29 Minn. 120 | Minn. | 1882
This action is brought on two instruments executed by defendant to J. D. Easter & Co., and by them transferred to the .plaintiff. By one, defendant promised to pay said J. D. Easter & Co., or order, $100, and by the other to pay them $120, with interest, and to pay an attorney’s fee if collected by suit. They recited that they were given upon the purchase of a Marsh harvester, on condition that the title or ownership should not pass until the notes were paid; the payees reserving the right to declare the notes due at any time they might deem themselves insecure, and to take possession of the harvester. Within the decisions in Third Nat. Bank v. Armstrong, 25 Minn. 530, and Jones v. Radatz, 27 Minn. 240, the instruments are not negotiable, and consequently the plaintiff took them subject to any defence that would be good against the payees named. The
The memorandum signed by Schnell is, standing alone and without anything to explain it, prima facie his contract, and not that of his principal, and the word “agent” affixed to his signature is, prima facie, descriptio persones, and not as determining the character in which he contracted. But it was open to proof that it was the intention to bind his principal and not himself. Bingham v. Stewart, 13 Minn. 106; Same v. Same, 14 Minn. 214; Pratt v. Beaupre, 13 Minn. 187. There is nothing in the case to indicate the character in which Schnell executed the memorandum, except the instrument itself, and the circumstances under which it was executed, — to wit, that it was executed in transacting the business of his principals, that it refers to their business, and purports to be one of the terms of the contracts for sale which he was making for them. The jury were warranted in finding, from these circumstances, that it was intended and understood to be a part of the contract for the sale made by Schnell for his principals, and so as binding on them as any other term of the contract. The court left it fairly to the jury to determine whether it was intended to bind the principals or only the agent, and their decision settles it.
It is claimed that he had no authority to make any such stipulation as the memorandum contains. That he was authorized to sell the machine, and had it in his possession for that purpose, is con
Order affirmed.