I. INTRODUCTION
This matter comes on before the court on an appeal by Deanna Turner from an order of the district court entered March 30, 2005, dismissing her action against the Secretary of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”). In this case Turner allеged that HUD failed to perform mandatory duties that the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., imposed on it with respect to her status as a residential lessee. 1 In particular, Turner alleged that in ruling on a complaint she filed with HUD against her landlord, HUD did not determine from an analysis of the facts whether she had been a victim of a discriminatory housing practice. Instead, relying on the res judicata effect of a judgment in favor of her landlord in a state court proceeding, HUD dismissed her complaint as it found no reasonable cause for the comрlaint. That unfavorable outcome in the HUD proceeding led Turner to bring this action against HUD. The district court dismissed Turner’s action as it believed that the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., did not provide for judicial review of HUD’s determination. For the reasons set forth below, we will аffirm the order of dismissal.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Turner filed the complaint with HUD leading to this litigation on December 14, 2001, alleging that she was the victim of various discriminatory housing practices in which her landlord, Crawford Square Apartments III, L.P. (“Crawford Square”), engaged in violation of the FHA. 2 Prior to and after filing her HUD complaint, Tur *538 ner was involved in proceedings before the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, stemming from Crawford Square’s attempts to evict her and her attempts to thwart her eviction. Crawford Square initiated the state court proceedings by reason of Turner’s delinquency in rent paymеnts, and Turner responded in the state court with various state law counterclaims and a petition for injunctive relief to block her eviction. Turner, however, did not raise the FHA claims underlying her HUD complaint in the state court. On September 30, 2003, following a four-day trial, the court of common pleas found in favor of Crawford Square, rejecting all of Turner’s claims and defenses on the merits.
After the state court adjudication, HUD sent Turner a “Determination of No Reasonable Cause,” dated August 12, 2004, in which HUD explained that “[biased on the evidence obtained during the investigation, [HUD] has determined that reasonable cause does not exist to believe that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred” and that her complaint therefore must be dismissed. S.A. at l. 3 HUD enclosed with its letter a “determination” on which it based its decision in which it explained “that the present investigation should be dismissed under the legal doctrine of res judicata,” predicated on the state court
proceedings because “HUD conclude[d] that this constitute^] a successful defense against the present complaint.” Id. at 7.
Nevertheless, HUD informed Turner that “[n]otwithstanding this dismissal by HUD, the [FHA] provides that the complainant may file a civil action in an appropriate federal district or state court.”
Id.
at 1. A few days later, on August 18, 2004, Turner did just that, bringing a private action
(“Turner
I”) аgainst her landlord, Crawford Square, and its management company, McCormack Baron Management Services, Inc., (“McCormack Baron”), in the district court alleging violations of the FHA. The district court, however, granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants in
Turner
I by an order entered March 22, 2005, on the basis of the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine.
See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
On September 10, 2004, Turner filed the present action (“Turner II”) against HUD, alleging that it failed to undertake certain mandatory duties affecting her interests that the FHA and its implementing regulations imposed on it. In particular, Turner alleged that HUD’s dismissal of her complaint based on res judicata principles violated the statutory mandate requiring it tо complete an investigation and determine, based on the facts concerning the alleged discriminatory practices, whether there was reasonable cause to believe that she had been the victim of discriminatory practices. Turner claims that HUD completed its investigation but wrongfully withheld the mandated determination of whether there was reasonable cause to believe that there were discriminatory housing practices.
On November 10, 2004, HUD moved to dismiss Turner’s complaint in this case, Turner II, under Federal Rules оf Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The district court granted the motion, concluding that the APA did not include a provision from which the court could find a basis for allowing judicial review of HUD’s disposition of Turner’s complaint. In particular, the district court determined that the APA permitted judicial review only for “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court,” and that Turner “had an adequate remedy” in court, as evidenced by her district court suit against Crawford Square and McCor-mack Baron in Turner I. See App. at 8-10. 4 The district court also noted that еven if review were appropriate under the APA, there was a “strong presumption” against judicial review of agency decision concerning whether to undertake enforcement actions. Id. at 9-10. Lastly, the district court, acting consistently with its adjudication in Turner I, explained that application of the Rooker-Feldman doсtrine provided an alternative ground compelling dismissal.
Turner then filed a timely notice of appeal in Turner II on April 11, 2005. By this opinion we adjudicate the appeal.
III. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The parties dispute whether the district court had jurisdiction, Turner asserting that it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question) and 1361 (All Writs Act), and HUD claiming that it did not have jurisdiction. We, however, have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise plenary review over the district court’s dismissal on the grounds that the APA barred judicial review.
See Raymond Proffitt Found, v. United States Army Corps. of Eng’rs,
IV. DISCUSSION
The APA provides that agency actions are judicially reviewable if they arе “made reviewable by statute,” or if there was a “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. Neither party points to any statute making HUD’s determination with *540 respect to Turner’s complaint reviewable, 5 but they disagree as to whether HUD rendered a “final agency action fоr which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” This question implicates section 818 of the FHA, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(2), which authorizes private suits directly against perpetrators of allegedly discriminatory practices, even if, as here, HUD renders a determination that therе was no reasonable cause to believe that there had been discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(2). 6
Other courts that have confronted situations like those arising from Turner’s action against HUD, have held that section 813 provides an “other adequate remedy in a court,” barring judicial review under the APA.
7
See Godwin v. Sec’y of Hous. and Urban Dev.,
We hold that section 813 provided Turner with another “adequate remedy” which, in fact, she pursued by filing her action in the district court against Craw
*541
ford Square and McCormack Baron in
Turner
I.
8
We further hold that she has not been deprived of her “adequate remedy merely because the district court in
Turner
I dismissеd her complaint in an order we are affirming. In this regard we agree with the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit which held that “[a] legal remedy is not inadequate for purposes of the APA because it is procedurally inconvenient for a given plaintiff, or because plaintiffs have inadvertently deprived themselves of an opportunity to pursue that remedy.”
Town of Sanford v. United States,
The decisions of the Courts of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
Martinez
and for the Ninth Circuit in
Sable Communications
are illustrative of the principle that, for purposes of section 813, another remedy is not inadequate merely because the cоmplainant cannot pursue it successfully. In each case the court of appeals held that the plaintiff had an adequate judicial remedy barring APA review notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff had forfeited the right to that remedy by failing to pursue it in a timely manner.
Martinez,
V. CONCLUSION
Inasmuch as we have concluded that 5 U.S.C. § 704 bars the judicial review sought in this action, we need not address the question of whether 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2), which precludes review of agency action “committed to agency discretion by law,” compеls dismissal of Turner’s complaint. For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the order of March 30, 2005.
Notes
. We discuss the history of the FHA in
Mitchell v. Cellone,
. Turner’s December 14, 2001 HUD complaint was her second such complaint; she filed the first with HUD on January 5, 2001. She specifies, however, that the December 14, 2001 complaint forms the basis for this action and appeal.
*538
Turner stated in her district court complaint that she filed her December 14, 2001 HUD complaint against "Crawford Square.” Although she has not included the complaint in her appendix on this appeal, we have examined the complaint which is included in the appendix filed in Turner's related appeal,
Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III, L.P., et al.,
. S.A. refers to the supplemental appendix that HUD filed.
. "App.” refers to the appendix that Turner filed.
. In fact, HUD's determination was not reviewable pursuant to statute.
See Godwin v. Sec'y of Hous. and Urban Dev.,
. Although we uphold the district court's order dismissing this action because we conclude that Turner had another "adequate remedy” in court, we consider the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine in accordance with the explanation of the doctrine that the Supreme Court set forth in
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
. We have had occasion to note, albeit in dictum, that the FHA provides an adequate judicial remedy barring APA review.
See Am. Disabled for Attendant Programs Today v. U.S. Dept. of Hous. and Urban Dev.,
We also note that Turner points to our statement in ADAPT that following the filing of an administrative complaint HUD has a "mandatory” duty to investigate the complaint and if it finds in the investigation that there is a reasonable basis for the complaint, it "must bring a charge on behalf of the aggrieved person.” Id. at 387. That language cannot help Turner because HUD did investigate the complaint but it concluded the proceeding before it with a "Determination of No Reasonable Cause.”
. Our result would have been the same even if Turner had not filed suit in Turner I as her failure to seek her remedy would not have meant that she did not have an "adequatе remedy in a court.”
. To the extent that
Godwin,