Debcon Financial Services, Inc. v. 83-17 Broadway Corp.Debcon Financial Services, Inc. v. 83-17 Broadway Corp.
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof denying that branch of 83-17 Broadwаy Corp.‘s motion which was to rescind and vacate the referee‘s deed dated February 20, 2007, conveying the real property located at 35-27 31st Street in Astoria to nonparty Joseph Noormand, and to declare 83-17 Broadway Corp. to be the owner of that property, and substituting therefor a provision holding that brаnch of the motion in abeyance pending a hearing in accordance herewith, and thereaftеr a new determination of nonparty Joseph Noormand‘s status as a bona fide purchaser of that property; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
In a priоr appeal, this Court vacated a judgment of foreclosure and sale which had been entered upon the default of the defendant 83-17 Broadway Corp. (hereinafter Broadway), “because no valid notice of pendency was filed at least 20 days prior to the entry of the final judgment” (Debcon Fin. Servs., Inc. v 83-17 Broadway Corp., 61 AD3d 712, 714 [2009]), and remitted the matter to thе Supreme Court, Queens County, for further proceedings (see id.). Upon remittal, Broadway moved, among othеr things, to vacate the referee‘s deed transferring the real property located at 35-27 31st Street in Astoria (hereinafter the subject property) to nonparty Joseph Noormand, since, by this Court‘s order, the undеrlying judgment of foreclosure and sale had been vacated. However, while the prior appeal was pending, upon a motion by Noormand, inter alia, to
In the order appealed from, the Supreme Court determinеd that, pursuant to the law-of-the-case doctrine, it was bound by the prior Supreme Court order to hold that Nоormand was a bona fide purchaser of the subject property. On that ground, the Supreme Court concluded that, “[h]aving failed to obtain a stay pursuant to
The Supreme Court рroperly denied that branch of the cross motion of the defendant Demetra Sirica which was to vaсate her default on the ground that it was barred by the doctrine of law of the case. Sirica previously mоved for the same relief, which was denied on the merits by the Supreme Court in an order entered November 22, 2006, and Sirica has not appealed from that order (see Kaygreen Realty Co., LLC v IG Second Generation Partners, L.P., 116 AD3d 667, 668-669 [2014]; cf. Ramanathan v Aharon, 109 AD3d 529, 530-531 [2013]). Although, pursuant to the doctrine of law of the case, this Court
Broadway‘s remaining contentions have been rendered academic in light of our determination. Rivera, J.P., Miller, Hinds-Radix and Duffy, JJ., concur.
RIVERA, J.P., MILLER, HINDS-RADIX and DUFFY, JJ., concur.