OPINION
{1} Rosarita Gutierrez, Hilbert Gutierrez, and Delora Gutierrez (collectively referred to as Defendants), appeal the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Henry Deaton (Plaintiff), in his suit to quiet title. We affirm the order of summary judgment.
BACKGROUND
{2} Plaintiff filed a complaint on July 30, 1997, seeking to quiet title to several tracts of land located in Sandia Park in Bernalillo County, which are identified as Tracts 1, 4, and 5 of Small Holding Claim (SHC) 2994.
{3} This land was conveyed to Plaintiff by Jose Sanchez, an heir of Meliton Espinoza, along with some additional land, via a quitclaim deed executed on January 30, 1990. Meliton Espinoza had applied for a patent to these lands in 1894, which was rejected in 1911. Following the rejection, the General Land Office requested a resurvey of the lands to eliminate small holding claims and show the lands as public lands. Tract 3 was resurveyed, but the remaining Tracts, 1, 2, 4, and 5 remained intact and unpatented. In 1973, in response to a letter from an attorney investigating the situation, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) examined the case file and reached the determination that the claim had been rejected in error. The BLM informed the attorney of the situation and of the actions necessary to ensure patent would issue. However, patent did not issue from the United States to the heirs of Espinoza until December 18, 1990. Prior to patent issuing in 1990, notice was published in the local paper, stating that protests from any adverse claimants or from individuals who knew of any substantial reason why patent should not issue, would be accepted. No protests were filed.
{4} Defendants Hilbert and Delora Gutierrez did, however, answer Plaintiffs complaint to quiet title, in which they argued that they had title through either fee simple ownership or adverse possession. In an amended answer, they later added the theory of acquiescence. They also asserted the affirmative defenses of failure to state a claim, laches, unclean hands, and estoppel, and they filed counterclaims, asking that title be quieted in them and alleging fraud, abuse of process, slander of title, prima facie tort, and negligence.
{5} Defendant Rosarita Gutierrez answered separately, asking to quiet title to the property in her favor and claiming, as affirmative defenses, failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, laches, unclean hands, and estoppel. She also alleged abuse of process by Plaintiff. Her quiet title counterclaim was based on her apparent misconception that the property at issue included SHC 3001, which she owned by virtue of a federal patent. When Rosarita Gutierrez realized that the land at issue was not SHC 3001, but rather SHC 2994, she amended her answer. The amended answer deleted the portion of her answer relying on her patent for SHC 3001, and instead relied upon adverse possession and acquiescence as bases for ownership. Rosarita Gutierrez has lived on a portion of this land since 1931. She traces her claim to tracts 4 and 5 of SHC 2994 to deeds which her husband, Jesus Gutierrez, obtained from Epifanio Garcia in 1934 and 1950. In 1977, Rosarita and Jesus Gutierrez conveyed to Hilbert Gutierrez and his son, by warranty deed, tract 4 of SHC 2994. In 1991, this land was placed in Hilbert and his wife Delora’s name. Hilbert and Delora claim title in fee simple through the 1977 deed. Defendants do not claim to be able to show any chain of title to the government.
{6} Defendants also filed a cross-claim against the estate of Meliton Espinoza, as a third-party defendant, to quiet title to the disputed lands and to assert ownership by adverse possession. The trial court issued a default judgment against the estate of Meliton Espinoza and quieted title against the estate of Espinoza, in favor of Defendants.
{7} During the course of litigation, Defendants moved for summary judgment more than once, which motions were denied by the trial court. In denying summary judgment, the trial court determined that, as a matter of law, “adverse possession cannot be initiated before the issuance of a patent.” Defendants petitioned this Court for interlocutory review of this ruling, and this petition was denied.
{8} Relying on the trial court’s determination that adverse possession cannot be initiated before the issuance of a patent, Plaintiff filed motions for summary judgment against Defendants. Plaintiff argued that any claims made by Defendants of having acquired title to the lands by adverse possession were without merit as the statutory period of ten years could not have begun prior to December 1990. He argued that because the remaining claims all required a claim to title, those claims should also be dismissed. In support of his motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff submitted the 1990 patent demonstrating that the United States had not released the land at issue until 1990. The trial court granted Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment in its entirety. The trial court determined that the issuance of the patent in 1990 was dispositive because the government held title to the land until the patent issued, and the government’s ownership of the property negated Defendants’ claims to title.
{9} Defendants moved for reconsideration of the grants of summary judgment, filing nearly 100 pages of documentation, most of which were not previously filed. The trial court refused to consider the additional materials and denied the motion for reconsideration. To the extent that Defendants argue that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider the materials, and in denying the motion, we disagree. In In re Estate of Keeney
{10} Furthermore, to the extent that Defendants argue that the trial court erred in denying the motion because the court did not have “good reason” to deny the motion, we disagree. See Laffoon v. Galles Motor Co.,
{11} Finally, we do not specifically act on Plaintiffs motion to strike portions of the reply brief. The motion requests that we not consider arguments made in the reply brief in reliance on the additional materials. Although Plaintiff appropriately filed the motion because there were no subsequent briefs he was entitled to file, our refusal to consider the improper material makes it unnecessary for us to specifically act on the motion. Cf. In re Aaron L.,
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
{12} “Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Self v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
Legal Status of SHC 2991 Prior To Issuance of Patent
{13} We first address whether the trial court was correct in its conclusion that the government held title to the land until the patent issued. Defendants contend that the land at issue was private land prior to issuance of the patent. This contention, and much of Defendants’ arguments, appear to be premised on then* misapprehension that the Espinoza patent was adjudicated by the Court of Private Land Claims, and that accordingly it was private, not government, land prior to the issuance of the patent.
{14} Espinoza’s patent was issued pursuant to §§ 16 and 17 of the Court of Private Land Claims Act of March 3, 1891 (the Act), which provides for issuance of patents based on adverse possession. 51 Cong. Ch. 539 (1891) (formerly codified at 26 Stat. 854). The patent was not issued pursuant to §§ 1 through 8, which concern private land, and the government’s release of any claim thereto, as Defendants argue. Section 17 specifically addresses adverse possession by individuals whose ancestors, grantors, or lawful successors became citizens of the United States by reason of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Id. § 17. The land in this case was ceded to the United States after the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Sections 16 and 17 were exceptions to the general jurisdiction of the Court of Private Land Claims. Id. § 18 (stating that claims arising under §§16 and 17 shall not be adjudicated by the court created by this act). The patent to Espinoza was considered by and eventually issued by the Bureau of Land Management. Until that time, title to the land remained in the United States. See Ainsa v. New Mexico & A.R. Co.,
{15} Whether the land was public or private is critical as one can not adversely possess government property. See Christmas v. Cowden,
{16} Nor can one obtain government property through acquiescence. See Stone v. Rhodes,
{17} Furthermore, any claim by Defendants of fee simple title cannot stand, as á deed from a private individual conveying land owned by the United States is clearly ineffectual. In re Estate of Duncan v. Kinsolving,
Adverse Possession Through the Doctrine of Relation Back
{18} Defendants argue that, even if legal title rested with the United States, when a patent issues from the United States, the patent relates back to the date of entry on the land allowing, through a legal fiction, adverse possession to commence from that earlier time. The doctrine of relation back is a “principle by which an act done at one time is considered by a fiction of law to have been done at some antecedent period.” Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. ( 13 Wall.) 92, 100-01,
{19} New Mexico has determined that adverse possession of public lands cannot begin until issuance of a patent therefor. See Christmas,
the doctrine of relation is a fiction of law adopted by the courts solely for the purposes of justice, and is only applied for the security and protection of persons who stand in some privity mth the party that initiated proceedings for the land, and acquired the equitable claim or right to the title. The defendants in this case were strangers to that party and to his equitable claim, or equitable title, as it is termed, not connecting themselves with it by any valid transfer from the original or any subsequent holder. The statute of limitations of Missouri did not operate to convey that claim or equitable title to them.
Id. at 101-02 (footnote omitted and emphasis added).
{20} The cases relied upon by Defendants for the proposition that New Mexico has held that patents relate back to the date of entry comport with the view, as expressed in Gibson, that the doctrine of relation back exists to protect the interests of the party who ultimately receives a patent from the United States Government. In Stoneroad v. Beck,
{21} To the extent that Defendants rely on James Barlow Family Ltd. Partnership v. David M. Munson, Inc.,
{22} We accordingly find that the trial court correctly ruled that the statutory period for adverse possession could not begin to run until the patent issued.
Defendants’ Tort Claims
{23} As we have determined that Defendants have no claim to title to the disputed property, we agree with Plaintiffs contention that Defendants have no standing to maintain them claims for fraud, abuse of process, slander of title, prima facie tort, and negligence. “To acquire standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of (1) an injury in fact, (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Forest Guardians v. Powell,
Laches, Unclean Hands, and Estoppel
{24} Defendants also argue that summary judgment should have been denied based on the affirmative defenses of laches and unclean hands. However, these are affirmative defenses, not counterclaims. See Rule 1-008(C) NMRA 2003. In an action to quiet title, “before the effects of the affirmative defenses need be considered, appellants first had to establish their right to the relief they sought, absent these defenses.” Morris v. Merchant,
{25} Defendants have failed to explain, and we do not see, how in the absence of Defendants’ ability to establish their right to the relief they sought (title), these affirmative defenses apply to the case at hand. Cf. State v. Neswood,
{26} With regard to the affirmative defense of estoppel, Defendants make no argument on appeal, and we accordingly deem it abandoned. See In re Doe,
Plaintiffs Prima Facie Case for Summary Judgment
{27} To the extent that Defendants argue on appeal that Plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment, we disagree. See Bartlett v. Mirabal,
{28} Once the movant has made a prima facie showing that the movant is entitled to summary judgment, “the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to demonstrate the existence of specific evidentiary facts which would require trial on the merits.” Roth v. Thompson,
Defendants’ Procedural Arguments
{29} Defendants also raise two procedural arguments. They argue both that Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment did not comply with Rule 1-056 because Plaintiff did not rely on supporting affidavits and that Plaintiffs motion was untimely. Rule 1-056 does not require the movant to attach affidavits. See Rule 1-056(A) (stating that “[a] party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof’) (emphasis added). As noted above, Plaintiffs submission of the 1990 patent as evidence that the land was public land until 1990, together with the deed to him that was part of the court file, satisfied Plaintiffs burden of making a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment against Defendants, in light of the specific arguments advanced in his motion.
{30} Defendants also argue that it was error for the trial court to consider Plaintiffs motions because they were untimely filed. The motions were filed approximately one month prior to trial. Our rules require only that motions for summary judgment be “filed within a reasonable time prior to the date of trial to allow sufficient time for the opposing party to file a response and affidavits, depositions or other documentary evidence and to permit the court reasonable time to dispose of the motion.” Rule 1-056(D)(1). It is clear from the record that there was sufficient time for Defendants, not only to respond, but also for Plaintiff to reply and for the court to hold a hearing on the motions. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in hearing the motions. Furthermore, Defendants make no showing of prejudice. “In the absence of prejudice, there is no reversible error.” State v. Fernandez,
Statements Regarding Settlement
{31} Defendants contend that they suffered prejudice by virtue of Plaintiff inappropriately referring to settlement offers during the summary judgment hearing. Plaintiff specifically stated that “[P]laintiff has offered some reasonable and viable solutions to those encroachments.” With regard to Defendants’ allegation of' prejudice, we note that, “[a]n assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice,” and “[i]n the absence of prejudice, there is no reversible error.” In re Ernesto M., Jr.,
Default Judgment Against Estate of Espinoza
{32} Defendants filed cross-claims against the estate of Meliton Espinoza to quiet title in the disputed lands. The trial court granted a default judgment and quieted title in the disputed lands against the estate and heirs of Meliton Espinoza and in favor of Defendants. Defendants, on appeal, assert that quieting title against the persons through whom Plaintiff claims title precludes Plaintiffs quiet title action against Defendants. We find that Defendants failed to preserve this argument below. Although Defendants made reference below to their entitlement to a default judgment against the estate and heirs of Meliton Espinoza, Defendants did not argue that the default judgment would also preclude judgment in favor of Plaintiff. “To preserve an issue for review on appeal, it must appear that appellant fairly invoked a ruling of the trial court on the same grounds argued in the appellate court.” Woolwine v. Furr’s, Inc.,
CONCLUSION
{33} We affirm the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff on his action to quiet title, in its entirety.
{34} IT IS SO ORDERED.