The individual plaintiffs, Deborah Olson and Kevin Schultz, brought identical claims against Risk Management Alternatives, Inc. (“RMA”) under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692
et seq.
(1998) (“FDCPA”). Each plaintiff asserted that RMA violated § 1692g of the FDCPA by contradicting the required validation notice and violated § 1692g(a)(l) by failing to adequately state the amount of the debt as of the date of the collection
I. History
RMA, a “debt collector” subject to the FDCPA, see 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6), sent nearly identical form collection letters to Olson and Schultz. The December 24, 2001 letter to Schultz listed a “Balance” of $4,881.81. The Schultz letter also stated twice that $1,035.00 was “Now Due.” In much the same fashion, Olson’s March 18, 2002 letter listed a “Balance” of $303.34, then twice stated that $146.00 was “Now Due.”
Each dunning letter, RMA’s first communication with both of the plaintiffs, contained the statutorily required validation notice at the bottom of the page. The notice in each letter stated:
Unless you notify this office within 30 days after receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of this debt or any portion thereof, this office will assume this debt is valid. If you notify the office in writing within 30 days from receiving this notice, this office will: obtain verification of the debt or obtain a copy of a judgment and mail you a copy of such judgment or verification. If you request this office in writing within 30 days after receiving this notice, this office will provide you with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. We are a debt collector, attempting to collect a debt and any information obtained will be used for that purpose.
The validation notice was in the same font, same color, same format, and same size as the rest of the text of the letters, and was also on the same side of the paper as all of the material text.
On August 13, 2002, Schultz filed a complaint against RMA, on behalf of himself and a class of all others similarly situated. Shortly thereafter, on August 20, Olson did likewise. Upon a joint motion for relatedness, Olson’s case was transferred to the district court where Schultz’s matter was pending.
On June 12, 2003, in an oral ruling, the district court granted RMA’s summary-judgment motions in both cases and denied the plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment. These appeals followed, and they were consolidated by this court on August 11, 2003.
II. Analysis
We review de novo the propriety of summary judgment and questions of statutory interpretation.
APS Sports Collectibles, Inc. v. Sports Time, Inc.,
The FDCPA requires debt collectors to send a written validation notice containing certain information to a consumer debtor within five days after initial communication.
See, e.g., Marshall-Mosby v. Corporate Receivables, Inc.,
Olson and Schultz make two arguments. First, they assert that twice stating that a portion of a debt is “Now Due” is an outright contradiction of the thirty-day validation notice and thereby violates § 1692g. The second argument is that RMA’s letters fail to adequately state the amount of the debt under § 1692g(a)(l) because the letters include two different amounts — the “Balance” and the amount “Now Due.”
A. The Effectiveness of the Thirty-Day Validation Notice
It is undisputed that RMA’s letters include language tracking the text of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). Thus, RMA’s initial obligation to provide a validation notice under the FDCPA has been satisfied. Schultz and Olson argue, however, that the inclusion of the phrase “Now Due” twice in the letters contradicts or overshadows the meaning of the validation notice and therefore deprives them of the knowledge that they had thirty days to contest the debt.
“A debt validation notice, to be valid, must be effective, and it cannot be cleverly couched in such a way as to eviscerate its message.”
Avila v. Rubin,
In deciding whether the collection letter is confusing, we ask whether the validation notice is likely to be understood by an unsophisticated consumer.
See id.
at 500;
Veach v. Sheeks,
An unexplained demand for payment within the thirty-day validation period creates confusion by contradicting, and thus rendering ineffective, the validation notice.
See, e.g., Bartlett,
We agree with the district court, however, that the words “Now Due,” when considered in the context of the letters at issue, do not eviscerate the message conveyed in the debt-validation notice. The phrase “Now Due,” even to an unsophisticated consumer, simply means that the debt collector is willing to accept less than the total balance of the debt to bring the account to a current status. The consumer has the option of paying the amount due, paying the total balance, or doing
B. The Amount of the Debt
The FDCPA requires that “[w]ithin five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall ... send the consumer a written notice containing — (1) the amount of the debt[.]” 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). Schultz and Olson argue that by using two different numbers on the dunning letters — one for the balance and one for the amount now due— RMA failed to state clearly the amount of the debt.
The cases cited by Olson and Schultz in support of their position are inapposite because the dunning letters in those cases did not state the full amount of the debt anywhere in the letter.
See Veach,
We conclude that an unsophisticated consumer, able to make “basic logical deductions and inferences” and to not interpret collection letters “in a bizarre or idiosyncratic fashion,”
Pettit,
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we Affirm the grant of summary judgment to RMA in both cases.