Lead Opinion
Vacated and remanded for resentencing by published opinion. Judge GREGORY wrote the majority opinion, in which Senior Judge DAVIS joined. Senior
Judge DAVIS wrote a separate concurring opinion, and Judge WILKINSON wrote a dissenting opinion.
This case presents the question of whether a federal inmate may use a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to challenge a sentence that was based on the career offender enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guidelines when subsequent case law reveals the enhancement to be inapplicable to him. We find that he may, and in doing so hold that the mistake results in a fundamental miscarriage of justice that is cognizable on collateral review. For the reasons stated below, we grant a certificate of appealability, vacate the petitioner’s sentence, and remand the case for resentencing.
I.
The facts relevant to this appeal are brief and largely undisputed. In July 2009, the petitioner-appellant, Deangelo Whiteside, was indicted on charges of possession with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Shortly thereafter, the government filed an Information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851 notifying Whiteside that it intended to seek an enhanced penalty based on a 2002 North Carolina felony drug conviction.
Whiteside then entered into a plea agreement with the government. The agreement acknowledged the possibility that Whiteside might be designated a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. It also contained several waivers of White-side’s rights to challenge his conviction and sentence in an appeal or collateral proceeding. As discussed in more detail below, the parties dispute whether these provisions bar Whiteside’s current claim.
Prior to Whiteside’s sentencing hearing, the government filed a § 5K1.1 motion seeking a downward departure based on the petitioner’s substantial assistance. The government recommended that White-side receive a sentence based on a total offense level of 32 and a criminal history category VI, which yielded a 210 to 262 month Guidelines range. The district court granted the government’s motion and, on July 9, 2010, sentenced Whiteside to 210 months’ imprisonment, a sentence below both his Guidelines range and the twenty-year mandatory minimum.
On August 17, 2011, this Court issued its en banc decision in United States v. Simmons,
Whiteside argues that without those enhancements he would have faced a Guidelines range of 140 to 175 months and a statutory term of ten years to life. Assuming the same downward departure based on substantial assistance — eighty percent of the low end of the Guidelines— Whiteside contends that his sentence would have been 112 months, roughly eight years shorter than the sentence he received.
On May 18, 2012, Whiteside filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his sentence. He argued that, in light of Simmons, he did not qualify as a career of
II.
A.
We must first address whether Whiteside’s motion to vacate is procedurally barred. The first question on this point is whether Whiteside in his plea agreement waived his right to collaterally attack his sentence. We review this issue de novo. See United States v. Copeland,
The relevant portions of Whiteside’s plea agreement are as follows:
20. Defendant, in exchange for the concessions made by the United States in this plea agreement, waives all such rights to contest the сonviction except for: (1) claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or (2) prosecutorial misconduct. Defendant also ... knowingly and expressly waives all rights conferred by 18 U.S.C. § 3742 or otherwise to appeal whatever sentence is imposed with the two exceptions set forth above. Defendant also reserves right to appeal ruling as to career offender pursuant to USSG § 4B1.1.
21. Also, in exchange for the concessions made by the United States, defendant agrees that the United States preserves all its rights and duties with respect to appeal as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b), while the defendant waives all rights to appeal or collaterally attack the sentence of conviction with the two exceptions set forth above.
The government contends that under these terms, Whiteside waived his right to collaterally attack his sentence on all grounds except that of ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct. We disagree, finding that the language of the plea agreement is ambiguous and does not clearly specify which rights were waived.
In short, the paragraphs quoted above contradict one another. Paragraph 20 states that the defendant may challenge his conviction only on the two grounds just mentioned. It goes on to state that the defendant retains his right to appeal his sentence with respect to the career offender enhancement. However, paragraph 21 then states that he may only challenge his sentence (through either a direct appeal or § 2255 motion) on ineffective assistance or prosecutorial misconduct grounds. This simply does not make sense. Either the parties intended to limit thе defendant’s right to challenge his sentence to two grounds, a result which would render the career offender reference at the end of paragraph 20 superfluous, or the statement in paragraph 21 limiting Whiteside’s rights to challenge his sentence to two grounds was a mistake and should instead have cited three possible bases for a challenge. Either reading is problematic, leaving it impossible to say exactly which
B.
We next consider whether Whiteside’s motion to vacate was timely. A § 2255 petitioner ordinarily has one year from the date on which his conviction becomes final in order to file a motion to vacate. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). White-side’s conviction became final on August 17, 2010, but he did not file his motion until May 18, 2012, well beyond the one-year period. However, the statute of limitations in § 2255(f)(1) may be equitably tolled in certain circumstances. Specifically, equitable tolling applies if the petitioner can show “ ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” Holland v. Florida,
As explained below, we find that the erroneous application of the career offender enhancement worked a gross miscarriage of justice. We also hold that Whiteside pursued his rights diligently by filing his motion within a year of our decision in Simmons and that extrаordinary circumstances prevented him from filing the motion earlier. Our decision is based on the simple fact that our case law prior to Simmons absolutely foreclosed White-side’s current argument. In United States v. Jones,
The government nevertheless contends that Whiteside should have filed his petition prior to Simmons in spite of its sure defeat. In addition to simply having an air of absurdity about it, this argument would lead to the perverse result of reading the AEDPA’s time limitations to encourage inmates to flood the courts with baseless petitions on the off chance that the law might one day change. Further, if White-side had filed his petition prior to Simmons and it had been denied, his current claim would possibly be barred as a sue-
Nor are we bound to. We recognize that we previously held that the futility of a petitioner’s claim does not constitute a circumstance external to his control. Minter v. Beck,
Although Holland dealt with attorney misconduct, an issue not before this Court, the decision’s broader point was that the “exercise of a court’s equity powers ... must be made on a case-by-case basis.... ” Id. at 649-50,
III.
Turning to the merits of the case, we are asked to decide whether a petitioner may challenge his sentence on collateral review based on an incorrect application of the career offender enhancement. Because it is the only response that is both consistent with the realities of federal sentencing and just, we answer yes.
Section 2255 allows federal prisoners to move to set aside sentences that are imposed “in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Thus, § 2255 relief is not limited to constitutional errors. See Davis v. United States,
Like a number of our sister circuits, we have held that “ordinary misapplication of the guidelines does not amount to a miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Mikalajunas,
Three courts of appeals have, however, confronted this precise question, albeit with differing results. In Sun Bear v. United States,
The imposition of the career offender status branded Mr. Narvaez as a malefactor deserving of far greater punishment than that usually meted out for an otherwise similarly situated individual who had committed the same offense. It created a legal presumption that he was to be treated differently from other offenders because he belonged in a special category reserved for the violent and incorrigible. No amount of evidence in mitigation or extenuation could erase that branding or its effect on his sentence. His designation as a career offender simply took as unchallenged a premise that was not true and gave him no way of avoiding the consequences of that designation.
Id.
Narvaez, however, dealt with a sentence issued prior to United States v. Booker,
The Eleventh Circuit then reached the opposite conclusion of both the Eighth and Seventh Circuits. In a case that was recently vacated pending rehearing en bane, Spencer v. United States,
In Peugh, the Court held that retroactive application of a Guideline that increases a defendant’s applicable Guidelines range violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. Id. at 2084. In the process, the Court reaffirmed the important role that the Guidelines play in sentences issued post-Booker. The Court stated that the Guidelines remain “the lodestone of sentencing,” id., and that “[t]he post-Hoofcer federal sentencing scheme aims to achieve uniformity by ensuring that sen
Relying on the Supreme Court’s recent pronouncements and citing additional statistical data concerning the career offender enhancement, the Spencer panel held, “[w]e cannot pretend that, because of Booker, career offender status no longer matters to sentence length.”
We agree with the Spencer panel’s reasoning and hold that an erroneous application of the career offender enhancement amounts to a fundamental miscarriage of justice that is cognizable on collateral review. By no rubric can the impact of the career offender enhancement be considered “ordinary.” The Supreme Court has recognized that career offender status creates “a category of offender subject to particularly sеvere punishment.” Buford v. United States,
Whiteside’s case is representative of the enhancement’s dramatic impact. Absent the enhancement, he would have faced a Guidelines range of 140 to 175 months; after it was applied, his range skyrocketed to 262 to 327 months.
In Whiteside’s case, had the district court begun with the correct range, it almost certainly would have imposed a different sentence. Consider that if the court had employed the same twenty percent downward departure based on substantial assistance, Whiteside would have received a sentence of 112 months as compared to 210 months. And in the abstract, it is highly unlikely that any defendant with a Guidelines range of 140 to 175 months who has been granted a § 5K1.1 motion for a downward departure would receive a sentence 35 months in excess of the high-end of that range. At the very least, the § 3553 factors supporting such an increase would be subject to rigorous review under Gall on direct appeal.
It is not by accident that the career offender enhancement so significantly impacts defendants’ sentences. Unlike most of the Guidelines, which are based on the policy calculations of the Sentencing Commission, the career offender enhancement derives from a congressional requirement. A statute provides that “[t]he Commission shall assure that the [G’Juidelines specify a sentence to a term of imprisonment at or near the maximum term authorized” for those who qualify for the enhancement. 28 U.S.C. § 994(h). Heeding this charge, the Commission fashioned strict penalties for career offenders: their criminal history categories are automatically boosted to VI, the highest possible rung, and their offense levels become tied to the statutory maximum penalty as opposed to the actual conduct of conviction. See U.S.S.G. § 4Bl.l(b). Both factors contributed to the significant increase in Whiteside’s Guidelines range.
Clearly then, the impact of the career offender enhancement is far from ordinary. It is certainly nothing like the two-level enhancement for restraint of the victim which we rejected as a source of habe-as relief in Mikalajunas. That case presents a far better example of a garden variety Guidelines adjustment that, while possibly having an impact on the defendant’s sentence, cannot be said to constitute a fundamental miscarriage of justice. In contrast, an enhancement that casts the defendant as a hopeless recidivist worthy of the strictest possible punishment, and that has the effect of robbing a defendant of his freedom for some eight years, is fundamentally different.
The government is certainly correct in remarking that this case does not present exactly the kind of error recognized by the Supreme Court in Davis. The petitioner in Davis was convicted for actions later deemed not criminal.
Nor does the fact that White-side was sentenced beneath the applicable statutory maximum mitigate the mistake. Contrary to the government’s contention, this fact alone does not make a sentence “lawful,” for several reasons. First, such a conclusion is contrary to our well-established principles of appellate review. While sentencing review is highly deferential, that “does not mean there is no review at all.” United States v. Abu Ali,
Of course, these standards are utilized only on direct appeal. But they highlight the rigor with which we view our role in ensuring that each and every defendant sentenced in federal court receives a fair and reasonable sentence, to say nothing of a lawful one.
The animating principles of fundamental justice are no different here. First, through no fault of his own, Whiteside’s opportunity for such review did not arise
Second, the Supreme Court just last year told us that the advisory nature of the Guidelines does not cure the harm that results from utilizing an incorrect Guidelines range as a starting point. See Peugh,
In addition to the continued vitality of the Guidelines in an advisory system, Peugh also drew on the principles of fairness and justice that animate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at 2085 (“[T]he Clause also safeguards a fundamental fairness interest ... in having the government abide by the rules of law it establishes to govern the circumstances under which it can deprive a person of his or her liberty or life.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (ellipsis in original)); id. (“[The Clause] does not merely protect reliance interests. It also reflects principles of fundamental justice.”). We find that these principles map easily onto our analysis of whether Whiteside was subject to a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Because of the career offender enhancement, White-side’s sentence is plainly at odds with what he would receive were he sentenced today. He is not a career offender, and he should not serve a sentence that was based on his classification as one. The mere fact that his sentence was beneath the statutory maximum does not somehow assuage this fundamental unfairness.
In the face of this clear injustice, the government pleads that wе respect — with something approaching sanctity — the finality of sentencing decisions. We agree that finality is an important consideration. It encourages defendants to accept their punishments and move forward with their lives; as well, it minimizes the misuse of judicial resources. Perhaps most importantly, in cases involving victims, finality offers these individuals some degree of peace of mind and a sense that their suffering has not been forgotten. But we do not agree that these considerations, to the extent that they apply here, can or should outweigh the plain injustice that would result from denying the petitioner what he seeks, which is only a chance to be sentenced according to the factors that every
Because we find that Whiteside suffered a fundamental miscarriage of justice, we need not address his additional claim that the error violated his constitutional rights to due process. We have, however, considered the constitutional question to the extent necessary to grant a certificate of appealability, which has yet to issue in this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(c) (permitting issuance of a certificate of appealability only where petitioner “has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right”) (emphasis added). A certificate of appealability may issue on a constitutional question that is “debatable.” Miller-El v. Cockrell,
IV.
For the reasons stated above, we hold that equitable tolling applies to Whiteside’s claim. We also hold that erroneous application of the career offender enhancement amounts to a fundamental miscarriage of justice that can be corrected on collateral review. We grant a certificate of appeala-bility, vacate Whiteside’s sentence, and remand the case for resentencing.
Notes
. The probation officer disagreed with the government’s stipulation in the plea agreement that Whiteside would be held responsible for more than 50 and less than 150 grams of crack cocaine.
. The career offender enhancement defines a "career offender,” and provides that a defendant is such an offender if
(1) [he] was at least eighteen years old at the time [he] committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) [he] has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.
U.S.S.G. § 4Bl.l(a). For purposes of the enhancement, a "prior felony conviction” includes “a prior ... state conviction for an offense punishable by ... imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, regardless of whether such offense is specifically designated as a felony. ” Id. § 4B1.2 cmt. n. 1.
. Whiteside subsequently filed a supplement to his motion to vacate, making the same arguments, but seeking, in the alternative, relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a writ of coram nobis, and a writ of audita querela.
. We expressly do not decide whether the savings clause in § 2255(e) might justify relief from a Simmons sentencing error through the filing of a § 2241 petition. While we have not previously "extended the reach of the savings clause to those petitioners challenging only their sentence,” United States v. Poole,
. Moreover, the factual differences in the cases aside, our outcome is entirely consistent with Holland. Indeed, the circumstances here are arguably more compelling, given that attorney errors are generally attributable to clients, see Holland,
. Indeed, even the government recognizes that on a case-by-case basis, Simmons relief should be afforded to some petitioners notwithstanding limitations or appeal waivers. See Mungro v. United States, Nos. 5:11-cv-141-RLV & 5:04-cr-18-RLV-CH-1,
. Our friend in dissent accuses us of running “roughshod" over circuit precedent. This is demonstrably not the case. Aside from the fact, explained below, that the career offender enhancement is plainly not a run-of-the-mill guideline, the dissent ignores the particulars of our prior cases. In United States v. Pettiford,
. The court first acknowledged that Begay set forth a substantive rule that could be applied retroactively on collateral appeal. We need not consider this preliminary issue with respect to Simmons, since we have previously determined that Simmons announced a substantive rule that may be raised in a habeas proceeding. See Miller v. United States,
. It is worth noting that the sentence imposed in Sun Bear was within the Guidelines range applicable even in the absence of the career offender enhancement. Id. at 705.
. After Peugh, the panel in Hawkins released supplemental opinions discussing Peugh's impact on its case. See
. These figures put aside consideration of the statutory minimum penalty, which, of course, we also know was improperly applied in light of Simmons.
. The dissent faults us for failing to provide a "nonarbitraiy” line delimiting the types of sentencing errors that constitute "extraordinary circumstances.” Post at 561. Given the inherent folly of attempting to forecast the contours of "extraordinary” events, our review is quite properly limited to the case before us, and we decide only that when subsequent case law makes manifestly clear that a petitioner was wrongly designated a career offender he may challenge his sentence through a § 2255 motion.
. The dissent refuses to acknowledge the basic truth underlying our decision: that White-side is not, and was not, properly designated a career offender. Our sentencing regime prior to Simmons was overinclusive; it swept up defendants whose criminal histories, when viewed individually—a general bugaboo of the dissent—did not expose them to the enhancement. Simmons corrected this mistake by directing district courts to examine the specifics of the defendant’s predicate convictions. Under this approach, there is no question Whiteside should not have received the enhancement. Simply because a criminal defendant was at one point classified a career offender does not mean that classification was ever correct. Neither the Eighth nor Seventh circuits hаd any trouble recognizing that by narrowing the definition of the terms “crime of violence” and "violent felony,” Begay and Chambers exposed "errors" in how the Guidelines had been applied. See Sun Bear,
. Unfortunately, our dissenting colleague sounds the alarm that after today’s decision no criminal sentence is safe from collateral attack. The dissent's attempts to expand our holding on our behalf could only result from its larger, misguided goal of convincing the reader that habeas relief is somehow harmed by its utilization. Somewhat amazingly, the dissent is explicit on this point. Post at 569-70. With due respect to our colleague’s views, habeas review is not merely a deterrent that fulfills its purpose by its threatened use; criminal defendants are aided only when it is employed. The dissent would have its own exaltation of the history of the Great Writ and § 2255 relief contribute to the mechanism’s futility. Accusing us of Whig history, the dissent’s approach is rank with the fearful mistrust of individualized decision-making inherent to traditional conservatism. The suggestion that district courts and future panels of this court cannot discern actual injustices from less serious errors casts too critical an eye on the judges throughout our circuit. In short, we simply do not share the view that the criminal justice system is somehow harmed when defendants are sentenced according to a proper understanding and application of the law.
. Although Whiteside fashioned his due process claim on the Supreme Court’s decision in Hicks v. Oklahoma,
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
Deangelo Whiteside was properly designated a career offender in the course of his federal sentencing proceedings. Now, years later, the majority vacates that sentence. In invalidating Whiteside’s sentence, the majority creates a circuit split over whether career-offender designations are cognizable on collateral review, and ignores settled law as to whether changes in circuit precedent can reset the statute of limitations for post-conviction review of federal criminal proceedings.
The majority opinion represents a dramatic expansion of federal collateral review that is unsupported by law or precedent. It makes a shambles of the retroactivity doctrines that have long safeguarded the basic finality of criminal convictions. It disrupts the orderly administration of our criminal-justice system.
If it were purely a matter of orderly administration, that might be an arid basis on which to deny relief. But there was no injustice done here. Whiteside pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and his two predi
None of these convictions has ever been invalidated. No procedural or substantive irregularity ever marked the plea or sentencing proceedings. In short, Whiteside was sentenced according to the law as it existed at that time. Absent a constitutional violation or miscarriage of justice, neither of which is remotely present here, that is all a criminal defendant can ask or expect. Moreover, the defendant must raise the petition in a timely manner, which Whiteside has failed to do.
My colleagues attempt a basic restructuring of the purposes of collateral review in not one, but two, respects. It is bad enough that the majority envisions collateral proceedings as a form of error correction intended, not so subtly, to supplant direct review. The comparative question the majority poses is even worse. It inquires whether yesterday’s result was the same that would or should obtain today. To the contrary, collateral review is what its name implies: whether the proceedings under review conformed to law as it instructed at the time. If they did, the rule of law was honored and upheld, and further inquiry is impermissible.
Because any other disposition of this case would open concededly lawful proceedings to endless and untimely collateral attack, I would affirm the district court’s dismissal of the petition. For the reasons set forth below, I respectfully dissent.
I.
The majority opinion creates a square circuit conflict over whether allegedly erroneous career-offender designations in particular, and what Sentencing Guidelines errors in general, are cognizable on a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition for collateral review. On one side are the opinions of the Seventh and Eighth Circuits holding challenges to career-offender designations not cognizable. See Hawkins v. United States,
Like traditional habeas corpus, § 2255 “does not encompass all claimed errors in conviction and sentencing.” United States v. Addonizio,
As neither Whiteside nor the majority claims that the district court lacked jurisdiction when it sentenced him as a career offender, Whiteside’s claim is only cognizable if it alleges a constitutional error or a fundamental defect resulting in a miscar
A.
The heart of collateral review is the correction of constitutional error. In fact, a certificate of appealability, which is necessary to appeal from a district court’s final order in a § 2255 proceeding, requires the petitioner to make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Whiteside has made no “substantial showing” of the denial of a “constitutional right.” And even if he had made such a showing, he could not possibly prevail on the merits of his claim.
The only colorable constitutional claim even plausibly available to Whiteside is that he was denied due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment. But there was no denial of due process here. There is no claim of procedural irregularity occurring at any point in these proceedings. While the sentencing regime in force at the time of Whiteside’s sentencing was later overturned in United States v. Simmons,
I thus cannot embrace the paradox that a manifestly lawful criminal proceeding amounts to an unlawful deprivation of due process. Lawful one day, unlawful the next — it makes no sense. The doctrinal hook for Whiteside’s due process challenge, the Supreme Court’s decision in Hicks v. Oklahoma,
Hicks differs markedly from this case: the Hicks jury was barred from exercising its full sentencing discretion, whereas the district court here not only recognized that it had discretion to depart from the Guidelines range, but in fact did so when it sentenced Whiteside to a below-Guidelines sentence. This distinction makes all the difference. Whiteside was entitled to a sentence somewhere between the statutory minimum and maximum, imposed after the Guidelines range was properly calculated in accordance with the law that existed at the time. This he received, and thus there is no violation of any sort anywhere to be found.
But even if Hicks could be bent and stretched to support Whiteside’s due process claim, it would still be procedurally unavailable to him. Under Teague v. Lane,
Teague insisted, then, that retroactivity doctrine not succumb to a severe case of presentism, where a decision later in time not only becomes the law, but seeks to discredit all that went before. Thus, a rule is new for Teague purposes if it was not “dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” Graham v. Collins,
Because Hicks does not apply at all to Whiteside’s situation, let alone squarely address it, Whiteside’s attempt to extend Hicks would require us to announce and retroactively apply a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure on collateral review: namely that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to an amended sentence based on later decisional law that calls into question an advisory Guidelines calculation manifestly correct at the time it was imposed. This case is thus very different from Miller v. United States, in which we held that, under the retroactivity principles announced in Schriro v. Summerlin,
Furthermore, Whiteside’s proposed new rule would not fit in either of the Teague exceptions. It does not place any conduct outside the reach of the criminal law. Nor does it present the exceedingly rare case of a “watershed rule of criminal procedure,” since the procedural rule that Whiteside wants us to announce is not “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Teague,
Seeking to avoid Teague’s restrictions, the majority tries to hang its constitutional case on Simmons itself and issue the certificate of appealability on that basis. See Maj. Op. at 555 & n. 15. But Simmons, even if declared retroactive by Miller, is a case about statutory interpretation— namely the interpretation of federal sentencing law — not the Constitution. Given that Hicks is far afield and that any rule derived obliquely from it cannot possibly bе made retroactive under Teague, White-side has no constitutional claim and no entitlement to a certificate of appealability.
B.
Given that Whiteside has no available constitutional claim, the majority must
First, the majority refuses to recognize that, after United States v. Booker,
That the Guidelines are advisory is no mere theoretical point; on remand, the district court will be perfectly free to impose the exact same sentence on White-side. It is notable that the district court granted Whiteside only a limited downward departure for substantial assistance, a departure that was itself broadly discretionary. See United States v. Pearce,
The scenarios spun by the majority on what might or might not happen on resen-tencing are nothing more than rank speculation. The majority suggests that the district court would likely be unable to satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 3553’s sentencing factors and “rigorous review under Gall on direct appeal” if it departed by 20 percent above the top of the newly calculated Guidelines range of 140 to 175 months and imposed an identical sentence of 210 months. Maj. Op. at 552. Quite apart from this bald attempt to put the hammer to the district court, such speculation ignores the “broad sentencing discretion” afforded trial judges, Alleyne v. United States, — U.S.—,
Second, the majority argues that, because the Guidelines still exert a substantial influence on sentencing, career-offender designations are serious enough to be cognizable on collateral review. No one could deny that the Guidelines are still influential even after Booker. Mere influence on the ultimate sentence, however, is insufficient to warrant correction under § 2255. See, e.g., Daniels v. United States,
The majority never explains how the reality of error correction customarily reserved for direct appeal is to be reconciled with the broad scope it now proposes for § 2255 review. Nor can it, since there is no clear line to differentiate why this Guidelines calculation is open to collateral attack and others are not. The majority apparently believes that career-offender designations are “far from ordinary” and should be subject to challenge, Maj. Op. at 552, but why stop there? I cannot fathom. The majority offers no basis in law for its ruling, and the main reason given is that a career-offender designation results in a substantially larger prison term and “casts the defendant as a hopeless recidivist worthy of the strictest possible punishment.” Id. It is left to the reader to divine why the application of such a penalty constitutes “extraordinary circumstances” justifying collateral review. United States v. Pregent,
Finally, the majority confuses a change in law favorable to a defendant with a fundamental breakdown in procedure or justice. As explained above, Whiteside’s sentence was imposed properly, with no procedural irregularities or substantive errors. Thus, to hold that Whiteside’s situation warrants § 2255 relief implies that every change in law creates a manifest injustice no matter how lawful the prior proceeding. But “[precedential decisions come pouring out of the federal courts of appeals and the Supreme Court.” Hawkins,
To further say that a criminal defendant lawfully sentenced prior to Simmons was the victim of some manifest injustice is to adopt a naively Whig history of law as an unbroken march toward progress and enlightenment, when in truth it is more often a matter of fits and starts, of limitless gray areas, all bereft of the guarantee that later attempts to reconcile public safety with human liberty will necessarily be better than earlier ones. The majority’s approach to retroactivity also ignores the analogous reality that plea bargains are contracts under which, in exchange for avoiding the uncertainties of trial, the defendant “assumes the risk of future changes in circumstances in light of which [his] bargain may prove to have been a bad one.” United States v. Bownes,
Once we recognize that a favorable change in law does not automatically render prior lawfully imposed sentences unjust, it becomes clear why collateral review is a poor forum for correcting sentencing errors. Unlike with ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, sentencing issues can usually, even if not always, be effectively fixed on direct appeal. The majority’s invocation of the “rigor” with which appellate courts review sentences on direct appeal only supports this point. Maj. Op. at 553-54; see also id. at 552. It does nothing to undermine a “basic distinction between direct review and collateral review”: that “an error that may justify reversal on direct appeal will not necessarily support a collateral attack on a final judgment.” Addonizio,
C.
In addition to being conceptually unsound, the majority’s holding that White-side’s claim is cognizable under § 2255 leads it to misread Supreme Court precedent and run roughshod over our own.
The Supreme Court cases upon which the majority and Whiteside rely are in another room. In Peugh v. United States, the Court held that the Ex Post Facto Clause forbids a district court from using Sentencing Guidelines promulgated after the original offense to sentence a defendant if the later Guidelines increase the recommended sentencing range. — U.S. —,
Johnson v. United States,
Finally Davis v. United States,
If the majority opinion distorts Supreme Court precedent, it tramples our own. Whiteside states that “[d]eciding this case requires the Court to break new ground in this Circuit,” a euphemistic way of inviting us to disregard our prior precedent. Appellant’s Reply Br. at 27.
Sadly, the invitation has been accepted. We held in United States v. Pregent, “Marring extraordinary circumstances ..., an error in the application of the Sentencing Guidelines cannot be raised in a § 2255 proceeding.”
Moreover, the holdings in the above cases stem from the fact that § 2255 is designed for “cases in which ‘the sentence
Similarly, in United States v. Pettiford,
II.
In addition to being non-cognizable, Whiteside’s claim for relief is time-barred. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) provides for a one-year statute of limitations that is triggered by one of four conditions, whichever occurs latest:
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviсtion becomes final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(l)-(4).
A.
Whiteside contends that his claim fits under (f)(4), and that United States v. Simmons,
Whiteside grounds his argument on the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States,
We commonly speak of the “fact of a prior conviction,” and an order vacating a predicate conviction is spoken of as afact just as sensibly аs the order entering it. In either case, a claim of such a fact is subject to proof or disproof like any other factual issue.
Id. at 306-07,
Johnson does not govern Whiteside’s claim. Simmons represented a change of law, not fact. The circuits to have considered this type of issue have uniformly reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Phillips v. United States,
Contrary to the vacatur at issue in Johnson, Simmons did not directly alter Whiteside’s legal status as a prior state offender. See Lo,
Instead of altering the factual landscape, Simmons merely announced a generally applicable legal rule. But a decision “establishing an abstract proposition of law arguably helpful to the petitioner’s claim does not constitute the ‘factual predicate’ for that claim.” Id. Decisions that update the legal significance of certain facts without modifying them do not qualify under (f)(4). Simmons did precisely this: unlike a vacatur decision, it altered the legal significance of Whiteside’s prior convictions without amending the convictions themselves. See Owens v. Boyd,
Whiteside’s (f)(4) argument fails for the additional reason that it would effectively nullify (f)(3), which provides for tolling in instances where the defendant’s claim is founded on a right “newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). As the Eighth Circuit has reasoned:
[The specific criteria enumerated in (f)(3) for tolling the limitations period] impliedly reject[] the notion that the creation of a new right by the Supreme Court that is not made retroactive to cases on collateral review, other rulings of law by the Supreme Court, and decisions taken from the courts of appeal in all instances, could trigger any of the limitations periods enumerated under § 2255.
E.J.R.E.,
If changes in law are cognizable under (f)(4), then (f)(3) becomes superfluous because any claim brought under (f)(3) could also be brought under (f)(4). See Lo,
B.
Recognizing the speciousness of his statutory argument, Whiteside asserts in the alternative — in an argument embraced by the majority — that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled. Equitable tolling of petitions for collateral review is available only when a defendant demonstrates “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Holland v. Florida,
Whiteside claims that he was prevented from timely filing by the unfavorable precedent that would have governed his claim had he sued prior to Simmons. The standard announced in Holland, however, focuses not on whether unfavorable precedent would have rendered a timely claim futile, but on whether a factor beyond the defendant’s control prevented him from filing within the limitations period at all. See Shannon,
This court’s decision in Minter v. Beck confirms this line of reasoning. In that case, as here, the defendant’s claim originally seemed foreclosed by extant precedent. After the issuance of a favorable decision, however, he sought to collaterally attack his sentence, invoking a provision equivalent to (f)(2). Minter contended that the newly issued decision, by nullifying the unfavorable precedent that had previously barred his claim, served to remove an “impediment” to filing. After rejecting this argument, the court held that equitable tolling was inappropriate. Minter,
Tellingly, Whiteside makes no allegation that he was unable to file in a timely fashion — only that doing so would probably have been unsuccessful in light of extant case law. Indeed, any such allegation would be frivolous given the many defendants who filed suits prior to Simmons asserting the exact same substantive claim that Whiteside now raises, including of course Simmons himself. See, e.g., United
Furthermore, Whiteside has failed to demonstrate that “gross injustice” would result should this court deny his request for equitable tolling and find his claim time-barred. See Green v. Johnson,
Finally, as several circuits have noted, it is quite improper to use the doctrine of equitable tolling to circumvent the express limitations contained in § 2255. See, e.g., Lo,
In this case, Simmons came down roughly a year after Whiteside’s conviction became final. That may seem a short time to the majority, but its equitable reasoning applies equally to a long history of three, five, or even ten years, or whenever a change in circuit decisional law or Guidelines interpretation may appear. This sort of reasoning makes a mockery of Congress’s desire to have post-conviction petitions filed when the evidence is not stale or missing altogether.
III.
It has often been noted that one of the casualties of expanded collateral review is the finality of criminal convictions. The majority pays the kind of lip service to this value that is typical when a principle is about to be disregarded. See Maj. Op. at 554. In the majority’s eyes, finality is an empty and hollow concept with no meaning comparable to a defendant’s rights to relit-igation. But the evisceration of the finality principles imposes costs, and many of these costs are born by the judicial system. See McCleskey v. Zant,
As the Seventh Circuit emphasized in Hawkins, collateral review of years-old proceedings ties up prosecutorial resources that could otherwise be used to promptly resolve new criminal cases. See Hawkins v. United States,
By undermining finality, expansive collateral review also harms our criminal-justice system more broadly. Because endless collateral review keeps convictions and sentences in legal limbo and makes it more doubtful that announced punishment will actually be imposed, it eviscerates the deterrent effect of criminal law. See Teague v. Lane,
Ultimately, repetitious litigation under the guise of collateral error correction “disparages the entire criminal justice system,” McCleskey,
At some point, the criminal process, if it is to function at all, must turn its attention from whether a man ought properly to be incarcerated to how he is to be treated once convicted. If law, criminal or otherwise, is worth having and enforcing, it must at some time provide a definitive answer to the question litigants present or else it never provides an answer at all. Surely it is an unpleasant task to strip a man of his freedom and subject him to institutional restraints. But this does not mean that in so doing, we should always be halting or tentative. No one, not criminal defendants, not the judicial system, not society as a whole is benefited by a judgment providing a man shall tentatively go to jail today, but tomorrow and every day thereafter his continued incarceration shall be subject to fresh litigation on issues already resolved.
Mackey v. United States,
At the time Justice Jackson lamented the flood of post-conviction petitions in Brown v. Allen, the federal courts heard approximately 500 state-prisoner habeas petitions a year.
Reasonable people may disagree over the proper tradeoff between finality and error correction, but it is not up to judges to supplant Congress’s judgment on this point with their own. Above some constitutional crossbar, which most would agree is easily cleared by our current system, Congress alone possesses the power and responsibility to define the contours of federal collateral review. And by Congress’s own terms, the proper focus of such review is on whether, in the direct proceedings, there was a “violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Because Whiteside’s sentence was properly imposed according to the undisputed law in force at the time, there was no such violation.
When the majority expands the scope of § 2255 in excess of what Congress intended, or excuses Whiteside’s untimely petition in clear violation of statutory requirements, it augments its own power at Congress’s expense. As is often the case in federal post-conviction review, dissatisfaction with the underlying provisions of the criminal law fuels expansion of what should be a selectively utilized device for collateral attack. Whatever problems may exist in our substantive criminal and sentencing regimes, reform is properly committed to Congress via its constitutional authority, not to judges through the backdoor of collateral review.
Seldom has a court broken more china en route to a result. Certificates of ap-pealability, doctrines of retroactivity, statutes of limitation, pertinent precedents are all disregarded. Law is relegated to the margins. All that need be staked is one’s own claim to sole possession of the “truth” and “right.” Instead of respecting the limitations that Congress, the Supreme Court, and our precedent have imposed on § 2255, the majority conflates claims that are cognizable only on direct appeal with the sort of fundamental defects that represent the proper focus of § 2255. The Supreme Court has warned against an approach under which
the writ would become a delayed motion for a new trial, renewed from time to time as the legal climate changed.... Wise judicial administration of the federal courts counsels against such [a] course, at least where the error does not trench on any constitutional rights of defendants nor involve the jurisdiction of the trial court.
Sunal v. Large,
The majority’s approach devalues collateral review by transforming its nature. The Great Writ, upon which § 2255 was modeled, has earned its name not only because of its power, but because, when used properly, it is used sparingly and to correct certain fundamental infractions. Today, the majority renders post-conviction review unrecognizable as compared to its intended role at the Founding: to challenge sentences in violation of a court’s “jurisdiction or detention by the Executive without proper legal process.” McCleskey,
The Great Writ stands for the fundamental proposition that government too is subject to the given law. Here the government observed the law; it is, sadly, a court that accords no meaning to that fact. How is it that requiring someone to serve a sentence lawfully imposed and constitutionally rendered becomes a “plain injustice” and a “fundamental unfairness”? Maj. Op. at 554. This path vindicates no fundamental liberty. It only transforms collateral review into a double of direct review, a redundant mechanism for routine error correction, deployed to unsettle sentences that were imposed years earlier under governing law, in accordance with unexceptionable procedure, and by a sovereign acting in accordance with its sovereign duty to protect citizens from those who repeatedly violate its criminal laws.
For the aforementioned reasons, and because I view this decision as wholly wrong and deeply damaging to our criminal-justice system, I respectfully dissent.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring:
I am pleased to join Judge Gregory’s extraordinarily compelling opinion, which fully responds to the dissent’s overwrought and formalistic protestations that our judgment hеre presages an end to law as we know it. (Evidently, it is not enough simply for the dissent to say that there is no miscarriage of justice shown on this record.)
The dissenting opinion is hopelessly pleased with itself. This is not surprising, as it prostrates itself at the altar of finality, draped in the sacred shroud of judicial restraint. There is much that could be said about the dissenting opinion’s paean to finality, but one can hardly say it more poignantly or more persuasively than has Judge Rovner. See Hawkins v. United States,
In any event, what’s remarkable is that, as viewed through the lens of our good friend’s dissenting opinion, it is perfectly fine for the United States Department of Justice, which is to say the Executive Branch, to bypass supposed reverence for finality on a case-by-case basis, through waivers of limitations and other devices, see ante, Maj. op., n. 6, but the Third Branch is duty-bound never to acknowledge instances in which law’s interest in finality must give way to competing values rooted in our shared abhorrence of manifest injustice. To devolve to the Executive Branch sole authority to identify a cognizable miscarriage of justice amounts to judicial abdication, not judicial restraint. Such an approach enjoys no legitimate place in our scheme of institutional checks and balances. The Third Branch’s transcendent role, in our enviable but imperfect system of criminal justice, is to afford protection from the loss of individual liberty resulting from profoundly erroneous decision-making, and not least of all, erroneous decision-making by the Third Branch itself, as in this very case.
The dissenting opinion favors what’s “finished” over what’s “right” and thereby blinks at a profound miscarriage of justice. It is wrong to do so.
