46 A.2d 218 | Pa. | 1946
Argued January 10, 1946. John K. Decker, unmarried, died testate on April 24, 1940. He willed the residue of his estate to his *510 nephew, Glenn Decker, then about 26 years of age. The residuary clause of the will reads as follows: ". . . The said property, real and personal to be held in trust however, and the income therefrom to be turned over to Glenn Decker at periodic intervals. Said trust to continue until Glenn Decker reaches the age of forty years and at that time the said property is to be turned over to my said nephew, Glenn Decker, absolute." He appointed A. Emerson Howell as Trustee for the proper execution of this bequest. Later, the Honesdale National Bank became the substitute Trustee.
Glenn Decker instituted proceedings to terminate the trust and to deliver the corpus thereof to him on the grounds that the trust is both vested, and dry, and that the postponement of possession until the cestui que trust reached the age of forty years is invalid and void. The Trustee neither joined in the petition nor opposed it. The court below held that the trust was an active trust and that it could not be terminated by the request of the cestui que trust.
This holding is contrary to the established law of the Commonwealth in such cases. Bennett's Estate,
In Baughman's Estate,
In Wood's Estate,
In Sharpless's Estate,
In Shallcross's Estate,
In Klings Est.,
In Allen's Est.,
The absence from the will in Allen's Estate of a provision about the legatee's receiving the income does not, as the court below held, essentially distinguish that case from this. The fact that here the trustee was made a mere conduit through which the income would pass to the legatee does not alter the passivity of his role. The trust was not an active trust.
If the testator believed that his nephew "would squander or dissipate the principal of the trust" (as the court below intimates), he had it within his power to create a "spendthrift trust". This he did not do. The law of this Commonwealth treats a trust like the one before us exactly as if the testator had willed the property directly to the donee, making him the sole owner of it, by providing that the donee should receive the income, but should not use the principal until he attained a certain age. In such a situation the law is that the donee is entitled to the full enjoyment of the legacy at once. It is the policy of this Commonwealth, as declared in a *514
long line of decisions, to treat a legacy like the one now before us as an absolute gift to the donee, and that means, of course, that he has the right to the immediate possession of it upon demand.1 This policy so long adhered to has become with us a rule of law affecting the devolution of property. As we said in Smith v. Glen Alden Coal Co., et al.,
The decree of the court below is reversed. Costs to be paid out of the legacy.