708 N.E.2d 1029 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1998
Lead Opinion
The trial court certified as a class of plaintiffs three law firms and all persons who were patients of twenty-seven hospitals in the Cleveland, Columbus, and Cincinnati metropolitan areas who had permitted their attorneys (whether named in the suit or not) to request their medical records from seven medical records services employed by the defendant hospitals. The dispositive issue, raised in plaintiffs' motion to dismiss this appeal, is whether the class certification order is a final, appealable order. *452
The plaintiff class consists of patients and their attorneys who have requested medical records from defendant hospitals. The hospitals employ defendant records services that copy medical records for the hospitals. Plaintiffs allege that these services overcharge plaintiffs and at the same time kick back a portion of the fees they receive to the hospitals in the form of referral fees or free photocopies for other photocopy services required by the hospitals.
Our appellate jurisdiction is limited to reviewing final orders. See Section
Because the order appealed from is the certification of a class pursuant to Civ.R. 23 (an order that neither determines the action nor vacates or sets aside a judgment), the finality of this appeal is governed by the language of R.C.
In Blumenthal v. Medina Supply Co. (1995),
Certification of a class under R.C.
Defendants also argue that certification of the class could be made under R.C.
Accordingly, we find the court's certification of this class did not constitute a final, appealable order. The motion to dismiss is granted.
Cause dismissed.
JAMES D. SWEENEY, C.J., concurs.
ROBERT E. HOLMES, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. *454
ROBERT E. HOLMES, J., retired, of the Supreme Court of Ohio, sitting by assignment.
Dissenting Opinion
I am in agreement that under the law 9f Polikoff v. Adam
(1993),
However, we are dealing with a hybrid class certification order in this matter. Plaintiffs-appellees seek damages against the defendants, alleging in their complaint that the defendants committed unfair, deceptive, and unconscionable acts and practices in violation of R.C.
Without making any findings on the record, the trial court granted plaintiffs' amended motion for class certification.
The CSPA prohibits unfair or deceptive acts and unconscionable acts or practices by suppliers in consumer transactions. R.C.
"Whether the supplier knew at the time the consumer transaction was entered into that the price was substantially in excess of the price at which similar property or services were readily obtainable in similar consumer transactions by like consumers."
R.C.
"(A) Where the violation was an act prohibited by section
"(B) Where the violation was an act or practice declared to be deceptive or unconscionable by rule adopted under division (B) (2) of section
The underlying cause of action being pursued by the plaintiffs has been specifically provided for by statute, and the remedies found therein, including treble damages and attorney fees in an individual action, and other appropriate relief and attorney fees in a class action, were not available in an action at common law.
The appellees argue that this case is indistinguishable fromPolikoff because here too the question whether the action meets the requirements of Civ.R. 23 will be preserved throughout the litigation. However, unlike the circumstances in Polikoff andBlumenthal, a plaintiffs right to seek money damages under the CSPA is conferred by a statute that requires that certain conditions be present in order to bring the action, whether an individual action or a class action. R.C.
It is clear that these sections of the Act make a substantive distinction between pursuing remedies in an individual action and pursuing remedies in a class action. Consequently, before a class action for damages can be certified under the CSPA, a trial court must not only find that the procedural requirements of Civ.R. 23 are satisfied, but first find that the substantive requirements of R.C.
The trial court, in review, of the material before it when class certification is sought in a CSPA action, may find that the conditions within R.C.
It should be pointed out here that the enactment of CSPA has not limited the remedies available to these plaintiffs, in that R.C.
Based upon the foregoing, in my view, a motion to certify a class action in a suit for money damages under the CSPA is in the nature of a special proceeding that is conferred solely by statute, and therefore the order granting certification is subject to appellate review, at least as to the jurisdictional requirements set forth within R.C. Chapter 1345. The trial court having made no specific findings here, I would reverse and remand this matter.