128 Tenn. 123 | Tenn. | 1913
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This proceeding was instituted in the county court of Shelby county, by the clerk of that court, pursuant to chapter 174, Acts 1893, to collect a collateral inheritance tax on the estate of Hannah Jane Hall, who had died intestate in the county on the 16th day of March, 1912.
The method pursued was this: On the 17th day of March, the clerk of the county court, in compliance with section 12 of the act, appointed an appraiser to make a valuation of the estate for the purposes of the tax. On the 8th of October the appraiser filed his report; on the 10th of October'the parties claiming succession to the real estate filed exceptions to the valuations fixed. The same parties excepted to the inclusion of certain diamonds in the appraisement, because this property was claimed by others, under an alleged nuncupative will, and its ownership was in litigation between the administrator and the persons claiming under the will. The county court overruled all of the exceptions, confirmed the report, and rendered judgment against the claimants of the estate, the present plaintiffs in error, for the amount of the tax fixed by the statute (except for the tax on the diamonds, which was against the administrator, also a party), and also rendered judgment in favor of the clerk for the costs of the cause, including a fee of $30 to H. A. Roynon, introduced as an expert witness on the value of the
The plaintiff in error appealed to the circuit court of the county, where the case was tried de novo. In that court the tax claimed on the diamonds was disposed of as hereinafter stated. An agreement was made between the parties as to the valuation of two pieces of the real estate, based on a sale made by the heirs after the appraisement. This valuation was lower than that fixed in the appraisement, but higher than the one insisted on in the exceptions. The exception on this subject was therefore overruled, and likewise, all other exceptions. The circuit court thereupon rendered judgment against plaintiffs in error for the amount of the tax on the real estate under the valuations so modified, and also for the costs, including the Roynon expert witness fee, and also the attorney’s fee ■of the clerk’s attorney. From this judgment, plaintiffs in error prosecuted an appeal to this court.
The first question which we shall consider arises on the contention that neither the county court nor the circuit court had any power to render judgment for the amount of the tax and the costs, but that, under the form of the proceedings instituted, the only power conferred by law was to pass on the correctness of the valuations contained in the report. Is this contention sound? The answer depends upon a proper construction of sections 12, 14, and 16 of the act.
The statute, after providing for the appraisement, continues, in section 12: And “any interested person
"We have italicized the latter half of this section for convenience of reference. It is perceived from this langmage that the excepting party must give bond for costs, and for the tax, as a condition of his litigating the amount of the tax, and obtaining the judgment of the court thereon; that upon this bond being executed, and exceptions filed, the county court shall proceed to hear the questions raised by the exceptions on the amount of the valuations contained in the report of the appraisement, and also the liability of the appraised estate for the tax claimed by the State. The act does not provide in terms that a judgment shall be entered embodying the results reached; but this is necessarily to be implied from the fact that the questions mentioned are to be determined, as well as that there are provisions in respect of an appeal to the circuit court, and
We conclude, therefore, that by the method indicated a suit was, under the authority of the act, regularly instituted and conducted to its orderly termination, and that plaintiffs in error’s adverse contention is'not well founded. The legislature might have required more elaborate pleadings; but it had the power to prescribe the practice indicated. The act does, in section 14, contain express provisions for a suit to enforce the tax lien on realty at the end of one year from the death of the decedent. Those provisions, however, are not in conflict with a proceeding of the kind we have before us commenced within the year, in which the necessity for the enforcement of the lien is for-stalled by the bond required to secure the payment of the tax. There is no want of harmony in the system, occasioned by these several provisions. The two forms'of suit arise under different circumstances, each
The next contention is that attorney’s fees were improperly allowed as part of the costs; also that, in any event, 15 per cent, was exorbitant.
We have seen that under section 12 bond must be given for the payment of costs. Sections 14 and 16, which must be .construed together, and with section 12, include within the term “costs” a reasonable fee for the clerk’s attorney. Under section 16, the suit runs in the name of the county clerk, and it is made
As to the amount of the fee, after a careful examination of the record, showing the nature, character, and extent of the work ¡performed by the attorney for the clerk, we think he would be amply compensated by an allowance equal to seven and one-half per cent, of the amount of the tax adjudged, and the judgment of the trial court will be corrected accordingly. It is always within the power of the court to make such reductions, in this class of cases, as wili bring the fee down to a reasonable amount, one commensurate with the work done and the responsibility assumed.
As to Roynon’s witness fee, there is no evidence in the record on which we can base any correction of
Plaintiffs in error insist they should not have been taxed with the costs at all, since, as they claim, they were the successful parties in the county court. They resisted the tax on the ground that the valuation of the property was too high. The only reduction they secured in the circuit court, on the real estate, was by agreement of parties based on a fact which transpired after the appeal to that court, a sale by them- of part of the property, and this, too, as already said, at a figure higher than the valuation they put upon it in their exception. A claim of victory could not he justly based on this fact.
This leaves only the question arising on the inclusion of the diamonds in the appraisement. Stating the facts a little more at large upon this subject than previously, they are as follows: Hannah Jane Hall owned some diamonds, which were appraised at $1,000. After her death the North Memphis Savings Bank was appointed administrator. One Bridget Donohue claimed that Mrs. Hall gave her these diamonds. There is now a replevin suit pending between her and the administrator for the possession of the diamonds. The county court, as we construe its judgment, held the administrator liable for the tax on this part of the
It is insisted that the judgment could not be properly rendered because the tax was not due when the suit was instituted, or even when the judgment was rendered in the circuit court. No objection of this kind was made in the circuit court, and hence the immaturity of the action, if it existed, was waived, and could not be urged here. However, the state of the law upon the question of the date of the accrual of the tax is this: Section 4 of the act provides: “If the collateral of the inheritance tax shall be paid within three months after the death of the decedent, a discount of 5' per cent, on the amount of the tax shall be made and allowed; and if said tax is not paid at the end of one year from the death of a decedent, at which time it shall be due, interest shall then be charged at .the rate of six per centum per annum on such tax.” The ex
■ It results that, after making the modification as to the attorney’s fee above directed, the judgment must in all other respects he affirmed.