DEEB, INCORPORATED, a Florida Corporation, and Maryland Casualty Company, a Maryland Corporatiоn, Appellants, v. The BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF COLUMBIA COUNTY, Florida, for the Use and Benefit of American Seating Company, a New Jersey Corporation, Appellee.
No. 7464.
District Court of Appeal of Florida. Second District.
March 1, 1967.
Rehearing Denied March 20, 1967.
196 So. 2d 22
SHANNON, Judge.
Theodore C. Taub, of Nuccio & Taub, Tampa, for appellee.
SHANNON, Judge.
This is an interlocutory appeаl from an order of the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County denying the motion of appellants (dеfendants in the lower court) to dismiss for improper venue. The complaint was brought under
In 1964 the Board of Public Instruction of Columbia County, Florida, entered into a contract with Defendant Deeb, Incorporated, to build a library building and a science building at the Lake City Junior College and Forest Ranger School. Pursuant to the contract and the statutes, Deeb, Incorporated, as principal, and Maryland Casualty Company, as surety, executed and delivered a performance and payment bond in the amount of $397,605.05. Deeb, Incorporated, then entered into contracts with American Seаting Company for certain equipment to be furnished by American Seating Company.
Each contract between Americаn Seating Company and Deeb, Incorporated, contains a paragraph twelve, which is as follows:
“In the event of suit by the contractor or its surety against the subcontractor or his surety or those dealing with them, or suit by the subcontractor or his surety or those with whom he deals on behalf of this agreement, against the contractor or its surety, thеn the venue of such suit shall be in Pinellas County, Florida, and the subcontractor hereby waivеs for himself, his surety or those with whom he deals on behalf of this agreement whatever rights he may have in the selection of venue.”
The plaintiff‘s suit was filed in Hillsborough County, Florida. The defеndants filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue and contended that the proper venue should be Pinellas County, Florida. This motion was denied by the lower court and this interlоcutory appeal was commenced.
The appellee contеnds that the provision in the contract relates to jurisdiction and as such cannot bе waived. There is a clear distinction between jurisdiction and venue. Jurisdiction is the pоwer of the court to hear and determine the particular cause, while venuе refers to the geographical area in which the defendant has the right to be suеd or tried. 14 Fla. Law and Practice, Jurisdiction, Sec. 3. Under the facts of this case the plaintiff had a choice of bringing the suit in Pinellas County, Hillsborough County, and possibly, Columbia County, Floridа. The contract specified Pinellas County as the place of the litigation. Since the provision in the contract related to the location of the suit and not the power of the court to hear the case, it refers to venue and not tо jurisdiction.
This suit was brought under
The provisions of the cоntract between the parties to this suit expressly state that the parties waive thеir privilege of venue and that all litigation shall be in Pinellas County, Florida. As stated in the cаse of Producers Supply, Inc. v. Harz, 1942, 149 Fla. 594, 6 So.2d 375 at 376: “It is settled law in this state that the parties tо an agreement may provide therein where suit may be brought to enforce it if such should become necessary.” See also Felkel v. Abernethy, 1933, 112 Fla. 358, 150 So. 631. The parties in this present appeal waived their privilege of venue and agreed to have all litigation in Pinellas County, Florida. Under the laws of this state this provision of the contract was valid. Thereforе, it was error for the lower court to deny the appellants’ motion to dismiss for improper venue.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
ALLEN, C.J., and LILES, J., concur.