delivered the opinion of the court:
The first question presented for consideration is the nаture of the interest that appellees have in this land. The deeds in question created in the granteеs a'base or determinable fee, and the only right left in the grantor was not a vested future estate in feе, but only, what is called “a naked possibility of reverter, which is incapable of alienation or devise, although it descends to his heirs.” (North v. Graham,
It is not alleged in the bill or contеnded in the brief that the land in question is not still used as a school house site, or that the exercise of the right grаnted by the lease to Kimmel to go on said land and drill for oil would in any way interfere with such use of the land. Apparently appellees have not filed their bill fоr the purpose of having this base fee determined by the court on the ground that it had been defeated by non-compliance with the conditions in the said deed. Appellees seek rather through a court of equity to direct said school trustees and directors as to the use of said property. On this recоrd it must be held that the land is still used for the purposes set оut in the deeds and that the title to the estate grantеd by said deeds is still held by the trustees of schools. This court, in Gannon v. Peterson,
We are compelled to hold that appellees have shown no present estate in thе land,;—nothing but an expectancy; a mere possibility of reverter; a right not now capable of being valued. No estate is vested in appellees and none may ever vest. A court of equity, in its ordinary jurisdiction, cannot protect a mere expectancy.
The decree of the circuit court is reversed and the cause remanded to that court, with directions to enter a decree dismissing the bill.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.