40 La. Ann. 787 | La. | 1888
The opinion of tlie Court was delivered by
The plaintiff sues the defendant Railroad Company for injuries sustained in consequence of a collision between a train o f cars of the defendant anda wagon driven by plaintiff, in the City of New Orleans, near 7 o’clock p. m., at the Barracks street railroad crossing, on March 17th, 1887.
The testimony, as is usual in cases of this character, is conflicting. But from a careful and attentive review of the statements in the record, we think the following facts are conclusively established. On the evening of the 17th of March, 1887, about 7 o’clock, the incline engine of the defendant company coupled on to six freight cars for the purpose of placing them on defendant’s transfer boat, and began to hack them in the direction of the Barracks street crossing. This was the only practical way to put the cars on the transfer boat. The train was running at a reasonably slow rate of speed, not exceeding four miles an hour. The electric light at the crossing gave at this time a sufficient light to make plainly visible for some distance the surroundings at the crossing. There were no obstructions to prevent a full view of the crossing from the 3d District Ferry Landing, and the approach of trains from the direction of Hospital street, the direction from which the train come at the time of the collision. The Third District Ferry boat landed about the time the defendant company’s train was moving towards the crossing, 'three vehicles were driven from tlie ferry slip towards the crossing, the first two were driven at a comparatively rapid speed and successfully made the crossing when.
While the train was backing the bell was continually rung. Every reasonable effort was made by defendant’s employees to avert the accident. The signal to stop was given, the brakes applied and the engine reversed. The train hands were in their respective positions and were discharging their duties. There were lights at least on the top of the train. These were used as well as the loud voices of the employees to warn the plaintiff of his danger. All these warnings were given and the efforts to stop the train made as soon as it was evident that the plaintiff was in danger, that is as soon as he had reached the track. .The crossing, like others in populous cities, is dangerous. The railroad company is bound to take extraordinary precaution for the protection of the public at such places in the management and handling of its trains. Employees of railroad companies must always be vigilant and attentive, and their responsibility must be measured by the dangerous conditions which confront them; the greater the danger, the greater the vigilance and attention.
It would be the greatest carelessness and negligence for a railroad company to fail in any of the requirements necessary to protect the public, at a crossing where persons.and vehicles are constantly passing - There is an obligation also on the part of the public to be vigilant and attentive when passing over a crossing where passing trains may be frequently expected. Counsel for plaintiff says in his brief :
“Of course there can be no question, that if the court finds that the flagman was there, it was the greatest negligence on the part of plaintiff to undertake to drive by him.” We are convinced that the flagman was at the crossing, and gave timely warning to the plaintiff.
There is not sufficient evidence to establish the fact contended for by plaintiff, that there was a hole in the track, “longer and •deeper than should have been,” caused by the neglect of plaintiff to repair the same, in consequence of which plaintiff’s wagon was unable to be moved from the track in time to prevent the collision.
The plaintiff has failed to show that the accident in consequence of which he received his injuries, was due to the neglect of the defendant •company, and that he was guilty of no negligence which aided in the accident.
It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that the verdict of the jury and the judgment appealed from be set aside, annulled aud reversed, and it is now ordered adjudged and decreed that the demand •of plaintiff be rejected, with cost of both courts.