Dees v. LoganDees v. Logan
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Thompson
Lead Opinion
We granted a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals in Dees v. Logan, 281 Ga. App. 837 (637 SE2d 424) (2006), tо determine whether, under the provisions of an uninsured motorist policy, a damage award to the insured can be offset by workers’ compensation and similar benefits paid to the insured. The short answer is “no.”
Dees and his wife brought suit against Logan seeking damages for injuries suffered in an automobilе collision. The jury awarded the Dees $130,000 for lost wages, $4,939 for reimbursement of COBRA payments, $10,000 for pain and suffering and $5,000 for loss of consortium. The Dees’ uninsured motorist carrier, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”), argued that it could offset the jury’s award by amounts Dees had already received in workers’ compensation benefits ($83,200), social security disability benefits ($70,056), and a pretrial settlement with Logan’s liability insurer ($25,000). In this regard, State Farm pointed out that its UM policy expressly provided that “any amount payable . . . shall be reduced by any amount paid or payable tо or for the insured: (a) under any workers’ compensation, disability benefits or similar law.” The trial court accepted State Farm’s argument and ordered that the Dees recover nothing from State Farm or Logan. The Dees appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in pаrt, holding that the trial court
Georgia’s uninsured motorist statute provides:
The endorsement or provisions of the policy providing the coverage required by this Code section may contain provisions which exclude any liability of the insurer for injury or destruction of property of the insured for which he has been compensated by other property or physicаl damage insurance.
When an uninsured motorist policy provision is in conflict with the clear intent of
State Farm asserts that the 2006 amendment to
We reject the notion that the legislature necessarily acquiesced in the Court of Appeals’ interpretаtion of
State Farm also posits that, inasmuch as Dees is not entitled to a double recovery,2 he cannot be permitted to receive workers’ compensation benefits or other similar benefits in addition to a recovery under his uninsured motorist policy. Again, we disagree. Dees is not recovering twice; and State Farm is not paying twice. On the contrary, Dees is merely recovering sums he is due from Logan,
In passing, we note that our holding is in accord with a majority of jurisdictions which have uninsured motorist statutes that do not expressly permit or prohibit reduction clauses and which hold that offsets for workers’ compensation benefits are impermissible. See Annot., 31 ALR5th 116.
Judgment reversed.
All the Justices concur.Notes
See Ferqueron v. State Farm &c. Ins. Co., 271 Ga. App. 572, 573-574 (610 SE2d 184) (2005); Johnson v. State Farm &c. Ins. Co., 216 Ga. App. 541 (455 SE2d 91) (1995); Northbrook Property &c. Ins. Co. v. Merchant, 215 Ga. App. 273, 275 (2) (450 SE2d 425) (1994). Dacosta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 188 Ga. App. 10 (372 SE2d 7) (1988) did not reach а contrary conclusion. The issue to be resolved in that case was choice of law - and the court held that Tennessee law applied. The court did not determine whether Georgia law permits an insurer to offset workers’ compensation benefits. It simply recognized that Gеorgia’s statute was different from Tennessee’s in that regard.
See generally Carter v. Banks, 254 Ga. 550, 552 (330 SE2d 866) (1985).
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
I concur fully in the majority’s holding that, when damages for personal injury are awarded in a tort action against an uninsured motorist, the uninsured motorist carrier cannot set off from that recovery the amount of workers’ compensation and similar benefits received by the insured. However, I write separately to further support the majority’s correct resolution of the issue.
The applicable provisions of former
[t]he endorsement or provisions of the policy providing the coverage required by this Code section may contain provisions which exclude any liability of the insurer fоr injury or destruction of property of the insured for which he has been compensated by other property or physical damage insurance. (Emphasis supplied.)
As the majority correctly notes, this approval of a limited setoff for collateral benefits received as indemnification for property damage implies the exclusion of any comparable setoff for collateral benefits receivеd for other types of damage. See Alexander Properties Group v. Doe, 280 Ga. 306, 309 (1) (626 SE2d 497) (2006).
Thus, when the relevant statutory provisions are read together and harmonized, it is apparent that, at the times applicable to this appeal, a motor vehicle liability policy issued in Georgia was required to provide uninsured motоrist coverage for any damages recoverable by the insured against the tortfeasor, except to the limited extent that the carrier could, if it chose, exclude from coverage such property damage as had been indemnified from another source. Workers’ сompensation and similar benefits are not payable to an insured as indemnification for the injury or destruction of his or her property. They are payable based upon the physical injury suffered as the consequence of the uninsured motorist’s negligence. Therefore, such benefits cannot be the subject of a setoff, since they are within the broad coverage mandated by former
This construction of the Georgia statutes is consistent with existing authority. In Dacosta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 188 Ga. App. 10 (372 SE2d 7) (1988), the dispositive issue was whether the applicable uninsured motorist law was that of Tennessee, where the insured lived and the policy was issued, or of Georgia, where the collision occurred and the injury was sustained. That determination was of critical importance because the insurer proposed to setoff the insured’s workers’ compensation benefits, and
Tennessee law allow [ed] an insurer’s liability for uninsured motorist benefits to beoffset by any collateral benefits received by the injured person. [Cit.] . . . [However,] the Georgia uninsured motorist statute . . . does not provide for any such setoff.... (Emphasis supplied.)
Dacosta v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra at 11. The conclusion reached was that the insurer was entitled to assert the setoff, because “[t]he mere fact that the two states have different laws in this regard does not mean that the Tennessee law cannot be enforced. [Cits.]” Dacosta v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra. Thus, Dacosta recognized that Georgia law was “different” because it did not provide for a setoff of workers’ compensation benefits.
In this сase, the Court of Appeals reached the contrary conclusion, based upon several of its decisions decided after Dacosta which recognized that a setoff for workers’ compensation and similar benefits is permissible. See Dees v. Logan, 281 Ga. App. 837, 839 (2) (637 SE2d 424) (2006).
Where a statute has, by a long series of decisions, received a judicial construction in which the General Assembly has acquiesced and thereby given its implicit legislative approval, the courts should not disturb that settled construction. [Cits.]
Abernathy v. City of Albany, 269 Ga. 88, 90 (495 SE2d 13) (1998). Thus, if the post-Dacosta decisions cited by the Court of Appeals did, in fact, construe the relevant uninsured motorist statutes and the General Assembly thereafter acquiesced in that construction, then reliance on them would be proper here. See generally Hall v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 625 (216 SE2d 839) (1975).
As the majority notes, the General Assembly did amend
an endorsement or provisions undertaking to pay the insured damages for bodily injury, loss of consortium or death of an insured or for injury to or destruction of property of an insured under the named insured’s policy sustained from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle .... (Emphasis supplied.)
Ga. L. 2006, pp. 815, 816, § 1. However, that amendment to
require [d] an insurer to pay damages for the death of a person who was not covered under the policy. . . . The language of the [former] statute is plain and it is not illogical. It clearly states that the insurer is to pay “all sums which (the) insured shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle.” [Cit.] All means all, every single one. Since the insured in this case is entitled to recover damages for the death of his son against the owner or driver of the uninsured vehicle, he is entitled to recover those damages against his insurer. (Emphasis in original.)
Obviating that holding in Gordon, by limiting uninsured motorist coverage to such physical аnd property damage as was suffered by one who is “an insured” under the policy, is not equivalent to an authorization for a setoff of workers’ compensation and comparable benefits. Since the General Assembly has not amended
The earliest post-Dacosta decision cited by the Court of Appeals is Northbrook Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Merchant, 215 Ga. App. 273, 276 (2) (450 SE2d 425) (1994). That case correctly cited Dacosta for the proposition that enforcement of the Tennessee statute
The Court of Appeals also cited Ferqueron v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 271 Ga. App. 572 (610 SE2d 184) (2005) as authority for its holding in this case. However, that decision merely perpetuated the erroneous holding of Northbrook Property & Cas. Ins. Co. that no Georgia statute existed to preclude such a setoff. While Ferqueron did cite former
Accordingly, the majority correctly overrules such cases as failed to construe former subsection (a) (1) of