3:06-cv-02058 | D.S.C. | Sep 5, 2008
3:06-cv-02058-GRA Date Filed 09/05/08 Entry Number 42 Page 1 of 30
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION
Kenneth G. Deas, )
) C/A No. 3:06-cv-2058-GRA
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) ORDER
) (Written Opinion)
1
Michael J. Astrue , Commissioner of )
Social Security, )
)
Defendant. )
____________________________________)
This matter is before the Court to issue a final order on the magistrate’s Report
and Recommendation made in accordance with Local Rule 73.02, D.S.C. issued on
August 13, 2008. Plaintiff brought this action on July 18, 2006, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying the plaintiff’s claim for Disability Insurance
Benefits (“DIB”). On November 20, 2006, the Commissioner filed a motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff filed a response on November 21, 2006. The Court denied the motion to
dismiss on April 27, 2007 and ordered that the case proceed on the merits. The
magistrate judge recommended affirming the decision of the commissioner. For the
1
Michael J. Astrue became the Commissioner of Social Security on February
12, 2007. Therefore, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d)(1), Michael J. Astrue will
be substituted for Defendant JoAnne B. Barnhart from this point forward.
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reasons stated herein, the Court declines to adopt the magistrate’s Report and
Recommendation.
BACKGROUND
On March 4, 2002, the plaintiff filed for DIB alleging seizures, prostate
problems, and hemorrhoids commencing on November 20, 2000. His application was
denied initially and on reconsideration, and he requested a hearing before an
administrative law judge (“ALJ”). The plaintiff, the plaintiff’s sister, and vocational
expert (“VE”) testified at the hearing on November 19, 2003. The ALJ issued an
opinion on March 22, 2004 denying benefits. The plaintiff appealed to the Appeals
Council on March 31, 2004. The Appeals Council denied the request for review and
the ALJ’s decision became the “final decision” of the Commissioner for purposes of
judicial review. The plaintiff filed in federal court on July 18, 2006. After the Court
denied the motion to dismiss based on the defendant’s unsuccessful argument of an
untimely appeal, the case proceeded on the merits.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The magistrate makes only a recommendation to this Court. The
recommendation has no presumptive weight, and responsibility for making a final
determination remains with the Court. Matthews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261" date_filed="1976-01-14" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Mathews v. Weber">423 U.S. 261, 270-71
(1976). This Court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions
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of the Report and Recommendation to which specific objection is made, and this Court
may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendation
made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). This Court may also “receive
further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate with instructions.” Id. In
the absence of specific objections to the Report and Recommendation this Court is not
required to give any explanation for adopting the recommendation. Plaintiff timely filed
objections to the magistrate’s Report and Recommendation on August 15, 2008.
The role of the federal judiciary in the administrative scheme established by the
Social Security Act is a limited one. Section 205(g) of the Act provides: "The findings
of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "Substantial evidence has been defined
innumerable times as more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance." Thomas
v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541" date_filed="1964-04-15" court="4th Cir." case_name="Clistie Bell Thomas v. Anthony J. Celebrezze, Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare">331 F.2d 541, 543 (4th Cir. 1964). This standard precludes a de novo
review of the factual circumstances that substitutes the court's findings for those of
the Commissioner. Vitek v. Finch, 438 F.2d 1157" date_filed="1971-03-02" court="4th Cir." case_name="William B. Vitek v. Robert H. Finch, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare">438 F.2d 1157, 1157 (4th Cir. 1971). The court
must uphold the Commissioner's decision as long as it is supported by substantial
evidence. Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773" date_filed="1972-08-28" court="4th Cir." case_name="Rachel R. Blalock v. Elliot L. Richardson, Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare">483 F.2d 773, 775 (4th Cir. 1972). "From this it
does not follow, however, that the findings of the administrative agency are to be
mechanically accepted. The statutorily granted right of review contemplates more
than an uncritical rubber stamping of the administrative action." Flack v. Cohen, 413
F.2d 278, 279 (4th Cir. 1969). "[T]he courts must not abdicate their responsibility
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to give careful scrutiny to the whole record to assure that there is a sound foundation
for the Secretary's findings, and that his conclusion is rational." Vitek, 438 F.2d at
1157-58.
The Commissioner's denial of benefits shall be reversed only if no reasonable
mind could accept the record as adequate to support that determination. Richardson
v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389" date_filed="1971-05-03" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Richardson v. Perales">402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). The Commissioner's findings of fact are not
binding, however, if they were based upon the application of an improper legal
standard. Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514" date_filed="1987-09-23" court="4th Cir." case_name="19 Soc.Sec.Rep.Ser. 73 v. Otis Bowen">829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. Deas was fifty three years old on the date of the ALJ’s decision. (Tr.31).
He has a high school education and prior work history as a laborer. (Tr. 51, 56).
In 1990, the plaintiff was hospitalized for several days for treatment of a
reactive psychosis and seizure disorder. (Tr. 189-192). The attending neurologist at
the time noted that “with proper rest, nutrition, and compliance with medication, [the
plaintiff] ha[d] good control of his epilepsy.” (Tr. 191). The reports at that time
indicated that he was frequently not compliant with the drugs. He was living alone at
this time and had a psychiatric condition. However, when his daughter lived with him,
he was compliant with his medication. The psychotic behavior resolved over the
hospital stay and the doctor thought it was likely due to the seizure disorder. The
doctor noted only “marginal control” of the disorder. (Tr. 191-192).
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South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) Health Services records
indicate that the plaintiff was incarcerated from approximately December 2000 to
February 2002. (Tr. 201-79). While the plaintiff was incarcerated, he was restricted
from climbing, food service work, work with chemicals or irritants, work at extreme
heights, and work around machines with moving parts because of his seizure disorder.
(Tr. 234-35).
According to SCDC medical records, the plaintiff reported having seizures on
January 2 and 19, 2001. Lt. Miller took the plaintiff to medical on January 2, 2001
after the reported seizure. (Tr. 229). The plaintiff reported compliance with
medication on that date and immediately after the seizure he was combative and
disoriented but as time passed, he was able to sleep quietly. (Tr. 229). On February
12, 2001, the plaintiff reported no seizure activity and compliance with his seizure
medication. He denied any seizure activity since October 30, 2000 to the physician
on that date. (Tr. 226-29)
On March 23, 2001, the plaintiff reported another seizure. After the seizure
was over, he reported that he wanted to be left alone and wanted to sleep. He stated
he was taking his Dilantin as required. The plaintiff’s roommate saw the seizure and
stated it lasted two to three minutes. (Tr. 224). On March 26, 2001, his labs
reported a toxic level of Dilantin. (Tr. 223). Again on March 30, 2001, the plaintiff’s
roommate called emergency medical as his roommate was having a seizure. Records
state that he was not having a seizure on arrival but was “unresponsive to verbal
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stimuli” and was combative when they attempted to move him to medical. (Tr. 223).
When moved to medical, the plaintiff was “sleeping deeply, very unresponsive,
combative.” (Tr. 222). After the seizure, his Dilantin level was checked and was at
a level of 12.9. (Tr. 222). The doctor stated that it was below normal; however, later
evidence shows that the actual acceptable therapeutic levels are between ten and
twenty. (Addtl. Evid. 5).
On April 15, 2001, the plaintiff reported another seizure. Upon the medical
staff’s arrival, the plaintiff was standing up urinating, then laid back on the bed and
began grinding his teeth. He covered his head and refused to answer questions. (Tr.
220).
Again on May 20, 2001, the medical records indicate more seizure activity.
Upon arrival to the dorm, the medical staff noted that the plaintiff was grinding his
teeth, lying on the bed with his hands over his head and non-responsive to
questioning. When the staff placed ammonia under his nose, he rubbed his nose. The
staff did not see the seizure and put in the medical records “no seizure activity noted;”
however, he remained in medical for the evening. (Tr. 218).
Plaintiff’s roommate called emergency medical on June 6, 2001 stating that the
plaintiff was having another seizure, but was fine now. He was not in distress. (Tr.
217). June 7, 2001, the plaintiff reported two seizures to which his roommate
witnessed. Upon arrival, the medical staff witnessed the plaintiff sleeping. (Tr. 216).
Officer Sessions called medical on June 25, 2001 after plaintiff reported another
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seizure. (Tr. 216). Medical records from July 19, 2001 report compliance with
Dilantin and additional seizures on June 19 and 20, 2001. (Tr. 215). July 20, 2001
reports another seizure with the plaintiff’s roommate witnessing the event. The
roommate told medical that he likes to sleep after a seizure. He was unresponsive to
medical staff. (Tr.215).
SCDC records report another seizure on August 1, 200. Plaintiff had a blank
stare and rested for ten minutes before he would allow medical staff to transport him
to medical. The plaintiff reported that he was compliant with his medication and
responded to his name but could not recall his department of corrections number or
his room number. (Tr. 213-214). He stated that the electricity, stress of noise, and
food causes his seizures. (Tr. 212).
Medical records again noted compliance with medication on September 5, 2001,
October 8, 2001, and January 30, 2002. (Tr. 211, 212, 205). On November 4,
2001, the plaintiff has another seizure reported on his medical records. The plaintiff’s
roommate witnessed the seizure and stated that he was foaming at the mouth earlier.
The plaintiff was sleeping when help arrived and initially refused to go to medical. He
was more alert and responsive about twenty minutes in medical. (Tr. 209).
On November 30, 2001, the plaintiff was taken to medical on a stretcher after
a seizure. (Tr. 208). Seizures were reported on December 7 and 8, 2001 and January
1, 2002 with the same disorientation, blank stare, sleepiness, and refusal to go to
medical. (Tr. 207, 206).
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The SCDC drug administration records include a single notation on January 19,
2002 of the plaintiff refusing the Dilantin. (Tr. 244). February 2, 2002, the plaintiff
reported that he did not have his Dilantin and that he would need it later that night.
(Tr. 205). All the lab records testing the plaintiff’s level of Dilantin were either within
the acceptable range or too high. (Tr. 254, 256, 261, 262, 263, 266, 267).
The medical records from the Free Medical Clinic indicate that the plaintiff lost
control over the seizure disorder in 1999. (Tr. 200). On March 3, 2002, the plaintiff
went to the clinic for more Dilantin. On this day, the doctor noted that the plaintiff
reported having about four seizures a month. The doctor refilled the medication and
referred him to a neurologist. He stated that the seizure disordered was uncontrolled.
(Tr.139, 200). The plaintiff’s blood pressure was well controlled on medication. (Tr.
200). The records still indicate that he has continued problems with his prostate. (Tr.
198). On June 13, 2002 the plaintiff again reported about two to three seizures a
month for the last three to four years. On July 25, 2002 the plaintiff went to the free
clinic after a seizure which resulted in falling on his face. The nurse noted “some
discoloration still present.” The plaintiff’s Dilantin level on that day was 20.4.
(Tr.197). On September 12, 2002, the plaintiff again reported a seizure to the Medical
Clinic. (Tr. 196). January 22, 2003, the plaintiff reported a “bad seizure” to the
Medical Clinic. The seizure resulted in a fall with significant shoulder pain. (Tr. 195).
March 23, 2003 reports another seizure in the Medical Clinic records. This seizure
resulted in a frontal sinus fracture which the Clinic stated would require surgical repair.
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(Tr.194). Dilantin level was 9.3 on this date, slightly below therapeutic range but
plaintiff was also on additional seizure medications on the date the test was
administered. The doctor increased his dosage of Dilantin that day. (Tr. 193).
On April 16, 2002, state examiner Dr. William E. Gause, Jr. evaluated the
plaintiff. The plaintiff reported to Dr. Gause a extensive history of a seizure disorder
with approximately one seizure a week. He stated that his last seizure was on
February 16, 2002. Dr. Gause noted that the plaintiff had trouble giving a concise
history of his condition and most likely could not give him a proper history. He
reported a history of prostate infection, hypertension, and depression. Dr. Gause
stated that he would be capable of managing his monthly benefits. (Tr. 128-9).
Psychiatrist Thomas V. Martin examined the plaintiff on April 23, 2002. He
reported that “he had not been right since his wife left him” and was admitted to
hospital care for a psychiatric condition after she left. He was anxious and apologetic
for his forgetfulness. Dr. Martin also reported that he as a poor historian due to
forgetfulness and difficulties with concentration. The doctor stated that he met the
diagnostic criteria for a depressive disorder. The plaintiff reported crying spells,
uncontrolled grand mal seizures, prostatitis and hypertension. He noted he did not
abuse alcohol but did in the past. At the examination, the plaintiff stated that he
occasionally cooks but his sister did most of the cooking, cleaning, and laundry. He
occasionally went to church but mostly stayed at home and watched television. Dr.
Martin stated that he would benefit from neuropsychological testing and psychotropic
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medication management. The doctor stated that the memory and concentration
problems may be due to his epileptic disorder. He stated that the plaintiff “needs
further medical management for his epileptic and other medical disorders.” He
diagnosed the plaintiff with depression. He stated the plaintiff “was not competent
to manage his own finances.” (Tr. 132-34).
Dr. Klohn, Jr., also a psychologist, examined the plaintiff regarding the
possibility of obtaining benefits. Plaintiff told Dr. Klohn about his seizure disorder but
stated he could not remember his last seizure but thought it was two weeks before,
that he had hypertension, prostate problems, headaches, and sinus problems. He
reported a prior history of mental health problems. (Tr. 184). He also reported doing
some yard work by cutting the grass and raking leaves. (Tr. 185). During the testing,
the plaintiff fell to the floor and picked himself up. He said he had a seizure. Dr. Klohn
did not witness the incident. (Tr. 185). Dr. Klohn stated that the plaintiff did not have
any adaptive behavior limitations. He could cook and clean house. (Tr. 186). Dr.
Klohn stated that he could manage his money. (Tr. 187).
Dr. McCall opined on December 23, 2002 that the plaintiff had a moderate
impairment and memory problems but was “still able to do simple tasks and could
sustain that pace without special help or supervision for requisite time periods and
sustain that pace for a work-day.” (Tr. 144). Dr. McCall, a psychological consultant,
did not evaluate the effect on his seizure disorder and the memory impairment with the
plaintiff’s ability.
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The plaintiff testified at the hearing that he worked up until 2000 when he was
incarcerated. He stated that after a seizure he has problems from biting his tongue,
weakness, memory loss, and he has to sleep because he is tired. (Tr. 287). He stated
it takes about two to three days to recover from a seizure. He had to surrender his
driver’s license because of the seizure disorder. He has trouble with his memory. (Tr.
288). He cannot deal with stressful situations because it brings on seizures. He
testified that he took his medications regularly. (Tr. 289). He told the ALJ that he
stopped drinking years ago because the alcohol brought on seizures. He said he had
seizures “maybe two or three time a week, as far as I can remember. Or one or two
time a week, as far as I can remember... or maybe every other week or something like
that...”. (Tr. 291). He has minor seizures and grand mal seizures and loses
consciousness with all of them. (Tr. 292). He has no warning that a seizure is about
to occur. (Tr. 293). He has seizures at night as well as during the day. (Tr. 301).
He takes his seizure medication, blood pressure medication, and allergy medication
daily. The Dilantin, used to control seizures, causes drowsiness and weakness. (Tr.
294-95). He receives all medical treatment at the Free Medical Clinic. (Tr. 295). He
reports continued problems with his prostate, hemorrhoids, and that his seizures have
gotten worse with age. (Tr. 297).
The plaintiff stated that he lives with his sister. (Tr. 293). His sister takes care
of him during the day and she works at night. His neighbors check on him when his
sister is at work. (Tr. 298). He stated that he helps with yard work but his sister
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takes care of the cooking and cleaning. (Tr. 299). He occasionally goes to church but
does not hold a position there. His sister makes sure he goes to meet with his parole
officer. (Tr. 300).
Ms. Lang, the plaintiff’s sister also testified. She stated she and her brother
have lived together for thirteen years. (Tr. 307) She stated that his seizure condition
has gotten worse over the years. She stated that he has become more combative over
the years and it is very difficult to restrain him during and after seizures. (Tr. 303).
She stated that stress makes the seizures worse. She was living with him when he
went to the mental hospital; he was there for paranoia and fearing people. It caused
him to fight people. (Tr.304).
Ms. Lang stated that if the plaintiff was outside of his routine, that it would
increase seizure activity. She stated that in the work place, supervisors would have
to constantly repeat directions to him, and the intense focusing could cause a seizure
onset. (Tr. 305).
Ms. Lang has observed his seizures on many occasions. She said that the worst
seizures would last about ten minutes. During a seizure she states the plaintiff would
grit his teeth, and when he comes out of it he is combative. She stated that after the
worst seizures, when he comes back to the focusing stage, it would take two to three
days to recover. (Tr. 305). After the small seizures, he would just sit and stare. It
generally takes a day for him to recover from the small seizures, and they would have
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to closely monitor him. Ms. Lang stated that she monitors his medication use and that
he does take it regularly. (Tr. 306).
The plaintiff has a good work history. His sister stated “[t]hat’s something he’s
never avoided, working.” (Tr. 306). She said he would go to work unless he had to
stay home from a seizure. That stay could last anywhere from two to three days or
a week if severe. (Tr. 306). She said that up until 2000 he worked regularly.
Ms. Lang also discussed his concentration problems and short term memory
problems. She also said that he has some anger issues due to “the process of his
mind”. (Tr. 307). He was convicted of assault in 2000. She said that it was her
understanding that he had a seizure, came out of the seizure and a fight came about.
(Tr. 309). He has displayed that behavior at home as well. (Tr. 309). This is the only
account regarding the facts underlying the plaintiff’s incarceration.
She said the plaintiff takes care of himself well. He has to rest to take care of
himself during the two to three day recovery period, but he can walk around and eat.
She keeps him from leaving the house during the recovery period because he has not
come back to “full faculties” to respond to things properly. (Tr. 309). He is not
focused during the recovery time. She says that he has seizures two to three times
a month. (Tr. 310).
A vocational expert (“VE”) testified at the hearing. The VE answered the ALJ’s
hypotheticals. In response to the first hypothetical, the VE stated that a person
reaching advanced age with a high school education and a work background as a
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laborer with a seizure disorder, depressive disorder and high blood pressure would be
able to perform light unskilled work as a packer, assembler, or laundry service jobs of
which approximately 2,000 exist in South Carolina. He stated that those jobs were
low stress jobs in that the employee would work with one to two people and they
were low production. (Tr. 313-14). The ALJ added a concentration limitation to the
hypothetical and the VE stated that the individual would not be employable. (Tr. 315).
The attorney also posed a hypothetical that added a limitation of no production due to
stress. The VE stated that it would also take the plaintiff out the workforce. (Tr.
317).
DISCUSSION
The plaintiff makes three specific arguments in his objections to the Report and
Recommendation regarding the lack of sufficient evidence to uphold the ALJ’s finding
and the ALJ’s failure to properly follow the law and regulations. First, the plaintiff
argues that the ALJ erred in failing to comply with Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-
8p by failing to explain how he came up with his residual functional capacity (“RFC”)
assessment in light of the ALJ’s acknowledgment that the plaintiff had a seizure
disorder. Second, the plaintiff states that the Report and Recommendation is
erroneous in finding non-compliance with seizure medication. Last, the plaintiff alleges
that the ALJ failed to comply with SSR 00-4p by not resolving the conflicts between
the VE’s testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. (Objections of Plaintiff).
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The Court cannot uphold the ALJ’s factual findings and ultimate result because
it is not supported by substantial evidence and was not reached through the
application of correct legal standards. See Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171" date_filed="2001-07-05" court="4th Cir." case_name="Patricia A. Mastro v. Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of Social Security, No">270 F.3d 171 (2001).
Failure to Explain the RFC
The plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to explain the RFC. RFC is a
measurement of the most a claimant can do despite his limitations. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1545(a). According to the Social Security Administration, this is “an assessment
of an individual's ability to do sustained work-related physical and mental activities in
a work setting on a regular and continuing basis.” The regular, continuing basis is the
work week eight hours a day, for five days a week, or an equivalent work schedule.
Id.
The ALJ stated that the claimant has the following RFC: no exertional
limitations, he is unable to work with heights or hazardous machinery, climb, balance
or operate automotive equipment. He is restricted to routine, repetitive tasks in a low-
stress environment. (Tr. 21). With his, the ALJ concluded that the plaintiff could
work as a packer, entry-level assembler, or laundry folder/turner. (Tr. 25). The ALJ
bases this on the fact that he does not find the plaintiff’s testimony credible as he
could cut grass, attend church, and walk without difficulty. The ALJ also states that
the recovery period is not as long as the plaintiff alleges and there is no evidence of
forgotten seizures. The ALJ also stated that the depression gives him a mild limitation
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with daily living and social functioning and moderate limitations with concentration,
persistence or pace and no episodes of decompensation.
According to SSR 96-8p, the ALJ’s RFC assessment must include narrative
discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific
medical and nonmedical evidence. Additionally, the RFC assessment must be based
on all of the relevant evidence in the case record, such as: medical history, medical
signs and laboratory findings, the effects of treatment, including limitations or
restrictions imposed by the mechanics of treatment (e.g., frequency of treatment,
duration, disruption to routine, side effects of medication), reports of daily activities,
lay evidence, recorded observations, medical source statements, evidence from
attempts to work, need for a structured living environment, and work evaluations, if
available. SSR 96-8p (1996). The evidence in the record cannot sustain the ALJ’s
finding regarding the plaintiff’s RFC.
First, the ALJ and magistrate state that the claimant’s assessment regarding the
severity of his disorder is not credible because he stopped working due to his
imprisonment not due to his medical limitations and he can sit without difficulty, walk
without difficulty, mow grass, visit friends and go to church. (Tr. 22). The magistrate
is correct in stating that the ability to work with the condition is evidence to support
a denial of benefits according to Dixon. See Dixon v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 237" date_filed="1990-07-17" court="8th Cir." case_name="Thomas E. DIXON, Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Appellee">905 F.2d 237 (8th Cir.
1990). However, the holding in Dixon is limited to the extent that a claimant who
works with impairments over a period of years without any worsening of the condition
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is not entitled to benefits. The Fourth Circuit case law is also similar. The court held
in Cauthen v. Finch, (426 F.2d 891" date_filed="1970-06-03" court="4th Cir." case_name="Ruby F. Cauthen v. Robert H. Finch, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare">426 F.2d 891 (4th Cir. 1972)) that a claimant was not disabled
when she had eye problems of long standing, worked regularly for many years despite
the problem and evidence showed no significant deterioration. The ALJ and the
magistrate failed to address the worsening of the condition.
In 1990, doctors stated that the seizure disorder would be well controlled with
medication. (Tr. 189-192). However, the prison records, other medical evidence, and
the plaintiff’s and the plaintiff’s sister’s testimony suggest a worsening and loss of
control over the condition before November 2000. The fact that the claimant quit
work due to his incarceration alone is not sufficient to support a finding of non-
disability. When as claimant stops working for reasons unrelated to his medical
condition, it may support a finding that the claimant is not disabled. Cauthen, 426
F.2d at 892. Although the plaintiff was precluded from working due to his
incarceration, the evidence is sufficient to conclude that the condition began to worsen
at the time of incarceration.
The ALJ places significant weight on the plaintiff’s ability to perform the acts
of daily living such as sitting, walking, going to church, and occasionally doing yard
work. However, the Fourth Circuit has held that such activities do not establish the
ability to work on a full time basis. The court in Hines v. Barnhart found that the
ability to attend church, occasionally do repairs such as fixing a doorknob, cutting the
grass, visiting the sick, going out to eat, does not refute disability in certain
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circumstances and does not establish the ability to work full time despite the illness.
Hines, 453 F.3d 559" date_filed="2006-07-11" court="4th Cir." case_name="Jeffery Hines v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security">453 F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 2006). The plaintiff occasionally goes to church and
helps with yard work, but this work is similar to the above referenced case. These
limited activities do not establish the ability to work full time especially with an
uncontrolled seizure disorder. There is no inconsistency between the medical records,
and testimony regarding the plaintiff’s condition and ability to walk, sit, go to church,
or do yard work. The plaintiff has an epileptic disorder, this has no impact on the
ability to sit, walk, talk, or occasionally visit church, friends and do yard work. “An
individual does not have to be totally helpless or bedridden in order to be found
disabled under the Social Security Act.” Totten v. Califano, 624 F.2d 10" date_filed="1980-04-30" court="4th Cir." case_name="Hazel Totten v. Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare">624 F.2d 10 (4th Cir.
1980), (citing Thorne v. Weinberger, 530 F.2d 580" date_filed="1976-01-19" court="4th Cir." case_name="Lucille F. Thorne v. Caspar W. Weinberger, as Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare">530 F.2d 580 (4th Cir. 1976) and Thomas v.
Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541" date_filed="1964-04-15" court="4th Cir." case_name="Clistie Bell Thomas v. Anthony J. Celebrezze, Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare">331 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1964)). The Court finds the weight placed on the
consideration of the plaintiff’s activities error for both the ALJ and the magistrate.
The ALJ also states that the seizure disorder is not as severe as the plaintiff
alleges. The ALJ must make credibility determinations and must explain those
determinations based on the evidence. Hammond v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 424" date_filed="1985-06-24" court="4th Cir." case_name="Peggy R. HAMMOND, Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Appellee">765 F.2d 424, 427 (4th
Cir. 1985). The ALJ bases this opinion on the jail medical records. The jail records
often state that the jail personnel did not see a seizure and thus characterized the
seizure as “alleged.” The magistrate points out that Dr. Klohn listed factitious disorder
and malingering in the plaintiff’s evaluation records to support the finding. However,
these were ruled out as possible diagnoses. (Tr. 187). The magistrate also states that
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the prison records characterize the seizures as “alleged” as the staff did not witness
the seizures and that on some occasions, the plaintiff’s behavior was inconsistent with
have a seizure. The Court finds that the ALJ’s credibility assessment is deficient in
light of the totality of the evidence.
The Court believes that the records characterize the seizures as “alleged” merely
because they were not witnessed by prison staff and that the records state that the
plaintiff was not foaming at the mouth nor had they seen any urine or incontinence.
(See Tr. 209). The plaintiff’s sister and the plaintiff himself have stated that he has
seizures that vary from mild to severe. It is likely that a mild seizure would not
produce the above symptoms. By the time that medical staff reached the plaintiff’s
cell, the seizure event had likely terminated. The plaintiff’s roommate witnessed
seizures on numerous occasions. The plaintiff’s sister stated that the plaintiff has
large and small seizures, and that most severe seizures could last up to ten minutes.
She did not state how long the smaller seizures last. The doctor at the Free Medical
Clinic stated the seizure disorder is uncontrolled. The plaintiff has fallen on numerous
occasions due to the seizures. One seizure actually caused the plaintiff to fall and
break his nose requiring surgical repair. (Tr. 197). The plaintiff’s inconsistent
statements regarding when he had seizures are irrelevant as the inconsistencies may
be explained by the disorder itself. The plaintiff has been found to have a problem with
his memory likely due to the seizure disorder. The plaintiff, Ms. Lang, and numerous
doctors have stated that he has trouble with his memory and has trouble reciting a
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complete medical history. (Tr. 132, 144, 287, 288, 307). These inconsistencies are
explained by the problems with his memory. This finding that the plaintiff’s disorder
is not severe as he alleges is simply not based on substantial evidence. The Court
finds that the severity of the disorder is consistent with the plaintiff’s testimony as
evidenced by the medical records.
The ALJ also states that the plaintiff was not compliant with his drug treatment
regime. According to SSR 82-59, a claimant who does not follow prescribed
treatment measures may be denied benefits. See also, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1530. The
evidence in the record must show that there has been refusal to follow prescribed
treatment in order to sustain a denial. SSR 82-59. The magistrate bases this finding
on the finding that in 1990, the plaintiff had moderate control over his epilepsy and
the statement from the psychiatrist Dr. Martin that the plaintiff “has been seen for a
number of years. . . for a seizure disorder that has been difficult to control, it is unclear
whether or not this is due to breakthrough seizures or due to medication non-
compliance.” (Tr. 132). However, this statement by Dr. Martin was in the plaintiff’s
medical history, and non-compliance was not inquired into during the examination.
The statement was an unanalyzed conclusory statement that this Court finds
unpersuasive.
In this case, the evidence in the record cannot withstand a finding of refusal to
follow treatment. There are two instances in the record suggestive of drug
noncompliance. The first dates back to 1990 when the plaintiff was hospitalized for
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reactive psychosis and a seizure disorder. (Tr. 191-192). At that time, the plaintiff
candidly admitted that he was not compliant with his treatment. This record is dated
and is not persuasive on this Court. All other records show and testimony admits
compliance with the treatment. The second instance is in the drug administration
records from the jail; it notes a single incident of the plaintiff refusing to take his
Dilation on January 19, 2002 in the pill line. (Tr. 244). However, this is the only
notation in the drug records. The remainder of the medical record show compliance
with his drug regimen. All the lab records testing the plaintiff’s level of Dilantin were
either within the acceptable range or too high. (Tr. 254, 256, 261, 262, 263, 266,
267). On one incident, the Dilantin level was toxic. Although the plaintiff did not take
the medication on the pill line, he could have gotten it from another source. There are
many instances where the plaintiff would ask for his Dilantin. On February 2, 2002,
the plaintiff reported that he did not have his Dilantin and would need it later. (Tr.
205). The medical records from the Free Medical Clinic show constant changes in the
dosages of Dilantin because the disorder was uncontrolled. It also states that the
plaintiff came to the clinic to refill his Dilantin and sought other medications to help
control the seizure condition. (Tr. 193-200) These incidents, along with lab records
testing the plaintiff’s Dilantin levels strongly suggests that the he was compliant with
his drug regimen. In addition, the records show that the plaintiff requested Dilantin
when he knew he would need it. Two instances of non-compliance in the entirety of
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the medical records, with one instance being over ten years old cannot sustain a
finding of non-compliance with medical treatment.
The ALJ also bases his decision partly on the fact that no doctor has opined that
the plaintiff is unable to work. The ALJ and magistrate failed to address the fact that
SCDC placed the plaintiff on work restrictions. (Tr. 234-235). In addition, the ALJ
failed to consider the nature of the plaintiff’s medical care. The plaintiff is seen
primarily at the Free Medical Clinic to monitor his medication and seizure disorder and
to obtain medication refills. He has consistently stated that he cannot afford medical
treatment thus his need to receive care at the Free Clinic. Although the treatment was
not inadequate, it is generally known that the nature of care at free clinics is adequate
but minimalistic due to the limitation of resources. A claimant may not be penalized
for failing to seek treatment he cannot afford; “it files in the face of the patent
purposes of the Social Security Act to deny benefits to someone because he is too
poor to obtain medical treatment that may help him.” Lovejoy v. Heckler, 790 F.2d
1114, 1117 (4th Cir. 1984). Although this speaks towards obtaining treatment for
the ailments a claimant alleges, this Court finds it persuasive in the situation of a
failure to obtain an opinion that a claimant is unable to work. The plaintiff’s primary
care physician at the Free Clinic stated the disorder was uncontrolled. (Tr. 200). The
plaintiff sought treatment to control the disorder, not an opinion that he was unable
to work. The ALJ may not place significant weight on the inexistence of a medical
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opinion stating he was unable to work due to his inability to obtain other medical
treatment or opinions and the limited resources available at the free clinic.
It is apparent from the record that the ALJ sifted through the record to find
evidence to support a denial of benefits for the plaintiff. “An ALJ may not select and
discuss only that evidence that favors his ultimate conclusion.” Hines v. Barnhart,
453 F.3d 559" date_filed="2006-07-11" court="4th Cir." case_name="Jeffery Hines v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security">453 F.3d 559, 566 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300" date_filed="1995-05-24" court="7th Cir." case_name="Julian DIAZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shirley S. CHATER, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee">55 F.3d 300, 307 (7th Cir.
1995)). The ALJ ignored the medical evidence from the Free Medical Clinic and the
Department of Corrections regarding the constant therapeutic levels of Dilantin in the
plaintiff’s system. The ALJ does not discuss the fact that the plaintiff sought medical
treatment and refills for Dilantin nor the fact that the drug combinations and dosages
were constantly being altered by the plaintiff’s treating physician. Additionally, the
ALJ ignores the fact that the plaintiff’s treating physician stated that the disorder was
uncontrolled. (Tr. 200). The Fourth Circuit requires that the opinion of a claimant’s
treating physician be given great weight and disregarded only if there is persuasive
contradictory evidence. Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585" date_filed="1996-02-23" court="4th Cir." case_name="Ronda S. CRAIG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shirley S. CHATER, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee">76 F.3d 585 (4th Cir. 1987). There is no
such contradictory evidence here, and the ALJ committed error in not discussing the
treating physician’s statements.
The ALJ also erred in not discussing the plaintiff’s intermittent incapacity. In
assessing the RFC, the ALJ must discuss the individual’s ability to perform work on
a regular and continuing basis. SSR 96-8p. The ALJ only addressed the effects of
depression on the plaintiff’s RFC; the ALJ did not discuss the seizure disorder despite
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the fact that he found the disorder to be a severe impairment. (Tr. 24). In his opinion,
the ALJ found that there was no recovery period after a seizure. This finding is
contrary to the medical evidence. Although it is disputed as to how long the plaintiff
takes to recover after a seizure, it is undisputed that there is a recovery period after
a seizure. The plaintiff and plaintiff’s sister state it takes a day to a few days to
recover depending on the type of seizure. (Tr. 306). The medical evidence from the
Department of Corrections does not state specifically the recovery time, but after a
seizure, the record is consistent in that the plaintiff slept for a while before they would
be able to transport him to the medical facility. He would generally spend the night
there and rest in the medical department. (Tr. 205-229). This recovery period shows
that the plaintiff has significant periods of intermittent capacity.
Since the ALJ found no recovery period, he did not discuss how this recovery
period would affect the plaintiff’s work day in the event that a seizure occurred on the
job. The court stated in Totten v. Califano, 624 F.2d 10" date_filed="1980-04-30" court="4th Cir." case_name="Hazel Totten v. Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare">624 F.2d 10 (4th Cir. 1980) that the ALJ
must consider and make specific findings on whether intermittent incapacity affects
an individual’s ability to perform work in an ordinary setting on a regular and
continuing basis. The ALJ erred when he made no specific findings nor discussed the
possible periods of incapacity. The ALJ notes limitations based on the seizure
disorder, but does not discuss the work related effects of the unpredictability of the
seizures. When the attorney asked the VE what effect an uncontrolled seizure disorder
would have on the plaintiff’s ability to work the VE stated:
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this individual could most probably perform this and other jobs. However, the
unpredictability of the [seizures] . . . would create a problem for him keeping the
job once he’s on the job. Because these jobs only allow [ten] to [fifteen] days
personal leave time in the [twelve] month period.
(Tr. 318). The Fourth Circuit has stated that although jobs may exist in the plaintiff’s
area in significant numbers, the jobs may not be available to a claimant if the claimant
is “handicapped, particularly if they have no special skills.” Cooke v. Celebrezze, 365
F.2d 425, 428 (4th Cir. 1966). An employer’s fear of absenteeism and higher
worker’s compensation premiums and whether an employee in the plaintiff’s condition
would be able to perform satisfactorily in the job are factors that play against the
plaintiff’s employability. See Cooke, 365 F.2d at 428. The unpredictable frequency
and severity of the plaintiff’s seizures are insurance risks for employers, and the
recovery period, no matter how long, is a problem for absenteeism in this case. These
factors indicate there is a clear issue regarding the plaintiff’s ability to obtain and
maintain employment. The Fourth Circuit, in Tinsley v. Finch, ((300 F.Supp.
247)(D.S.C. 1969)) adhered to the rule that:
where the hiring practices of employers, based on health insurance, workmen's
compensation premiums, and liability insurance, preclude the hiring of an
employee because of his physical impairment, [the plaintiff] must, under the
statute, be considered disabled for all the kinds of work he has previously done
in such employment, and for all such employment in the future.
Sayers v. Gardner, 380 F.2d 940" date_filed="1967-07-14" court="6th Cir." case_name="Vera Sayers v. John W. Gardner, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare">380 F.2d 940, 952 (6th Cir. 1967). The ALJ’s failure to discuss
the plaintiff’s seizure disorder’s effect on the ability to obtain maintain employment is
error in light of Fourth Circuit precedent. The Court finds that the disorder is
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problematic and possibly preclusive in the plaintiff’s ability to obtain and maintain
employment; therefore, the Court finds the plaintiff disabled and incapable of
performing any gainful employment.
Failure to Comply with SSR 00-4p
The plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to comply with SSR 00-4p.
SSR 00-4p, places an affirmative duty on the ALJ to inquire into any apparent
unresolved conflict between jobs cited and the DOT. The Court notes that the plaintiff
erroneously states the law contained in this Ruling in his brief. He argues that the ALJ
must inquire into “any possible conflict” in the VE’s occupational testimony and
information in the Dictionary of Occupation Titles (“DOT”). However, SSR 00-4p
states any “apparent” conflict not “possible conflict.” SSR 00-4p. Before the ALJ
may rely on the VE’s testimony, he must properly develop the VE’s testimony and
resolve any apparent conflict with the testimony and the DOT.
In order for a VE’s opinion to be helpful and relevant, it must be based upon a
consideration of all the evidence on the record and must be in response to hypothetical
questions which fairly set out all plaintiff’s impairments. Walker v. Bowen, 889 F.2d
47, 50 (4th Cir. 1989). The hypotheticals need only reflect those impairments
supported by the record. Chrupcala v. Heckler, 829 F.2d 1269" date_filed="1987-09-28" court="3rd Cir." case_name="John Chrupcala v. Margaret M. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services">829 F.2d 1269, 1276 (3th Cir. 1987).
An ALJ may not rely on the answer to a hypothetical question where the hypothetical
fails to fit the facts. Swain v. Califano, 599 F.2d 1309" date_filed="1979-05-29" court="4th Cir." case_name="David Walton Swaim v. Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare">599 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1979), see also
Cornett v. Califano, 590 F.2d 91" date_filed="1978-12-27" court="4th Cir." case_name="Barbara M. Cornett v. Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare">590 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1978). The plaintiff alleges that the ALJ
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erred because the hypothetical failed to take into account the “effect of seizures upon
the frequency, predictability, and urgency of absences of the workplace as a result of
the seizures.” (Pl. Brief 1-2). The magistrate states that the ALJ’s findings that the
disorder was controlled when compliant with medication, that the testimony regarding
severity of the disorder was not credible, was supported by substantial evidence, and
there was no error in not including these in the hypothetical. The Court has addressed
these erroneous findings above and finds error in the ALJ’s hypothetical due to
omitting the effects of the seizure disorder in his hypothetical to the VE. The
hypothetical should have included the effects of the seizure disorder, and the ALJ
should have inquired into the additional limitations and precautions suggested by the
seizure disorder and the mental limitations which are not in the DOT definitions of the
cited occupations. The court finds that the ALJ erred in relying on the VE’s testimony
as it was not properly developed. However, since the Court has found the plaintiff
disabled, a remand to the ALJ to pose a proper hypothetical and inquire into DOT
inconsistencies would be unnecessary.
CONCLUSION
Reversal and remand to the Commissioner for further proceedings is the usual
remedy when the administrative record is incomplete or when the ALJ has applied an
improper legal standard. However, as expressly provided for by statue and consistent
with Fourth Circuit precedent, reversing an ALJ’s decision and remanding the case
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strictly to award benefits is proper when “the record establishes [claimant's]
entitlement to benefits.” Hines v. Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 567 (4th Cir.2006).
The Court sees no useful purpose in remanding the case to the ALJ as the
evidence establishes the plaintiff’s disability. The ALJ's duties are clear as mandated
by statute and decisional law as described above. The ALJ did not meet those duties
and therefore Commissioner’s decision is not based on substantial evidence. The ALJ
applied erroneous legal standards in determining the plaintiff’s RFC, in failing to
address the evidence from the treating physician, and improperly weighing the
evidence. The record is clear on the issue of the claimant’s disability and inability to
perform any substantial gainful employment; therefore, the Court remands solely to
determine the award of benefits to which the plaintiff is entitled.
This case has a long procedural history. On March 4, 2002 the plaintiff filed for
DIB alleging disability since November 20, 2000. The application was denied initially
and upon reconsideration. The plaintiff requested a hearing, and after the hearing with
the ALJ, the ALJ issued an opinion denying benefits. The plaintiff filed this action on
July 18, 2006. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss which was denied. Later, on
May 4, 2007, the defendant was granted a motion for an extension of time to answer
the plaintiff’s amended complaint. On June 12, 2007, the defendant was granted an
additional extension to file the transcript and answer. The defendant finally filed an
answer on July 10, 2007. After all briefs were filed and Report and Recommendation
issued, this Court finally has review over five years after the plaintiff filed the original
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application. “People generally do not seek Social Security disability benefits. . .
because they want to subsidize an already comfortable existence. In many cases, they
seek benefits because they have nowhere else to turn.” Schoofield v. Barnhart, 220
F.Supp.2d 512, 524 (Dist. Md. 2002). Any further delay in this matter is
unwarranted, and an award of benefits is appropriate. See Id.
INELIGIBILITY PERIOD
According to 20 C.F.R. § 404.468, “no monthly benefits will be paid to any
individual for any month or any part of which the individual is confined in jail, prison,
or other penal institution or correctional facility for conviction of a felony.” The Court
notes that the plaintiff is not entitled to back benefits for the period of incarceration.
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After a review of the magistrate’s Report and Recommendation, Plaintiff’s
objections thereto, and the administrative record, this Court concludes that the ALJ’s
decision is not supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ improperly applied and
analyzed the law and facts. The ALJ failed to consider the record as a whole which
is clear on the issue of disability.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Commissioner's decision denying benefits
be REVERSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the case is REMANDED to the Commissioner to
determine the appropriate award of benefits to for Plaintiff.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
September 5 , 2008
Anderson, South Carolina
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