This case presents the same questions as those involved in Jorguson v. Seattle, ante p. 126,
In support of the judgment, the respondent urges that the claim was fatally defective, citing cases in which this court has held that the above quoted рrovisions of the statute are mandatory, that a compliance therewith is “a condition precedent to the bringing of the action and that the giving of the notice in substantial compliance with the statute must be alleged and proven.” Ramsom v. South Bend,
In the Ransom cаse, the claim was not filed until seventy-three days after the accident. In the Collins case, the claim contained none оf the statutory requirements. In the Com-nor case, and also in the Benson case, the claim contained no reference whatever to the claimants’ place of residence. It is obvious that in none of these cases was there any compliance with the statute, substantiаl or otherwise. We have never held that even a mandatory requirement may not be met by a substantial, though not an exact, nice and literal compliance. In Lindquist v. Seattle,
“The obvious purpose of the charter provision is to insure such notice as will enable the city, through its proper officials, to investigate the cause and character of the injury while the facts are comparatively recent, and thus protect itself against fraudulent or exaggerated claims. This court, in cоmmon with many others, has held that, where there is a bona fide effort to comply with the law, and the notice filed actually accomplished the purpose of notice as to the place and character of the defect in the street, it is sufficient though defective, if the deficiencies therein are not such as to be actually misleading. Ellis v. Seattle,47 Wash. 578 ,92 Pac. 431 ; Hammock v. Tacoma,40 Wash. 539 ,82 Pac. 893 ; Falldin v. Seattle,50 Wash. 561 ,97 Pac. 658 . This court has also held thаt claims of this character are to be viewed with at least that liberality which is accorded to a pleading. Hase v. Seattle,51 Wash. 174 ,98 Pac. 370 , 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 938. Thesе and many other decisions which might be cited, show that this court has never adopted that Draconic strictness of construction which would sacrifice the just and reasonable purpose of the law to a technical exactness of terms, making it a pitfall for the ignorant and unskillful, rather than a reasonable protection against the fraudulent and designing.” .
In Frasier v. Cowlitz County,
“The purрose of these provisions, as applied to a claim arising from a tort, is to enable the municipality to investí*140 gatе both the claim and the claimant while the occurrence is recent and the evidence available, to the end that it may protect itself against spurious and unjust claims. When the claim substantially complies with the legislative requirement and thеse ends are subserved, the claim has accomplished the purpose intended.”
In Hammock v. Tacoma,
“The object is to give information, аnd, when that information is given in a practicable manner, the requirements of the law are met. Mr. Thompson, in his Commentaries on the Law of Negligence, Vol. 5, § 6330, voices the almost uniform sentiment of the courts on this subject in the following statement :
“ ‘It is manifestly sufficient if, in such a notice, the place where thе accident took place is described so as to identify it with reasonable certainty, and so that the proper investigating officer can find it from the description, aided by a reasonable inquiry, and that it is not calculatеd to mislead. Clearly, such a notice sufficiently designates the place of the accident when its descriptive words are such that, with the notice in hand, there can be no trouble in finding the place. On the other hand, it seems to be a just conclusion that, as it is the purpose of such statutes to furnish the proper municipal officers with the same facilities for asсertaining the condition of the place causing the injury that the injured party has or reasonably could have, the notice given by him ought to be sufficient to that end. Moreover, where there has been a bona fide effort to comply with the statute and there has been no intention to mislead, it is a sound and just rule which opens the door of the court to an inquiry whether the notice did in fact mislead. If it did not in fact mislead, but if its deficiencies or mistakes were helped out by other information given to the proper officers, or by other knowledge оn their part, no matter how acquired, then it would turn the statute into a mere trap for the ignorant and unskillful, to deprive them of а right of action because of failing to do something, which caused the municipality no injury and put it to no disadvantage.’ ”
See, also, King v. Spokane,
The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for trial.
Grow, C. J., Main, Gose, and Chadwick, JJ., concur.