MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Mario DeGenova brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that his *849 constitutional rights were violated when he was arrested and taken into custody by the Sheriff of DuPage County (and other defendants not party to the instant motion). In his complaint, DeGenova alleged that the Sheriff of DuPage County is liable in his official capacity for this offense. Defendant has moved to dismiss on the ground that he is an officer of the State of Illinois and is therefore immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. For the reasons stated herein, defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied.
BACKGROUND
In considering a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, we accept all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences from these facts in favor of the plaintiff.
Travel All Over the World, Inc. v. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
On October 2, 1996, Robert J. Stahurski signed.a complaint in which he falsely alleged that plaintiff Mario DeGenova had committed the misdemeanor offense of causing property damage to Stahurski’s lawn. (The complaint does not explain the relationship between DeGenova and Stahurski.) Pursuant to Sta-hurski’s complaint, an Illinois state judge apparently issued an arrest warrant for De-Genova and set bond on the warrant at five thousand dollars. On October 16, 1996, two DuPage County deputy sheriffs, one of whom was Sheriff Burtucca, entered DeGenova’s home and arrested him. At this point, De-Genova claims that he informed Burtucca that he had a cardiac condition which required medication. DeGenova further claims that Burtucca ignored this request both at the time of the arrest and throughout the period of detention, which ended the evening of October 17, 1996. As a result, DeGenova suffered serious medical harm. In his complaint,’ DeGenova claims that the sheriffs neglect of his medical condition amounted to a deprivation of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
ANALYSIS
I. State Officers and Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Plaintiff DeGenova hаs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State ... causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution ... shall be liable ...” The Supreme Court has interpreted the term “person” to include not only natural persons, but legal persons as well, such as states, municipalities and loсal governments.
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services,
Plaintiff alleges that the sheriff is liable in his official (as opposed to individual) capacity. Courts regard official capacity suits as actions against the government entity itself because the real party in interest is deemed to be the entity that promulgated the offending policies.
Graham,
It is well established that sheriffs in Illinois have, to some extent, the power to make policy with respect to law enforcement matters, including the treatment of persons in temporary custody and the investigation of certain crimes.
Moy v. County of Cook,
Defendant relies heavily on
McMillian v. Monroe County, Alabama,
in which the Supreme Court considered the issue of whether Alabama sheriffs represented the State of Alabama or the sheriffs county when they were performing law enforcement activities such as criminal investigation.
The Court then examined several different aspects of the Alabama constitution, court decisions and codes before concluding that the sheriffs were state officers. With respect to the statе’s constitution and the judicial opinions on the topic, the Court observed that: 1) Before ceifiorari was granted the Eleventh Circuit had ruled that the sheriff was not a policymaker for the county and considerable deference was to be given to that court’s more extensive familiarity with Alabama law; 2) The Alabama constitution states that the sheriffs are part of the state executive department; 3) As originally written the Alabama constitution did not contain this classification and had beеn deliberately altered by amendment to so provide in 1875; 4) In 1901 the constitution was amended to provide that the governor could order the impeachment of the sheriff and that the sheriff could then be tried for neglect of his duties; 5) This provision on impeachment also applies to state judges and state legal officers (but apparently not county officials); 6) “Critically,” the Alabama Supreme Court had interpreted the above provisions and unequivocally concluded that sheriffs were state officers and tort claims levied against them were consequently suits against the state; 7) That court had also ruled that Alabama counties were not liable for the sheriffs acts under a theory of respondeat superior and that sheriffs were absolutely immune from liability based on their official actions. Id. at 1736-39. The Supreme Court found that although the Alabama code was less definitive on the subject, there were certain provisions that supported its interpretation: 1) The sheriffs were required to attend upon and serve orders of the state courts, including those not within the sheriffs own county; 2) State judges had the power to order sheriffs to act, and the presiding judge had a general power of supervision over sheriffs, as with other state employees; 3) Importantly, the sheriffs had complete authority to enforce the state criminal law in their counties while counties were given no law enforcement power; 4) The sheriff had the duty to report crime to the stаte district attorney, not the county commissioner, and the county *851 commissioner had no power over the manner in which the sheriff pursued his law enforcement objectives, while the governor and attorney general did have that power; and 5) The sheriff enforces state law. 1 Id. at 1739. Finally, the Supreme Court observed that the following factors were not sufficient to overcome their determination that sheriffs were truly state officers: 1) The sheriffs salary was paid by the county treasury (bеcause this did not indicate any level of control); 2) The county was bound to provide the sheriffs equipment; 3) The sheriffs jurisdiction was limited to the county borders; 4) The sheriff was locally elected. Id. at 1740. For all these reasons the Supreme Court concluded that the sheriff in McMillian was immune as a state officer.
Defendant insists that McMillian controls here and requires us to conclude that the DuPage County sheriff is a state officer who falls within the Eleventh Amendment. We disagree. Although the Supreme Court’s analysis is relevant in determining whether the sheriff acts on behalf оf the state, it takes us no farther. For the reasons stated below we find that the sheriff is not a state officer. He is an independent constitutional officer who does not act on behalf of the state. Several factors, some drawn from McMillian, lead us to this conclusion.
Although there is obviously no lower court opinion in this case, the Seventh Circuit has twice considered whether Illinois counties are liable under § 1983 for the sheriffs actions and twice concluded that the county was
not
hable.
See Ryan v. County of DuPage,
In
Ryan,
the Seventh Circuit simply relied on
Thompson
to perfunсtorily conclude that a county could not be held liable when its sheriffs allegedly violated plaintiffs First and Fourth Amendment rights by arresting him after he refused to remove an air-filtration mask while present in the courthouse.
Ryan,
In the aftermath of McMillian, Judge Coar reached a contrary conclusion in
Hernandez v. County of DuPage,
*852
Certain provisions of the Illinois constitution strongly support this conclusion. First, Article II, titled “Powers of the State,” provides that “The legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate.” Ill. Const., Article II, § 1. No other state branch, agency or division is mentioned. Each branch has an Article devoted to describing its officers, powers, functions and purpose: Article IV on “The Legislature,” Article V on “The Executive,” and Article VI on “The Judiciary.” Sheriffs are not provided for in any of these Articles. Instead, that office is dealt with in Article VII, titled “Local Government,” Section 4(e) of which provides that sheriffs are “county officers.” Section 4(d) deals with the termination of local offices, and provides that all of the county offices can be eliminated by county referendum. The same section specifically provides that although most county offices can be alternatively eliminated by state law, the sheriffs positiоn cannot be.
Id.
The power to eliminate the sheriffs position thus rests entirely with the county electorate and is beyond the purview of state power. Moreover, the powers, duties and function of the sheriff are set both by state and county ordinance. Ill. Const. Art. VII, § 4(d). In addition, unlike Alabama, no section of the constitution allows for the impeachment of sheriffs, although a provision designed to prevent vigilante mob violence and the hanging of prisoners while sheriffs willingly turned their backs provides that the governor can suspend the sheriff if a prisoner in his custody is lynched. 720 ILCS 5/25-2;
People ex rel. Davis v. Nellis,
In
Moy v. County of Cook,
the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that counties cannot be held liable for a sheriffs tortious conduct in the course of performing his official capacity on a theory of
respondeat superior.
As observed by Judge Coar in applying the McMillian analysis, several other aspects of Illinois law and policy indicate that the sheriffs are properly regarded as county officers and policymakers: 2
The number of deputies that a county sheriff can appoint may not exceed the number set by the county board. 55 ILCS 5/3-6008. While the powers and duties of sheriffs are defined by state law, they are also defined by county ordinance and may be altered by ordinance. Ill. Const., Art. VII, § 4(d). Thus, even though a county board has no power to alter a sheriffs duties with resрect to his management of the county jail, see Moy,203 Ill.Dec. 776 ,640 N.E.2d at 929 , it is clear that county boards may exercise control over the sheriff in other areas. See 55 ILCS 5/5-1087 (“A county board may alter any other duties, powers or functions or impose addi *853 tional duties, powers and functions upon county officers [such as sheriffs].”)- In fact, one Illinois court seems to have rejected the argument that county boards have no control over how criminal incidents are investigated. In McDonald v. County Board of Kendall County,146 Ill.App.3d 1051 ,100 Ill.Dec. 531 ,497 N.E.2d 509 (2d Dist.1986), the Illinois Appеllate Court held that “investigatory responsibilities are the exclusive domain of no one county officer.” Id. at 512. The court in McDonald therefore concluded that the defendant county board in that case was within its powers in creating an “investigations” item in the county budget and dividing those funds equally between the State’s Attorney and the sheriff. Id. at 512-13.6
While the court cannot say that Illinois counties exercise a great deal of control over county sheriffs, they clearly exercise more control over county sheriffs than do counties in Alabama. Moreover, the fact that the County Board has little or no direct control over an Illinois sheriff underscores the latter’s role as final policymaker on law enforcement issues. It provides little help on answering the corollary question as to whether he is the final policymaker for the County or for some other entity. The overall organization of the county system in Illinois suggests that sheriffs, as county officials, make policy for the county and not for the State nor simply for their own departments.7 For these reasons, the court concludes that, based on Illinois law, a sheriff is the final policymaker (on law enforcement issues) for the county in which she is elected.
We also note that the county is required to indemnify any person who suffers physical or property harm because of the sheriffs or a deputy’s misconduct. 55 ILCS 5/5-1002;
Holda v. County of Kane,
Defendant argues that Judge Coar’s opinion was wrongly decided for four reasons. First, he claims that Judge Coаr based his opinion on the fact that the sheriff is classified as a “county officer” in the Illinois constitution. He argues that such reliance not only disregarded the Supreme Court’s mandate in
McMillian
that labels not control the analysis, but also that it “fails to recognize that the Illinois Supreme Court has determined that Illinois sheriffs are not agents of the county” (def. mem. in reply at 3). For reasons evident from the above analysis, we disagree. First, as explained above, in
Moy,
the Illinois Supreme Court considered the issue of whether a sheriff in Illinois was an agent/employee/servant of Cook County for purposes of determining whether the county could be held responsible for the sheriffs acts on the theory of
respondeat superior. Moy,
*854
Defendant further argues that Judge Coar’s reliance on the fact that sheriffs are classified as county officers in the Illinois constitution contradicted the Supreme Court’s ruling in
McMillian.
Although the Supreme Court in
McMillian
refused to rely solely on the label applied to the sheriffs office by the state, the state constitution’s classification of a particular office is certainly relevant and should be considered in the entire analysis. The Supreme Court in
McMillian
acknowledged this when it examined whether the sheriffs in Alabama were listed as members of the executive department.
Defendant next argues that we should not rely on Judge Coar’s opinion because his assertion in Hernandez that “the county board recommends an annual budget to the sheriff’ is contrary to state law. Defendant accurately states that the section relied on by Judge Coar in his opinion applies only to counties of more than 1,000,000 and as of the 1990 census by the United States Census Bureau DuPage County had a total population count of 781,666. Thus, that section does not apply to the sheriff in this case. However, our decision is not based on the Hernandez case alone, but upon an analysis of all applicable law, including McMillian, the Illinois constitution, the rulings of the Illinois Supreme Court, the rulings of the federal courts, geographically encompassing Illinois, and Illinois law. Thus, one error in one of those many sources is unlikely to have an effect on our opinion.
Defendant also argues that Judge Coar’s opinion should be disregarded becаuse it incorrectly asserts that in
McDonald v. County Board of Kendall County
the Illinois Appellate Court ruled that the county boards have the power to diminish the law enforcement powers of the sheriff. Not surprisingly, defendant does not provide a cite to this portion of
Hernandez
because Judge Coar’s opinion makes no such assertion. Rather,
Hernandez
accurately cited
McDonald
for the proposition that in Illinois “investigatory responsibilities are the exclusive domain of no one county officer.”
Hernandez,
Finally, defendant argues that all of the McMillian factors are present in Illinois and points out several provisions of the Illinois code indicating that the state, and not the county, ultimately controls the sheriffs in their law enforcement capacities. Certainly some of the McMillian factors are present in Illinois’ system. However, Illinois differs from the Alabama system in several important respeets. The structure and composition of the Illinois constitutional provisions regarding sheriffs, for example, are very different from those in the Alabama constitution which specifies that sheriffs are to be a part of the state executive department. In addition, in Moy, the Illinois Supreme Court confirmed the widely accepted belief that sheriffs were county officers, while in Alabama its supreme court had reached the opposite conclusion. Many more differences between this case and McMillian have been discussed previously in this opinion. Contrary to what defendant repeatedly asserts, however, the relevant inquiry is not who “controls” the office of the sheriff but, rather, whether the sheriff is a state officer who can claim the protection of the Eleventh Amendment. We find that the sheriff is independent of the state. Consequently, he cannot avail himself of the Eleventh Amendment immunity.
*855 CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied.
Notes
. As an aside, we cannot understand why the Supreme Court would find the fact that the sheriff enforces state law relevant to the issue. All law enforcement officers, whether state, county or municipal, enforce state law.
. The footnotes to the following passage from Hernandez are as follows:
Footnote 6:
The County cites to 55 ILCS 5/3-6021 for the proposition that the Sheriffs "law enforcement duties may not be altered in any way by a county board.” (County Reply, at 4). However, § 3-6021 does not require such a conclusion. That section simply states as follows: Consеrvator of the peace. Each sheriff shall be the conservator of the peace in his or her county, and shall keep the same, suppress riots, routs, affrays, fighting, breaches of the peace, and prevent crime; and may arrest offenders on view, and cause them to be brought before the proper court for trial or examination.
Footnote 7:
The court reads McMillian to hold that the proper analysis relates to whether the state or the county is the entity liable for the complained-of acts of the sheriff, and not whether an independent third party (i.e., the sheriff) is the proper Monell defendant.
. Interestingly, the Moy court defined "officers” in part as persons who "exercise some portion of *854 the sovereign power of the State" and who hold positions the "duties [of which] are continuous, without regard to the particular person who holds the office.” This definition reinforces our view of sheriffs as policymakers in the area of law enforcement and criminal detention.
