453 Pa. 353 | Pa. | 1973
Lead Opinion
Opinion by
We are presented by this appeal with the question whether the work of the Defender Association of Philadelphia in affording legal representation to indigent persons accused of crime will be compromised and rendered constitutionally ineffective by reason of the sub
The Defender Association, a nonprofit corporation in existence since 1934, applied to the court below in 1969 for approval of certain amendments to its Articles of Incorporation. The Non-Profit Corporation Law
In 1968 the still increasing need for legal defense services and the termination of contributions previously received for limited time periods from the Ford Foundation, OEO and the National Defender Project combined to create a financial crisis for the Association. An effort to obtain additional funds from the City was unsuccessful, and the Association was compelled to plan for a reduction of services. Contemporaneously, in November of 1968, a bill was introduced in City Council proposing the creation of a wholly new public defender program unrelated to that of the Association, the chief administrative officer of which would be appointed by the Mayor of the City of Philadelphia. The bill met immediate opposition from the Association and from many other groups in the community who were satisfied that throughout its existence the Association had provided indigent citizens
The contract was approved by a majority (19 to 16) of the Board of Directors of the Association. It provides that the Association shall provide counsel and necessary investigative and other services to indigents in various areas of representation,
As a result of the agreement between the City and the Association, the public defender bill then pending in City Council was not acted upon. It was to effectuate the contractual provisions pertaining to changes in its organizational structure that the Association undertook to amend its Articles of Incorporation, for that purpose seeking the necessary approval of the court of common pleas.
There is no dispute that any plan to provide counsel to persons who need representation in criminal proceedings should be designed to provide counsel who is both competent and independent. “The plan and the lawyers serving under it should be free from political interference.” A.B.A. Project on Providing Defense Services §1.4, at 19 (Approved Draft, 1968). The integrity of the relationship between lawyer and client,
In essence, appellants’ objections to the amendments are that the appointment of one-third of the Association’s directors by the Mayor (“City directors”) and the selection by those directors and the “Association directors” of the final one-third of the Board (“community directors”) in effect gives the City 50% representation and thus potentially effective control of the Association. This in turn, it is said, will adversely affect the independence of Association attorneys and thus create an unconstitutional conflict of interest. It therefore follows, so appellants argue, that the amendments are neither “lawful, beneficial or non-injurious to the community” as required by statute. The conflict of interest is found in the fact that the Mayor appoints both the Commissioner of Police and the City Solicitor,
We are of course well aware of the line of conflict of interest cases to which appellants refer us and which declare that “the potentiality that [actual] harm may result, rather than that such harm did result will require reversal.” Commonwealth ex rel. Whitling v. Russell, 406 Pa. 45, 48, 176 A. 2d 641 (1962) (emphasis in original). See also Commonwealth v. Wilson, 429 Pa. 458, 240 A. 2d 498 (1968); Commonwealth v. Werner, 217 Pa. Superior Ct. 49, 268 A. 2d 195 (1970); Commonwealth v. Bostick, 215 Pa. Superior Ct. 488, 258 A. 2d 872 (1969). These and other similar cases invariably involve direct conflicts that arose in situations in which defense counsel undertook to represent co-defendants with differing interests.
The Mayor appoints one-third of the members of the Association’s Board of Directors. Even should each of these City directors be obliged to follow, for political or other reasons, the dictates of the Mayor in exercising his or her vote as a member of the Board, this would not give the Mayor or the City control of the Associa
Appellants argue that, in the same way that effective control of a business corporation can be had with ownership of less than 50% of the outstanding shares,
Furthermore, the bylaws of the Association contain safeguards against the creation of an impermissible conflict of interest. The Board of Directors must select the Chief Defender and the First Assistant Defender by majority vote,
In sum, then, the assumed attitude of antagonism to criminal defendants which lies at the base of the conflict of interest charge must be transmitted from the Mayor and City Council to a majority of the Association’s Board of Directors, and thence from the Board to the Chief Defender. According to appellants’ scenario, the Chief Defender, acting for or under the influence of the Mayor and the Board, would make decisions and influence staff attorneys to violate the standards of professional conduct by acting in a manner contrary to the best interests of their clients. As the court of common pleas found, the record is devoid of any concrete facts to support this hypothesis.
In contrast, there is ample evidence in the record to sustain the lower court’s conclusion that the Defender’s office under the new structure will not be infected ab initio with a built-in conflict of interest.
We believe that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the organizational structure of the Philadelphia Association provides adequate safeguards to protect its independence. By today’s affirmance we do not suggest that this structure thus approved is necessarily the form of organization that will best withstand improper pressure; we hold merely that there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the lower court’s finding that the articles of incorporation,
Order affirmed.
Act of April 29, 1874, P. L. 73, §42, as amended, 15 P.S. §7707.
Appellants Segal and Schwartz are both members of the appellee Association who voiced their opposition to the proposed amendments at the appropriate meetings of the Association. Mr. Schwartz had been also a director of the Association, but resigned from that position because of the matters here in controversy. In the hearings below the appellants represented themselves and certain other objectors to the proposed amendments.
Judge Spaulding filed a dissenting opinion, in which Judge Hoffman joined.
Appellate scope of review in an appeal from an order approving articles of amendment of a nonprofit corporation is properly limited to whether or not the lower court committed an error of law or a serious abuse of discretion. See Nottingham, Fire Co. Charter Case, 394 Pa. 631, 632, 149 A. 2d 119 (1959); In re Elkland Leather Workers’ Association, Inc., 330 Pa. 78, 198 A. 13 (1938).
Other decisions of the Supreme Court extending the rights to counsel include Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1972) (extending the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to defendants in any criminal case where imprisonment for any term could be imposed); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 26 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1970) (defendants entitled to counsel at preliminary hearings); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 19 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1969) (holding revocation of probation and imposition of sentence to be a critical stage requiring assistance of counsel); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967) (juveniles in delinquency proceedings held constitutionally entitled to representation of counsel); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 9 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1963) (counsel must be provided for any indigent defendant on the first appeal from a conviction allowed as a matter of right). Cf. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1178 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977 (1964).
Our own Court has been diligent to protect the right to counsel at various stages of the criminal process. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Rambeau v. Rundle, 455 Pa. 8, 314 A. 2d 842 (1973); Commonwealth v. Sheehan, 446 Pa. 35, 285 A. 2d 465 (1971); Commonwealth v. Tinson, 433 Pa. 328, 249 A. 2d 549 (1969); Commonwealth ex rel. Firmstone v. Myers, 431 Pa. 628, 246
The contract identified the following types of proceedings wherein the Association’s services would be supplied:
(1) Juvenile delinquency;
(2) Any indictable offense at any stage of the prosecution;
(3) Any offense cognizable before the Municipal Court;
(4) Post-conviction proceedings;
(5) Habeas corpus proceedings;
(6) Extradition proceedings;
(7) Probation and parole proceedings; and
(8) Appeals.
For the fiscal year 1969-70 the Association budgeted $1,263,595 to provide the representation called for by the contract, of which amount it was agreed that the City would provide $1,160,095 (about 92% of the budget).
The agreement also contains the following additional provisions :
(1) The Chief Defender shall be a lawyer in active practice before the courts of record of the County of Philadelphia with at least five (o) years’ experience in the active practice of law.
(2) All employees shall be full-time except with the approval of two-thirds of all members of the Board.
(3) The term of the contract shall be perpetual; provided, however, that either party may terminate it on June 30th of any calendar year provided not less than ninety days written notice of such termination is given. In addition, the Association is authorized to terminate the agreement upon thirty days written notice “[i]n the event that the Association shall determine that any such appropriation by the City [to compensate the Association for its services under the agreement] is insufficient.”
(4) The City shall have the right to audit the books and records of the Association. For this purpose such books and records shall bo made available to representatives of the Finance Director of the City and the City Controller at such reasonable times as are required by any such representative.
See also Equal Justice for tlie Accused 61, 71, 74-76 (Report of a Special Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and The National Legal Aid and Defender Association, 1959).
The City Solicitor acts as a prosecutor in cases involving violations of some criminal ordinances (e.g., anti-weapon ordinances) and also in cases of violation of mayoralty proclamations.
See A.B.A. Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, Code of Professional Responsibility, Disciplinary Rules 5-105, 5-107(A), (B) (Final Draft, 1969); A.B.A. Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Defense Function §3.5(b) (Tent. Draft, 1970).
Wliile appellants assume that the City directors would act in concert on all matters, there is no evidence whatever in the record that this would necessarily he so.
See generally L. Loss, Securities Regulation 770 (2d ed. 1961) ; Berle, “Control” in Corporate Law, 58 Col. L. Rev. 1212 (1958).
Cf. United States v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 226 U.S. 61, 95, 96 (1912), wherein the Court recognizes that although a large corporation with many shareholders can effectively be controlled through united ownership of less than 50% of the stock, a small corporation cannot normally be controlled through ownership of less than a majority of outstanding stock. See also H. deck, NonProfit Corporations, Organizations, and Associations (2d ed. 1965) (“In a non-profit corporation Ta control] agreement is rather futile . . . since each member ordinarily has only one vote, an agreement of this kind would have no real effectiveness unless it included a majority of the members.” See generally, Hornstein, Stockholders’ Agreements in The Closely Held Corporation, 59 Yale L.J. 1040 (1950) ; F. H. O’Neal, Close Corporations (1970).
Judge McDevitt, in his thorough and careful adjudication, stated that it was his belief “that the Chief Defender and his assistants should have the protection of ‘tenure’ in office . . . Anything less will be a clear indication that the defender organization is suspect. The Association must offer lawyers career service opportunity.” We agree. Later in his discussion, the hearing judge observed that “[f]or the first time the Association will be in a position to offer prospective members of the defender staff a competitive and adequate salary or rate of compensation and hopefully a career.”
The “full-time” employment requirement for Association staff is an obvious recognition of tbe necessity for employee independence. The City’s acceptance of this arrangement would seem to be an indication of its good faith.
we note in passing that the record reveals that the amended articles of incorporation met with the approval of both the United Fund of Philadelphia, a large contributor to the Association, and the Board of Governors of the Philadelphia Bar Association. Bach organization indicated that it believed that the amendments would be beneficial and would not adversely affect the independence of the Association.
Seo generally Equal Justice for the Accused (Report of a Special Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and The National Legal Aid and Defender Association, 1959) ; A.B.A. Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Providing Defense Services (Approved Draft, 1968) ; Silverstein, Defense of the Poor in Criminal Cases in American State Courts (1965) ; National Defender Project, Handbook, How to Organize a Defender Office (1967).
See, e.g., Alaska Rules Grim. Prae. 39; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §453.190 (1963) ; W. Va. Code 62-3-l(a) (1966).
See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§54-81a, 54-80 (Supp. 1965) ; Minn. Stat. Ann. §611.12 (1964).
Our holding in no way precludes the possibility of judicial relief in future if the occasion should arise. As only one example, should it appear that pressure has been brought to bear on Association attorneys to persuade their clients to forego jury trials or appeals in order to avoid the cost to the City that they entail, a clear case of unconstitutional conflict of interest would be made out, not to speak of violations of the standards of professional responsibility. Evidence of improper influence or pressure, whether overt or covert, will trigger an appropriate judicial response.
Dissenting Opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
I dissent from the majority’s holding that the instant amendments to the Philadelphia Defender Association’s articles of incorporation are “lawful”, “beneficial” and “non-injurious to the community.” In my view, the changes are distinctly to the contrary, and therefore do not comply with the Non-Profit Corporations Act, Act of April 29,1874, P. L. 73, §42, as amended, 15 P.S. §7707. The amendments approved by the majority will undoubtedly destroy the necessary independence and non-political character of the Association. In turn, the challenged amendments create the inherent possibility of an unconstitutional conflict of interest, or at best, the equally objectionable appearance of such conflict.
Despite the majority’s repeated assertions that the Mayor of Philadelphia will name only one-third of the Association’s directors, the proposed amendments to the Defender Association’s charter give the Mayor far more than this. He can now directly appoint one-third of the Board (10), and indirectly (through his ten appointees) appoint another one-sixth (5), for a total of one-half (15) of the Board (of 30). This appointing power of the Mayor, coupled with control of the funds and the
The Mayor, however, also controls the appointment of the Police Commissioner and the City Solicitor. Section 3-206 of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter requires that the Mayor approve the appointment of the Police Commissioner; the annotation to that section notes “[t]he Mayor has a voice in the appointment process because the ultimate responsibility of City administration is his.”
Section 3-203 of the Home Rule Charter gives the Mayor the responsibility of appointing the City Solicitor, one of whose functions is to investigate, “fwjith the approval of the Mayor, . . . any violation or alleged violation within the City of the statutes of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania or the ordinances of the City” and to “take such steps and adopt such means as may be reasonably necessary to enforce within the City such statutes and ordinances.” Home Rule Charter §4-400 (d). The annotation states that while it “is not intended to transfer to the Law Department the traditional powers of the office of the District Attorney,... it does empower the Law Department ... to act in the law enforcement field.” See generally Specter v. Bauer, 437 Pa. 37, 261 A. 2d 573 (1970). Indeed, this re
This governmental structure, whereby the Mayor not only appoints the Police Commissioner and City Solicitor, but also substantially controls the appointment of the Defender, raises serious questions as to the practical and working ability of the Defender Association to give undivided loyalty to those it represents. Certainly present is the real possibility that the Defender may be forced, or appear to be forced, to accommodate interests (of the Police Commissioner, City Solicitor, and perhaps ultimately the Mayor) which may be in direct conflict with the defense interests of those accused of crime. Since the City Solicitor and the Police Commissioner, and now, under the majority opinion, the Defender, are accountable to the same official— the Mayor—“. . . might not a defendant with reason say that he feared he could not get a fair trial?” Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 533, 47 S. Ct. 437, 445 (1927) (emphasis added).
I
The petition to amend the Defender Association’s articles of incorporation, brought under the Non-Profit Corporation Act, Act of April 29, 1874, P. L. 73, §42, 15 P.S. §7707, to succeed, must show that the proposed changes are “lawful. . . beneficial and non-mfurious to the community(emphasis added.) Section 7707 of the Act requires the proponents of an amendment to show affirmatively that the changes are both “beneficial” and “non-injurious to the community.” The Legislature mandated that no amendment be allowed unless it improved or enhanced the organization’s service to the community. Totally absent on this record is any such showing.
Since no adequate proof was offered by the proponents on this issue (in fact, all of the testimony offered was to the contrary), the amendments should be disallowed. That controlling and uncontradicted testimony is set out in pertinent part in Judge Spaulding's dissenting opinion in Defender Association of Philadelphia Amendments of Articles of Incorporation, 219 Pa. Superior Ct. 309, 313-21, 279 A. 2d 210, 241-16 (1971) (dissenting opinion, joined by Hoffman, J.).
II
Moreover, the amendments are impermissible for the more basic reason that they are not “lawful”, 15 P.S. §7707, supra, since allowing control to pass to the Mayor creates the inherent possibility of an unconstitutional conflict of interest, or at the least, the appearance of impropriety.
Until today, this Court has been most vigilant in guarding against the possibility that defense counsel
It may be that counsel was “effective” (Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A. 2d 349 (1967)), but could have been more effective had he not been burdened with the conflict. See Whit-ling, supra at 49, 176 A. 2d at 643; cf. Comment, “Conflict of Interests: Multiple Defendants Represented By A Single Court-Appointed Counsel,” 74 Dick. L. Rev. 241, 249 (1970). However, effectiveness of counsel is not the test to be applied when dealing with counsel confronted with a conflict of interest, or the appearance of one. In such cases we have not deprived the defendant of his liberty, since the right to effective assistance of counsel (Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792 (1963)) “. . . is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial.” Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76, 62 S. Ct. 457, 467 (1942) (emphasis added). “It is unchallenged that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance requires the service of a lawyer who is not obligated to serve conflicting interests at the same time, . , .” Com
This Court has also heretofore wisely been concerned with the possibility, inherent in a conflict of interest situation, of an appearance of harm. Courts have long-been of the view that . . justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.” Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S. Ct. 11, 13 (1954) (Frankfurter, J.). Indeed, it is of vital importance that our system of criminal j ustiee convey to defendants the belief that they are being dealt with fairly. So too, “ j t]he public must be satisfied that fairness dominates the administration of justice.” Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S. Ct. 236, 241 (1942).
In Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S. Ct. 437 (1927), the United States Supreme Court held violative of due process a system for trying prohibition cases in which the mayor, as judge, imposed fines on behalf of the village, and kept the “costs” as his compensation. The Court emphatically refused to look into whether the defendant, in fact, had been harmed by this procedure. Id. at 535, 47 S. Ct. at 445. Rather, the Court stated: “With his interest, as mayor, In the financial condition of the village, and his responsibility therefor, might not defendant with reason say that he feared he could not get a fair trial or a fair sentence from one who would have so strong a motive to help his village by conviction and a heavy fine?” Id. at 533, 47 S. Ct. at 445 (emphasis added). More than three decades later the Court reaffirmed this view in Ward v. Village of Monroeville, Ohio, 409 U.S. 57, 59, 93 S. Ct. 80, 83 (1872). The similarity between Tumey, supra, and Ward, supra, and the facts presented by the instant case is strikingly clear. The sense of justice and fairness expressed in Tumey and Ward controls here as well and requires similar treatment,
In our adversary system of justice a defendant “. . . requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against Mm.” Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S. Ct. 55, 64 (1932). See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S. Ct. 2006 (1972). The defendant must be convinced that the “guiding hand” acts only in his interest, unhindered by any divided loyalty. See McKenna v. Ellis, 280 F. 2d 592 (5th Cir.
A defense lawyer who has conflicting interests can hardly give the necessary appearance of undivided loyalty, regardless of how effective he may be in reality. “[T]he indigent defendant is entitled to a lawyer who com give to his client undivided loyalty and faithful service. A lawyer forced, or attempting, to serve masters with conflicting interests cannot give to either the loyalty each deserves.” Goodson v. Peyton, 351 F. 2d 905, 908 (4th Cir. 1965) (emphasis added).
So too must be the case here, where public defenders, appointed and continued in office in large part by City Hall and possibly appearing to be controlled thereby, will conceivably be reluctant to provide the representation demanded by the Sixth Amendment. Clearly, the accused, while being represented by the Defender Association, may not feel “... that they have been dealt with fairly.” Suggs, supra at 974.
Although the American Bar Association’s Code of Professional Responsibility warns against the very conflicts inherent in the proposed “partnership” between City Hall and the Defender Association, the majority, paying no heed to the sound advice of this prestigious body, sanctions the inevitable appearance of impropriety.
“EC 5-22 Economic, political, or social pressures by third persons are less likely to impinge upon the independent judgment of a lawyer in a matter in which he is compensated directly by his client and his professional work is exclusively with his client. On the other hand, if a lawyer is compensated from a source other than his client, he may feel a sense of responsibility to someone other them his client.
“EC 5-23 A person or organization that pays or furnishes lawyers to represent others possess a potential power to exert strong pressures against the independent judgment of those laioyers. Some employers may be interested in furthering their own economic, political, or social goals without regard to the professional responsibility of the lawyer to his individual client. Others may be far more concerned with establishment or extension of legal principles than in the immediate protection of the rights of the lawyer’s individual client. On some occasions, decisions on priority of work may be made by the employer rather than the lawyer with the result that prosecution of work already undertaken for clients is postponed to their detriment. Simi
Not only does the Code of Professional Responsibility warn against “diluted” or “divided” loyalty, it also requires that a client be given an . . opportunity to evaluate his need for representation free of any potential conflict and to obtain other counsel if he so desires.” Code, supra EG 5-16 (emphasis added).
Here, even after full disclosure of the possible conflict of interest, the indigent defendant has no effective alternative but to accept the representation of the Defender Association. Such a conflict, which surely would not be tolerated by a non-indigent defendant, will be unavoidable and undoubtedly acquiesced in by the indigent, having no other recourse. Such differing standards, depending on wealth, when dealing with the fundamental right to counsel, are prohibited by the Constitution. Cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, supra; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S. Ct. 814 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S. Ct. 585 (1956).
Ill
The majority asserts that the potential conflict of interest will not materialize because vigilant watchdogs, like the losing parties here, will act to insure the Defender’s independence. Further, the majority offers
Can the community which the Defender Association serves and the indigents it defends have confidence and trust in an Association significantly controllable by the Mayor, who also appoints the Police Commissioner and City Solicitor whose interests are obviously those of the prosecution and antithetical to the defense? This potential conflict is even made more egregious by the reality of this record which reflects that the City Solicitor, appointed by the Mayor, has, in fact, also been appointed, by the Mayor, to serve as a Director of the Defender Association.
IY
The only attempted justification for the challenged amendments advanced by the proponents is that 50% mayoral control is necessary to insure that the funds allocated by the City are properly expended. In essence, the argument advanced by petitioners, and accepted by the majority, is that since the City pays (as it is required to, Argersinger, supra; In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1248 (1967); Gideon, supra) it is entitled to and must of necessity exercise control. Despite the fact that the City is obligated to insure that its funds are properly spent, its involvement here is far in excess of that required to meet this task. Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274 A. 2d 193 (1971) (involving more than $18,000,000 in Philadelphia funds).
Uncontradicted testimony, including testimony of petitioners’ witnesses (most importantly, that of the Court Administrator) undeniably established that the amount of control demanded by and granted to the City exceeds any legitimate budgetary interests. As the Court Administrator made clear, “. . . existing procedure through which his office channeled funds to the
Here, where the fundamental right to counsel (counsel free from the appearance of a conflict of interest) exists, the City’s action must be viewed as an “overly broad” restraint on an indigent defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to independent representation. Cf. Gideon, supra; Goodson v. Peyton, supra. The “chilling effect” (on confidence in the Defender’s undivided loyalty to his client) produced by the City’s significant power of control of the Association may be substantial. Cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S. Ct. 328 (19(53). Testimony by petitioners’ own witnesses indicates that “less drastic” means could be utilized to insure fiscal integrity. Hence, the Defender’s structure, today approved by the majority, is unconstitutional as an overly broad interference with indigent defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Cf. Button, supra; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S. Ct. 247, 252 (1960); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900 (1939). Although the City’s monetary concerns are legitimate, these concerns “. . . cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.”
Y
The majority’s error, in my view, is compounded by its failure to give anything more than lip service to the American Bar Association Project On Minimum Standards For Criminal Justice, Standards Relating To Providing Defense Services (Approved Draft, 1968). These standards, as the title indicates, devised as minimum guides for providing criminal defense services to indigent defendants, are in direct conflict with the structure the majority today approves.
“The plan should be designed to guarantee the integrity of the relationship between lawyer and client. The plan and the lawyers serving under it should be free from political influence and should be subject to judicial supervision only in the same manner and the same extent as are lawyers in private practice. One means for assuring this independence, regardless of the type of system adopted, is to place the ultimate authority and responsibility for the operation of the plan in a board of trustees. . . .” Standards, supra §1.4 (emphasis added).
The Commentary to Section 1.4 provides: A system which does not guarantee the integrity of the professional relation is fundamentally deficient in that it fails to provide counsel who have the same freedom of action as the lawyer whom the person with sufficient means can retain. Inequalities of this nature are seriously detrimental to the fulfillment of the goals of providing counsel. They are quickly perceived by those who are being provided representation and may encourage cynicism toward the justness of the legal system and, ultimately, of society itself. Much of the dispute concerning the merits of various systems has centered
“An independent governing board is the appropriate method of control of such a system, [public defender] Equal Justice foe the Accused 83-84.
“Whatever the type of system employed, placing responsibility for its operation in a specially designated board outside the ordinary framework of state or local government will assist in guaranteeing sufficient independence and adequate supervision. It will also help to ensure that the task of providing counsel is not submerged in the welter of other problems of government.
“Because the board would exercise general supervision over the policies and operations of an agency composed of lawyers performing professional work, the board should be composed of lawyers. See Application of Community Action foe Legal See vices, Inc., 20 App. Div. 2d 354, 274 N.Y.S. 2d 779, 787-88 (1966).
“Prosecutors and judges should be excluded from the membership of governing boards to remove any basis for an implication that defense attorneys under the system are in any way subject to the control of those who appear as their adversaries or before whom they must appear (Emphasis added.)
Section 3.1 of the Standards, supra, states: “A defender plan should be designed to create a career service. Selection of the chief defender and staff should be made on the basis of merit and should be free from political, racial, religious, ethnic and other considerations extraneous to professional competence. The tenure
The Commentary to that Section (3.1) notes: “[T]here is widespread agreement that it is essential that a defender be free from political influence. The independence of the defender is fundamental to both the fact and the appearance of zealous representation of the accused. One of the chief recommendations of the Special Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and the National Legal Aid Association was that the public defender should he appointed and given tenure in such a manner as to eliminate or minimize political and other influences which might affect his professional independence and his loyalty to his client.’ Equal Justice eoii the Accused 31. See also id. at 92.” (emphasis added.)
It is clear that the amendments sanctioned by the majority fail to adhere to either of the above noted standards.
VI
From July 1, 1971, to June 30, 1972, the Defender Association disposed of 14,099 criminal cases in the courts of the City of Philadelphia. (Approximately 500 additional cases were handled by the Defender in the United States District Court.) Defender Association of Philadelphia, 38th Annual Beport of The Directors 23 (1971-72). During a comparable period, January 1, 1972, through December 31, 1972, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas disposed of 21,727 criminal (including juvenile) cases. 1972 Annual Beport of the Philadelphia Common Pleas & Municipal Courts 1. Assuming that the figures for these two twelve month periods are comparable, the Defender Association handles more than 63% of all criminal cases disposed of by the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. The Defender’s monetary expenditure for the 1971-72 period was approximately $2,000,000; $1,500,000 represents the amount appropriated by the City. Defender Beport, supra at 26-27.
As previously noted, the City of Philadelphia is obligated to provide free defense services for indigents accused of crime. Argersinger, supra; In Re Gault, supra; Gideon, supra. Accordingly, the City, even absent the control now afforded it by the majority, is consti
The majority, accordingly, has today given the City control in exchange for its contract to do that which it is legally obligated to do, that is, to provide funds for the representation of those defendants who are unable to pay. The losers in this transaction are unfortunately the citizens of Philadelphia who have lost the services of a heretofore wholly independent and non-politicized Defender Association.
VII
It is inescapably clear that the majority has ignored the specific statutory language of the Non-Profit Corporations Act, supra, and approved amendments that are neither “lawful”, “beneficial” nor “non-injurious to the community.” 15 P.S. §7707, supra. Additionally, the majority has paid no heed to the strong public policy and constitutional considerations involved in keeping the Defender Association free from the spectre of external government and political pressures. Instead, it has gone in the opposite direction. The record makes clear to a firm and unquestioned certainty that the amendments diminish the ability of the Defender Asso
Today, the majority has given its aid to making the Association considerably less effective and less independent than it was prior to the amendments. This the majority has accomplished by compelling a “partnership” between the Defender Association and the Mayor of Philadelphia, a Mayor who at the same time is responsible for law enforcement under the Home Rule Charter. Hence, the Association cannot now be or appear to be professionally independent and “free from political influence.”
The majority’s determination evokes earnest disagreement and compels strong dissent.
¡Tor less than 50%, and in the absence of funding, see also Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, §2, 15 U.S.C.A. §79b(a) (8) (10% ownership of voting securities is presumptive control) ; investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §80a-2(a)(9) (25% is tantamount to control) ; see generally 2 Loss, Securities Kegulation 770 (2d ed. 1961).
See footnote 6 infra, and the accompanying text.
The City Solicitor was appointed to the Board on January 20, 1970.
Other obvious conflicts exist between the Mayor and the Defender Association. As the record amply demonstrates, it was uncontradicted that prior to any negotiations (and as a condition
The record also discloses that on June 10, 1969 (at this time, the Defender Association was being primarily privately funded, in substantial part, by the United Fund) the Philadelphia Bulletin reported (on page 1) Police Commissioner (now Mayor) Rizzo’s statement that he intended to stop police payroU deductions for the United Fund, since the United Fund also supported the Legal Aid Society. Commissioner Rizzo emphatically stated that organizations that “fight the Police Department . . . won’t get a penny.” The Philadelphia Bar Association, on June 16, 1969, roundly deplored, by resolution, the Commissioner’s threat.
The Philadelphia Bulletin on August 27, 1969 (page 42) and on August 29, 1969 (page 1), under the headline “Rizzo Sets Up Meeting With Judge Carroll”, reported a meeting, in Mayor Rizzo’s office, attended by the District Attorney, the Commissioner of PoUce, the Mayor and several judges (including President Judge Carroll), at which the judges were pressed to change their “lenient” sentencing policies. (These events, although included in the opponents’ brief, are not of record as they transpired after the hearing in the trial court).
The above events can hardly be viewed by the community and indigent defendants as an assurance that the City will in no way attempt to influence the criminal defense of those unable to retain private counsel.
In Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274 A. 2d 193 (1971), where this Court ordered the City of Philadelphia to appropriate approximately $2,500,000 in additional funds to the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas (in addition to approximately $16,000,000 already appropriated) for fiscal year 1970, the City at no time even suggested the need for any controls in any sense similar to those here approved by the majority. Obviously the usual government audits were sufficient there, as they are here, to maintain fiscal integrity. There has been no suggestion to the contrary.
See also Uniform Law Commissioner’s Model Defense Of Needy Persons Act, §10(a) (1) (Defender’s term of office to be not less than six years) ; National Conference on Criminal Justice, Standard 13.8 (January 23, 1973) (Defender’s term of office to be not less than four years).
See also National Defender Project, Handbook On How To Organize A Defender Office (1967) (recommends providing “. . . a screen between the defender and ‘City Hall’ ” and for minimizing “. . . the influences of partisan politics.” (p. 31)).
“Nothing could now be clearer than that a professional legal services program [or defender association], one with which the bar can cooperate and support, must have an independent, non-political base rather than be part of an agency [or city government] whose outlook and direction change with political winds and fortunes.” 59 American Bar Association Journal 523 (May, 1973) (emphasis added).