74 Fla. 346 | Fla. | 1917
It appears that V. Spoto, P. Spoto and S. Spoto owners of Lot One, Block 78 Ybor City, contracted in writing on June 8, 1914, with Parrish & Goin, copartners, that the latter should on or before October 8, 1914, erect, finish and deliver a building of stated specifications on the lot for $16,250.00, the contractors to furnish all material and labor; that to secure the performance of the contract by Parrish & Goin and for the protection of the owners of the lot and others referred to in the instrument, a bond in the penal sum of $8,500.00 was executed June 8, 1914, by Thomas S. Parrish and James D. Goin, copartners, as principals, and by Lee Dekle and T. B. Sherrill, as sureties; that about Sep
“And your orators further charge that on or about the 19th day of September, 1914, the said contractors, having-received from the said owners payments upon the said contract price for the construction of said building in violation of the terms of the building contract aforesaid, as above’stated, and largely in'excess of the amount to which said contractors had become entitled, under the terms of the said contract for the work done, the said contractors totally abandoned the said contract and the construction of the building therein provided for, leaving
“That from time to time payments were made which exceeded eighty (80%) per cent, of the cost of material furnished and built in and the costs of labor performed on the said building at the time of such payments and without reserving twenty (20%) per cent, of such- costs as provided in said contract; that payments were made at times other than the weekly or semi-monthly periods provided for in said contract; that payments were made without a certificate from A. L. Shaw, the architect therein named and who was then acting as architect under the said contract, to the effect that said architect knew that said work was correctly and thoroughly done, and that he considered said payment properly due, and that payments were made without there being a certificate obtained from the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County, Florida, that said Clerk had carefully examined the public records of his said office and found no liens or claims recorded against said building or on account of said contractors.
“Your orators further aver that the payments so improperly made amount to a large sum, the exact amount of which is to your orators unknown, but that they are informed and believe that said payments amount to more than the sum of Five Thousand ($5,000.00) Dol
The bill contains other allegations not essential to be stated here.
It is prayed, among other things, that the pending suits be enjoined; that the institution of other suits be enjoined; that the bond be canceled; that if relief asked is not proper, then for an accounting, and for general relief. Some of the defendants laborers and material-men demurred specially to a portion of section 6 of the bill of complaint, others to section 7, and still others to section 7 1-2 of the bill of complaint. These several special demurrers to portions of the bill of complaint were sustained, and the complainants appealed from such interlocutory orders.
By the terms of the bond the obligors “are held and firmly bound unto V. Spoto, P. Spoto and S. Spoto * * * as well as unto all persons who may become entitled to liens under the contract hereinafter mentioned, in the sum of $8,500.00 * * * to be paid to the said V. Spoto, P. Spoto and S. Spoto, and to the said parties who may be entitled to liens as aforesaid,” and conditioned that if the contractors “shall in all
Section 2213 General Statutes, 1906, provides that “in every suit at law or in chancery the contractor or the person for whom the labor was performed or the materials furnished must be made a party defendant to the suit and the judgment or decree may provide for the recovery from the contractor or other person as aforesaid of the amount due by him, and from the owner of the amount due "by Mm to the contractor or other person as aforesaid, at the time of the service of the notice provided for by Section 2211, as well as decree and enforce the lien against the property of such owner for such amount.”
Under this statute there can be no recovery from the owner or liens upon the property of the owner for labor and material furnished to the contractors and used in a building except for “the amount due by” the owner to
Where the assignees or the sureties of the contractors undertake to complete a contractor’s abandoned contract, the lien of laborers and materialmen may attach for the amount unpaid on the contract, but not for a greater amount. See King v. Ramsey, 66 Fla., 257, 63 South. Rep. 439; Carter v. Brady, 51 Fla. 404, 41 South. Rep. 539.
Where the contractor abandons the building contract and the building is completed by the owner of the land, liens may be obtained for amounts not greater than the amount due to the contractor under the terms of the contract. Lowry v. Downing Mfg. Co., 73 Fla. 535, 74 South. Rep. 525.
The statute contemplates the completion of a building contract by the contractor or by one who takes his place under the building contract, and that a part of the contract price shall be due and unpaid to the contractor or his successors in interest at the time or after the written notices of contemplated liens are delivered or served. In this case it appears that the contract was abandoned by the contractors when no liens had been acquired, and when there was nothing due and unpaid to the contractors on the part performance of -the contract, and nothing became due and unpaid afterwards to the contractors or their successors in interest as the owners completed the building at |a loss. Under /these 'circumstances liens were not acquired by the laborers and materialmen. The owners were not successors in interest to the contractors. The interests of the owners and of the contractors were adverse.
In determining the legal effect of a bond given to secure the performance of a building contract, all of its
The real intention, as disclosed by a fair consideration of all parts of a contract, should control the meaning given to mere words or particular provisions, when they have reference to the main purpose. L’Engle v. Oversteet, 61 Fla. 653, 55 South. Rep. 381.
Where a bond is given to secure the performance of a building contract, the owners of the property being the obligees and the bond is expressly given to indemnify the owners and “all persons who may become entitled to claims or liens under the contract according to the provisions of the law in such cases made- and provided,” the provisions of such bond should not be held to give rights of action thereon in favor of those who furnished labor and material to the contractor but have no claims under the law against the property owner obligees in the bond, unless the terms of the bond clearly require it to be so interpreted. See Gato v. Warrington, 37 Fla. 542, 19 South. Rep. 883.
The bond expressly stipulates “that this bond is made for the use and benefit of all persons who may become entitled to claims or liens under the aforesaid contract according to the provisions of the law in such cases made and provided.” “The persons who may become entitled to claims or liens under the” building contract according to law are those who furnish labor or material used in the construction of the building, and who deliver to the owner or his agent a written notice as provided for in Section 2211 of the General Stautes of 1906.
If a sufficient written cautionary notice of labor or
Laborers and materialmen have a right of action against the contractors under the general law, and the statute merely requires the Contractors to be made parties in action by laborers and materialmen against the owners, and enacts that “the judgment or decree may provide for the recovery from the contractor * * * of the amount due by him,” on account of indebtedness for labor and material.
Considered in its entirety the bond was executed to secure the owners and other “persons who may become entitled to claims or liens under the contract” against the contractors and against the owners or their property according to law. The condition of the bond that the contractors “shall duly and properly pay and discharge all indebtedness that may be incurred by the said Parrish and Goin (the contractors) in carrying, out the said contract” is limited by other portions of the bond to “the parties for whose benefit this bond is made,” who are the
An indebtedness of the contractors for material and labor is not a “claim” under the contract within the meaning of the bond obligations of the sureties. If the contract was breached by the owners and the contractors, no right of action is thereby given to laborers and materialmen who have not protected themselves by acquiring liens under the statute. This being so, the special demurrers were erroneously sustained.
The orders appealed from are reversed.