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Deborah Kramer v. Logan County School District No. R-1, A/K/A Stapleton Public Schools
157 F.3d 620
8th Cir.
1998
Check Treatment

*1 be considered for should not convictions reason, that he failed to car-

some a burden fact, ry. he offered no evidence whatever point. to this relevant

III. stated, judg- affirm the For the reasons ment of the trial court. KRAMER, Appellee,

Deborah SCHOOL DISTRICT LOGAN COUNTY R-1, Stapleton Public NO. a/k/a

Schools, Appellant.

No. 97-3132. Appeals, Court of United States Eighth Circuit. 9, 1998. Submitted Feb. Decided Oct. Rehearing Suggestion Rehearing

En Banc Denied Nov. 1998.* *Judge of this order. ‍​​‌​​​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‍Beam took no in the consideration or decision *2 Title arising VII

charge claim (“Title VII”), 42 of 1964 Act Rights Civil set seq. For the et § 2000e U.S.C. below, we affirm forth district court.3

I working for the began Kramer Deborah during teacher a substitute

school district certified year. school 1987-88 chemistry. work- While and in mathematics district, obtained Kramer ing for school mathe- school middle further certification general subjects, matics, all middle school natural science. science and school year, the school the 1990-91 During teacher science high school district’s and, ultimate- leave administrative placed on his re- named as Kramer was resigned. ly, teacher’s full-time a and awarded placement an- subsequently awarded She was contract. Nebraska, for the Lincoln, ar- contracts Perry, nual full-time teacher’s Gregory H. brief), for At all Gessford, years. (James school B. and 1992-93 gued probationary a times, remained Kramer appellant. by Nebraska law. defined teachеr as Nebraska, Omaha, ar- Fennell, V. Jerold brief), Howell, 1993, for district’s school (W. on Craig February, gued super- and Apple, Mike principal, high school Appellee. they Broadbent, decided intendent, John ARNOLD,1 Chief S. Richard Before Kramer’s recommend would HANSEN, Judge, following Circuit Judge, for the renewed not be contract Judge. LIMBAUGH,2 District approved the board school year. The school and, on non-renewal of recommendation LIMBAUGH, Judge District letter notice sent Kramer March requested R-l, effect.4 District County School Logan informal right to an (“the granted school Schools Public Stapleton a/k/a her the to allow board school before the en- jury verdict district”) following a appeals posi- explain to discuss opportunity employees, its former of one in favor of tered employment, regard to continued tion with discriminatory dis- Kramer, on Deborah District Ar School Education Board stepped down S. Arnold Hon. Richard 1. The (1988) nold, 417 N.W.2d Neb. Appeals Court States Judge the United Chief (Nebraska "repose[ ] in statutes business Eighth at the close Circuit for power to contract superintendent, by the been succeeded He has April 1998. administrators.”). The school teachers II. Bowman M. Hon. Pasco aof the contract renew may not to elect it deems reason for teacher probationary United States Limbaugh, Stephen N. Hon. 2. The constitutionally sufficient, it "is not long as so Mis- District of Eastern Judge for District souri, § 79- Neb.Rev.Stat. impermissible reasons.” by designation. sitting probation 828(4). it is determined Once renewed, the may not be Shanahan, ary contract teacher's United M. Thomas Honorable 3. The given written notice tois probationary teacher of Nebraska. Judge the District District States ... non- consider will “that the contract teacher's] [probationary of such may renewal law, only a Nebraska 4. Under 79- year." Neb.Rev.Stat. ensuing school probationary aof contract non-renew act to 828(3). 79-828; § Nuzum Neb.Rev.Stat. See teacher. her, in contraven- questions signed nor direct and to ask present information policy. tion of a written school behalf of the school dis- appearing on those 79-828(5) §§ trict. Neb.Rev.Stat. Additionally, (8). made material and Broadbent April misrepresentations was held and omissions *3 counsel, by called represented presenting Kramer was their recommen- school board the teaching and cross-examined re- several witnesses dation that her contract not be Although they her. she chal- presented witnesses evidence that newed. She regarding the lenged misrepresented performance the recommendation that her evalua- contract, average, of her Kram- five out of non-renewal tions were below when present any allegations or еvi- average er did not or six evaluations were better. She all, the specifically discrimination. in- dence maintains that Broadbent nearly five hours. the lasted the school board not to read structed evaluations before the approximately one hour of delibera- After opportunity board members did not have an tions, unanimously adopted hearing. during evaluations to read the employ- stating a resolution that Kramer’s Kramer adduced evidence that fifteen of the ment contract would not be renewed signed had a let- seventeen tenured teachers get along with the administra- she could her, support ter in but that Broadbent evaluations, tion, averаge received below give school board. failed to the letter player in failed to function as a team Finally, Apple presented she evidence that everyday working of the school environment position high had decided to leave his as the, district, and that school district would be principal and had informed Broadbent by seeking cooperative a better served more prior hearing, of his intentions but that teacher. they purposefully kept this from information challenge Kramer elected not to the school the school board. did, board’s decision state court. She The school district moved however, charge with file of discrimination a matter of at the end of Kramer’s ease Equal Opportunity Commis- the Nebraska and, again, at the close of all of the evidence. letter, Upon receiving right-to-sue sion. argued It that Kramer failed to introduce initiated the instant lawsuit in the Kramer finding evidence sufficient to for the District United States District Court gender discrimination. The dis- intentional Complaint alleges Her of Nebraska. trict court denied both motions. discriminatorily discharged she gender. of her conference, At the initial instruction presented sev- the district court counsel with May proceeded to trial on The case proposed jury enteen instructions. No ob- presented 1997. Kramer she made, jections though request- by disparately had treated been ed that Instruction No. be amended to high principal, Apple. Mike district’s “corporation” “polit- substitute the word with Specifically, presented testimony by accurately ical subdivision” to more describe others, including former co-workers and her- party-defendant. The school district did self, detailing Apple disciplined had how object agreed and the district court harshly severely more than male teach- amended, In- amend the instruction. As Likewise, other ers for similar misconduct. provides: No. 2 struction they testified that too had female teachers unfairly parties plain- inappropriately or be- The to this action are the been treated defendant, tiff, gender. of their Deborah Kramer and cause Throughout testimony inappropriate Stapleton Public Schools. of off-color and/or instructions, may plaintiff be re- by both and the school these remarks made by plaintiff to as the or her name. superintendent, John Broadbent. ferred district’s may by Apple The be referred to as the produced reprimands written defendant by defendant or its name. personnel from her file which were neither ques- this, court political posed subdivi- district answer such In eases Schools, stating “the by simply, school board.” sion, including Stapleton Public tion employees. through agents acts the second court аnswered political of a subdivi- agent employee An or instruction, by substituting a question new by may political bind the subdivision sion 10(a). In- Revised Instruction No. Revised agent or made acts and statements 10(a) provides: struction No. agent employee or employee while the you If find in favor of authority scope of acting [sic] you then must answer Instruction No. employee by the delegated agent or following question in form: the verdict Additionally, political subdivision. defendant, Stapleton Public Has may political agent bind the Schools, proved by preponderance and statements made subdivision acts would the evidence that the defendant *4 scope employee’s the duties the of within have made the same decision not to renew political an subdivision. for plaintiffs employment contract of the year plaintiffs of regardless another 22, 1997, jury May received On gender? deliberations, hours of case. After several following jury questions submitted the 23, 1997, May jury returned On court: the district plaintiff, in Deborah verdict favor of $110,000.00 jury Kramer. awarded her 10(a), No. does “Sta- Under Instruction $15,000.00 wages and for for lost and benefits Public stand for the school pleton Schools” pain suffering. The court emotional and or the school board administra- jury’s judgment entered verdict clerk tion? Thereafter, $125,000.00. in the amount of 10(a), phrase Instruction No. Under judg- filed a motion amend plaintiff’—doеs “actions include order of ment to reinstatement happened or all include pay prejudgment interest. front of period employment? during her attorneys’ for a motion filed 10(a) provides: Instruction and costs. fees you plaintiff If find in favor of granted part in and de- The district court you then answer Instruction must part motion to amend the nied in Kramer’s following question in the form: verdict request It for rein- judgment. denied defendant, Stapleton Public Has statement, years her three of front awarded Schools, preponderance proved by the $71, pay—reduced to its value the evidence that the defendant would request prejudg- and denied her 288.06 against the have taken the samе actions grant- interest. The district court also ment regardless plaintiffs gen- mo- part and Kramer’s ed in denied der? fees attorneys’ It awarded her tion for fees. $42, costs, counsel, Following a but amount conference with reduced final The district court entered question court the first 378.18. district answered 9,1997. supplemental July 20. drafting judgment Instruction No.

Supplemental provides: No. 20 Instruction ‍​​‌​​​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‍II instructions, Stapleton

As used these defendant, Lo- means the appeal, Public Schools point first For its R-l, County gan School District No. erred argues the district court district governed political by the is a subdivision matter judgment as a denying its motion for Please refer to district’s board. of law.

Instruction 2. aof We de novo the denial review Please all the instructions reread law, as matter motion your continue deliberations. standards as the applying same Sieben, F.3d v. 108 objected to the court. Feltmann specifically The school district (8th Cir.1997). assume pro- “must to Instruction No. It also 974 We reference 624 con- her full-time teacher’s nonmoving party’s non-renewal of

proven all facts gender discrimination. show, tract was intentional give the benefit evidence tended inferences, and assume that of all reasonable previously recognized This has Court were resolved in the evidence all conflicts application agency principles this Hathaway Runyon, 132 F.3d v. her favor.” Kientzy v. Mc Don Title VII context. See (8th Cir.1997). Judgment as a (8th Douglas Corp., nell if, only consider appropriate matter Cir.1993)(“[a] jury reasonable could have manner, in this no reason ing the evidence [plaintiffs supervisor] [a used found that non-moving par able could find disciplinary com company investigator], the Ryther KARE 108 F.3d ty. See v. mittee, resources] of human [the director — denied, Cir.) (en banc), (8th cert. prejudice”); his Jiles v. as the conduit of U.S. -, 2510, 138 L.Ed.2d 1013 117 S.Ct. (8th Cir.1991)(“there is Ingram, 944 F.2d 409 (1997). jury’s will not set aside “[W]e court’s inconsistency between the district Hardrives, lightly.” Corp. Triton verdict finding of no intentional discrimination Inc., 343, 345 high ranking officials who made the the two to dis final recommendation and decision argues that Kram The school district City charge, conclusion that the and its discriminatory discharge claim is insuffi er’s be guilty disparate of a treatment violation there is no cient as a matter of law because of in of the uncontradicted evidence cause *5 engaged in that evidence by the lesser officials tentional discrimination As the gender intentional discrimination. discharge proceeding”); see who initiated the decisionmaker board was the ultimate school Co., Shager Upjohn F.2d 405 also v. 913 respect to the non-renewal of Kramer’s (7th Cir.1990) (“If as committee] acted [the contract, teaching district con preju [plaintiffs supervisor’s] the conduit of it the motivations of the individ tends that its paw—the cat’s innocence оf dice—his that are at issue. The ual board members spare company from members would not that the school board school district insists liability.”). legitimate, non-discrimi articulated several argues that this The school district decision, natory for its distinguishable case is to establish that the reasons Kramer failed fact-finding independent board conducted pretext for intentional College, hearing. e.g., Long v. Eastfield discrimination. (5th Cir.1996)(“If [college F.3d 307 88 president] his decisions on his own suggest that the evidence based Kramer does independent investigation, the causal link be that the presented indicates individual allegedly [plaintiffs’ supervisors] retal to not renew her tween members electеd Rather, iatory [plaintiffs’] terminations gender. of her intent and contract because broken.”). troubling is her would be Even more argues that because the non-renewal of Kramer, by represented coun by Apple Broad- that who was contract was initiated and any bent, hearing, evi acting scope employ- of their sel at the did not within the mention, of, allegations of ment, nor even and Broadbent dence Yet, concerns misrepresentations gender discrimination. these made material and omis- credibility which we presenting their to involve determinations sions recommendation reviewing not consider a motion the school district should be liable do when Moreover, Corp., matter of law. Triton discriminatory as a for their conduct. (“We evaluate, weigh, will not argues her com- 85 F.3d at 345 (cid:127)Kramer that the evidence of evidence.”). credibility and, contrast, by Apple’s and Bro- or consider the petency question of whether the school board disparate of female adbent’s treatment teach- ers, accurately Kramer’s situation or sufficiently legitimate, accessed undermines the perfunctory ‍​​‌​​​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‍review and “rubber non-discriminatory performed reasons articulated to stamped” the recommendation non-renew Accordingly, Kramer main- school board. jury.. As sup- appropriately ample was tains that there was by Kramer were suming alleged the facts port finding that the real reason

625 properly before us. Kostelec of ail of error is proven, giving her benefit reason- Co., inferences, Casualty 64 F.3d Farm Fire and resolving all conflicts State able (8th 1220, 1225 favor, say cannot that in her we the evidence jury to conclude unreasonable for it was jury the district court’s “We review of her full-time teach- that the non-renewal abuse of instructions for discretion was result of intentional contract er’s simply review must determine whether gender discrimination. instructions, taken as a whole and viewed law, light applicable fair the evidence III ly submitted adequately the issues point appeal, the For its second Co., jury.” Kim v. case Nash Finch argues Instruction (8th Cir.1997)(internal instruction, supported agency omitted). on in quotations We will reverse evidence. only if structional error we find that rights error the substantial “affected matter, note an initial we As parties.” Id. objection to Instruc school district made 2 at the conference or tion No. instruction Because we conclude Instruction Rules Rule 51 of the Federal of Civil trial. any properly given, we not find do provides party may as “[n]o Procedure Supplemental No. 20. error Instruction give failure sign giving error the or the If, however, emphasis upon placed undue objects party an instruction unless instruction, agency believe theretо before retires consider resulting was harmless. error verdict, stating distinctly objected the matter objection.” grounds Fed. to and the V 51; En Dupre see v. Fru-Con R.Civ.P. Inc., gineering, Cir. *6 point appeal, its final on For 1997)(“to argument concerning a preserve an court argues that the district district review, party appellate instruction a jurisdiction to was without award objected distinctly the matter to must state $71, pay it exceeds 288.06 front objection grounds for the and the compensatory damages statutory limit on record”). these, In such as circumstances pecuniary loss.” 42 U.S.C. for “future only if amounts to reverse the instruction will 1981a(b)(3). monetary § a award Whether 333; plain Dupre, Ryther, 112 at error. subject сompensatory pay of front is review, plain error F.3d at 847. Under 108 damages in Title VII is of first cap an issue grounds “only if is for reversal an instruction impression in this Court. rights of prejudices the substantial the error pay held front is The Sixth has Circuit miscarriage in a party a would result subject legal remedy cap. See Hud a Smith, justice v. if left uncorrected.” Rush (6th Reno, v. 130 F.3d son Cir.1995) (en banc). (8th 918, 922 56 F.3d Cir.1997); Township Hamlin v. Charter already agen- we have determined that As Flint, (E.D.Mich.1997). F.Supp. 987 965 apply in principles can and do the Title cy statutory Applying canons of con general context, 2 was er- Instruction No. VII struction, Circuit the Sixth determined plain ror—let alone error. common, ordinary the term meaning of pecuniary loss” is “an amount “future

IV money time.” which will be lost at a later Hudson, Accordingly, the at 1203. point appeal, the 130 F.3d For its third “ pay’, concluded ‘front argues Supplemental Instruction Sixth Circuit law, purpose is question a from both definition response to is a mone pecuniary ‘future loss’ because it emphasis on erro- a jury, placed undue salary tary award for agency instruction. As school dis- neous but for the discrimina objected express ref- would have received specifically trict trial, tion.” Id. to Instruction 2 at this claim erence

626 decision; Ms. Kramer Circuit, however, this make a non-renewal the Sixth

Unlike law to right under state pay did not exercise her front as form always viewed has Court by a state reviewed v. the board’s decision Newhouse McCor have equitable relief. See (8th court, court; and, Co., gone to a state Cir. if she had 110 F.3d mick & 1997)(“Front remedy, have been limited to equitable an review would pay is may the school board before court its discretion record of the the district by a deferen- governed rights statutes] and would have been the [civil award under view, my none of these injured party whole.”)(quoting tial standard. make the Co., Kramer’s action points 38 F.3d is fatal to Ms. Insurance Smith World (8th Cir.1994)). view, requirement pay In our front law. There is federal remedies, those be- other than monetary award for the administrative much a is not so agen- counterpart employee would have received or a state salary that the fore EEOC discrimination, precedent to rather as a condition cy, but be exhausted but for the reinstatement, That under Title VII. in a federal court monetary equivalent suit is did not claim sex discrimination reinstatement given in situations where e.g., may New lessen the credi- impossible. See impracticable or before assertions, house, 641; Philipp but that was bility v. ANR her later 110 F.3d at Inc., Limbaugh jury, Judge System, question Freight ante, Ms. ‍​​‌​​​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‍Kramer rightly says, is more at 624-625. This subtle distinction 1981a(b)(2) any pursue state- obligation section under no than semantics because that, damages independently an cre- “[cjompensatory remedy. She has provides VII, under Title right this section shall not include to sue awarded under ated federal are backpay, motives other in that forum the defendant’s backpay, interest novo, 706(g) per- though under section the burden of type of relief authorized reviewed de always Rights Act of 1964.” U.S.C. of course remains suasion Civil added). And, finally, against is 1981a(b)(2)(emphasis plaintiff. § We there the action unit, district, fore, governmental disagree with the Sixth the school respectfully, pay, of the school board or that front the members Circuit and conclude Certainly entity. remedy from statuto the board as an equitable excluded relevant, motives, here, provided compensatory damages good uncontested are ry limit on 1981a(b)(3). invariаbly dispositive, orn- they are not but section ante, 624-625, eases, clearly state. see Accordingly, we affirm. *7 that present the ease is evidence Crucial to ARNOLD, Judge, S. Circuit RICHARD district, of the top the two administrators concurring. Broadbent, were motivat- Mr. and Mr. thorough opinion join Judge Limbaugh’s I recommending non-re- by gender the ed fully, separately to but write for the Court plaintiffs contract. Without this newal dissenting thoughts our a few about offer recommendation, hearing the school-board observations, especially invo his colleague’s Some of the would never have occurred. opinion in Lacks v. Fer cation of our recent re- supporting these conclusions are fаcts R-2, 147 Reorganized School Dist. guson opinion. Judge Limbaugh’s counted rehearing en banc suggestion evidence, ap- Among things, there was other Cir.1998) (9 denied, F.3d 904 — 2 jury, two parently persuasive to the vote). women teachers top administrators treated men, coarsely favorably than and that indicating points less begin by the on Let me remarks, disparaging the details of which All of the agree I with the dissent. which recounted, made about need not be presented Kramer no following is true: Ms. evidence, There was at the women teachers. evidence of sex discrimination defendant, by that men and board; full the was the school the before up It was equal treatment. fair; any mem- women received that there is no evidence biased; to believe. jury to decide which side the to the personally of the board ber was addition, jury a chance In authority empowered to is the sole any subsequent board poisoned school board have been would Kramer Ms. whether decide termi- action, decision to event, gen- so that regardless of terminated ad- “rubber-stamped” the simply not have. would nate her der, that she it found recommendation, gender-based ministrators’ dissenting colleague, my deference With Kientzy, stand. See jury’s verdict could reasoning, in any of this that not think I do prevail allowing her to But F.2d at 1057. case, is in this the record the context great present case is a the facts of (As in Lacks. opinion our inconsistent with Staple- precedents. The departure from our I were Judge happens, both Hansen it not, by of exercis- virtue board did ton school As I read panel.) Lacks of the members fire authority to hire and statutory ing its It very fact-specific. it is opinion, Lacks teachers, paw, “one used a cat’s thus become a fair rule that any general does not erect purposes.” accomplish his by another board immunizes impartial hearing before (3d Dictionary, 354 International Webster’s consequences of from the a school ed.1986). opinion Unfortunately, the court’s the district’s part discrimination into a pаw” cases our “cat’s today administration, transforms if that discrimination ac- be employment tails that wiE used cat o’ nine of adverse proximate cause part provides every of bias school district whose tion. The evidence weak, mandated, very statutorily independent, in Lacks was thorough, administrators (or teacher acting adjudicatory the misconduct review before fuE-blown misconduct) was regarded the board what recommendations. on termination circumstances, it was those egregious. In claim, paw” “cat’s present a submissible To wholly verdict view that our tending to evidence proffer must Ms. Kramer authority com- Lacks is not unreasonable. influ- school bоard “that the demonstrate in the jury verdict us to overturn peEing administrators, and by bias of enced circumstances quite different consequently served that the board case. the ... animus conduit, paw,’ of or ‘cat’s Lacks, 147 F.3d administration.” the school dissenting. HANSEN, Judge, Circuit no “produced Ms. at 725. Since view, Ms. my dissent. respectfuUy I deferred evidence can has produced [the administra- opinion or of discrimina inference reasonable id., determination,” making its tors] in Stapleton school part of the tion on “influ- the board was shown has not favor therefore in her and a verdict any gender bias on enced” conclusion, reaching “In stand. cannot administrators, except to the extеnt must the evidence mindful [I am] dispute raised resolved school board light most favorable viewed which, of the termination recommendation — infer verdict, all reasonable jury’s the board course, requires Nebraska law al must be of the verdict in support ences ac- school board Stapleton The elected do. *8 Reorganized Ferguson Lacks lowed.” statutory hearing at Kramer her Ms. corded R-2, Cir. Dist Sch. by counsel represented which she states, correctly 1998). opinion The instant her own evidence on witnesses and presented the evidence suggest that not “Kramer does who witnesses behalf, and cross-examined board individual that the indicates presented a hint Thеre not against her. appeared her to renew not members elected full and hearing was other than itself Supra at gender.” of her contract because for hearing continued trial-type fair. The to recover Kramer sued Ms. Since retired, the board nearly hours before five by discriminatory discharge damages for consider session to jury, into executive Eke a this failure board, might suspect one had been which arguments the evidence However, if she to her ease. be should fatal Lacks, Here, “no members inas presented. discrimina gender unlawful show that could during present were of the administration who of the administrators part tion Id. dehberations.” to the thе board’s separation her initiaUy recommended differently she. See than Ward in- were treated that bias claimed at trial Ms. Kramer Co., 111 Paper Products the administra- v. Procter & Gamble hearing, fected 560-61(8th She misrepresentations and F.3d material tors “made dispa alleged their recommenda- presenting probationary but omissions board,” supra at male of tenured teachers. tion to the rate treatment decision. not poisoned say, teachers are these errors tenured Needless Principal Apple and Su- probationary contends that similarly teachers. situated to misrepresented to 79-828(4), perintendent Broadbent §§ See Neb.Rev.Stat. perfor- hеr the contents of (1996). Further, allega the school many specific her testimony to which mance evaluations. re unequivocally completely and tions were that, when Mr. in fact indicates she refers administrators, trial, at where futed Broadbent recommended members, themselves all and the teachers Ms. Kram- letter to a nonrenewal board send in fact teachers had that the male testified er, that the board members not requested he disciplined misconduct over been hearing until a evaluations review her they had not. Ms. Kramer claimed , presented at held, were and the evaluations that Mr. Broad- Kramer also claims Ms. (Tri- presence. hearing in Ms. Kramer’s letter, sup- in her possessed a written bent 996-97.) Ms. Kramer does not al Tr. at by many of the signed tenured port and hearing any at the made effort claim that she pres- did not Stapleton, which he teachers misrepresentations any alleged to correct initially Broadbent the board. Mr. ent to board, any expose or to made to the school passing recall that he could not testified unfair, treatment. She most gender-based (Trial 655); but then testified letter on Tr. at to the school board certainly did not indicate (Id. at to the board. that he did submit it had inten- that either administrators 888-89.) testified that Mr. her record tionally about misled (Id. presented to the board. at letter was It strains of a bias women. 869.) if nеither of the administrators Even that, credulity breaking point to believe to its had the letter Ms. submitted long course adversarial over the rep- Kramer was counsel, represented by Ms. Kram- and while called as witnesses by counsel. She resented not what she believed challenge er would many of the teachers who on her behalf supervisor, false statements made letter, herself signed and she had charge the statements or make have copy If the board did not of it. any gender bias. in fact bottomed on part of all the consider as evidence letter to case, not themselves do indi- the evaluations employment when it regarding Ms. Kramer’s bias, legitimate, non- gender cate but contain deliberate, the reason is Ms. retired renewing Ms. discriminatory for not reasons proffer of negligence. Her Kramer’s own very prof- Kramer’s contract —the support letter regarding the does considered these fered at trial. The board gender discrimina- permit an inference This evi- making its decision. evaluations Stapleton school board. tion require to make a credibili- does not us dence importantly, it does ty More determination. testified at board members trial The school board was raise an inference no indication that Ms. hidden, undisclosed, by any influenced them, their consideration gender bias underlying bias uncomplained about record. Mem- reviewing employment superinten- principal testified, noth- “There was David Jones ber dent. up innuendo or ing brought sexual *9 April.” discrimination that her evaluations Ms. Kramer asserts 683.) asked, (Trial you “Did Tr. at When they supervisor’s her bias reflected [gender at that hear- anything bias] like hear criticisms for misconduct contained 1993?” member Linda ing April 28th of teachers did not re- similarly situated male (Trial “No, none of it.” Licking responded, dispa- However, through to show bias ceive. 978.) Still, Kramer insists that Tr. at Ms. treatment, demon- Kramer must rate Ms. (which joined keep- she hidden bias similarly male teachers some situated strate that jury’s to very that used review similar to bringing it to the board’s by not ing hidden Dist., County v. York Sch. attention) would verdict. See Cox board. She infected the 138, (1997); 142-43 that, hearing, and 560 N.W.2d despite the 252 Neb. have us believe wit- School Dist. of her own Boss Fillmore despite presentation (1997). board, Neb. 559 N.W.2d nesses to lim- appeal would have been stamped” the Her state court recommenda- simply “rubber record made before the school All evidence ited to the her contract. tion not to renew id., course, which, this, jury’s because she com- inference presented belies it, complain to about contained pletely failed contrary is unreasonable. play. discrimination at not a whiff sex evidence, the board taking hours of After pro- with two into executive session retired rеcord, I thorough review of the After a them, to Ms. one retain posed before motions that the board’s review was find no evidence her, Kramer; six rea- with one to terminate it perfunctory proforma, but rather either deci- of the termination sons listed review, thorough conducted inde was a sion, retiring not unlike a a situation con pendently school board members elected consider and special verdict forms to with statutory duty scientiously discharging their evidence, the Upon review of the complete. them, adjudicate issue set before They unanimously voted terminate. view, my In no taint of bias. simply adopt proposed termi- did not adjudicatory hearing admittеdly and fair full motion, however. Their review of nation possessed by independent fact-finders who pro- two of the evidence led them strike one) (let alone a sex-based personal bias Kram- Ms. posed for termination. opportunity to hear all and who had sides very pointed out the evi- er’s trial counsel issues, served to break of the termination did not demonstrates the board dence which alleged any causal between connection He “rubber-stamp” the recommendation. top of the two underlying bias sex-based member Jones cross-exami- asked board Here, final decision. and the administrators nation, [sic] lines were stricken “And those no evidence of “rubber because there was resolution, lis- after the board discussed pawing.” can be no “cat’s stamping” there and decided how to the evidence tened unequivocally in this case “The evidence ' matter, correct?” Answer: this decide independent board made an shows that the 694.) (Trial this Tr. at “On “That’s correct.” should [Kramer] as to whether determination record, inference that merely as a did not serve terminated and gender] wholly [plaintiffs acted administra desires of school conduit for the Lacks, 147 F.3d at 726. unreasonable.” paw theory ‘cat’s must tors. [Kramer’s] Lacks, 147 F.3d at 725. Our fail.” therefore ap permits Ms. Kramer law Nebraska in Lacks demands that precedent recеnt to state district peal the board’s decision view, my jury’s “the verdict. set aside 79-833; § court. Neb.Rev.Stat. Schaf by the hearing given [Kramer] exhaustive County Sch. Dist. v. Lancaster fert anyone no room for reason ‍​​‌​​​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‍board leave[s] (1998). 581 N.W.2d Neb.App. ably [Kramer] [termi to conclude view, Instead, my to do so. elected not [gender].” Id. at 726. because of nated] sandbagged not reveal having the board respectfully I dissent. ing at the nonrenewal to the board Superintendent’s recom her belief actually to terminate her was

mendation sex, proceeded to then based on by filing this Title VII blindside believe Lest the reader in federal court. suit comparing the my analogy, role hearing to that at Ms. Kramer’s school board stretched, under jury, is Nebraska of a have decision would termination a deferential standard reviewed under been

Case Details

Case Name: Deborah Kramer v. Logan County School District No. R-1, A/K/A Stapleton Public Schools
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Date Published: Nov 18, 1998
Citation: 157 F.3d 620
Docket Number: 97-3132
Court Abbreviation: 8th Cir.
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