ALBERTO DELACRUZ AND LENITA DELACRUZ, HIS WIFE, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS AND CROSS-PETITIONERS, v. BOROUGH OF HILLSDALE, BOROUGH OF HO-HO-KUS, BOROUGH OF SADDLE RIVER, TOWNSHIP OF WASHINGTON, POLICE DEPARTMENT OF THE BOROUGH OF HILLSDALE, POLICE DEPARTMENT OF THE BOROUGH OF HO-HO-KUS, POLICE DEPARTMENT OF THE TOWNSHIP OF SADDLE RIVER, POLICE DEPARTMENT OF THE TOWNSHIP OF WASHINGTON, OFFICER ROBERT LABIANCA, OFFICER FRANK NOVAKOWSKI, SERGEANT ROBERT BREESE, OFFICER EUGENE SCHULTZ AND SERGEANT ROBERT ORR, DEFENDANTS-PETITIONERS AND CROSS-RESPONDENTS, AND JOHN DOES 1-10 (SAID NAMES BEING FICTITIOUS), DEFENDANTS.
870 A.2d 259
Supreme Court of New Jersey
Argued September 28, 2004-Decided April 12, 2005.
183 N.J. 149
In conclusion, we hold that a private person does not have the right to present an allegation or evidence of a crime to a grand jury. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division.
For reversal-Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices LONG, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, ALBIN, WALLACE and RIVERA-SOTO-7.
Opposed-None.
870 A.2d 259
ALBERTO DELACRUZ AND LENITA DELACRUZ, HIS WIFE, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS AND CROSS-PETITIONERS, v. BOROUGH OF HILLSDALE, BOROUGH OF HO-HO-KUS, BOROUGH OF SADDLE RIVER, TOWNSHIP OF WASHINGTON, POLICE DEPARTMENT OF THE BOROUGH OF HILLSDALE, POLICE DEPARTMENT OF THE BOROUGH OF HO-HO-KUS, POLICE DEPARTMENT OF THE TOWNSHIP OF SADDLE RIVER, POLICE DEPARTMENT OF THE TOWNSHIP OF WASHINGTON, OFFICER ROBERT LABIANCA, OFFICER FRANK NOVAKOWSKI, SERGEANT ROBERT BREESE, OFFICER EUGENE SCHULTZ AND SERGEANT ROBERT ORR, DEFENDANTS-PETITIONERS AND CROSS-RESPONDENTS, AND JOHN DOES 1-10 (SAID NAMES BEING FICTITIOUS), DEFENDANTS.
Argued September 28, 2004-Decided April 12, 2005.
Richard S. Lehrich argued the cause for respondents and cross appellants.
Karen L. Jordan, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae, State of New Jersey (Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Patrick DeAlmeida, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel).
Justice RIVERA-SOTO delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cross-appeals require that we address two discrete but related issues: (1) does the verbal threshold of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act,
We hold that the Tort Claims Act‘s verbal threshold applies to common law false arrest/false imprisonment claims. We further hold that, under
I.
Starting in early 1997, several neighboring Bergen County communities suffered from a series of burglaries that led local law enforcement officials to believe that their communities were being targeted by a band of professional burglars. Among the affected communities were the Borough of Saddle River, the Borough of Hillsdale, the Borough of Ho-Ho-Kus, and the Township of Washington. In an effort to stem, if not stop, this plague, the Saddle River Police Department, with the assistance of the Bergen County Prosecutor‘s Office, spearheaded a multi-jurisdictional task force designed to speed up the police response time to burglaries as well as to minimize the delays inherent in fractionalized law enforcement efforts that cross municipal boundaries. This task force was to be simple in its operation: once a burglary was reported, the police forces of the contiguous communities would form a cordon around the victimized community in an effort to catch the culprits as they tried to escape.
The early evening of October 24, 1997 brought with it two burglaries in Saddle River, the first one block away from the second. The Saddle River Police Department triggered the task force response, and officers from the surrounding communities of Waldwick, Allendale, Woodcliff Lake, Montvale, Ho-Ho-Kus, Washington Township, Hillsdale, Mahwah, and Ramsey formed a cordon around Saddle River‘s borders. Also brought in were the services of a helicopter from the Sheriff‘s Department of neighboring Rockland County.
Plaintiff, then a 45-year-old self-employed air conditioning, heating, ventilation and refrigeration contractor and the married father of three children, had just completed two days of work at the home of plaintiff‘s customer, a Saddle River physician. As plaintiff and his co-workers were leaving the worksite, the customer returned home and, pulling into the driveway, asked plaintiff, who was driving, in which direction he was heading. When plaintiff explained where he was going, the customer told plaintiff that there was a police checkpoint along that route-the flashing lights of the checkpoint were visible from the driveway-and recommended that plaintiff turn in the opposite direction to spare himself what looked like a twenty-minute delay. Plaintiff thanked his customer for the suggestion and headed in the opposite direction from the checkpoint.
Shortly after turning in the direction the customer recommended, plaintiff saw the flashing lights of a police car in his rear view mirror. Plaintiff testified at trial as follows:
Q All right. What happened when you saw the flashing lights?
A When I saw the flashing lights, I just pulled over right away knowing that a regular police would ask your driver license or insurance. So I pulled over with no hesitation. As soon as he turn his lights on, I pulled over to the right.
Q What happened after that?
A Then all of a sudden, I could see this-the police come out of the you, he says. Pull out the gun right away. I could see it in my side mirror. And I don‘t know what to do. I was panicking. My-both knees were shaking.
Q How close was the officer to you when you first saw him?
Q Do you know which officer was talking to you at that time?
A I-he was referring to me, the driver, aiming a gun, was pointing at me through the door. So I says, I don‘t know what I-so I told him while I was-Officer, what did I do, you know, what did I do. I was keep repeating those words. I says, please. So he says, you, mother f**ker. He says, get out of the truck. You know, so I get more nervous. So a minute after that, there‘s another cop came over in front of me, you know, or the truck. And they made a big scene. I mean, the lights are on pulsing. So I get more nervous. I don‘t know what to do. I thought I‘m going to be dying, and I was just praying. I says, please, I hope I don‘t really-you know, I hope I see my family again.
So as I walk back towards the truck, he says-and he kept-please, Officer, I says, please I have my credential on my wallet, my back pocket, please open them up, I have-
Q I‘m sorry. I couldn‘t understand you.
A I have my wallet, you know, my credentials, pull them out, and I have an invoice for the doctor, would you please call him up, you know. But the policeman don‘t even want to listen. So I said I was walking ‘cause I was scared. I don‘t know what to do. I was-he says, walk faster. He was cursing. You know, the other guy was blocking the walk. And then he says, kneel down. As soon as I kneel down, he kind of push me. And I says, what did I do. He puts his knees in my back and put the handcuff like that. So I says-I was crying. I said, please, Officer, what did you do to me. I says, would you please call [the physician/customer]. They would not listen.
So probably ten minutes later, another police came, and I could hear it. And he says-I heard something like, you went too far with this.
Q I‘m sorry. You have to-
A You went too far. In other words all of a sudden with my handcuff on, two police came over and trying to lift me. I says, please, don‘t lift me up, just let me down on the ground with my handcuff on. So the-one of the officer tried to loosen up the key, but it won‘t fit on his-on my handcuff. So I heard he go, okay, don‘t-my keys don‘t fit on this. So one officer threw keys to the other officer and loosen up my-the handcuff.
And then soon as they took the handcuffs off, I was laying down facing the ground. They trying to pick me up. I says, please, let me just lay down for a while because you‘re hurting me. I was really, really begging the police, please, don‘t do it, you know.
After explaining that he had his driver‘s license, registration card and proof of insurance all in order but was never asked for
Q Have you ever been arrested in your life?
A Never.
Q Do you have any kind of criminal record at all?
A No.
Q Have you ever looked at a police gun before?
A That‘s why I was so scared because I got pulled over with a State Trooper. It‘s not cursing you out and aiming a gun at you. I was shocked. The first time it ever happened to me.
Plaintiff described the length and conclusion of the exchange as follows:
Q Mr. DelaCruz, how long would you estimate you were in the handcuffs?
A I would say about 10, 15 minutes.
. . . .
Q And what happened after you got up?
A After I got up, one officer told me, oh, now I remember you, you are the contractor who‘s doing the doctor‘s house on the corner. I says, I‘ve been telling that long time ago, I was begging them. And he says-
Q Do you know which officer said that to you?
A I couldn‘t remember a face, but he says to me, did I-we scare you, we‘re just doing the normal procedure. So I said, Officer, I‘m tired, just let us go. That‘s why he let us go.
Officer Frank Novakowski of the Hillsdale Police Department testified that he was aware of the burglary task force created in order to address the spate of burglaries afflicting Bergen County. Officer Novakowski testified that he was on duty on the evening of October 24, 1997 when he received a dispatcher‘s call that there had been additional burglaries in Saddle River and that Saddle River had requested Hillsdale‘s assistance in setting up a perimeter. Together with Officer Labianca of the Washington Township Police Department, Officer Novakowski separately responded to the three-way intersection of Mill, Jacqueline, and Chestnut Ridge Roads, where they were on the lookout for “any traffic that might be trying to get out of the burglary area or a car going in to pick up the burglars.”
ordered the-the driver to open the car door, the van door using his right hand from the outside. I wanted to keep his-for my safety, I wanted to keep his hands in view at all times.
Q And did he?
A Yes, he did.
. . . .
Q What happened next?
A I instructed him to exit the van and face forward. I told him to keep his hands up in the air where I could see them, that way he couldn‘t pull out any concealed weapon that he might have had. I then ordered him to walk backwards toward the sound of my voice.
Q And did he do all these things that you told him to do?
A Yes, he did.
. . . .
Q What happened next?
A I had him proceed walking backwards until he got just-just past the back of his van, at which point I told him to slowly go down to his knees to the-to the road, maintaining his hands in the air. When he got down into that position, I told him to lay down on the ground.
Q And did he?
A Yes, he did.
Q All right. And what happened next?
A At that time, Officer Schultz from Ho-ho-kus had arrived and he took up a position next to me. He was in plain clothes. I noticed that he didn‘t-he didn‘t have his uniform on, his-his gun or anything. I handed him my handcuffs.
A He-he walked up to the-to the suspect. I maintained cover from my car and Officer Schultz patted him down and then handcuffed.
. . . .
Q What happened next after the handcuffs were applied by [Officer] Schultz?
A I believe at that time Officer Labianca had the--the person in the front passenger seat exit and walk back towards him. In that time, within a couple of minutes, additional officers arrived.
Q And then what happened?
A I remember the rest of the occupants of the van were taken out.
Q Did you have anything to do with taking them out?
A No. No. Officer-I‘m sorry, Lieutenant Breese arrived. He walked over to-to Mr. DelaCruz and at that time I-I had walked over to the curb where several of the other subjects were sitting down.
In all material respects, the account of these events from the witnesses at trial is remarkably similar. The differences lie in plaintiff‘s testimony concerning, and the police officers’ denial of, the use of profanity, and plaintiff‘s claim, and the police officers’ denial, of rough handling immediately preceding and during the time plaintiff was handcuffed. As a result of the alleged rough handling, plaintiff testified that, two days later, he sought medical attention for pain to his shoulder and back, which was treated by rest and a mild sedative and subsided completely within one week. Plaintiff testified that the effect these events had on his mental state were more lasting, and his wife testified as to her resulting loss of consortium claim. Plaintiff proffered no expert testimony as to any psychiatric or psychological injuries as a result of these events.
II.
In 1999, plaintiff and his wife filed an action against the Boroughs of Hillsdale, Ho-Ho-Kus, and Saddle River, and Washington Township; their respective police departments; Officers Novakowski, Labianca, and Schultz; Lieutenant Breese and Sergeant Robert Orr of the Ho-Ho-Kus Police Department; and
Trial started on May 1, 2002. At the close of the evidence, the trial court dismissed, as a matter of law, all of plaintiff‘s federal claims under § 1983 against all of the defendants as well as all of plaintiff‘s state law claims against the municipal defendants. Plaintiff‘s sole surviving state law claim was that Officers Novakowski and/or Schultz used excessive force, first by placing the handcuffs on plaintiff and later when lifting him off the ground while removing the handcuffs. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff and against Officers Novakowski and Schultz and awarded $20,000 in compensatory damages; the jury declined to assess any punitive damages. The trial court later awarded $71,195 in attorneys’ fees and $3,099 in costs.
On appeal to the Appellate Division, plaintiff claimed that the trial court erred in: (1) finding that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity so as to bar liability under the Federal Civil Rights Act; (2) dismissing plaintiff‘s common law false arrest/false imprisonment claims as barred by the verbal threshold provision of the Tort Claims Act,
Defendants sought certification on the single issue whether, in the absence of physical or emotional injury, the verbal threshold of the Tort Claims Act bars a claim for false arrest/false imprisonment. Plaintiff cross-petitioned for certification limited also to a single issue: whether the good-faith defense is available in a § 1983 Federal Civil Rights Act claim for false arrest and excessive force. We granted both defendants’ petition for certification and plaintiff‘s cross-petition for certification, 179 N.J. 370, 845 A.2d 1253 (2004), as well as the application of the State of New Jersey for leave to appear amicus curiae. We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Appellate Division.
III.
We first address the issue whether the trial court correctly dismissed plaintiff‘s false arrest and false imprisonment claims as
[n]o damages shall be awarded against a public entity or public employee for pain and suffering resulting from any injury; provided, however, that this limitation on the recovery of damages for pain and suffering shall not apply in cases of permanent loss of a bodily function, permanent disfigurement or dismemberment where the medical treatment expenses are in excess of $3,600.00.
[
N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d) .]
It is admitted that, if the verbal threshold applies to plaintiff‘s false arrest/false imprisonment claims, those claims are barred. As noted earlier, the Appellate Division held that the Act‘s verbal threshold is inapplicable to false arrest/false imprisonment claims, reasoning that
A public employee is not liable if he acts in good faith in the execution or enforcement of any law. Nothing in this section exonerates a public employee from liability for false arrest or false imprisonment.
[(Emphasis supplied).]
The comment immediately following that section states, in relevant part:
This section does not, however, immunize law enforcement officials from false arrest and false imprisonment. It is recognized that law enforcement officers are not now immune in the State of New Jersey and it is believed that existing principles of law provide sufficient protection for the officer from frivolous suits. Therefore it is the intent of this section to emphasize the importance of compensating a citizen whose freedom has been unreasonably restricted.
[Report of the Attorney General‘s Task Force on Sovereign Immunity 216-17 (1972).]
Based on that comment, the Appellate Division reasoned that
[w]hen dealing with questions of statutory construction, the Court first considers the plain meaning of the provision at issue. Such language should be given its ordinary meaning, absent a legislative intent to the contrary. When a statute is silent or ambiguous, however, the Court must interpret the statute in light of the Legislature‘s intent. In order to ascertain legislative intent, the Court may look to extrinsic evidence, including legislative history, committee reports, and contemporaneous construction. The primary task for the [C]ourt is to effectuate the legislative intent in light of the language used and the objects sought to be achieved.
[Burns v. Belafsky, 166 N.J. 466, 473, 766 A.2d 1095 (2001) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).]
See also
By its unambiguous and specific terms,
Our reading of
We, therefore, reject the reasoning of the Appellate Division in this case because the panel, by its broad reading of
Nothing in the Act exempts false arrest/false imprisonment claims from the reach of the verbal threshold requirement of
IV.
We turn, then, to the issue certified on plaintiff‘s cross-petition: is good faith a defense available in a § 1983 Federal Civil Rights Act claim for false arrest and excessive force. The Appellate Division, citing Fielder v. Stonack, 141 N.J. 101, 132, 661 A.2d 231 (1995), and Leopardi v. Tp. of Maple Shade, 363 N.J.Super. 313, 332, 832 A.2d 943 (App.Div.2003), ruled that Officers Novakowski and Labianca “are still entitled to raise their subjective good faith as a second line of defense to plaintiff‘s federal claims under § 1983.” DelaCruz v. Borough of Hillsdale, supra, 365 N.J.Super. at 151, 838 A.2d 498. We disagree. Plaintiff‘s § 1983 Federal Civil Rights Act claims are governed by federal precedent. Under that precedent a law enforcement officer‘s state of mind is irrelevant to the issue of liability premised on an unlawful search or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
As the United States Supreme Court painstakingly explained in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1872, 104 L.Ed.2d 443, 455 (1989):
Because “[t]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application,” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 [99 S.Ct. 1861, 1884, 60 L.Ed.2d 447] (1979) . . . , its proper application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S., [1] at 8-9, 105 S.Ct., [1694] at 1699-1700[, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985)] (the question is “whether the totality of the circumstances justifie[s] a particular sort of seizure“).
The “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. See Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S., [1] at 20-22, 88 S.Ct., [1868] at 1879-1881, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)]. The Fourth Amendment is not violated by an arrest based on probable cause, even though the wrong person is arrested, Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 91 S.Ct. 1106, 28 L.Ed.2d 484 (1971), nor by the mistaken execution of a valid search warrant on the wrong premises, Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987). With respect to a claim of
excessive force, the same standard of reasonableness at the moment applies: “Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge‘s chambers,” Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d, at 1033, violates the Fourth Amendment. The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving-about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.
As in other Fourth Amendment contexts, however, the “reasonableness” inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers’ actions are “objectively reasonable” in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137-139, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1723-1724, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978); see also Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S., at 21, 88 S.Ct., at 1879 (in analyzing the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure, “it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard“). An officer‘s evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officer‘s good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional. See Scott v. United States, supra, 436 U.S., at 138, 98 S.Ct., at 1723 [ ( ]citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973)[ ) ].
[490 U.S. at 396-97, 109 S.Ct. at 1872, 104 L.Ed.2d at 455-56 (emphases supplied).]
The rule is thus clear. When a § 1983 Federal Civil Rights Act claim is leveled against a law enforcement officer for an alleged deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights, his or her conduct is to be evaluated through an objective lens that focuses on what a reasonable officer would have done under the circumstances. This is not to say that the law enforcement officer‘s version of the events is irrelevant. On the contrary, the law enforcement officer of course may argue that the facts that existed at the time of the incident are different from the plaintiff‘s version. See Graham, supra, 490 U.S. at 397, 109 S.Ct. at 1872, 104 L.Ed.2d at 456 (the “question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them” (emphasis supplied)).
To the extent that Leopardi v. Tp. of Maple Shade, 363 N.J.Super. 313, 327, 832 A.2d 943 (App.Div.2003), certif. granted, 179 N.J. 370, 845 A.2d 1253 (2004), suggests otherwise, it is based upon a misreading of Bennett v. Murphy, 274 F.3d 133, 137 (3d Cir.2002). To be sure, the Court in Bennett stated that, at trial, “[a]n officer may still contend that he reasonably, but mistakenly,
Therefore, we reiterate what is already clear federal precedent: a law enforcement officer‘s state of mind is irrelevant to the issue of liability on a § 1983 Federal Civil Rights Act claim premised on an unlawful search or seizure in violation of Fourth Amendment rights.
V.
There can be no doubt that plaintiff‘s experience at the hands of law enforcement on October 24, 1997 was, to say the least, harrowing. By the same token, we are mindful that, in judging the reasonableness of a police officer‘s conduct in this setting, “the calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving-about the amount of force that is necessary in a particu-
We find that false arrest/false imprisonment claims against public entities and employees must nevertheless meet the verbal threshold of the Tort Claims Act. On the flip side, we are also mindful of the extreme circumstances under which law enforcement personnel must operate and we are loathe to gauge their behavior solely under the unforgiving glare of perfect hindsight. Thus, if the police officer‘s actions were objectively reasonable, the officer will be entitled to qualified immunity. In those circumstances where qualified immunity is unavailable for claims asserted as either common law torts or under the Federal Civil Rights Act because the police officers either (1) did not act with probable cause or (2) in the absence of probable cause, an objectively reasonable police officer would not have believed in its existence, that police officer‘s subjective good faith is relevant only as to the issue of punitive or exemplary damages.
The judgment of the Appellate Division remanding the matter to the Law Division for trial as to plaintiff‘s § 1983 claims is affirmed; the judgment of the Appellate Division remanding plaintiff‘s state law claims for entry of judgment of liability and for trial on damages is reversed; the matter is remanded to the Law Division for entry of judgment in favor of defendants and against plaintiff on plaintiff‘s state law tort claims and for trial as to plaintiff‘s § 1983 claims in accordance with this opinion; and the award of attorneys’ fees is vacated and must abide the result of the trial of plaintiff‘s § 1983 claims.
Justice LONG, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I am in full agreement with the Court‘s conclusion that
Under the verbal threshold, a plaintiff may not recover damages against a public entity for pain and suffering resulting from any injury that is not permanent and substantial. Brooks v. Odom, 150 N.J. 395, 406, 696 A.2d 619 (1997). As this case demonstrates, false arrest, unless coupled with other tortious conduct, is unlikely to cause permanent injury. As a result, under the majority‘s view, most false arrests will go unremedied. I do not believe that was what the Legislature intended.
Although the Tort Claims Act does not clearly exclude false arrest claims from the ambit of the verbal threshold, that does not end the inquiry. As Chief Justice Weintraub observed:
It is frequently difficult for a draftsman of legislation to anticipate all situations and to measure his words against them. Hence cases inevitably arise in which a literal application of the language used would lead to results incompatible with the legislative design. It is the proper function, indeed the obligation, of the judiciary to give effect to the obvious purpose of the Legislature, and to that end “words used may be expanded or limited according to the manifest reason and obvious purpose of the law. The spirit of the legislative direction prevails over the literal sense of the terms.”
Alexander v. New Jersey Power & Light Co., 21 N.J. 373, 378 [122 A.2d 339] (1956); Wright v. Vogt, 7 N.J. 1, 6 [80 A.2d 108] (1951); Glick v. Trustees of Free Public Library, 2 N.J. 579, 584 [67 A.2d 463] (1949).
[New Capitol Bar & Grill Corp. v. Div. of Employment Sec., 25 N.J. 155, 160, 135 A.2d 465 (1957).]
With that teaching in mind, it seems clear that the failure of the Legislature specifically to carve false arrest out of the verbal threshold was an oversight. The essential purpose of the Tort Claims Act is to insulate governmental entities from having to answer for minor incidents and injuries. Ordinarily, the requirements of permanency and substantiality denote the kind of seriousness the Act was intended to remedy. That is simply not the case with false arrest.
One who is wrongfully deprived of freedom does not necessarily suffer from a denial of the necessities for maintaining a physical existence. Nor can the signs of unlawful confinement be detected by conducting a physical examination of the victim. As noted by the Supreme Court of California in Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles, 12 Cal.3d 710, 117 Cal.Rptr. 241, 527 P.2d 865, 868 (1974), “[i]n a false imprisonment case, the ‘injury’ suffered by an individual is the illegal confinement itself rather than any detriment occurring after imprisonment ....” One who is wrongfully deprived of freedom sustains an intangible injury, the magnitude of which cannot be measured or assessed in physical terms. Although this injury may, in some cases, also cause psychological or emotional trauma, a victim of false arrest/false imprisonment need not experience such trauma to have a legally compensable claim.
[DelaCruz v. Borough of Hillsdale, 365 N.J.Super. 127, 150, 838 A.2d 498 (App.Div.2004).]
By its opinion, this Court leaves that violation essentially unremedied and undeterred save for cases that, by happenstance, involve permanent injury resulting from separately actionable claims of excessive force. I do not read the Tort Claims Act in that confined way; nor do I believe that the Legislature, which took pains to underscore its continued abhorrence of false arrest in
For affirmance in part/reversal in part/remandment--Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, ALBIN, WALLACE, and RIVERA-SOTO-6.
For concurring in part/dissenting in part-Justice LONG-1.