Debra Estey v. Commissioner, Maine Department of Human Services

such should have taken [Storage Tank] Tremblay Donnelly, 103 N.H. v. action.” 498, 500, We de A.2d conclusion the district court’s

cline to disturb evidence sufficient presented

that Clausen Storage jury to find Tank

for a reasonable

negligent. Storage Tank’s Motion to

2.Denial Judgment or Amend Alter

Storage Tank maintains that the dis denying its Motion to

trict court erred Judgment, which asserted

Alter or Amend a excessive, grossly jury’s verdict was

that the facts, subject to supported Storage Having considered

remittitur. us, argument and the record before

Tank’s jury’s say that verdict

we cannot

$1,426,000 so exorbitant that the district was by denying its discretion Stor

court abused See, e.g.,

age request for remittitur. Tank’s Interiors, Inc. v. Ha

American Business (8th

worth, Inc., F.2d Cir.

1986) that, (holding because “the trial court and knows the com

has heard the evidence standards,

munity’s appeals] court of will [a a denial of remittitur when

reverse pressed to conclude [it is]

rare circumstances represents a verdict monstrous

shocking injustice”). court is judgment the district af- appellee. Costs to

firmed. ESTEY, al., Plaintiffs, et

Debra

Appellants,

COMMISSIONER, MAINE DEPART SERVICES,

MENT HUMAN OF al., Defendants, Appellees.

et

No. 93-1453. Appeals,

United States Court of

First Circuit.

Heard Oct. 1993. April

Decided

H99 I.

BACKGROUND defendant-appellees Secretary are the (Secretary) of USDA and the Commissioner Services, Department of the Maine of Human agency charged applying the state with guidelines administering USDA’s uniform in stamp program in the food Maine. Plaintiffs receiving are a stamps, class of tenants food utilities, paying for living household and in public housing, privately-owned HUD apartments, “Section 8” HUD-assisted and in privately-owned housing.1 FmHA-assisted Ende, Patrick Francis with whom Pine Plaintiffs, as tenants HUD and FmHA Assistance, Inc., ME, Augusta, Legal Tree housing, monthly payments, receive called brief, plaintiffs, appellants. was for on “utility reimbursements,” because all of their rent, Coffman, DC, Washington, utilities are not included in their Peter D. with Jay McCloskey, Atty., monthly very Port- because their income is whom P. U.S. low land, ME, Hunger, Atty. average utility relative to Frank W. Asst. costs their com Gen., Jay Singer appeal Ruth munities. The issue on Michael and Deborah is whether Kant, Justice, DC, Dept, Washington, count reimbursements as defendants, Act, brief, appellees. Stamp income under the Food were on U.S.C. although section TORRUELLA, Judge, Before Circuit 2014(d)(11)(A) expressly of the Act excludes BOWNES, CYR, Judge, and Senior Circuit from food Judge. Circuit stamp income. BOWNES, Judge. Senior Circuit Stamp A. Food Act appeal judgment stipu from a on Plaintiffs policy Stamp Act upholding lated facts of the United The Food establishes a federal- (USDA) Department Agriculture ly-funded, program to al- States state-administered stamp hunger in low in- that reduces their food benefits. The leviate malnutrition upheld policy by providing needy persons district court the USDA come households stamp purchase counting purposes coupons as income for food with food from retail 2011; plaintiffs § reimbursements receive stores. See id. Massachusetts v. (1st Cir.1990); Department Housing Lyng, from the and Urban 893 F.2d West (HUD) (3d Cir.1989). Bowen, Development and from the Farmers (FmHA). Estey uniform Home Administration v. USDA establishes standards Commissioner, Dep’t stamp eligibility. Maine Human food See 7 U.S.C. (D.Me.1993). 2014(b). Servs., § F.Supp. Eligibility depends Be on income. money energy-related payable cause we conclude that “Income” is defined as to a household, source, subject components of HUD and FmHA reim from whatever bursements are excluded statute from the exclusions and deductions the Act. 2014(d)-(e). Stamp income under the Food we re See id. The exclusion issue exempts stamp “any pay- verse. from food duced, 1. The includes or denied because of the defendant's class refusing to exclude FmHA persons and/or [a]Uthe in the State of Maine who will from "income” [reimbursements] HUD receive or received FmHA who have and/or determining stamp eligibility when anytime since [reimbursements] benefits. March whose food benefits terminated, wrongfully Estey, F.Supp. were or will be re- at 154. “utility payment called a reim- in a purpose of results or allowances ments monthly income is Fed- under bursement” whenever energy assistance providing Plaintiffs, 2014(d)(11)(A). relatively high. utility costs are very Id. low and eral law.” utility re- and HUD equal of FmHA to the sum recipients A reimbursement imbursements, allotted fewer supplied are any for utilities of all allowances interprets the Act to USDA stamps monthly because of by landlord minus 30% as income. utility 813.102, 913.102; reimbursements include 7 §§ 24 come. See C.F.R. C, 1930, subpt. exh. E.IX.A.2. pt. C.F.R. Utility FmHA HUD and B. monthly example, if a tenant’s income For Reimbursements (30%) $100, is the total amount the is $30 utility of whether analysis an To frame costs, including housing pay must for tenant un “energy assistance” are reimbursements utility utility If the allowance allowance. outline we Stamp Food der the $5, utility a not receive the tenant is will under utility reimbursements regulations on reimbursement, landlord will owe the but program and rental the FmHA is because the allowance credited $25 housing pro public 8 section and the HUD due. A tenant with against the total amount regula respects, these grams. relevant income, utility monthly but with a the same Tenants HUD and identical. tions are $50, pay landlord no of allowance will no more than 30% of housing pay FmHA utility a reimbursement rent and will receive plus an for rent allowance income household (the of utility minus 30% allowance of $20 by supplied the landlord. any utilities not for utility $100). Every to a entitled tenant 1437a(a)(1); pt. 7 C.F.R. 42 U.S.C. a bill from least reimbursement receives B.IV.A.2.C, C, E.II.E. 1930, subpt. exhs. utility company. reimbursement en- one The collection, electricity, Water, sewerage, trash tenants, living in FmHA sures that heat, fuel, hot water are utilities cooking households, generally pay will not very poor may be established. for which allowances for income ener- more than 30% household 965.476; 813.102, 965.472, 7 §§ 24 See C.F.R. water, and trash gy, sewerage, collection E, A-5, 1944, subpt. exhs. A-6. pt. C.F.R. costs. the util utility reflects FmHA allowance majority of house ity incurred costs II. housing complex. in a units holds similar - E, A-6.I, 1944, subpt. pt. exh. See 7 C.F.R. DISCUSSION represent utility a allowances 6.II. HUD “by argue utility utilities an consumption” of Plaintiffs reim “reasonable assistance,” of modest cir “energy household and that energy-conservative bursements requirements 2014(d)(ll)(A) Stamp with the consistent of the Food Act cumstances section safe, living envi sanitary healthful of a income calcula exempts such 965.476(a). 813.102, §§ 24 C.F.R. provision, ronment.” this tions. USDA contends “any pay excluding from food pay their own prevent who To tenants providing purpose ments for the incurring generally excessive utilities from assistance,” “energy because inapplicable costs, regulations HUD and payments made to income) assistance” limited permit (capped 30% rent costs, whereas rapidly rising offset utilities. See 24 offset an allowance routine cover 813.102, 913.102; pt. reimbursements 7 C.F.R. C.F.R. C, This set off costs.2 subpt. exh. E.IX.A.1. 31, 1993); (S.D.W.V. March WL 435566 split 1993 whether 2. Courts have over See, Grunow, 1:90-0188, as income. No. 1992 WL count reimbursements Scott v. Cir.1989) Bowen, (3d e.g., 22, 1992); 1122 (M.D.Tenn. West v. May Susan v. 611462 (striking policy); accord South Da- down USDA’s S-91-65M, Scales, WL 672394 No. 1992 Madigan, F.Supp. Dep’t v. 824 kota Soc. Servs. 19, 1992); (N.D.Ind. Madigan, May Garcia v. No. Nos, docketed, (D.S.D.1993), appeal 1477 (S.D.Tex. H-91-1992, Nov. 1991 626449 WL 23, 1993); (8th July & Cir. 21 Yamauchi, 1991); F.Supp. Larry v. Res., Carpenter Dep’t Human v. North Carolina Block, (E.D.Ark.1990); 82-3297- Mitchell (1992). N.C.App. Con- 419 S.E.2d 582 22, 1983); (D.S.C. Dep’t Orr v. June Arizona 2:91-0826, 2:91-0139, Espy, tra Gore v. Nos. A. of Review elude that Standard assistance” means what it says: subsidy public purchase reviewing agency’s in A court energy. terpretation of statute administers must plain reading Under spoken provision, has first determine whether plaintiffs have no claim “precise at issue.” Chevron colorable unless Council, their reimbursements are v. Natural Res. subsidies for U.S.A. Defense 837, 842, 2778, 2782, energy. FmHA and HUD allowances U.S. water, account for precise question L.Ed.2d 694 utilities such as sewerage, collection, un trash as well this case is whether 2014(d)(11)(A) heat, including encompasses only electricity, utilities der section gas, natural offsetting rapidly rising energy and hot water. A payments tenant direct- 840, 845, ly utility liable for certain utilities costs. id. at S.Ct. at receives a Cf. only (noting question reimbursement if the sum of precise at issue is the allow- ances for plantwide these utilities whether EPA’s definition of “sta exceeds 30% of Therefore, tionary applies requiring utility household income. source” to a statute a reim- permits stationary bursement does not subsidize pur- for new or modified pollution). Congress’s pays If chases unless the tenant sources of air in at least one clear, energy company this for the provided. tent on is “that is the end services court, Otherwise, matter; utility a as well as the reimbursement is not an energy subsidy agency, give at all unambiguous must effect to the because assists the paying tenant ly expressed Congress.” nonenergy utility pro- intent of Id. at viders. S.Ct. 2781. Our review of the district court’s construction of the statute is response, In Secretary’s to argument Lyng, de novo. See 893 F.2d at 428. that, utility reimbursements can never be en- ergy they might because offset intent, determining congressional In costs, nonenergy utility plaintiffs contend employ statutory we the traditional tools of utility always reimbursements are ener- construction, including a consideration gy they “pri- assistance because are intended structure, language, purpose, of A, marily” payment for of bills. Commissioner, the statute. See Dion v. report discussing committee as- Servs., Dep’t Maine Human of provid- sistance exclusion states that benefits (1st Cir.1991). inquiry begins Our with an Energy ed Home Assistance statutory examination of the relevant lan Energy Energy Crisis Intervention and Patterson, guage. American Tobacco Co. v. Programs, “energy Crisis Assistance are as- 63, 68, 1534, 1537, 456 U.S. 102 S.Ct. Cong., sistance.” See 96th L.Ed.2d 748 To be excluded from (1980), reprinted 2d Sess. 122-23 in 1980 2014(d)(11)(A), income under pay section a 955-56. Because these ment purpose must be “for the programs food, historically provided medi- provides assistance.” The Act no definition cine, assistance, and rental as well as direct assistance,” meaning for but its is bills, plaintiffs subsidies for fuel contend generally payment pro understood. A did not intend, commonly pub vides “assistance” refers to a payments to include for utilities. assistance, subsidy; example: housing lic for assistance, pay rental and medical acknowledge Plaintiffs fail to the difference legislative ments. We ‘“that assume between their reimbursements and the purpose expressed by ordinary provided programs mean benefits under the dis- ” ing of the Report. According words used.’ American Tobacco cussed in the House Co., (citation 68, 102 report, programs 456 U.S. at at 1537 provided these assis- omitted). impact high energy the absence of a manifestation tance to offset the id.; contrary, intent §§ we con- costs. see also 45 C.F.R. 1061.- Sec., (Ariz.Ct. inteipretation

Econ. 158 Ariz. 761 P.2d 1085 of exclusion for USDA's App.1988). Maryland Dep’t laws). Human Res. v. provided under state or local Cf. A, (4th Cir.1992) (upholding USD 976 F.2d 1462 813.102, See, case, e.g., id. 882- adjustments. in this At issue 51-6(a), 1061.70-8. that HUD and the that are We assume however, 882.214. reimbursements housing agency offset would retain rec public designed part local by plaintiffs is suggested analogy and would make allowances costs. The ords clarify not whether it does apt; to the tenant thus not information available , for a mixture designed to account payments allowance. depends rent on that whose n nonenergy expenses are “ener- energy and to deter information be used Such énergy assis- Neither gy assistance.” utility reimbursement much of a mine how legis- language, nor its plain tance exclusion’s subsidy energy costs. See South in fact a an intent to exclude history evince lative Servs., F.Supp. Dakota Dep’t Soc. pur- primarily for the provided non-energy (“computing the reason, For this energy assistance. pose of [utility reimbursements] components of to read the invitation plaintiffs’ we decline arithmetic, simple matter of would be a equivalent into the or its “primarily” word burden”). If 60% of a great administrative statute. utility allowance is attributable Secretary argues that a reim costs, 60% of the reimbursement then subsidy never be can bursement assisting purchase of ener payment is a energy because the allowance purchase of gy. According to a construction of the stat nonenergy utili exclusively on may be based plain language, ute consistent with its likelihood, however, part of ty In all costs. may be counted 40% of the reimbursement utility reimbursement is based every tenant’s Stamp Act. income under the Food as utility allowance. energy-related on an utility fact, reimburse receive some tenants Act: Deductions B. Structure energy utilities. Named only for ments and Exclusions utility reimburse Peter’s plaintiff Felix St.-' Turning analysis of the structure of to an party made ment, example, a two check is for reading consider whether we him and Maine Public Ser jointly payable to 813.108, in context ren- §§ assistance exclusion Company. See C.F.R. vice ambiguous utility or Con- reim ders counter-intuitive that HUD (providing 913.108 utility meaning may payable gress’s on the be intent bursements energy and com The assistance.” providers). utility allowance are itemized ponents of a Secretary argues that the structure The approved is

when the allowance Stamp utility Food Act indicates HUD; may used to information be and “energy assistance.” are not reimbursements utility of a reim fraction determine what for food eligibility determinations Income regula energy-related. FmHA bursement calculations, tax stamps resemble income to list each require a landlord tions Block, Department Health & Welfare seeking FmHA separately when allowance (9th Cir.1986); is, net allowance, provide and to approval for the income, mi- equals gross income pt. the tenant. 7 C.F.R. this information to by stat- any payments that are excluded nus E, A-6.III to A-6.V. The subpt. exh. ute, any and minus the standard deduction housing agency operating a HUD public local applicable to the household. other deductions similar housing project must maintain public Stamp The Food Act’s “standard deduction” allowances, and this informa lists account cost deduction” and “excess shelter the tenant. 24 C.F.R. tion is available 2014(e). for costs. See U.S.C. 965.473, regula Although HUD 965.474. Secretary, excluding According to the housing privately-owned section 8 tions for reimbursements infor require that itemized explicitly do not once as an would subtract costs twice: utility allowances be retained mation on again as a deduction. exclusion tenant, implication regula this is the payment may not be argument that a public the local requiring that HUD or tions already a cost because it offsets excluded housing agency approve proposed allowances deduction is annually accounted for the standard and that allowances be reviewed households, excluded, persuasive. regardless All while the costs themselves deduction, size, the standard receive which Implicit would be deductible. con general most reflects ener sense struction of the assistance exclusion costs, just gy utility many as it reflects other is that intended standard a costs. The deduction is fixed sum energy utility to be excluded and costs to be adjusted annually according deducted, to the extent that all shelter costs Consumer Price Index “for items other than monthly .exceed 50% of income. This is food and the homeowners’ costs and mainte borne legislative history out repair component nance and of shelter energy assistance exclusion: “If a household 2014(e). costs.” 7 U.S.C. grant, allowance or receives spe- grant deduction for excess shelter costs allowance or is not to be included in utilities, cifically accounts for all, but it but the costs which it capture does not the entire cost of covers poten continue to be treated as a utilities. The statute a household to allows tially expense deductible shelter when billed expenses, including deduct shelter rent H.R.Rep.. supra, due.” utilities, only monthly “to the extent that the 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 956. expended by amount household for [the] matter, practical unlikely there is As shelter” exceeds 50% of the household’s overlap substantial between households come after all other deductions have been excluding energy component expenses taken. Id. Deductible include deducting reimbursements and those excess rent, taxes, insurance, property property shelter receiving utility costs. Tenants reim- interest, mortgage payments and as well as pay bursements no rent and incur no home- fuel, water, electricity, sewerage, trash col- expenses. They owners’ lection, entitled to the telephone service. See 7 C.F.R. .273.9(d)(5)(ii). only § excess shelter cap cost deduction The on the deduction is the adjusted changes utility extent that their to reflect in the Consumer costs alone exceed shelter, fuel, income, monthly Price Index for the and utilities half of including their the components housing of costs. U.S.C. component utility of their reim- 2014(e). § words, bursements.3 other poorest the stamp recipients food living public housing in According Secretary, Congress would exclude component the of their could not have intended to exclude the ener- utility reimbursements, then deduct the frac- gy component utility reimbursements, giv- of exceeding tion of their bills half of en the existence of the excess shelter cost their income. This result is consistent with Secretary deduction. But the does not offer purpose hunger the Act’s to alleviate an alternative construction of the Act that by augmenting pur- malnutrition the food absolutely precludes deducting energy utility chasing power participating of low-income costs whenever § households. See 7 U.S.C. 2011. We do are excluded from income. if Even the ener- not that gy find the structure of the Food Stamp assistance exclusion were intended to cov- requires Act only payments offsetting rising energy pro- er that the costs, contends, any payments contrary vision construed plain de- be to its lan- signed rising energy guage. to offset reading provision costs would be Our of in con- calculating 3. For using administrative convenience in reimbursements from SUA un deduction, expense the excess shelter a “stan- pub less their actual costs exceeded their (SUA) may dard allowance” be used in allowances, housing utility lic see West v. Sulli lieu of a household's actual costs. 7 van, denied, (3d Cir.1992), 973 F.2d 179 cert. 273.9(d)(6). receiving C.F.R. Households “en- -, U.S. (1993). 113 S.Ct. 124 L.Ed.2d 684 ergy they use the SUA if argue they may Plaintiffs that use the “out-of-pocket” heating cooling incur or ex- SUA, even if their reimbursements are 2014(e). Circuit, penses. 7 U.S.C. The Third assistance, they pay because must of 30% having previously impermissible found the USDA household income for utilities. We ad do not counting utility reimbursements as in- argument dress this because it is not an issue in come, West, 1132, subsequently 879 F.2d at this case. upheld policy preventing recipients a USDA energy assistance under providing the ments our determination text reinforces “any” federal law. Congress’s intent. manifests plain language report further states: The committee History Legislative C. provided house- energy assistance Where Federal, ... through use holds consider nextWe Federal, State, flowing or local exclusion, to determine energy assistance from funds State, dealing specifically or local laws clearly find legislative intent we whether concerned, energy assistance is such with statutory language is cloud- expressed in the Dependent with Chil- as Aid to Families by any statements of or contradicted ed Assistance, the Committee dren or General Congress.4 the exclusion When members excludability guarantee also intends Committee House enacted was provided [USDA] noting that report issued a Agriculture satisfied on by the State awarded increase in allowances, de- grants and certain benefits (either matching government on a local energy, rising cost of had signed to'offset or on the Federal Government basis with stamp income calcu- food excluded from been own) is, fact, an assistance- express provisions in years by prior lations simply general increase and not related supra, at statutes. other that would have occurred increase report at 955. 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. welfare not a even were costs programs energy assistance examples of cites factor that, therefore, viewed as income should be the rise ener- designed to that were offset Only purposes. program for food and in id. in the late 1970s gy costs cause 954-55, where costs 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. but-for pay- payment should the the increased for assistance exclusions that the clusion, “incorporatefs] the essence” of which adjustment energy assistance increase Id. The committee prior exclusions. these advantage of this exclu- in order to take would exclude “all provision that the stated sion— households provided energy assistance added). (emphasis Id. State, Federal, or local use of through Secretary argues highlighted that the The laws that focus on the flowing from funds 123, of support a narrow definition Id. at statements energy problem of assistance.” purpose of sec- “energy for the The committee at 956. 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2014(d)(ll)(A). scrutiny of the con- “ex- tion' Our provision would that the further stated text, however, conclude that us to these any payments made leads income direct clude from prompted the concern that remarks were by the Federal Government” to households governments might pass off “regular and local ener- state intervention” “crisis under nonenergy-related existing, in aspect increases wel- programs. Id. This of gy assistance” payments program assis- not define fare report does the committee Res., Maryland Dep’t Human assistance,” tance.” See indicate that section but does of 1470-71. Because the federal 2014(d)(ll), 976 F.2d at by incorporating the essence of pays the entire cost of food government in other similar, provisions program-specific 2013(a), benefits, “any” pay- 7 U.S.C. such statutes, to exclude was intended (1992). That statute addresses parties' into neither reject invitation to delve We ' should be legislative history.of treated language the Hous- how reimbursements 1992, proper Stamp nor the inter- Community Development of under the Food ing Act 3672, 102-550, pretation energy of the assistance exclusion. 106 Stat. Pub.L. No. , percentage the allotments of food remain constant as a of ploy would increase household income, year year. at no stamps practice to a state’s residents substantial USDA’s efforts, counting state. To thwart such energy component cost to the subsequently Congress amended the exclu- reimbursements as income does not hold ten- payments provided sion for they ants “harmless” for the assistance re- Maryland and local laws.5 See under state ceive. Res., 976 F.2d at 1471.

Dep’t Human Secretary argues Congress rati reimbursements, contrast, Utility pro- in interpretation fied USDA’s of the statute regulations specify under federal vided when it amended the assistance ex account for clusion 1988. Prior section nonenergy utility Although costs. we do not 2014(d)(11)(A) exempted from “any dispute that the committee intended that payments, or allowances made under “energy assistance” include benefits offset- purpose Federal 'law for the providing rising energy, ting the cost of Bowen, assistance.” See West v. provision' of the reveals no intent to F.2d at 1130. reworded the stat language provi- plain circumscribe the provision currently ute Í988 so that the apply only sion it would to such so “any payments excludes or allowances for the benefits. purpose providing energy assistance under Furthermore, Secretary’s note that the we any Federal A law.” Senate committee re interpretation of the assistance exclu- port indicates that this “technical amend legisla- sion causes a result at odds with the ment” clarified history. Report indi- tive House agencies that USDA and local do not need typical' energy cates that inquiry purpose to conduct an into the of a grams “hold low-income households harmless excluding federal statute before federal by permitting buy them to the same amount “payments purpose assis- energy they past would have utilized tance.” The law as now written could be years having to diminish their al- without require analysis. read to ready marginal incomes.” No. The crucial should be whether the supra, at 955. An purpose payment assis- assistance, according exclusion for such tance, statute, whole, not whether the as a Report, guarantees that the House low-in- primarily assistance or in- come households are held harmless for the cludes other human services as well. This they Utility receive. Id. reim- change change is not intended to current energy components bursements with are de- policy. signed part tenants, to ensure that on S.Rep. Cong., 100th 2d Sess. average, purchase energy will be able to reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2266- spending utilities without more than 30% of added). (emphasis underly- household income. The allowances adjusted Secretary urges ing these reimbursements are annu- The us to read the last ally energy quoted in endorsing to reflect substantial cost increas- sentence the text as the See, 1930, C, e.g., pt. subpt. agency’s policy restricting es. 7 C.F.R. exh. of the definition of E.IX.C; 882.214, solely payments 24 C.F.R. 965.478. In assistance to offset- manner, utility ting energy. this reimbursements ensure dramatic increases the cost of expenditures problem Secretary’s argument that a for the household’s The with 1)(B) 2014(d)(1 period any year not to exceed six months in Section excludes from income, payments (including even if such or allowances credits) provided tax are not on a seasonal any payments pur- or allowances made the for administratively basis because it would be pose providing energy ... under of assistance impracticable feasible or to do so. designated by State or local State laws the for legislative body authorizing pay- Unlike the exclusion tance, federal assis- or local such assistance, expressly provides this statute the Secre- ments or allowances as tary determining payments by Secretary a role in whether determined the to be calculated designated by governments provided by government state or as if the State or local local "en- aggregate ergy involved on a seasonal basis for an assistance” should be counted as income. Act, Stamp agency’s Food the the under applying exclu the is that USDA’s changed over practice this has rationale for offsetting dramatic payments only to sion Prior to the 1988 time. amendment did not exist cost in the increases litigation the agency that the asserted Report was drafted. time the Senate at the un- only payments to applied exclusion utility reimburse treated Although USDA specifically to laws enacted der federal 1988, agency before as income ments 1988 amend- energy assistance. The vide faulty interpreta practice on this based interpretation, this ment condemned that energy assistance exclusion tion of the Bowen, 1322, and the 879 F.2d at West v. designed to was correct. amendment position it in favor of the agency abandoned prior to construing the statute The cases two case, “energy assis- espouses in this that it Bowen, 1988, 1987 WL No. v.West offsetting only tance” refers rev’d, 17, 1987), F.2d (E.D.Pa. Dec. interpreta- rising energy costs. The rapidly Cir.1989) Block, (3d v. No. and Mitchell appeal at issue on thus tion of the statute (D.S.C. 82-3297-3, op. at 10 June slip the 1988 amendment. predate does not interpre 1983),held, consistent with USDA’s unvarying considered USDA’s time, We have reimburse tation at that an utility reimbursements as treatment of “energy assistance” because not ments are capable rat “interpretation” of the statute by housing they authorized federal were silence, great do not ification but we find laws, laws.6 than rather Congress’s inaction.- “Con significance plaintiffs’ light, the inter- in this Viewed frequently un gressional inaction betokens and the 1988 amendment pretation of the awareness, paralysis.” Zu preoccupation, or persuasive: more Report Senate Allen, n. v. 396 U.S. ber change con- not intended was amendment 314, 323-324 n. 24 L.Ed.2d 346 S.Ct. repudiated in effect it gressional policy, but (1969). significant Legislative silence is most by clarifying position agency’s litigation year-by- of traditional when the “area is one any payments tax, watchdog year supervision, like where excluded, purpose of the regardless of the revising considering and committees sup- payments. authorizing the Further law statutory Id. In the baker’s doz scheme.” com- interpretation is that the port years passed that have since the Food en rewording the statute mittee described the Stamp energy assistance exclusion was Act The as a “technical amendment.” statement enacted, many Act has been amended history that amendment legislative in the times, itself been but the exclusion has change policy” current “is intended amended twice. The 1981 amendment a substantive revision that it is not reaffirms excluding provision state affected statutory language. payments. and local Secretary’s argument based on final legislative history of the 1988 amendment Congress ex- is that committee’s appreciation reflects senate interpreta- approval USDA’s pressed statute, tacit does not misread the but it leaving place when amended tion committee’s indicate awareness signify Inaction in 1988. the statute reimbursements. USDA’s treatment interpretation. agency acquiescence supra, to an S.Rep. States, See, (stating Univ. United e.g., Bob Jones at 2266 “USDA 2017, 2032-33, 674, 600-01,103 agencies do not need to and local conduct U.S. logical prerequisite A inquiry purpose of a federal statute 76 L.Ed.2d 167 into the assistance). from si- inferring approval excluding” energy or ratification before interpretation Therefore, ante- agency’s even if what the senate committee lence that the is agency’s prior misread recognized That is not about the dates relevant amendments. invariably to the ing of statute were attributable Although ÚSDA has so here. prove not con- Congress, this would be income entire reimbursements to deemed counting utility See legisla- reimbursements as income. court in Mitchell cited The district Mitchell, 82-3297-3, energy slip op. exclusion as at 13-28. tive of the No. practice upholding alternate basis cognizance of gressional the treatment of and we noted that the remarks reflected the utility reimbursements. committee’s concern that state or gov- local might pass ernments off general increases in leg- There are still fewer facts outside the welfare as Utility assistance. reim- history supporting islative an inference of bursements, contrast, are by authorized congressional awareness. USDA has not regulations federal specifying pay- that the interpretation its embodied federal ments account energy utility costs. The regulation. assistance exclusion a legislative history by cited Secretary Moreover, nothing our research uncovered empower does not USDA to refine the ener- suggesting agency po- that the embodied its gy assistance exclusion so that it does not any agen- sition on reimbursements in apply to the component of a 1990, cy publication prior to when issued reimbursement. policy statements on the matter. And the considering courts USDA’s treatment of Finally, Secretary contends that prior to reimbursements 1988 issued policy because, USDA’s should upheld West, unpublished opinions. E.g., No. 84- Chevron, under courts must defer to an Mitchell, 28346; 1987 WL No. 82- agency’s interpretation reasonable of a stat Furthermore, including 3297-3. ute it prescribes administers. Chevron stamp reimbursements two-step analysis courts employ agen of an only very poor FmHA and affects HUD ten- cy’s interpretation of a statute it administers. ants, persons unlikely to have the resources Dion, 933 F.2d at 14-15. Deference is publicize plight. their We cannot infer appropriate only when the intent legislative history from the and from these Hosp., is unclear. See St. Luke’s 810 F.2d at congressional signals facts that silence ratifi- case, 331. In plain language of the agency’s policy. cation of the Nor do we find Congress’s statute1 manifests intent on the legislative history any bely- in the statements any payment at issue: designed to ing Congress’s our determination that offset costs is excluded from food meaning tended for the income, stamp just payments offsetting not exclusion is plain language. manifested rapidly rising energy costs. We conclude component of a HUD or D. Deference utility reimbursement, subsidy as a Secretary argues that we must purchase energy, must be excluded agency’s judgment appli defer to the on the from food Any income calculations. cability assistance exclusion to policy of contrary impermis USDA to the authority reimbursements because this sible. expressly has delegated agency. been to the The decision of the district court is there- According Secretary, Congress explic to the fore itly called on USDA to determine whether Reversed. any payments provided under federal “laws specifically dealing with assis Dissent follows. “energy-assistance tance” were related.” CYR,’ Judge supra, (dissenting). Circuit agency’s 956. An reason Although proposes plausible the court able construction of a statute is entitled to alternative, agree I cannot that the Exclusion Congress delegates deference when interpretation adopted by the United agency power interpret the statute. (“USDA”) Department Agriculture States Hosp. Secretary See St. Luke’s Health & “arbitrary, capricious, manifestly con- Servs., (1st

Human Cir. U.S.A., trary to the Chevron Inc. statute.” 1987). Council, v. National Resource Defense previously quoted passage 2778, 2782, We U.S. Report Secretary the House cited in L.Ed.2d statutory Not support argument, by of this see interpretations administering agency 788, 123, 956, supra, review, id., at 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at entitled to deferential but the

1208 273.9(c)(5) living expenses.” 7 C.F.R. hold underlying the doctrine Chevron rationale case. I would there- implicated in this fully deference to USDA’s Chevron fore accord course, acknowledge, readily I language pivotal “ener- interpretation of the judicial deference does not dictate Chevron excluding ordi- [payments],” as gy assistance in all circum- agency interpretations (“URs”). nary utility reimbursements See, Larson, 2 at 468 e.g., F.3d stances. First, regulatory scheme es omnibus (under Chevron, have the last word “courts (“FSA”) Stamp Act under the Food tablished statutory interpretation [and] on literal complex” both its is “technical weight accorded to much to be is one of how interdepen statutory and in its manifestation added). views”) my (emphasis agency with several elaborate implementation dent however, view, charting the course after public assistance statutes and state federal inquiry, the court mis- its two-tiered Chevron by agencies (e.g., other administered by withholding deference places compass its FmHA). 865, at id. at 104 S.Ct. See grounds. impermissible on 2792; Maryland Dep’t Human Resources analy overarching aim of the Chevron Dep’t Agric., 976 F.2d v. United States Congress has to determine “whether sis is Cir.1992). (4th 1462, consequence As a 1470 question at directly spoken precise to the in the intricacies accustomed immersion of its Chevron, 842, 104 467 U.S. at S.Ct. issue.” FSA, familiarity with and its intimate of the added); Corp. K Mart (emphasis see at 2782 schemes, USDA, like statutory related Inc., 281, 291-92, Cartier, 108 v. 486 U.S. ordinarily is administering agencies, other (1988) 1811, 1817-18, 313 100 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. Congress the confidence of presumed to have (“[A] if reviewing court must determine interpretations of affording interstitial first language regulation is consistent with to its administration. See statutes entrusted ... the statute is silent [i]f of the statute [or] Chevron, 865, at at 467 U.S. S.Ct. specific ambiguous respect field....”); with (“Judges experts in the (em regulation_”) Larson, 462, addressed issue 2 F.3d Sierra Club added). case, court present In the (1st IRS, 962, phasis Cir.1993); F.2d Aronson v. precisely than Chev (1st inquiry less Cir.1992); frames v. Commissioner Evans (the Servs., 1, requires. supra p. 1201 issue is ron Dep’t Maine Human (1st Cir.1991). Further, ‘energy [Exclu assistance’ under politically “whether only payments offset generally encompasses agency, sion 11] accountable executive costs”). rising energy Under ting rapidly left to “strike speaking the should be framework, by Congress, “precise ques [policy] not struck balance” the Chevron Chevron, 842, tion,” accommodation of at 104 S.Ct. at and to reach “a reasonable 467 U.S. Chevron, one, manifestly competing controlling is much more interests.” thus the 865-66, 104 (empha Congress expressed at at 2792 narrowly 467 U.S. S.Ct. Has focused: added). plainly impli choices sis to include or exclude “specific intention” provisions on income cated the FSA’s FmHA URs from the ambit HUD and exclusion, Congress’s re inclusion and assistance”? phrase “payments] long peated to countermand USDA’s failure at 2783 id. at S.Ct. Cf . URs, standing policy favoring inclusion of see Congress evinced (inquiring whether Rusk, 1, 12, 85 S.Ct. Zemel v. 381 U.S. proposed apply EPA’s “specific intention” to (1965), present a text 14 L.Ed.2d statutory term “sta concept” to the “bubble Lastly, book case for Chevron deference. source”). tionary pollution] [air considering Exclusion ever since after Structure, Purposes Language, “in a detailed and its Exclusion 11 FSA and Chevron, fashion,” 467 U.S. and reasoned “energy assistance If undefined term 865, 104 consistently the USDA plain and determinate [payment]” has a not intend has concluded that did FSA, sug as the court meaning under the stamp recipients from to insulate food (“a[ny] public subsi gests, supra p. 1201 routinely accompany infla cost increases energy”); but Dion dy purchase of house- tionary in the nature of “normal rises cf. Dep’t (1977), Cong., v. Maine Human 1st reprinted Commissioner Sess. 27 in 1977 (1st Cir.1991) Resources, 1704, 1978, 2004; 933 F.2d see 7 U.S.C. “child,” 2014(d) (“Household (rejecting interpretation of USDA purposes income for term), of same based on FSA’s variant uses of the shall [FSA] include all income from prong (em initial under the excluding then the Chevron whatever source only:...”) met, added). inquiry prevail phasis and the cannot context, USDA Given this historical plausible interpretation. no matter how its it appropriate would seem recognize Employees Syst. Public Retirement broadly gauged See the FSA’s “income” inclusion Betts, 158, 171, 109 2854, 2863, provision strongly U.S. suggests that exclusions (1989). However, 106 L.Ed.2d 134 from “income” under the FSA- are to be disagree strictly limited, does not that the term lending USDA “en considerable rational ergy [payment],” assistance iso force to limiting viewed the USDA’s interpretation lation, susceptible expansive to more inter “energy Exclusion term Rather, pretation. [payments].” it Cf., contends the stat e.g., Commissioner v. Ja utory cobson, 28, 49, and historical contexts of Exclusion 11 336 U.S. 69 S.Ct. (1949) (Internal

support given by the narrower construction L.Ed. 477 Revenue Code’s agency. Skidgel Dep’t deliberately v. Maine broad definition of taxable “in (1st Servs., Human Cir. come” limiting interpretation necessitates re 1993) (“plainness” legislative language lating exemptions). must be context considered Second, the court concedes that the entire policy goals); entire statute its see also phrase “energy [payments]” —not Passenger Corp. R.R.

National v. Boston & merely component its discrete assis- — U.S. -, -, Corp., Maine 112 S.Ct. ambiguous important tance” —is in one (1992) 1394, 1401, (same). 118 L.Ed.2d 52 viz., respect; unmistakable viewed as a uni- Thus, at impediments least three related tary payment, federal assistance average must be the term before overcome unlike, HUD or example, a UR— [payment]” can be considered suf payment pursuant to the Low Income ficiently “plain” withholding to warrant Chev Energy supra Home Assistance pp. ron in this deference case. obviously purely “pay- is not a 1201-02— First, explicitly at the same time it added purpose ment[ ] allowance[ ] made for the assistance,” “income” exclusions to the providing energy FSA but often Congress clearly evidenced its intention that nonenérgy components (e.g., includes various “broad-gauged the statute’s charges, definition of in- charges). water trash collection come ... broadly proposes measure income as looming as The court to avoid the possible recipients interpretive to be to all path by [FSA] dilemma in requiring fair tax-paying public well as to the agency segregate and not these UR simply by purchasing power components reference to energy component. from the available for food.” supra p. 95th See 1202.7 As the district court structure, set, monitor, complex 7. Given the FSA’s and the USDA does not or control internal cross-references in Exclusion 11 to other allowances, HUD or FmHA nor the annual comparable federal and state statutes of com- Thus, adjustments to those allowances. even plexity, accept it is difficult to the facile conclu- though segregation may appear "simple matter segregation energy component sion that abstract, simply of arithmetic” in the it cannot nonenergy components from the pose in URs would segregation assumed that would not entail elabo- significant no administrative burden. The interagency monitoring policing rate —for otherwise, vigorously insists and the dis- example, between the USDA and HUD to ensure prudently bypassed trict court istrative the entire admin- stamp recipients correctly that food declare the implementation Estey, issue. See appropriate components of their URs as exclud- hand, F.Supp. at 158 n. 2. On the other evidence, contrary ible income. Absent some court bases its “minimal administrative burden" therefore, likely the USDA’s assessment of solely appel- thesis on an examination of the cold record, FSA, HUD, implementing burdens entailed including such an ad- late and FmHA implementing regulations, regime prima without the benefit of facie warrants defer- ministrative ence. developed relating types prob- record might portend lems which burdens. serious administrative phrase “payments ... operative however, phrase “pay- view the noted, the entire aptly ambiguous, very is energy assistance” purpose of ... made ments “plain” impediments to a these three least ambiguity from a latent assistance” suffers require careful at- language interpretation as to whether a serious and raises legislative history any tention to relevant possi- considered the Congress ever the 96th meaning. might light on its throw which might interpreted bility Exclusion Legislative History portions of “mixed” of FSA and Exclusion include discrete to like HUD utility payments multi-purpose (cid:127)

and FmHA URs. any is on historical focus of the search The specific congressional intent to of a evidence in that the USDA Finally, the conclusion “energy pay- classify assistance” URs as legislative with the terpretation is at odds or, alternatively, evidence that Con- ments not with underlying the FSA does policy type task to gress left this of definitional and scrutiny. Recipients of HUD stand Chevron, 467 U.S. at agency expertise. See lay special to no bur can claim FmHA URs (“Sometimes legis- at 2782 104 S.Ct. stamp scheme. under the food den e agency particular on a delegation to an lative principle of “fair recognized th itself has explicit.”). implicit rather than question is narrowly- underlies the FSA’s ness” which legislative history confirms that relevant exclusions, competing and the income drawn ambiguous on the 11 is at least Exclusion allocation benefit interests at stake Dion, 933 F.2d at 16 matter at issue. See H.R.Rep. No. by government. See made (looking legislative to confirm acknowledging that 27. supra, at While statutory language). nonambiguity of often feel lowest incomes families with the poli congressional this financial brunt of readily agree the court I with choice, assiduously acts to fur cy the USDA pre- interpretation of the various proposed treating policy by as ther that eminently reports is enactment committee many other routine hand, includible the other reasonable. On in payments which need-based in the committee points to several references power. family’s purchasing real crease a suggesting Congress, in the reports 273.9(b)(2)(i) See, (supple § e.g., crisis, C.F.R. unprecedented OPEC oil wake AFDC, and “other mental SSI from “income” for contemplated no exclusion on need” are includible programs based payments to FSA federal income”) (emphasis stamp “unearned “extraordinary” energy recipients, except for (veteran’s 273.9(b)(2)(ii) added); id. through already addressed expenses not payments); id. unemployment compensation for ac “ordinary mechanisms” the FSA 273.9(b)(2)(iv) Thus, not (scholarships). inflationary eost-of-liv commodating normal prefer withstanding strong humanitarian Cong., S.Rep. No. 96th ing increases. affording maximum nutritional bene (1980), ence for reprinted in 1980 2d Sess. families, precisely type needy it is fits to 410, 520. balancing, of finite and allocation Report, pivotal Committee resources, nor governmental that Chevron (1980), Cong., 2d 122-23 No. 96th Sess. politically accounta mally ordains be left to 843, 955-56 reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.AN. than the administering agencies rather ble 788”], Report “House No. [hereinafter: Chevron, 467 U.S. at courts. See 1204-05, particular exam- supra pp. cites (“[F]ederal judges have S.Ct. at 2793 —who recently enacted federal statutes ples of duty respect constituency le no —have purpose of en- viding “payments by those who gitimate policy choices See, Energy e.g., Home ergy assistance.” do.”). (1976) (formerly Act, 94 Stat. 229 Assistance (1976)). 8601-8612 sum, codified at U.S’.C. “precise question” for determi- (repealed and reenacted Low-Income analysis whether nation under Chevron Energy Pub.L. No. Assistance “specific inten- Home Congress’s the FSA evinces (co- (1981) 97-35, §§ 95 Stat. pay- bring UR tion” to (1982))) §§ my at 42 U.S.C. Although in dified Exclusion 11. ments within LIHEAP]; LIHEAA or see be [hereinafter: considered [pay- (committee S.Rep. supra at 111 ments]” also “to the extent that the increase is LIHEAA). report Report House No. 788 high heating on attributable to costs rather than pay- general inflationary the federal “intervention” noted (empha- conditions.” Id. added). authorized under these ments “new” sis grams had enabled low income households to Payments “Hold Harmless” in “meet the dramatic increases home heat- rejoinders The court offers two to the costs,” ing buy “to the same amount of ener- reading legislative history. USDA’s they gy past years would have' utilized in respect, I With believe both are flawed. having already

without to diminish their mar- First, moving beyond questionablé conclu- incomes,” ginal thereby “represent and ] nothing sion that in Report House No. 788 more of a wash than real .transaction interpretation USDA’s of “ener- confirms recipient in [FSA] increase or benefited gy [payments],” assistance the court states purchasing power.” H.R.Rep. household’s that the USDA’s choice is “at odds” 122, supra, at No. 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at legislative history. supra with the p. added). (emphasis 955. presumably The court’s statement Although compel these references (1) premises: stems from two prac- USDA’s USDA, interpretation adopted by including tice URs as stamp food “income” they surely permissible support a inference stamp fails to hold food families “harmless” specific that type this was the of federal by ensuring expenditures that “a household’s “energy payment targeted by Ex- for percentage remain constant as a Having promptly adopted clusion 11. income, year year,” household from to and statutory gloss, regulatory both in its defini- (2) hypothetical payments might UR some- 273.9(c)(5) (FSA tion, see 7 C.F.R. “in- times contain superinfla- reimbursements for come” includes all reimbursements for “nor- tionary increases, energy cost for which URs living expenses” mal household which “do not would hold tenants “harmless.” In to order represent gain or benefit to the house- assess the soundness of premises, these two hold”), practice, in and maintains necessary it is first to determine what Con- that income exclusions for FSA reimburse- gress meant when it said that the “new” go ments of routine costs would well energy programs designed were to hold re- beyond merely holding recipients FSA cipient families “harmless” for assis- “harmless,” for the obvious reason that the payments, tance” LIHEAP being a known FSA, HUD, programs FmHA already and type payment. of “new” taking contain mechanisms for into account Congress intending enacted LIHEAA any general inflationary energy increases programs type “new” supple- of its would (e.g., FSA’s “standard” “excess shelter” preexisting governmental ment deductions). programs previously provided which had not

Similarly, Report adjustments House No. 788 demon- benefit to low income house- Congress strates that did not hesitate to holds to account for cost increases delegate significant outpaced general discretion to the cost-of-living USDA which increas- state-paid to determine S.Rep. supra, which benefits are es. See No.

properly [pay- classified (expressing U.S.C.C.AN. at 520 concern that ordinary ments]” under adjusting Exclusion “the mechanisms for supra, programs rising U.S.C.C.A.N. at come assistance costs (“provided living may inadequate [the USDA] satisfied to meet that the extraordinary increase or [state local] in benefits increases which taken have is, fact, costs”) added). place (emphasis assistance-related Thus, simply general LIHEAA, increase and not enacting Congress welfare when os- increase”) added). (emphasis Significantly, tensibly preexisting determined statuto- one criterion guid- ry making adjustments established for mechanisms for for ing increases,” [energy the USDA’s classification of these bene- “substantial like rate] already FSA, fits is that state benefit incorporated increases could those in the year, one a 20% over rates increased ill-designed $72 were programs, increase, UR would increase the tenant’s “spike” in- unprecedented recent offset general If or across- from $16 $27. costs, opted to reim- creases year the same rate for the-board inflation for recipients in all stamp food burse Jull 15%, one-quarter of the $12 then were for expenditures unreimbursed otherwise $3, tenant, paid to the in the UR increase increases. “spike” past and future these Cf. an additional reimburse- could be considered (LIHEAP 8624(f) payments not 42 U.S.C. beyond the increases cost ment calculating food “income” includible as rate, inflationary and some lesser general senses, entitlements). Thus, in two payment of segregable portion $3 “gain” no real stamp recipients realized (as superinflationary would be (1) LIHEAP LIHEAA: utility) price increases. opposed to energy cost superinflationary merely offset hypothetical UR would Accordingly, our $27 increases, were stamp recipients and food energy cost components: basic include three pre-OPEC financial to their simply restored ($9), ($16), inflationary increase general the same to them position, so as afford ($3). increase superinflationary crisis, the oil energy as before amount of (2) analy- power, and harmless” spending “hold loss of real When the identical without just applied cost LIHEAP is superinflationary applied to these sis since by any prior to being Congress other established housing not offset URs were creases LIHEAA, provision, the cost-of-living the flaw in statutory its enactment no double court clear.8 payments would effect the becomes LIHEAP thesis advanced simply stamp URs “gain,” payments, to food fami- LIHEAP compensation, or Unlike therefore, pursuant LIHEAA to a respects, “new In these not lies. in to House complete gram” specifically referred worked a “wash.” pp. supra 1201-02.] Report [See No. 788. hand, following the consider the other On housing legis- 8 example, HUD’s section For representative calculations hypothetical in see P.L. No. 93- lation was enacted . housing payments and URs: (codified (1974) 383, 201(a), 653 88 Stat. 1990 1991 1437f), Congress can well before U.S.C. rent approved $300 $300 allowance + utility $ $ thought to have the reasonably be foreseen price ex- increases superinflationary cost shelter approved $360 $372 income of 30% family $ $ $150 were perienced in the 1970s. When URs late therefore, established, Congress could housing assistance payment $327 $315 first — rent approved $300 $300 intended, let alone contemplated, not have ($15) component cost” that the UR’s “basic reimbursement utility $ $ ($9) component “general inflation” allowance, may may or its not which “harmless” in recipient families costs, average fig- would hold is an actual reflect special which LIHEAA the two senses for all units the “landlord” calculated ure recipients. Prior to their later benefited facility, designed to afford in covered and is URs, fami- low income initial entitlement to for house- “adequate” allowance tenants an full cost presumably paid the utilities, $60 lies deterring inefficient ener- while hold income; immediately out, after “substan- from whereas points gy usage. As the court URs, family same it cost the (e.g., establishment increases in rates tial” annual purchase the same amount 10%) only “landlord” might require $45 than more previous purchased for pre- $60 it had in the corresponding increases to make cost” Congress the “basic year. established pt. 7 C.F.R. allowance. See set 882.214, and URs to component allowances E.IX.C; C, subpt. 24 C.F.R. exh. of household income percentage So, if reduce hypothetical, in our 966.478. ever, right question. posed not practice the court has "USDA’s 8. The court concludes that inquiry whether appropriate these counting energy component [URs] as in- housing programs were intended ‘harmless’ come does not hold tenants way the same LIHEAA supra pp. hold families harmless they 1205-06. receive.” See answer, do. right was meant to Regardless how- this whether expended energy regardless that must be current HUD and FmHA presumably URs inflationary coupled Thus past trends. reimburse “routine” costs and adequate subinflationary with an internal mechanism for increases in energy costs. making adjustments general future infla- The regulations current flexibly track increases, tionary the UR worked a real presumption by $15 this reference to the includi- purchasing power, bility increase overall of all reimbursements for “normal merely living a “wash.” expenses.” household As a conse- quence, I support find no for the thesis that most, therefore, At the court has demon- USDA’s choice is “at odds” with theory might strated in that the USDA legislative history. required at some time in future to ex- relatively portion clude a small of some URs “Energy Payments State Assistance” viz., (or “income”; from food the $3 rejoinder, As its second the court takes the less) hypothetical UR attributable $27 position that language quoted any “superinflationary component.” But Report House supra p. theory inevitably imports concep- serious context, considered in can lead to one reason- impediments tual of its own. able conclusion par- was —that First, theory in defense of this the court ticularly concerned that gov- “state and local disregards unitary pay- nature of UR might pass ernments off increases in exist- ments, opining easily that can ing, nonenergy-related program pay- welfare segregate URs into their and nonen- ‘energy as assistance’” so as to shift ments ergy thereby components, smoothing the local federally-funded welfare burdens to path for its conclusion that the UR’s programs (e.g., program). the FSA Once component qualifies alone for “exclusion” however, again, this thesis does not with- 1202; supra p. from FSA “income.” See but scrutiny, begin stand close let dispel alone supra pp. Having 1209-10. thus disre- cf. plausibility of the alternative view ad- garded unitary payments, nature UR by vanced the USDA. credibly suggest the court cannot then that acting arbitrarily by the USDA would be If shifting this sort of burden had indeed segregating excluding income significant legislative FSA been a matter of con- from hypothetical' cern, a superinflationary compo- UR’s simple would have been a matter for ($8) including Congress nent while at the same time to authorize a FSA exclu- ($15) “general the UR’s “basic cost” sion for all bona cost assistance fide ($9) components paid inflation” stamp recipients by FSA income. to food the States. Second, importantly, part and more any Congress no All require need have done is to superinflationary UR will include such a satisfy Secretary any com- States ponent during periods subinflationary, state-paid sta- creases in benefits were for food ble, declining energy increases, or prices. Indeed, stamp recipients’ energy cost rath- appropriate USDA concedes that it er than their cost increases. In to exclude from requirement FSA income a UR which addition to its threshold actually represents a reimbursement for su- cost increases be the “but-for cause” perinflationary energy gen- any reimbursements, increases. Given increase in a state’s however, second, Congress eral economic late imposed 1980s and a trends subsid- 1990s, however, early appellants advisedly iary condition: a even state’s bona ener- fide argued gy-related have not that their own exempt URs covered reimbursements should be any superinflationary increases, energy price “only under Exclusion to the extent that they suggest attempt- nor do high [benefit] USDA has increase is attributable to any superinflationary ed to heating general include such com- costs rather than inflation- ponent recipient’s other stamp ary food conditions.” The court- has not ex- Rather, plained “income.” Congress USDA continues to how could have meant to improper include HUD and FmHA inURs food thwart diversions of State welfare theory proven program by “income” on the prohibiting unless costs FSA income superinflationary component, contain subinflationary some exclusions for bona ener- fide impermis State, adopted by the court is the proach by if federal gy cost reimbursements that on both readily presumption occasions were sible purposes for the same amended, Congress Exclusion 11 was In when stamp income. exeludible administering agen was unfamiliar with contrast, reading -given House Re- sharp very provision cy’s policy position on the neatly dovetails by the USDA port depends. agency’s policy upon which the federal goals of “new” stated with the 100-435, LIHEAA, 102 Stat. Congress Pub.L. No. which grams, such as 397, 100th (1988); Cong., S.Rep. No. “inter- 1663-64 of federal prototypes to as referred (1988), reprinted in 1988 2d Sess. 28-29 “energy assistance.” payments for vention” (designating conclusion, interpretation is the USDA’s correction” as a “technical FSA amendment reading by a reasonable both corroborated change not intended to current which “is language and its ambiguous ll’s Exclusion added). (emphasis Not policy”) statutory history. There is no statutory or historical basis for there no whatever that historical evidence it it undermines presumption but Chevron to include “specific intention” evinced has self, require which would otherwise defer the Exclusion FmHA URs within interpretation of Exclu ence to the reasoned “payment[s] language: as the FSA’s adopted the USDA sion allud- Congress has- once never assistance.” administering agency. URs to HUD ed reasons, respectfully I foregoing though For the even URs [payments],” dissent. Exclusion preceded the enactment See, e.g., P.L. No. years.

some six 201(a), defer- Chevron Stat. on a determination dependent

ence is not was the agency construction

“that ..., reading one or even

[permissible] if reached have

the court would judicial setting.”

initially in a had arisen Chevron, n. at 843 S.Ct. 467 U.S. ASSOCIATES, LAKE ORANGE n. 11. INC., Plaintiff-Appellant- dispel Notwithstanding its able effort Cross-Appellee, legis- ambiguity in the relevant permeant interpret Exclusion 11 history, and lative context, unique apart from its historical KIRKPATRICK, A. Robert Robert J. suggestion that Con- has disclosed no court Kunkel, Herbert, Richard P. Salvatore gress disapproval intimated its- ever Walczak, Crosta, P. De Charles treating policy against longstanding USDA’s Fogarty, Defendants-Appellees- Thomas utility reimbursements routine Cross-Appellants. Although recog- I [payments].” 1084, 1140, Dockets 93-7807. Nos. frequently “[c]ongressional inaction nize that unawareness, pa- preoccupation, or betokens Appeals, States Court United Zuber, 21, 90 at 185-86 n. ralysis,” 396 U.S. Circuit. Second 21, Congress has amended n. at 323-24 Argued Feb. 1994. since the 11 not once but twice Exclusion present policy on URs. adopted its April Decided Pons, 575, 580, See, U.S. e.g., Lorillard v. (1978) (not- 866, 870, L.Ed.2d 40

98 S.Ct. aware of “Congress presumed

ing: interpretation of a stat- administrative adopt interpretation when

ute and to change”) (empha- a statute without

re-enacts added). Nevertheless, ap- implicit

sis notes and, then, ment be excluded programs ensured under these vided the extent that the increase “harm- be held stamp recipients would high heating costs rather attributable to 122, 1980 Id. at for their benefits. less” general inflationary conditions. than at 955. obviously expects that State Committee amendments to the Food Preferring that ... not legislatures and local councils will aegis, under its Stamp Act advantage this exclusion label- take energy assistance ex- committee drafted every regular allotment ing welfare

Case Details

Case Name: Debra Estey v. Commissioner, Maine Department of Human Services

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Date Published: Apr 20, 1994

Citation: 21 F.3d 1198

Docket Number: 93-1453

Court Abbreviation: 1st Cir.