Case Information
*1 IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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Christopher Dee, ) MEMORANDUM DECISION
)
Plaintiff Appellant, ) Case No. ) ) F I L E D
) (August 2012) Ricky L. Johnson, )
) App 237 Defendant Appellee. )
)
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First District, Brigham City Department,
The Honorable Ben H. Hadfield
Attorneys: Robert G. Gilchrist, Eric S. Olson, Jordan Kendell, Salt Lake City,
for Appellant
Terry M. Plant Joshua T. Gardner, Salt Lake City, Appellee ‐‐‐‐‐
Before Judges Voros, Davis, Christiansen.
VOROS, Associate Presiding Judge: This personal case arising automobile collision. Defendant
Ricky L. filed motion summary judgment, arguing that was plaintiff Christopher injuries. agreed granted summary favor Johnson. We affirm.
For purposes motion, admitted he owed Dee duty care, breached duty, suffered damages. *2 ¶2 Johnson car eastbound I ‐ 84 near Tremonton, Utah, when roads became slick snow and ice—Johnson later described it a “skating rink.” lost control, and slid into median. He called Utah Highway Patrol, which called tow truck. tow arrived within twenty minutes pulled highway, partially left lane. Other vehicles began lose control, and Dee’s truck. sustained severe injuries. ¶3 Dee challenges court’s ruling matter law, Johnson’s did not proximately cause injuries. “An appellate reviews trial court’s legal conclusions and ultimate grant . . . summary judgment correctness and views facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom light most favorable nonmoving party.” Orvis v. , 2008 UT 2, ¶ 6, 177 P.3d 600 (citations internal quotation marks omitted). “[S]ummary judgment is appropriate cases only clearest instances.” Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers , 811 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1991); see also Jensen v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. , 611 P.2d 363, 365 (Utah (recognizing “in appropriate circumstances summary be granted issue proximate cause”). Therefore, “[i]t is when facts are undisputed but can drawn therefrom” proximate cause becomes question law. Apache Tank Lines, v. Cheney , 706 P.2d 614, 615 (Utah 1985); see also Raab v. Utah Ry. Co. , 2009 UT 61, ¶ 11, 221 P.3d ¶4 Proximate cause is “that cause which, natural continuous sequence, unbroken by any new cause, produced injury, without which would have occurred.” Bunker v. Union Pac. R.R. , Utah 764, (1911); also Magana Dave Roth Constr. , P.3d (“An event is legal or proximate plaintiff’s when event ‘in natural continuous sequence, (unbroken an efficient intervening cause), produces without which result would have occurred.’” (quoting Mitchell Pearson Enters. 697 (Utah 1985))). Furthermore, “foreseeability element cause.” Steffensen Smith’s Mgmt. Corp. (Utah 1993). Therefore, “[t]he more fundamental test whether particular circumstances [the defendant] should foreseen conduct would exposed others unreasonable risk harm; includes situations where other wrongful conduct others should reasonably anticipated.” Watters Querry (Utah 1978). *3 However, the context of proximate cause, foreseeability not concerned with categorical inquiries such whether “a person could anticipate a general risk of to others.” See B.R. ex rel. Jeffs West UT ¶ 275 228 (emphasis added). Rather, the appropriate inquiry focuses on “the specifics of the alleged tortious conduct,” such “whether the specific mechanism of the harm could be foreseen.” See Normandeau Hanson Equip., UT ¶¶ (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶6 Dee’s claim relies act Johnson’s part: driving his a way caused it to slide into the median. Dee does not allege that Johnson acted negligently after his car came to the median. For example, Dee does not allege had a duty “wait until spring” rather than call for help. Nor did Dee hit Johnson’s the median—indeed, had Johnson’s car remained in median, presumably the collision would never occurred. Dee the tow truck after called highway patrol, highway patrol contacted tow truck company, driver pulled Johnson’s from median the highway. Accordingly, we cannot agree negligent driving was “cause which, natural continuous sequence, unbroken by any new cause, produced injury, without which would occurred,” Bunker at
¶7 Our finds support Justice Wilkins’s opinion Fordham Oldroyd , (Wilkins, J., concurring dissenting). There, driver “encountered icy snowy road conditions, lost control vehicle, crashed.” Id. ¶ (majority opinion). A highway patrol trooper responded scene. While retrieving warning flares trunk, trooper struck third driver. See id. majority our supreme held that, under professional rescuer rule, first driver owed trooper no duty care. See id. ¶ 18. That rule at issue here. But Justice Wilkins, writing himself only, analyzed case rubric proximate cause. He stated, “A act at times chain events eventually leading injury, but still too remote warrant holding negligent party liable injury.” Id. (Wilkins, J., concurring dissenting). He explained view, causal separation between first driver’s trooper’s just too great satisfy requirements cause:
In this case, [the trooper] asks us to conclude that [the first driver] navigated through snow, he should have foreseen risk of injury to an assisting trooper from another driver . . . acted, in part, with that risk in mind. We said that “foreseeability is required to meet test of negligence.” [The trooper’s] injuries were reasonably foreseeable [the first driver], my view. . . . legal separation between [the first driver’s] driving slick road trooper’s just too great to sustain a claim our established law.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Similarly, here asks us conclude Johnson navigated over snow ice, should foreseen risk of to another driver negligent driver acted, part, with risk in mind. But legal separation between slick highway too great satisfy requirements cause. We do not believe “the specific mechanism harm could be foreseen” case, Normandeau , 44,
¶8 Dee cites number traffic accident cases where question proximate held jury question. But these cases all involved accidents where immediately after defendant’s act defendant’s vehicle, another vehicle, some other obstruction or hazard blocked highway. See Harris v. Utah Transit Auth. , 217, 218, (Utah 1983) (defendant stopped bus side road, obstructing travel lane); Jensen v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. , 363, 364–66 (Utah 1980) (defendant’s utility vehicle parked intersection several hours); Watters , 703–04 (defendant made abrupt stop while cars were following behind her); Herman v. Welland Chem., Ltd. , F. Supp. 827–28 (M.D. Pa. 1984) (defendant’s chemical spill created ongoing hazardous condition requiring highway shut down); Cooke Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. So. 3d 1193–94, (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (defendant collided tractor ‐ trailer parked emergency lane, collision scattered packages across highway); Smith Commercial Transp., S.E.2d 447–49 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (defendant’s resulted tractor ‐ trailer overturning all lanes traffic); Hook Heim N.E.2d (Ill. App. Ct. (defendants’ collision resulted coming median vehicle plaintiffs later coming to *5 rest center road); Wing Morse A.2d (Me. 1973) (defendant’s resulted vehicle blocking passing lane traveling lane); Taylor Jackson A.2d 773–74, (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994) (defendant slowed stopped due sudden rain storm second defendant jackknifed vehicle attempt to avoid collision, resulting vehicle both westbound lanes highway); J. Wigglesworth Peeples S.W.2d (Tex. App. (defendant missed exit brought traffic standstill when had stop because was too wide cross bridge construction zone). This such case. Here, at conclusion Johnson’s act, came safely median. court’s ruling injuries drawn undisputed facts case. Summary therefore properly entered Johnson’s favor. Affirmed.
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J. Frederic Voros Jr.,
Associate Presiding Judge
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¶10 WE CONCUR:
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James Z. Davis, Judge
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Michele M. Christiansen, Judge