. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 306 (2d Cir.2004) (stating that unjust enrichment requires showing that “(1) defendant was enriched, (2) at plaintiff‘s expense, and (3) equity and good conscience militate against permitting defendant to retain what plaintiff is seeking to recover“). Plaintiffs have failed to explain how the district court‘s factual finding on this point was erroneous. While plaintiffs presented evidence regarding the value of their efforts creating the database, that does not compel a conclusion that defendants procured a benefit. Moreover, plaintiffs do not address the district court‘s specific finding that any benefit Weiser obtained derived from the retention of other employees, not from copying the database. See Schatzki v. Weiser Capital Mgmt., LLC, 995 F.Supp.2d at 253. This finding is sufficient to support the district court‘s decision in favor of defendants.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court‘s judgment as to the unjust enrichment claim.
5. Conclusion
We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments, and we conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is VACATED as to plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims and AFFIRMED in all other respects, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order.
Kathy Chang Park (Pamela Seider Dolgow, on the brief), Assistant Corporation Counsels, for Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, NY, for Appellees.
PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, REENA RAGGI, RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges.
SUMMARY ORDER
Plaintiff Brendan Delaney appeals the dismissal of his Second Amended Complaint, challenging the district court‘s determination that his claims for discriminatory and retaliatory termination of employment under
Each of Delaney‘s discrimination and retaliation claims is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. See Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir.2002) (applying three-year statute of limitations to
We conclude, as the district court did, that defendants gave Delaney definite notice of termination on April 7, 2010. On that date, Dr. Lynn Silver—Delaney‘s supervisor and one of the individuals responsible for identifying employees who would be laid off, see Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 53, 55, 64—said to Delaney, “I hope you signed up to attend a layoff session,” id. ¶ 72. Consistent with allegations in his original complaint, Delaney conceded at oral argument that in response to this statement, he asked Silver if he was being laid off, to which Silver responded, “Yes. It‘s the budget.” Compl. ¶ 334. This conclusively demonstrates that by April 7, 2010, defendants “had established [their] official position—and made that position apparent to” Delaney. Economu v. Borg-Warner Corp., 829 F.2d at 315 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Delaney nevertheless argues that he did not have definite notice of termination until April 28, 2010, when he was informed in writing that his employment would end on May 14, 2010. See Second Am. Compl. ¶ 76. We have not identified communication of a final work day as an essential component of definite notice of termination. For example, in Economu v. Borg-Warner Corp., we concluded that plaintiff “received... sufficiently definite” notice as of the date of a meeting at which corporate officers informed plaintiff‘s lawyer that the company “was no longer interested in [plaintiff‘s] services.” 829 F.2d at 314-16. In reaching this conclusion, we did not consider whether a specific termination date was communicated to counsel at the meeting.
Equally unavailing is Delaney‘s argument that discussions about budget cuts and layoffs were ongoing on April 7, 2010. Indeed, “the mere possibility that the decision might be reversed [is] not enough to label it advisory or ineffective for time-bar purposes.” Miller v. Int‘l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 755 F.2d at 24 (concluding that plaintiff received definite notice of termination when orally informed “that he would, absent exceptional circumstances, be removed from the payroll on April 1, 1979,” despite fact that personnel department had not yet voted to approve termination). We therefore conclude that the applicable three-year statutes of limitations for Delaney‘s claims began to run on April 7, 2010.
Delaney argues that this conclusion cannot apply to his sex discrimination claims because he did not learn that he was re-
Accordingly, all of Delaney‘s claims for discriminatory and retaliatory termination of employment accrued on April 7, 2010. Because Delaney did not commence this action in state court until April 20, 2013, more than three years later, the district court correctly concluded that his claims were time-barred.1
We have considered Delaney‘s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. Therefore, the district court‘s judgment of dismissal is AFFIRMED.