236 Pa. 146 | Pa. | 1912
Opinion by
The single question raised by this appeal is whether the word “indebtedness” in the assignments of the two life insurance policies means an indebtedness existing
Batley assigned to DeHaven the two life policies, each for five thousand dollars, “as a collateral security for indebtedness.” Whatever may have been the intention of the parties, the language of the assignment standing alone includes only an indebtedness existing at the date of the transfer of the policies. Instead of making the transfer “as a collateral security for indebtedness,” if the parties intended it to cover future advances, as claimed by appellee, they could, and we think would, have said “collateral security for any future indebtedness.” An assignment as collateral should be strictly construed, and, as thus interpreted, the language of the assignment in question does not disclose an intention to secure future advances.
The circumstances and facts surrounding the transaction confirm the view that the policies were intended to secure an indebtedness existing at the time of the assignment. Batley was engaged for several years in extensive building operations, and DeHaven was a conveyancer, manager of estates, and real estate broker. They had dealings growing out of Batley’s business as a builder. DeHaven advanced money and negotiated mortgages upon houses built by Batley. He stated an account running from May 24, 1891, to December 12, 1892, which shows receipts of money by him and payments of money made to Batley. These all grew out of Batley’s building operations. The balance shown by the account, seventy-five hundred dollars, was secured by mortgage. Batley retired from the building business in 1892. So far as appears, therefore, there was no oc
The facts suggested in the argument of the, appellee as showing that the mortgage debt was not the indebtedness intended to be secured by the insurance policies do not sustain the position. It is true that DeHaven retained the policies after the two mortgages were satisfied in 1902. It appears that Batley paid the premiums on the policies up till the date of the assignment, and thereafter they were paid by DeHaven. The latter, therefore, had the right to retain the policies until these premiums were repaid him which was not done until they were paid out of the proceeds of the policies collected by his executors. The fact that Batley did not have the policies reassigned to him does not conclude him as to his right to their proceeds, as it may well be that he was unable to raise the money to pay the premiums. He could not and did not object to the payment of one of the policies to the executors as it required the amount to repay the premiums. That the mortgage indebtedness was of some years’ standing is not sufficient to show that it was not intended to be secured by the assignment of the policies. The creditor had the right to take as many securities for the indebtedness as he could obtain from the debtor. His purpose in doing so is immaterial. The claimant having shown that the mortgage indebtedness existed at the date of the assignment the burden was shifted to the executors to show any other indebtedness due from Batley secured by the assignment. This burden was not met by the statement of June 28, 1901.
We are of the opinion that the language of the as
The decree of the court below is reversed, and it is ordered that the appellant receive the amount of the policies less the premiums paid by DeHaven thereon diminished by the dividends received by him.