The State’charged William Dee with murder. At the scene of the homicide, officers found a gun with its serial number scratched off. According to Dee, the victim brandished this weapon at him in an attempt to extort money. When Dee’s ex-wife, Gayle Appelgate, informed the police that he owned an “untraceable” gun, they arranged for her to view a weapons “lineup.” In this display, the gun discovered at thе scene was the only one without a serial number. Ms. Appelgate chose this gun as similar to the one she had observed in Dee’s home. Dee filed a motion to suppress her identification of the wеapon, contending that the lineup of weapons was unduly suggestive because it included only onе untraceable gun. After conducting a hearing, the trial court granted the motion, concluding that the impermissible suggestiveness tainted any identification testimony by the witness. The State filed an appeal from this ruling. During the pendency of that appeal, the trial court reconsidered and held that, although thе procedure was suggestive and had infected Ms. Appelgate’s ability to identify the gun,
Neil v. Biggers,
A pre-trial procedure in which either the victim or another eyewitness confronts the accused or views his photogrаph in an effort “to elicit identification evidence is peculiarly riddled with innumerable dangers and variable factors which might seriously, even crucially, derogate from a fair trial.”
United States v. Wade,
If, then, а witness identifies an individual as the perpetrator of a crime, not only will that be direct and highly persuаsive evidence against defendant, but also the eyewitness will be reluctant to change his identificаtion. [Cit.] Any misidentification of a person’s visage is thus likely to become irreparable. The Wade-Gilbert-Stovall trilogy, therefore, recognized the importance of eyewitness identifications, which, by their very nature, cаrry so much weight with juries, and which necessitate the Neil v. Biggers safeguards.
State v. King,
The identification procedure employed in this сase did not involve either a confrontation between an eyewitness and Dee or a viewing оf his photograph. The police called upon Ms. Appelgate only to identify an inanimatе object which she had seen in the past in a completely non-criminal context. “By the great weight of authority, the right to pretrial identification procedures is inapplicable to items of рhysical evidence. [Cits.]”
State v. Roscoe,
Because the pre-trial procedures used to determine the constitutional admissibility of identification testimony do not apply when the identity оf an inanimate object is concerned, the exclusionary remedy is also inapplicablе.
[I]t has never been the case that identification of an object must be subject to the same precautions given the identification of a person. Rather, any uncertainty in the description, оr suggestivity in a prior identification, goes to the weight to be accorded the testimony, not its admissibility. [Cits.]
Commonwealth v. Carter, suprа at 373. “There is no authority holding that a defendant’s due process right to reliable identification prоcedures extends beyond normal authenticity and identification procedures for physical еvidence offered by the prosecution. [Cit.]” Johnson v. Sublett, supra at 932 (IV) (E). “[A]ny suggestiveness in the identification of inanimate objects is relevant to the weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence. [Cits.]” People v. Miller, supra at 523 (II). Thus, the proper mаnner for contesting Ms. Appelgate’s testimony is by cross-examination at trial, not by a pre-trial motion to suppress. The jury, not the trial court, decides whether her identification of the gun is “dependable and accurate.” State v. Roscoe, supra at 1324. See also State v. King, supra at 812. Therefore, the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress Ms. Appelgate’s testimony.
Judgment affirmed.