536 S.E.2d 743 | Ga. | 2000
Lead Opinion
The issue raised in this granted interlocutory appeal is whether OCGA § 50-21-28, which provides that venue under the Georgia Tort Claims Act (GTCA)
The appellant, Brenda Dean, is the surviving spouse of Charles Dean and administratrix of his estate. In January 1997, Charles Dean died as a result of an accident that occurred while he was driving his pick-up truck in Pickens County, Georgia. Ms. Dean filed the present action against Tabsum, Inc., J.M. Huber Corporation, and the Georgia Department of Transportation (the “DOT”). The complaint alleged, among other things, that Tabsum and Huber, which own commercial property along the highway where the accident occurred, had negligently caused a dangerous area of standing water to accumulate on that part of the highway, and that the DOT had negligently designed the drainage system where the highway in question intersected the driveway of Tabsum’s and Huber’s property. Ms. Dean initially filed the action in Fulton State Court, based upon her belief that Tabsum and Huber had their registered offices there. When Ms. Dean learned that Tabsum and Huber had their registered offices in Cobb County, she moved the Fulton State Court to transfer the case to Cobb County. The DOT, however, filed its own motion to transfer, contending that the Tort Claims Act placed venue of the action in Pickens County, where the loss occurred. See OCGA § 50-21-28.
In Campbell, this Court addressed an issue similar, but not identical, to the issue raised in this case. Campbell filed a tort action against the Georgia Department of Corrections in the Department’s county of residence. In doing so, Campbell relied upon the constitutional venue provision providing for venue in the county of residence of the defendant.
On interlocutory appeal, this Court affirmed. We concluded that the analysis set forth in Glover v. Donaldson was applicable to Campbell’s case, and controlled the case adversely to her. In Glover, Glover filed a tort action against the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (“MARTA”) in DeKalb County, the county of residence of one of MARTA’s joint tortfeasors. In doing so, Glover relied on the same constitutional venue provision governing joint tortfeasors that Ms. Dean relies on in the present case. Relying on a venue provision in the MARTA Act that provided that venue in actions against MARTA was proper only in Fulton County, MARTA contended that venue was improper in DeKalb County.
Applying the Glover analysis in Campbell, we concluded that Campbell’s constitutional challenge to § 50-21-28 turned on whether “the State’s waiver of immunity in the GTCA is conditioned on the limitation of venue provided in the statute.”
Although we stated in Campbell that we were not addressing the issue presented by the instant case - “whether § 50-21-28 provides the exclusive venue where the ‘joint tortfeasor’ provision of the state constitution is implicated,”
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that OCGA § 50-21-28 is constitutional.
Judgment affirmed.
OCGA § 50-21-20 et seq.
Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. IV of the 1983 Ga. Constitution.
268 Ga. 408 (490 SE2d 99) (1997).
243 Ga. 479 (254 SE2d 857) (1979).
OCGA § 50-21-28 provides as follows:
All tort actions against the state under this article shall be brought in the state or superior court of the county wherein the loss occurred; provided, however, that, in any case in which an officer or employee of the state may be included as a defendant in his individual capacity, the action may be brought in the county of residence of such officer or employee. All actions against the state for losses sustained in any other state shall be brought in the county of residence of any officer or employee residing in this state upon whose actions or omissions the claim against the state is based.
Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. IV provides that “[s]uits against joint obligors, joint tort-feasors, joint promisors, copartners, or joint trespassers residing in different counties may be tried in either comity.”
Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. VI of the 1983 Ga. Constitution.
Glover, 243 Ga. at 480.
Glover, 243 Ga. at 481.
Glover, 243 Ga. at 481-482.
Campbell, 268 Ga. at 410.
Campbell, 268 Ga. at 411.
(Citations omitted.) Campbell, 268 Ga. at 411.
Campbell, 268 Ga. at 411.
Id.
Campbell, at 411, n. 4.
See C. W. Matthews Contracting Co. v. Barnett, 219 Ga. App. 763, 764-765 (466 SE2d 657) (1996).
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
The majority makes this case appear more complex than it really is. The majority concludes that this Court’s recent decision in Campbell v. Dept. of Corrections, 268 Ga. 408 (490 SE2d 499) (1997), should control as to the interpretation of OCGA § 50-21-28, which statute is the implementation of Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX (e) (Ga. Const. 1983). I agree with the majority that Campbell controls, but only to the extent of its holding. In Campbell, the plaintiff contended that the Department of Corrections resided in Fulton County and could be sued in Fulton County. However, this Court held “that § 50-21-28 establishes the proper venue in actions brought under the GTCA and against the State as the sole defendant” (Emphasis supplied.) Campbell v. Dept. of Corrections, supra at 411. We then specifically stated that “[w]e do not here consider whether OCGA § 50-21-28 provides the exclusive venue where the ‘joint tortfeasor’ provision of the state constitution is implicated. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. IV.” Campbell v. Dept. of Corrections, supra at 411, n. 4. In Campbell, the state agency was the sole defendant and had to be sued where the loss occurred. Here, the majority says that DOT must sue in Pickens County “where the loss occurred, and Pickens County will then become DOT’s county of residence for purposes of this lawsuit.” I agree that, pursuant to the holding in Campbell, Pickens County is deemed to be DOT’s county of residence for the purpose of this lawsuit. However, unlike Campbell, the plaintiff in this case sued two defendants in addition to DOT. Thus, this action was not brought “against the State as the sole defendant.” Campbell, supra at 411. Therefore, under Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. IV, the plaintiff could
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court.