140 A. 515 | Pa. | 1927
Argued December 5, 1927. This appeal involves the construction of the Act of March 31, 1915, P. L. 39, entitled, "An act relative to judgments, and prescribing the duties of prothonotaries in connection therewith," which reads as follows, viz.: "Section 1. Be it enacted, etc., That the prothonotary of each county is hereby directed not to enter any judgment unless the judgment creditor, or his duly authorized attorney or agent, produces to the prothonotary a certificate signed by the judgment creditor, or by his duly authorized attorney or agent, setting forth the precise residence address of the said creditor. The certificate shall be filed at the same number and term as the judgment.
"Section 2. The prothonotary shall monthly prepare, and deliver to the county authorities who assess property for county tax purposes, a list of all judgments *553 entered during the preceding month, with the names and residence addresses of the respective judgment creditors and the amount of the respective judgments.
"Section 3. All acts and parts of acts inconsistent with or supplied by this act are repealed."
In the instant case plaintiff, holding defendant's judgment note, took it to the office of the prothonotary of Columbia County, on December 13, 1924, to have judgment entered thereon. He stated his precise residence address to the deputy prothonotary, who indorsed it on the back of the note, viz.: "Plff's residence is Allentown, Pa., No. 1505 Liberty Street." Judgment was then entered of record as follows: "Whereupon same day, judgment is entered for the plaintiff and against the defendant for $500.00, by Jackson Rhodes, Prothonotary. Plaintiff's residence is 1505 Liberty Street, Allentown, Pa.''
On defendant's petition, the court of common pleas struck off the judgment because of noncompliance with the act above quoted. The Superior Court, by a majority decision, affirmed the decree of the trial court (
In our opinion, striking off the judgment was error. Considering the act as a whole, its sole object was to afford reliable record information to the taxing authorities and that was fully accomplished here. In fact, endorsing the required information on the back of the note and also on the face of the record placed it in the most convenient and permanent form possible. Holding that, in addition, plaintiff's certificate must be filed on a separate slip, is requiring a too literal compliance with the statute. The act permits an agent to make the certificate and in recording the information plaintiff gave as to his residence, the prothonotary and his deputy were acting as agents for him in doing what he had at least impliedly authorized them to do. The statute makes no requirement as to who the agent shall be or *554 how he shall be authorized and excludes no one from acting as such.
The essence of the thing to be accomplished by this statute is the placing upon record with the judgment the precise residence address of the plaintiff, and this may well be treated as mandatory; while the exact manner in which it shall appear may be regarded as a matter of form and construed as directory. The true test is, as stated by Lord MANSFIELD in Rex v. Locksdale, 1 Burr 447, viz.: "That whether a statute is mandatory or not depends on whether the thing directed to be done is of the essence of the thing required," quoted with approval in Norwegian Street,
Were we to give the language in the instant case a literal construction a statement setting forth a plaintiff's precise residence address, written and signed by him on the face of the judgment record would not be a certificate produced to the prothonotary and filed in the same number and term as the judgment. In adhering too closely to the letter we may overlook the substance. Under the Act of February 24, 1806, Purdon's Digest (13th ed.), vol. 2, p. 2036, the holder of a judgment note, or other obligation, where there is certainty as to the amount thereof, with warrant of attorney to confess judgment, may take the same to the prothonotary, whose duty it is to enter judgment thereon without requiring the assistance of an attorney. This statute is simple and for more than a century has been in constant use. If now he must at his peril prepare and file a certificate complying literally with the Act of 1915, he will as a rule require legal assistance and the intent of the original act will be frustrated. We are familiar with the rule that the power to confess judgment, being in derogation of the common law, must be strictly construed (Oberlin v. Parry,
The decree of the Superior Court and the order of the court of common pleas, which it affirms, are reversed and the judgment is reinstated.