Debra J. Wheeler appeals from the district court’s 2 order affirming the denial of *894 her requests for disability insurance benefits, under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq., and for supplemental security income, under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq. We affirm.
I.
Wheeler was born on April 8, 1954, and has received her high school equivalency diploma. Her past work experience includes positions as a photo laboratory worker, punch press operator, hand packager, and cosmetologist. Wheeler filed her applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income on March 3, 1994, alleging that she is unable to work due to worsening conditions of asthma, fibromyalgia, and rheumatoid arthritis.
The Social Security Administration denied Wheeler’s application initially and again on reconsideration. Wheeler then requested and received а hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who also denied Wheeler’s application. Upon review, the Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration vacated the ALJ’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Following a supplemental hearing, the ALJ again evaluated Wheeler’s claim according to the five-step sequential analysis prescribed by the social security regulations.
See
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f);
Bowen v. Yuckert,
The Appeals Council denied Wheeler’s request for further review, thereby making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. Wheeler then sought review in the district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The district court affirmed the decision of the Commissioner.
On appeal before this court, Wheeler argues that the ALJ erred by: (1) failing to properly consider the testimony of Wheeler and her husband, pursuant to
Polaski v. Heckler,
II.
We consider the Commissioner’s denial of benefits to determine whether substantial еvidence on the whole record supports the decision.
Reeder v. Apfel,
Wheeler first argues that the ALJ improperly discounted the credibility of Wheeler and her husband and did not correctly apply the credibility factors set forth in
Polaski v. Heckler,
The ALJ expliсitly found that Wheeler’s subjective complaints of pain were not credible to the extent alleged, both with specific reference to the above
Polaski
factors and in consideration of inconsistencies in the record as a whole. The ALJ determined that, although Wheeler had certain symptoms that limited her functional abilities, the evidence did not support Wheeler’s assertion that her symptoms were of such severity so as to preclude the performance of any type of work. The ALJ first noted that, despite Wheeler’s complaints of leg, joint, and back pain and immobility, Wheeler had had no treating physician for two years.
See Gwathney v. Chater,
The ALJ then set forth a partial description of Wheeler’s history of medical treatment, as it appeared in the record.
3
The ALJ discussed, for example, the findings of Dr. Charles Ash, who examined Wheeler on April 15, 1994. Dr. Ash determined that Wheeler exhibited satisfactory general movement with no limp or list, that Wheeler’s lungs exhibited no evidence of respiratory distress, that the spine showed a full range of motion with no deformity or muscle spasm, that no evidence of swelling or limited motion appeared in Wheeler’s fingers, that her grip was good in both hands, that no swelling was visible in the knees or ankles, and that Wheeler’s ankles exhibited a full range of motion. Similarly, after examining Wheeler on October 31, 1996, Dr. Ali J. Abu-Libdeh concluded that he could find no evidence of active rheumatoid arthritis. Dr. Abu-Libdеh determined that Wheeler’s hands, wrists, feet, and ankles were free from arthritis and showed no swelling
*896
or tenderness, that both elbows and shoulders were normal, that Wheeler’s knees showed minimal tenderness, and that a mild reduction in mobility appeared to be caused by Wheeler’s obesity. The record thus shows that the ALJ properly discounted Wheeler’s subjective complaints of arthritic pain and immobility.
See Comstock v. Chater,
The ALJ also found that the corroborating testimony of Wheeler’s husband was not fully credible. Although the ALJ did not list specific reasons for discrediting the testimony of Wheeler’s husband, the omission is not fatаl to the ALJ’s decision because the same evidence supported discounting both Wheeler’s and her husband’s testimony.
See Robinson v. Sullivan,
Wheeler next argues that the ALJ made only selective use of the medical evidence in determining Wheeler’s residual functional capacity and unduly relied upon the findings of Dr. Abu-Libdeh, a non-treating government-paid physician. Specifically, Wheeler alleges that the record establishes that she suffers from severe manipulative limitations, which limitations were improperly ignored in determining, her residual functional capacity. We disagree.
The ALJ made extensive reference to Wheeler’s past medical examinations, including examinations by Dr. James Flan-ery, Dr. Ash, and a treating physician in an emergency room, as well as Dr. Abu-Libdeh. As previously discussed, both Dr. Ash and Dr. Abu-Libdeh found no evidence of swelling in the extremities and found that Wheeler could make a good hand grip bilaterally. Dr. Ash determined that Wheeler had a full range of motion and Dr. Abu-Libdeh specifically concluded that he could find no evidence of arthritis. The conclusions of both Dr. Ash and Dr. Abu-Libdeh were the result of their examinations of Wheeler, while Wheeler had not had a treating physician in two years.
Thе ALJ’s opinion thoroughly discussed Wheeler’s medical records in assessing her physical abilities and adopting a residual functional capacity. We find that, in focusing on certain portions of the medical records that were consistent with his findings, the ALJ was not ignoring the totаlity of the record, but rather was properly giving specific reasons to support his conclusions. We thus conclude that the ALJ’s assessment of Wheeler’s residual functional capacity was supported by substantial evidence. See
Craig,
Finally, Wheeler argues that the ALJ erred in relying upon the testimony of a vocational expert who proposed potential work for Wheeler which, according to Social Security regulations and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), was incompatible and inconsistent with Wheeler’s residual functional capacity as determined by the ALJ. Specifically, Wheeler argues that the jobs identified by the vocational expert were unsuitable due to the standing, sitting, and stooping limitations incorporated into Wheeler’s residual functional capacity.
*897
We reject Wheeler’s argument. In framing his questions to the vocational expert, the ALJ specifically asked the expert to assume a job applicant with Wheeler’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, inсluding her limitations of sitting, standing, and/or walking, with normal breaks, 30 minutes at one time or 4 hours in an 8 hour day, and never stooping. In accordance with the vocational expert’s testimony, the ALJ found that Wheeler could perform less than a full range of light work, due to standing, walking, sitting, and stooping limitations, but would be able to work as an expediter clerk, order clerk, addresser, mail clerk, or office helper. Wheeler argues that the proposed jobs, as defined in the DOT, are inconsistent with her residual functional capacity and limitations. Whеeler’s “reliance on the DOT as a definitive authority on job requirements is misplaced, however, for DOT definitions are simply generic job descriptions that offer the approximate maximum requirements for each position, rather than their range.”
Hall v. Chater,
The judgment is affirmed.
Notes
. The Honorable John T. Maughmer, Chief Magistrate Judge, United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri.
. That the ALJ did not attempt to describe the entirety of Wheeler’s medical history does not supрort Wheeler’s argument that the ALJ disregarded certain aspects of the record.
See Black v. Apfel,