Dean v. Chrysler Corp.

Chrysler Corp DEAN v CHRYSLER CORPORATION 7). (Calendar 7, Argued De No. No. 84065. November Docket 15, 1990. Rehearing May 1204. denied 435 Mich cided compensation for workers’ benefits Dean was awarded Corrine injuries arose in the course of her with which injuries subsequently Chrysler Corporation for sustained and en a office for the vehicular accident while route to doctor’s a original seeking purpose for the of further medical treatment Compensation Appeal compensable injury. Board The Workers’ affirmed, consequence finding subsequent injuries to be a Sawyer, P.J., original. Appeals, The and Maher Court of JJ., unpublished opinion per Burns, T. M. reversed in an and curiam, Co, Smelting Reñning relying Michigan & on Rucker (Docket 98898). (1942) plaintiff appeals. Mich 668 No. by joined Griffin, opinion by Chief Justice In an Justice Riley Brickley, Supreme and Justices Levin held: in motor vehicle accident while en An incurred a compensable prior injury for medical

route treatment Disability Compensation not Act is itself under the Workers’ by compensation. covered workers’ Disability Eligibility compensation for under the Workers’ 1. Act, Rucker, always Compensation by has been as construed employ- arising out of in the limited to course 1972, system a subse- ment. When the no-fault was enacted quent injury in a motor vehicle accident while en incurred prior injury for medical treatment route act was covered work- under the workers’ Rather, compensation. Legislature intended that ers’ system. to be the no-fault costs of such accidents were born 2. Rucker settled in 1972 when the no-fault Because was law Legislature passed, no there was reason act anticipate compensation liability of workers’ an extension incurred a motor vehicle accident otherwise covered References 2d, Compensation 333. Am Jur Workmen’s §§ Ambulances; under Automobiles and the Index to Annotations See Traffic; Compensation. Highway Workers’ 434 Mich 655 Despite opportunities act. numerous no-fault disturb Legislature the decision has never seen fit to do so.

Affirmed. joined by Archer, Cavanagh, dissenting, Justice Justice injuries employ- stated of and in course arise out the of they necessary ment when are the result of and reasonable previous compensable injury. because actions taken of a Where person injured a is in accident en an while route to seek prior compensable injury, medical treatment for a the arising compensable out of that should accident be under the Disability Compensation Workers’ Act. longer good Michigan. is no Rucker law The theories on jurisprudence which it was been based have excised from interpreting meaning "arising the of out of in the course employment. longer of” is Proximate cause no the test for compensability compensation act; under the workers’ nor are "peculiar and increased street risk” or of God” "act rules currently Michigan. discussed in Rucker valid in quasi-course employment incorporates of test the “aris- ing employment out and "in of” the course of” tests. A subsequent injury, aggravation original an whether of the injury injury, compensable or a new and is if distinct it is the primary injury. injury direct natural result of For an subsequent injury job compensable, to an on the also to be it is necessary employment proximately caused the second Rather, injury. injury compensable such an when it arises necessary light out of activities which are reasonable and compensable injury. negligence While a claimant’s in caus- ing injury causation, the second will not break the chain injury, intentional claimant’s conduct which causes the second may regarded expressly conduct impliedly where the be as or prohibited by employer, case, will break the chain. In this trip original compen- claimant’s seek further care for her necessary light sable was both reasonable and original injuries compensable. and thus should also be Boyle, dissenting, quasi-course adopt Justice also would plaintiff’s inju- test to determine whether the compensable ries are under workers’ act. However, required findings remand to the wcab further for finding question of crucial facts. The made no wcab plaintiff’s whether the accident was caused her intentional might regarded having expressly conduct which been impliedly prohibited by employer. her Chrysler Opinion Compensable Injuries — — Compensation Subsequent Workers’ Injuries. en route for in a motor vehicle accident while An incurred compensable prior injury under of a medical treatment Disability Compensation Act is not itself covered Workers’ compensation. workers’ (by Conrad, P.C. Mancini, Schreuder, Kline & Kline), Roger plaintiff. R. for the Schwartz) Stephen Jay (by Lacey for & Jones the defendant. compensat seeks workers’ J. Plaintiff

Griffin, automo incurred ion1 benefits traveling to her from home accident while bile treatment was to receive office where she doctor’s for Nearly injury. prior work-related a Michigan ago, century in Rucker half Smelting Refining Co, 668; 2 & subsequent 808 injury this Court held that circumstances was

sustained under similar compensable not "out of did arise because employment” in the course of within and appeal meaning act.2 In this we are asked of the compensation coverage to include workers’ extend injuries. Taking plaintiff’s automobile accident in 1972 that Rucker was the law into account when the Legislature passed act,3 the no-fault the no-fault and as between which allocated costs noting compensation system, that the workers’ opportunities despite Legislature, numerous to do MCL MCL 418.301; 418.101 et MSA seq.; 17.237(301) MSA 17.237(101) provides: et seq. arising personal injury employee, out of An who receives employer subject in the course of an shall be who injury, paid compensation time of this act provided this act. seq. seq.; et MSA 24.13101 et MCL 500.3101 434 Mich 655 Opinion op the Court holding so, has left undisturbed our we Accordingly, decline to overrule it. we affirm the Appeals. decision of the Court of

i engaged Chrysler’s employ While in defendant April plaintiff 1, 1978, Corrine Dean suffered a injury explosion work-related piece when an hurled a against leg. of metal her Defendant does not dispute injury under the Disability Compensation Workers’ Act. Plaintiff May returned to 19, work 1978, around and was placed on restricted or favored-work status. Plain- report tiff did not 28, 1978, work on June appointment personal order to attend an with her physician to review the results of lab tests and receive further prior treatment in connection with the leg injury.

work-related While en route from physician’s plaintiff home to her office sustained multiple injuries in a one-car motor vehicle acci- apparently flipped dent in which her car over a concrete barrier. disability compensation

In addition to workers’ workplace leg injury, for the which is not con- plaintiff coverage tested, seeks under the act 28, sustained the June motor hearing vehicle accident.4 A referee found although "plaintiff’s injury, travelling while to the compensa- doctor’s office [did] not constitute a new injury consequence origi- ble ... it [was] 4We note that a "aggravation” distinction has been made between preexisting compensable of a subsequent and a which is prior injury. Larson, distinct from the work-related See 1 Workmen’s Compensation Law, 13.11, p past 3-348.91. In the we have held that aggravation preexisting occupational of a compensable. disease is also Grey Foundry Braxton v Chevrolet Corp, Iron ofDiv General Motors (1976). However, 242 NW2d 420 Ms. Dean does not allege injuries the she received in the automobile accident were "aggravation” prior leg injury. work-related Chrysler Opinion of the Court therefore, . . . disability the [was]

nal and injury The wcab therefrom.” as resultant compensable to this relevant not modifications with affirmed appeal. the panel unanimous

Subsequently, curiam per unpublished in an reversed Appeals controlled, Rucker the Court Finding that opinion.5 in the auto- the sustained concluded in the of and not arise out accident did mobile they because employment plaintiff’s course the result of natural the direct were injury. primary to this Court application initial Plaintiff’s (1988). was denied. appeal leave to for reconsidera- However, filed a motion plaintiff to appeal. leave tion, granted we then ii supra, work- suffered a plaintiff In employ while in defendant’s connected injury. treated the who and was sent doctor in a Afterwards, plaintiff home doctor sent the insurer. expense of the defendant’s taxicab at collision, in a route, involved en cab was While In plaintiff’s eye. resulting in an occa- which accident determining whether out of and "arose plaintiff’s eye injury sioned the the Rucker employment,” of his in the course arise general rule Court stated out of mind, to the rational apparent there "[w]hen circumstances, a of all

upon consideration under conditions connection between causal performed, and required to be the work which 10,1988. August Docket decided No. 434 Mich 655 [May- Opinion the of Court test, resulting injury. the Under this if the injury be can seen to have followed as a natural incident contemplated by of the work reasonable to been have a person familiar with the whole situa- exposure tion as a result of the nature of the the occasioned employment, then it arises 'out of’ the employment. But it injury excludes an which fairly cannot traced the as a proximate contributing cause and which comes from a hazard which the workman would have exposed equally apart been employment.” the 671, Appleford Kimmel, Mich quoting [300 8, 12; (1941).] 296 NW 861 Rucker Court held unanimously there was "no causal prior connection” between injury work-related and the suffered in the injury added). taxicab collision. 300 Mich 672 (emphasis Although Rucker is virtually indistinguishable, that Rucker plaintiff urges this case longer no controls. It is claimed that Rucker was overruled Awkerman, decision Whetro v plurality to the extent Rucker required proximate cause between Whetro, employment. In three members of this Court stated "that the law Michigan no longer requires today establish ment of a proximately causal connection between the employment and the injury to entitle a claim Id. ant to at compensation.” 242.6 reject We that Whetro had such argument respect effect with a subsequent occurs away workplace. from the Aside from the Whetro fact that plurality opinion prece- supported reasoning Justice Black "would” have of the lead opinion "question in Whetro had the previously not been However, question . . . .” decided series since the had been "settled Court,” unanimous decisions of this Justice providing rationale for the fourth Black’s vote affirmance was the Court finds merely judgment to "attain some of a case in which groups itself fractured . into indecisive . . 383 Mich 248. Chrysler Opinion question not address dent,7 simply does subsequent a second such compensability injury. from Rucker

Whetro on two distinguishable Whetro First, injured claimant was grounds. "wherein building destroyed a tornado working employer . . . Id. .” for his he was 239. added.)8 Thus, employee unlike the (Emphasis in Whetro case, Rucker and in this the claimant in business engaged employer’s his actually was injured.9 when he was

Secondly, Whetro’s not on a second or focus was rather, was question the there subsequent injury; first, compensa- only, injury was whether case, contrast, the issue ble. By subsequent Rucker, injury is a second or whether Accordingly, Whetro did not over- compensable. is by implication. or expressly rule compensation, Pro- In on his treatise workmen’s rules recognizes causation fessor Larson not are primary injury applicable workplace should principles which the same as the causation or that occurs subsequent injury to a second apply As explains: Larson away workplace. from the causa- must be observed between A distinction agree ground "majority on a for decision A of the Court must People binding precedent v future for decisions.” order to make that (1973). 155, Anderson, also 205 NW2d 461 See Groen 389 Mich (1937), 135, 140; ing McCambridge, v 282 Mich 275 NW 795 Breckon v 251, 278; (1970), Co, In re 174 NW2d 836 Franklin Fuel 383 Mich (1971), Estate, 334, 336; Negri v Mich 183 NW2d 220 Curzenski 105, 109; Apportionment Slotkin, 244 NW2d 98 224, 249-250; 1982, 413 321 NW2d Wayne Bd Co of 615 Comm’rs — Co, case, Huge employee "killed companion Emery was In trip staying he while a business motel in which was when the his Whetro, supra at destroyed by added). . . . .” employer the tornado was (emphasis 239-240 9 Rucker, argument rejected supra the Court In at subsequent injury, still, under employee the time of employer. of his control op Opinion the Court affecting primary

tion rules . . . and injury range causation rules that determine how far the compensable consequences carried, once the connected with the is primary injury causally employment. primary As it injury, to the has been "arising” unique quite shown that test is a one cause, concepts legal unrelated common-law and will be shown later employee’s that the own contributory negligence is ordinarily an inter- vening preventing compensability. cause initial question But when the compensability whether subsequent should be extended to a injury aggravation way primary related to the some injury, the rules that come into play are essen- tially upon based concepts of "direct and natu- results,” ral and of claimant’s own conduct as an independent intervening Larson, cause. Work- [1 Law, 13.11, Compensation men’s p 3-502. Empha- sis added.] "The basic rule” to be applied to second according cases to Professor Larson subsequent is that a injury, aggrava- whether original tion of aor new and distinct if it the injury, compensable is direct and natu- ral result of a primary injury. [Id., p Emphasis 3-503. added.]

However, required Larson is to concede that the "basic rule” is inadequate justify compensation to for because, most second injuries "in the strict sense, of none the consequential injuries we are concerned with are in the course of employment Id., . 13.11(d), Thus, . . .” p 3-542. Larson finds it § "necessary to contrive” a new "quasi-course of employment” concept for analyzing the diffi- more cult cases:

By expression [quasi-course this employment] is meant activities by employee undertaken the Chrysler Opinion of the Court which, although they following upon his of the space limits the time and place take outside employ- be considered and would not employment, are neverthe- purposes, for usual ment activities that sense to the less related they that activities or reasonable necessary are for the com- undertaken but not have been would injury. pensable [Id.] "quasi-course explanation of his

In further approach, employment” Larson states: suggest point is no intention at There out is drawn here worked formulation actual cases. On the pronouncements from the developed opinions no reported have contrary, problem. analysis of the How- satisfactory overall ever, holdings, one can if one looks at actual proposition that support for the find considerable developed not out principle pattern of here on the body the main case law of line with subject. [Id., p 3-546.] may contends, true, the dissent

While tally courts other that a of the decisions slight majority jurisdictions line show that would up approach Larson, taken Professor with principled hardly basis alone could serve as that for reversal of reasoning the rule in Rucker.10Such usually Although have found Professor Larson states courts merely prior injury nexus because the occasioned a sufficient causal doctor, Larson, 13.13, 3-564, supra, p many trip to the See, present. stronger causal nexus was Larson a much cases cited Co, Taylor e.g., (1963) doctor, 379 P2d 217 v Centex Construction Kan (the supervisor report him to a certain directed claimant’s gasoline company pay, trip company was on time trip provided by employer, accident occurred Associates, work); returning N Charles Clark while claimant was 1978) (the (Miss, Robinson, employer authorized 357 So 2d 924 Ltd suggested a doctor and offered to the claimant should see and pay missed); Corp, App Coal time Bettasso v Snow-Hill Ind for the (1963) (the employer placed in an the claimant NE2d as a result of involved an accident which was then ambulance 434 Mich Opinion the of disregard duty would our to construe a so statute give Legislature’s as to effect to the intent. As McKinstry Valley Clinic, PC, stated v OB-GYN (1987): 167, 190-191; 405 NW2d 88 interpretation statutes, "In the legislative the all-important controlling will is the deed, In- factor. is frequently stated in the effect legislature intention of the constitutes the law. Accordingly, primary rule of construction of statutes is to ascertain and declare the intention legislature, carry to such intention into degree. effect to the fullest A construction adopted should not such nullify, destroy, as to or defeat legislature.” intention of [Quoting 73 Am 2d, Statutes, 145, p Jur § 351.] period many years, When, Legisla- over a acquiesced ture has in this Court’s construction of judicial power change statute, inter- pretation ought great to be with exercised re- straint. On more than one our occasion Court has quoted approval with the statement that stare decisis especially applicable

"is where the construction placed on by previous a statute decisions has been acquiesced long legislature, by its contin- change use or language ued failure to construed, statute so power change the law interpreted being regarded, in such circum- stances, as one be exercised solely legisla- Muskegon Co, ture.” Co Power [Consumers 243, 251; quoting CJS, Courts, 214, pp 388-390. See also In re slowing company doctor); Augustine down for the v NYS Elmira (1978) (a Facility, depart- Correctional 64 AD2d NYS2d employer ment tion). ordered the claimant to submit to an examina- Chrysler 665 op Opinion the Court 101, Estate, 107; 1 343 Mich 72 NW2d

Clayton (1955).][11] prolonged sug- acquiescence

To the extent that given approval gests legislative the construction provision, statutory by is it rein- Court to a this statutory Legislature forced reenacts change. language Detroit, In Smith v 388 without (1972), 300 we said: 637, 650-651; 202 NW2d Mich is the rule that where persuasive "Even more provisions of a statute have been con basic provisions and these are strued subsequently courts legislature, may it reenacted legislature that the acted with knowl be assumed legisla edge of the Court’s decisions that carry statute to ture intended the reenacted Court’s [Emphasis origina it.” interpretation with l.][12] 11" policy, usually most is because in matters 'Stare decisis wise applicable important rule of law be settled than it is more that a matter of serious that right. commonly true where the error it be This is even settled concern, provided can be had correction ” 510, 517; Farrell,

legislation.’ 170 NW2d Abendschein v (1969) (citations omitted, quoting v Oil & Gas Burnet Coronado J., (1932) (Brandeis, Co, 443; 393; 52 Ct 76 L Ed US S Estate, supra dissenting). Clayton at Consumers See also In re Awkerman, Co, supra supra Muskegon v Power at Whetro Co v affirmance). (Black, J., Bank, 577, 631-632; Michigan Sheppard In v Nat’l Dethmers, concurring, wrote: Justice NW2d 614 Chief change statutory provision in the action was taken in is re-enacted without Where a presumed language, it must upon

light judicial placed prior it and with the construction Supreme adopt construction. When the intent has period such placed interpretation on a statute over a considerable indulge assumption may judicial years in the interpretation legislature content with be- has been independent prerogative to to exercise its cause of its failure provision. omitted.] restate the [Citations Co, 513, 520; 158 Magreta See also NW2d 473 interpretation the Ambassador Steel (" (1968) legislature ... to this Court’s silence of the 'The only . . as consent of its intent . can be construed ”). accuracy interpretation’ of that 434 Mich 655 Opinion of the Court only Legislature many Not has the convened times since Rucker was decided but the Legislature on numerous occasions has revised and Legislature amended However, the act.13 has change never seen fit to make a substantive in the employment” require- "out of the course of any ment, way nor has it undermined in application Court’s construction and of that lan- guage nearly century decided half a ago.14 today

Moreover, we believe that our decision Legislature consistent with the intent of the mani- by during past fested A its reform efforts the decade. purpose comprehensive 1980 and 1981 compensation system15 revisions of the workers’ modify expansive interpreta- was to overturn or placed upon by Although tions the act this Court.16 13See, e.g., 245; 175; 317; 357; 1943 PA 1984 PA 1954 PA 1969 PA 1980 PA 200; 304; 103; 1981 PA 1985 PA 1987 PA 28. Disability Compensation (1st The originated Workers’ Act in 1912 Sess) years, Ex PA 10. statutory provision Over the the relevant that, requiring the original compensable, to be the must arise out of and in employment, largely course of unchanged. has remained The provided: statute employe personal If an . injury arising an . . receives a out of and in the by employer course of his ... he paid compensation

shall be in the manner and to the extent provided hereinafter .... provide, The statute was part, amended 1943 PA 245 to in "An employe, personal injury arising who receives a out of and in the employment by employer course of his an . . . .” again 175; however, statute was amended once 1954 PA phrase changed. relevant was not 317, Legislature In 1969 PA revised and consolidated the compensation provided: workers’ receives a act. employee, Section 301 "An who personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment by employer an . . . .” 357; 192; 193; 194; 1980 PA 1981 PA 1981 PA 1981 PA 1981 PA 1981 PA 195; 196; 197; 198; 199; 1981 PA 1981 PA 1981 PA 1981 PA 200; 1981 PA 1981 PA 1981 PA 203. 16 general, Salter, In disability compensation, see Booms & Workers’ 1035, Wayne L R 1053-1054 Chrysler Corp Dean Opinion of payable to benefits workers dollar amount compensation eligible increased, can there was Legislature also intended that be no doubt through efforts to narrow 1980 and reform its Against eligibility qualifications.17 and restrict light background, of the fact Legislature the rule fit to disturb has never seen we it because to overrule we decline Legislature the result we intended believe that today. reach

m longer controls the that Rucker no To hold only require disposition would case disregard legislative but would have intent we responsibility usurping legislative the effect of system important respect. no-fault When the controlling Rucker was was enacted subsequent proposition that a law; it for the stood accident while in a motor vehicle incurred prior compensable en route for treatment of injury compensation. not covered workers’ Legislature’s Thus, of costs as be- allocation sys- and workers’ tween no-fault that the no- an tems was made with awareness18 1980, decisions, prior down to handed That a line of Court’s compensation sweep "expanded age” the of workers’ cover- and broadened (On acknowledged Motors in McClure v General was (1980) 203; 191, (opinion Rehearing), of NW2d 631 289 J.). decisions, regarded by Ryan, Justice list Court’s For a of this Ryan 203, effect, having n 4. see id. at had that 17 Section, 1044, 7, 1981; January Analysis 1980 SB See Senate (statement VanderLaan); of Senator Journal of the Senate 3439-3440 (statement Welborn); 821-822 of Senator of the Senate 1980 Journal Salter, supra, pp n 1053-1054. Booms & 16 also judicial existing Legislature presumed of is to be aware The Wayne legislation. passing interpretations Jeruzal of law when 527, Comm’r, 87 NW2d Co Drain Mich 434 Mich 655 Opinion the Court of system of fault insurance would shoulder the cost such accidents.19 reasoning joining

Justice Levin’s to form a majority for the result McClure v General (On Rehearing), 191, Motors off-premises NW2d lunchtime which involved directly applicable

accident, to explained, instant case. As he then Under the case law extant when the no-fault enacted, insurance was employers act were generally off-premises liable for injuries lunchtime thus, act, under the the motor vehicle insurer family of worker a ordinar- member would ily bear the entire cost motor vehicle during period. the lunch An today extension compensation coverage worker’s tomobile to lunchtime au- would, because of 3109 of the § act, no-fault allow the motor vehicle carrier compensation pay- deduction for worker’s benefits reallocation, able and work probably thus un- Legislature, foreseen ance cost of insur- reparations for such from the no- accidents system fault system. worker’s This Court should not disturb the cost allocation extant when the no-fault act was enacted. explained, Justice Levin further It is no say purpose answer to that because of 3109 towas reduce the cost of no-fault insur- ance, a reallocation of the cost of motor [such] away system vehicle accidents furthers from the no-fault Legislature’s purpose. legislative argues Legislature presumably The dissent aware longer good passed that Rucker was no law the no- disagree. thing presume Legislature fault act. We It is one decisions, prior entirely aware unanimous such as suggest Legislature plurality another decision, discerns that a Whetro, had, implicitly such as case overruled a which precedent passed, thirty 1972 when the no-fault act was stood as years. Chrysler Corp Archer, J. have been based may decision embodied existing regarding the costs to the assumptions not compensation system that did include

worker’s injuries generally. automobile payment for [such] compensation liability to of worker’s An extension previously covered injuries automobile [such] greater part of impose system on that would reparations providing insurance of burden through the motor compensated injuries heretofore system. insurance vehicle 229.] [Id. off-premises case of the lunchtime

As overturning McClure, addressed accident charge would, time, to the for the first Rucker compensation system the cost workers’ en accidents while in motor vehicle sustained route for treatment of prior compensable injury. a in 1972 was settled law Because Rucker passed, Legislature had no no-fault act was anticipate an extension workers’ reason compensation liability such incurred in by the covered vehicle accident otherwise motor by plaintiff The advocated no-fault act. result necessarily of the costs work a reallocation would such motor vehicle accidents associated with workers’ the no-fault and between Legisla- systems, clear direction without ture. authority reasons, and on the

For these affirm the decision of we Appeals. JJ.,

Riley, C.J., Brickley, con- and Levin J. Griffin, curred with presented (dissenting). J. issue

Archer, compensable, employee who suffers whether an injured subsequently on-the-job injury in a to seek medical en route vehicular accident while 434 Mich [May- Dissenting Opinion Archek, prior treatment for that compensable injury, may receive for the injuries arising out of the vehicular accident. Michigan Smelting that Rucker v & I believe

Refining Co, 300 Mich no longer expresses present state of the law in would, therefore, this area. I reverse the decision of the Court Appeals and hold that out of and in the of employment” course "arise[] when they are result of reasonable and neces- sary actions taken because of previous a compensa- 17.237(301). 418.301; ble MCL injury. MSA Where an is injured individual an occurring accident while en route to seek medical treatment for a prior compensable injury, the injuries arising out of that accident should compensable under Workers’ Disability Compensation Act. MCL seq.; seq. 418.101 et et 17.237(101) MSA

i Questions regarding whether a claimant’s injury out of and in the course of employment,” "aris[es] 418.301; MCL 17.237(301), MSA can be character- questions law, ized as fact, questions of or mixed questions law, of fact and depending on the facts Koschay Pontiac, Inc, v Barnett case. 223, 191 NW2d 334 The issue in appeal upon calls the Court to determine an issue of law. We take the wcab’s findings of fact as conclusive absent fraud. 6, §28; Const art 17.237(861). 418.861; MCL MSA Those findings indicate that Ms. Dean compensable suffered injury when she initially injured right her leg1 her automobile accident occurred while she was en April injury compensable, The wcab found as fact that was noting April underlying was conceded . . . that "[i]t event [the injury] occupational origin.” 185. WCABO Chrysler Opinion Dissenting Archer, injury.2 The for her initial to seek route treatment findings for her treatment to seek in her decision Dean acted indicate that Ms. also initial reasonably.3 of deter- the task Thus, is left with this Court relationship: mining jural the fact that Given seeking reasonably for a treatment Ms. Dean was injured she was subsequent accident, did her automobile arise out employment? course of her of and in the urges majority to that the answer question 1942 decision in this Court’s lies points majority out, Rucker As the Rucker. indistinguishable from this its facts almost Rucker, however, cannot follow I believe we case. express of this the law that case does because Though the books remained on Rucker has state. two for almost 1942, it a dead letter has been since which that deci- the theories on decades because explicitly have been excised based sion was "arising meaning interpreting jurisprudence ” employment. course of out of and very facts Rucker are similar The facts of injured at work Arthur Rucker case. leg. slag pot em- his His full of struck ployer office for treatment. him to a doctor’s sent treatment, sent the doctor After examination Rucker homeward expense taxi, of the in a at the way employer’s home, the taxi insurer. On the involved in an accident Rucker rode was which eye. left He sued Rucker the use of his which cost to Dr. Ganesh’s office received WCABO esh’s prior compensation adjustor, treatment The board The wcab opinion injury] 189. in the course and was not found that on June than stated, [that justified we do that of Mr. plaintiff "[w]e for "treatment who reached certainly give greater . . . .” 1987 WCABO suffered scope 28, 1978, of her continuing problems his conclusion Lovernick, the residuals Ms. Dean was 189. weight that of an . . . .” 1987 on her defendant’s with Dr. medical Gan way her Mich Archer, compensation bene- for and was awarded workers’ injuries. This fits for his Court, however, against accident automobile ruling In that award. reversed explicitly Rucker, this relied on Mr. opinion "pecu- three theories. our We based rule,” risk on the "act of liar and street increased rule,” to recover God and on the notion prove disability a worker must proximately employment-associated risk caused injury.4 Appleford Kimmel, In this Court cited upon and relied Mich NW proximate-causation of a that case’s enunciation "peculiar test and the and increased street risk rule.”5 fairly injury which cannot be traced to "[A]n contributing proximate cause

employment and from a hazard to which the which comes exposed apart equally workman would have been employment. danger from the The causative must peculiar to the work and not common to the neighborhood. It must be incidental to the charac- independent ter of the business and not relation of master servant.” [300 citing Appleford Emphasis at 12-13. added.] there existed "no connec- We held causal leg injury plant tion between the received at eye injury and the received the taxicab colli- that, it, agree majority put 4 I with the as Professor Larson "[a] affecting between causation rules distinction must observed primary injury . . . and causation rules that determine how far the Larson, range compensable consequences is carried . Work Law, 13.11, p primary Compensation men’s 3-502. flaws One ante, pp it fails to this See 661- Rucker is that observe distinction. 662. adopted This version of the "street risk rule” was first in this state School, Michigan Training v Home & 231 Mich Pearce (1925). adopted the test from the 1916 NW 699 The Pearce Court (1916). McNicol, case In re 215 Mass 102 NE 697 Massachusetts Chrysler Corp Archer, Opinion by Dissenting broken, and the was of causation sion. The chain injury eye to which the 'from a hazard came exposed apart equally have been would workman employment cit- ing Appleford found that Ruck- 12. Because we "contributing proximate job cause” not a er’s injury, a taxicab accident was the risk of of his peculiar employment and that

to Rucker’s not increased were risks of automotive eye inju- employment, we held that his Rucker’s his of and in the course of not arise out ries did employment. in Rucker on further our decision We based Thier v in such cases as of God” rule followed "act 355; 178 "Deci Widdifield, 210 Mich NW by Thier v is controlled in the instant case sion employee Widdiñeld, was killed . . . an where during lightning of his the course a stroke employment. case, in that as we This court held here, was not one the accident must hold 'arising employment.” 300 Mich 673. out of’ "exposed by the nature of was not Because Rucker particular danger,” we this Id. denied benefits. longer the test for com- is no

Proximate cause Compen- Disability pensability the Workers’ under "peculiar and in- are the Act. Neither sation creased street risk” rules still valid or "act of God” Rucker not follow because in the state. We should longer good law. Rucker is no Awkerman, 235; 174 In Whetro history Court reviewed purpose found of workers’ previously proximate ceased had causation determining appropriate being test in the course out of and arises whether requires longer employment. The law "no proximately causal connection of a establishment 434 Mich by Opinion Dissenting Archer, J. employment to entitle and the between compensation. . . . can said [I]t be a claimant employment today injury, of the is the occasion that if the proximate though cause, com- even not paid.” pensation 242-243. 383 Mich should analysis a Thus, that formed basis causational explicitly expunged in Rucker was for our decision from the law 1970. longer say, we did

Further, no it is correct accident are that automobile they out of risks if do not arise not Michigan employment. "peculiar a worker’s to” recognizes compensability of "street risk” law injuries employee employment an causes

where through exposed to an work-related travel to be though injury-causing risk, risk was not even that peculiar employment. 1916, In this Court to the during compelled employees are "[w]here held the course of their streets, to travel about to us to be unreasonable does seem danger being by say to cars, struck street every description automobiles, traffic of of.” Kunze v Detroit be taken account should 435, 438; Co, 158 NW Shade Tree (1916) (compensation a foreman who was awarded traveling by while between struck streetcar sites). job began long line of which hold Kunze cases6 discharge duties, em in the of his "[i]f, upon highway ployee required or to to travel transportation, and while so use other means of performance doing, his em in the of a service to ployer, caused he accidental suffers compensation.” traveling, he is entitled to his so Angell, Shreve, & Wilhelm Wilhelm (1931) (compensation was 648, 652; 234 NW 433 Whetro, supra significant prodigy, Kunze n a list of see For 3. Chrysler Corp Archer, by a train who was struck an architect awarded returning meet- home from a work-related while ing).7

Although caused were Arthur Rucker’s street, found his case this Court risks by case, Thier v "act of God” be controlled authority However, the Rucker at Widdifield.8 673. 1970, after this ceased in cases of "act of God” Court’s itly necessary prove explic fact, In Whetro in Whetro. decision longer Whetro, it is no Thier. After overruled claimant a worker’s for not establish— Arthur Rucker could what danger proximately caused that an employm arising peculiarly the nature of ent.9 explicit rule announced that make I would longer Cessante ratione no valid.

in Rucker is ipsa legis, Rucker was To the extent et lex.10 cessat Thier, Whetro overruled overruled when not Rucker, not decide should now.11 should be case. commonly as the "actual known in Kunze is The rule announced Larson, §9.40, pp supra, 3-73. Professor 3-67 to rule.

street-risk” Larson describes the the ture of the employment occasions this test as follows: "[I]f street, are the risks of employee’s the risks of the street use and, quite the na employment, immaterial whether . . . '[i]t expo only employment continuous or occasional involves ” Id., 3-67, citing p dangers Dennis White of the street.’ sure to & 1917 Law (HL) Co, App Rep 10 BWCC280. Cas of and in the did not arise out a worker’s death Thier held that lightning while he was struck course of his standing employer’s doorway of the barn. in the authority argues because majority insufficient Whetro opinion. rely majority We and there is no was divided the Court the the "actual” nonetheless, treatment of plurality opinion because its in Whetro precedent merely established rule followed street risk plurali- opinion, in the concurred which Justice and because Black’s reasoning plurality’s result, question validity of the ty’s does not proximate tests. cause rejects God” and the "act of as it insofar Justice regarding express specifically firm views his Black wrote Whetro’,s application strictly proactive to call for a decisis and stare rule. ceasing, Black’s itself also ceases.” the law reason of the law "The (5th ed), p Dictionary 207. Law published opinion Court or of this in a cited Rucker has been 434 Mich 655 Archer, J. agree majority’s fully

I with the conclusion unchanged Legisla- controlling precedent, by the lightly ture, should not be amended under I am doctrine of stare decisis. unconvinced principles dictate a result of stare decisis different despite majority’s argument here to the con- trary. pronouncing In of the rule demise an- only making nounced explicit we would be long implicit. that which Stare had been important promoting decisis is an consistency doctrine for principles; it in settled was never in- corpse interred, to resurrect a doctrinal tended undisturbed, two almost decades. We have past "arising often in the modified the definition of employment,” out of and in the course of even legislative action, the absence of whenever new developments theories, patterns law, new in the fact new proven previous decisions to un- have e.g., Crilly workable, unfair, See, or anachronistic. (1958), Ballou, 303; v 353 Mich 91 493 NW2d changed regarding which compensability in the law the state by horseplay,

of caused noting upon previ- after cases which the ous rule was based had been overruled and review- Appeals of since our 1955 decision in Lauder v Paul M (1955). Foundry, 159, 167; Wiener 72 NW2d 159 Where it 1955, generally alongside Appleford cited it was support before cited long-since "peculiar and the street discredited increased risk rule”: "To 'out of’ the arise sustained performed; must have a causal connection with the work to be it must employment, be one which follows as a natural incident to the it, connected with and not the of a result risk disassociated there- Sears, Co, 219, 229; v from.” Carner 263 Roebuck & 59 NW2d (1953). previously questioned validity This Court has of the rule See, Appleford e.g., announced and followed in Rucker. Thomas v Inc, 630, Refrigeration, Certified n Mich NW2d 378 (1974), Carner, questioned validity supra where we and Meehan Apartments, v Marion Manor Mich light of Both Whetro. Carner and Meehan relied on Rucker and Appleford. Chrysler Corp Dean Archer, ing the previous how rule failed comport with the principles policies behind workers’ com- pensation law.

ii Given Rucker’s ceasing area, authority this I would look to Professor Larson’s treatise on work- ers’ compensation to resolve this case. major- too, ity, looks to Professor guidance Larson for but fails to apply Larson’s rules to the facts of this case. The ignores majority the fact that Professor regards Larson like Ms. Dean’s as the paradigmatic example compensable conse- quences of work-related injuries.12

According to treatise, Professor Larson’s "[t]he basic rule is that a subsequent injury, whether an aggravation of the original or a new and distinct injury, compensable if it is the direct and natural result of compensable in- primary Larson, jury.” Compensation, 13.11, Workmen’s 3-503. p The Court of Appeals adopted Professor Larson’s in Schaefer v Wil- analysis point liamston Schools, Community App 26; 323 NW2d 577

As out, Professor points Larson this "direct and natural result” rule is easily applied in a variety circumstances, such as where a worker fur- ther injured by complications from the initial compensable injury, where a compensable in- jury exacerbates a preexisting medical condition. In those situations is easy to characterize secondary injuries as "direct and natural results” supra, injuries. Larson, See 13.11(a), (b), 3-503 to 3-535. See also Braxton v pp § Chevrolet Grey Iron Foundry Div of General Mo- Corp, tors (1976) 685; Mich 242 NW2d 420 Larson, supra, 13.13, p See 3-564. § 434 . by Archer, Opinion Dissenting occupational (aggravation preexisting disease a Darling compensable); Co, Klein v Len H is also (1922) (benefits were NW granted died of an where a worker emotional employee a death of shock fellow caused hands); Co, v W E Wood his Adams (1918) compensable (reinjury aof 169 NW compensable broken arm also during return claimant’s travel when caused ing advice). company to work doctor’s grant order, However, as is from our evident present presented do not so clear a case. facts here Ms. are We must decide whether Dean’s a workplace "direct and result” her in- natural despite jury, of a direct connection lack causal injuries. analyzing In between first and second question, "quasi-course-of-employ- I find the proposed persua- test Professor Larson ment” majority this test fails sive. The cites and then signifi- explanation apply and, it without most offering cantly, without test or framework to place. majority take its forty-year-old The best the can offer conceptually

case that was debunked ago. decades incorpo- quasi-course employment test "arising out of” and the "in the

rates course ” compensable It tests. makes following employee activities undertaken which, upon although place take they his space employ- outside time and limits of ment, employment not be would considered re- purposes, are nevertheless activities usual they are lated to the the sense that necessary would not reasonable activities that been but for the have undertaken 13.11(d), [Larson, p injury. supra, 3-542.] Chrysler Corp 679 Opinion Dissenting Archer, J. required is different in this test link The causal injury- required law. For in tort that on-the-job injury subsequent also to be com- to an employment necessary pensable, injury. However, proximately the second cause employment for” cause than a "but must be more following injury injury. An of that second compensable compensable injury is also initial are reason- activities which it arises out of light necessary and able injury. causing negligence

The claimant’s injury of causa- the chain will not break second which intentional conduct tion, a claimant’s but injury that conduct will where a second causes impliedly prohib- expressly regarded "may p employer.” Id., 3-543. ited quasi-course-of-employment apply to test To April given 1 case, that her I take as Ms. Dean’s injury trip compensable,13 Dr. her Ganesh’s was purpose of treatment 28 was for office on June injuries,14 her decision and her work-related day was reason- treatment seek Dr. Ganesh’s injuries.15 light initial of those able findings, light to decide it is for us In of these necessary only for a it is reasonable whether person to seek medical situation in Ms. Dean’s 13 compensable, April was fact that The wcab found as underlying event noting . . . that [the was conceded that "[i]t origin.” occupational 185. April injury] WCABO 28,1978, way Dean was on her Ms. found that on June The board residuals of an "treatment for the Dr. office for to received WCABO Ganesh’s scope employment . . . .” of her in the course and 189. weight stated, certainly give greater Dr. The wcab "[w]e continuing problems her plaintiff with opinion suffered [that Ganesh’s prior Lovernick, the defendant’s injury] Mr. we do that of than that medical compensation adjuster, his conclusion who reached justified 189. . . . .” 1987 WCABO was not treatment Archer, J. injury.16 In other for a work-related

treatment relationship jural words, we must determine trips for com- to seek medical attention between pensable injuries in terms of the compensation statute. workers’ following reasons, I find that a of a For the would trip office to seek treatment to the doctor’s compensable injury activity is an is reason- light compensa- necessary of the initial able injury. ble Dean suffered an which

When Corrine employment out of and in the course of her arose on April Corporation duty Chrysler 1, 1978, had a provide necessary to her with medical care or expenses her medical reimburse her for occasioned reasonable 418.315(1); injury. MCL MSA 17.237(315)(1). required duty was both This by contract, the terms of the statute and since state’s workers’ statute can be said incorporated employment to into an contract entered into and executed within this state. See Doehler-Jarvis, 510; 100 NW2d Wilson v (1960); Co, 284 226 Thomas v Parker Rust Proof (1938); Rapids 260; 504 v Mich 279 NW Grand (1922). Crocker, 189 NW 221 Ms. right, under and Dean had both statute employment contract, her her own if to seek medical care provide

Chrysler failed to it. MCL 17.237(315X1). 418.315(1);MSA duty Furthermore, im- Ms. Dean was under a posed by employment statute, her and hence contract, to seek medical attention order to damages April injuries. mitigate of her 1 See " 16 point As Professor Larson noted: 'Reasonable’ at this relates used, Larson, category activity of itself.” the to method but to 13.11(d), Thus, supra, p inquire 3-542. we do not into reasonable § particular day, Dean’s decision to seek treatment on this ness Ms. or her decision bus, to rather than take a or the manner drive which she drove. Chrysler 681 Dean Archer, 172; 312 Co, Mich Leather v Whitehall Bower (1981). duty employees Injured have a NW2d surgical proper treat- medical to submit Any to do so will refusal unreasonable employer’s ment. compensate obligation release injury. Bos- v American Kolbas work-related for a (1936); Mining 616; 267 NW Co, 275 Mich ton 1; 2 Co, 301 Mich Coombs v Kirsh Corp, (1942); Dyer Motors v General 27 NW2d trip office to seek

Thus, to a doctor’s Ms. Dean’s April reasonable was both care for her injuries. light necessary Given the of those finding to Dr. en route that Ms. Dean was wcab’s treating purpose work- office for the Ganesh’s injuries, I hold would related resulting are also accident her automobile compensable.17_ that, agree majority’s in the words Again, I with the observation suggest Larson, point "[tjhere at this is no intention

of Professor that nouncements pro from the [quasi-course is drawn test] Larson, Compensation, Í Workmen’s cases.” actual 13.11(d),p 3-546. However, agree that "if one looks Professor Larson I also with proposi- support holdings, for the one can find considerable the actual developed line pattern principle is not out of here tion that the with the main subject.” body Id. of case law on the 265, 271; Corp, See, Plating example, 338 Mich v Rives for Adkins compensation (1953), upheld the denial 117 where we bicycling injury aggravated in a accident. who an industrial worker We noted employ- absolutely Adkin’s no link between that there was that, in bicycling, have dictated "common sense would and ment condition, exposure.” refrain from such his he Co, 673; 169 NW 845 Compare v W E Wood with Adams of a compensation for the exacerbation was awarded where claimant when the compensable in a street car accident caused Thus, recognized past that way have in the we on his to work. was upon dependent secondary injuries some compensability the reasonable employment. relationship the between Schools, supra Community Williamston See also Schaefer v applied result” Appeals and natural the "direct the Court of where consequential injury. The Court for a and allowed test principle, consistent with "for the noted it stands cited Adkins and view, prove that his subse- had to . . . the claimant Larson’s by Archer, holding puts majority’s in a clear

The this Court minority have addressed this issue. of courts that opinions published discuss- Most courts that have ing consequential compensability injuries on-the-job injuries of a claim- have ruled favor injured seek medical attention for ant en route to prior injuries.18 in his trea- Professor Larson notes p employee § 13.13, "[w]hen tise at 3-564, injuries of an accident suffers additional because journey in the of a to a doctor’s office course compensable injury, occasioned the additional injuries compensable generally . . . .”19 are held quent injury intervening primary injuries the direct and natural result of his were independent his not act as an and that own conduct did (Emphasis original.) . . . in the cause complete agreement majority 18 I in that it is the am with the Legislature intent of our interpretations that controls our decision and not the However, jurisdictions. of other decisions of other light interpretation courts throw on the of this state’s statute. Wola Chrysler Corp, 164; nin v 7 NW2d 257 following following adopted analyses states cases have recognize injuries during seeking which occasioned the course of prior compensable injuries compensable. treatment for sas: (1963) (automobile are also Kan Co, 130; Taylor v Centex 191 Kan 379 P2d 217 Construction injuries compensable accident are when the acci happened returning appointment dent compensable eye injury 408 A2d 1289 claimant was an from an while where examined); Zayre Corp, was Maine: Moreau v 1979) (Me, (compensation was when the awarded returning injured in an automobile accident while appointment with the doctor who examined a work-related hand Associates, Robinson, injury); Mississippi: Charles N Clark Ltd v 1978) (an (Miss, employee’s compensable So 2d 924 death where it returning was caused in an doctor’s accident from the automobile while suggested appointment employer for treatment of a aggravated by employment); Jersey: Camp back condition Lockheed New v Electronics, (1981) 535; Super (compen NJ 429 A2d 615 granted sation was inflicted in an automobile accident occurring returning while home from treatment administered treating Shattuck, prior injuries); authorized doctor for work-related New York: (1960) Kearney (compensa AD2d 207 NYS2d 722 pain on-the-job injury tion was awarded where to a the contributed pom. slip occurring during journey and fall home on the advice of employer’s physician); Augustine v NYS Elmira Correctional (1978) (automobile Facility, 64 AD2d 410 NYS2d 141 accident during trip were occurred accident employer to the doctor’s office at the direction of the with an in connection application prior disability); for benefits for a work-related Chrysler 683 Dean V Archer, in his treatise indicates

Professor Larson trip to during a a accident a fall or automobile suffi usually been considered office has doctor’s employment related to ciently causally was the injury a work-connected fact mere any necessity for without journey, cause showing way in some contrib the first course, prior if the the fall or accident. Of to uted to the second acci any way contributes pain dent, stronger, when case that much may played have drugs or a weakened member 13.13, supra, pp to [Larson, 3-567 part. a 3-569.][20] (1986) 743; McElroy, 1 Mass 494 NE2d In re 397 Massachusetts: (compensation granted for sustained in an automobile was an and with a en route to obtain examination consultation accident on-the-job injury); private physician regarding an back California: Bd, 872; App Compensation Appeal 48 3d Workmens’ Cal Laines v (1975) granted Rptr (compensation where the em- was Cal motorcycle ployee injured a a accident en route to medical was compensable injury); prior a Indiana: Bettasso v examination for (1963)(the 396; Corp, App court Coal 135 Ind NE2d 833 Snow-Hill compensation Board awarded to a overturned Industrial injured occurring the ambulance in an accident mineworker was hospital transporting treatment of a work-related him to the for Brosnahan, 720; injury); Virginia: (1967) & Co v 207 Va 152 SE2d 254 Immer granted (compensation employee "blacked out” was where way his automobile while on his have stitches removed crashed work). from a cut sustained at 20However, following jurisdictions recovery have denied trip following by a to the doctor’s office in the occasioned Georgia: Douglas Dep’t, App 559; Rd 160 Ga cases: Street v Co (1983) (no 556; app App 165 Ga 141 accident while SE2d 586 dis SE2d injured recovery a was in an where worker automobile returning physical therapy to work a session which court Corp, after time); happened Kiger his Idaho found to have on own Idaho: (1963) resulting (injuries 380 P2d 208 from an automo Idaho occurring during trip a to a office seek bile accident doctor’s compensable injury treatment for are not because the injuries); contributing proximate was not a cause (La Theriot, App, 1978), Allstate Ins Co v 362 So 2d 1214 Louisiana: 1979) (the (La, grounds employer’s rev’d other 376 So 2d 950 on obligation pay had no workers’ where insurer injured occurring way employee home after treated for rian injured in an automobile accident his being being discharged hospital he was from the where compensable injury); Pennsylvania: Presbyte Tatrai v (1982) (a Hosp, hospital employee 497 the Univ Pa A2d through provision hospital’s negligent medical services 434 Mich 655 Dissenting Opinion Archer, J. finding trip Given board’s that Ms. Dean’s to purpose Dr. Ganesh’s office on June 28 was for "obtaining] medical treatment for the residuals scope of an in the received course and employment,” her WCABO she received the accident en route to Dr. Gan- compensable. esh’s office are also disagree separate opinion I with the in dissent favoring a remand to determine whether Ms. Dean’s possible intoxication or some other

intentional part may act on her have defeated the causal nexus between the first and second I accident. intervening view the "intentional act” issue in the quasi-course Chrys- test as an affirmative defense plead duty prove. agree ler had the I with separate opinion Chrysler would not be quasi-course prove liable under the if test it could intentionally that Ms. Dean drove while intoxi- recklessly intentionally cated, drove caused the proof However, accident. of these sorts of actions always recovering have barred workers from for injuries. their 418.305; Under MCL MSA 17.237(305),21 intentionally a claimant who causes clearly receiving an accident is barred from com- pensation. voluntary

Workers whose intoxication causes compensation, their have been denied cf. Paper Trucking App Co, 1; Rose v Mills 47 Mich 209 NW2d 305 as have been workers in- jured by driving, Day their own reckless cf. v Gold (1943). Dairy, Star See compensation against was not restricted a workers’ claim employer hospital which treated her in this instance as if she were a general public). member of the employee injured by If the reason of his intentional misconduct, wilful he shall not receive under the provisions of this act. Chrysler Dean Archer, Co, v Beaver Coal also Fortin 352; 23 ALR NW supra, Schaefer, it clear Adkins and Under escape liability Chrysler for a could by proving secondary injury that Ms. Dean’s inten- Chrys- noting fact, In caused her accident. tional conduct argument made this before ler wcab, a traffic ticket because of that Ms. Dean received report’s referencing the accident the accident and drinking. might that Ms. Dean have been mention Chrysler arguments already has made and lost separate opinion in dissent would which the I this case a remand. see no reason to send order prove Chrysler it in order to let facts could back regarding prove not earlier an accident not or did ago. happened years twelve that hi policy Finally, I address two concerns raised majority. majority The claims that this the legislative follow "reform efforts” which should narrow the Michigan eligible category of workers disability compensation. pp Ante, 666- for workers’ Citing concurring opinion 667. Justice Levin’s (On Rehearing), v General Motors McClure 191, 209; 631 Mich argues majority deny also that we should Ms. Legislature Dean benefits because has deter- mined that her no-fault insurer should bear the imposed by Ms. risk Dean’s automotive excursions office. to the doctor’s may contention, to first while it true

As legislative generally trend the current to types limit the number narrowing claims,22 such "reforms” entitlements specific categories injured other, for workers are as to whether this trend exists. We make no statement Archer, precedent before the Court and for issue mitigate nothing duty they our clear to do to liberally. remedial statute See construe this supra purpose Bower, clear 191. Compensation Disability Act is to com Workers’ pensate persons injured job.

on the Basil v Butter Hosp, worth NW duty interpret Therefore, it is this Court’s to persons provide compensation to all act so as can be said to arise out of and whose except Legis employment, where the the course employee clearly lature intends to exclude majority give of the act. The fails benefits legislative intent it denies com effect to because pensation injuries are a direct to a woman whose employment. and natural result of her majority’s reject I also reliance on Justice McClure concurrence two reasons. Levin’s argument assumption First, on the rests good Rucker was law no-fault agree I law. It was not. with the act became majority Legislature presumed that the have existing judicial interpretations aware of been law when enacted the workers’ presume no-fault act. We can therefore "peculiar Legislature was aware that rule,” the "act of increased street risk and God rule” upon proximate causation rule which good longer Rucker rested were no law. Rucker an anachronism in 1972 as it is was as much reasoning majority’s today. The threatens to atro- compensation phy body of workers’ laws with our prior involving accidents decided automobile cases it is clear to the Court and the to 1972. When prior Legislature of a the doctrinal bases longer compensation valid, case are no workers’ there is absolutely no reason the case should sur- simply it involves an vive because automobile Chrysler Archer, letter, By even was a dead Rucker accident. explicitly though overruled. it had never been passing Legislature life into not breathe did the no-fault laws. argument, policy advancing the

Second, this majority in this fix have us entitlements would interpretation of the area, of our not on the basis guess language as to act, best on our the but Legislature risk to allocate intended how pronouncement despite in the area, the clear always liability shall that no-fault no-fault act secondary mately, liability. compensation Ulti-

to workers’ requires majority opinion to allo- us legislative direction. risk in contravention cate setting precluded This workers’ disability policy compensation Bueh- in this state. Michigan, NW Univ of ler v (1936). drafted the statute as our task to take It is language Legislature con- its and construe only legislative We are intent. sistent with Legislature expressed by following policy compensation to allow this act we construe proven the existence has to a worker who arising of her in the course out of and employment. majority there

Furthermore, fails to see important the Workers’ between differences are Compensation Disability act and the no-fault Act identity The work- of the risk bearer. besides compensation a substi- not intended as act is ers’ Ragnar-Benson, Inc, Rector v for insurance. tute (1946); Ford Luteran v 277; 487; 21 NW2d Co, Motor to be the converse Therefore, cannot believe we Legislature particularly indi- has true, where language act that the no-fault cated within secondary liability no-fault insurer’s a liability See insurer. of a workers’ 434 Mich Dissenting Opinion by Boyle, J. though 500.3109; MCL MSA 24.13109. Even Ms. compensation Dean is entitled to collect workers’ injuries, precluded for benefits her she is not from recovering against her no-fault insurer for benefits her workers’ insurer would not Freight System, cover. Mathis v Interstate Motor

CONCLUSION 28, 1978, In her automobile accident on June Corrine Dean suffered which arose out of employment. the course of her The Work- Compensation Appeal ers’ Board found that Ms. way office, Dean was on her to her doctor’s receiving necessary whom she was injuries treatment compensable which she received in a in- jury April trip 1. Ms. Dean’s to the doctor’s necessary activity office was a and reasonable which she would not have undertaken but for her April injuries. Ap- 1 work-related The Court of peals incorrectly supra relied on because legal principles premised on which Rucker was longer points are no valid law this state. I would, therefore, reverse the decision of the Court Appeals. J., J.

Cavanagh, Archer, concurred with (dissenting). Boyle, J. I concur in Justice Archer’s adopt result which would Professor Larson’s quasi-course test to determine plaintiff’s injuries, whether sustained an auto- appointment mobile accident en route to a doctor’s prior compensable injuries, for the treatment of are themselves under the Workers’ Chrysler Corp Dean Boyle, separately Compensation Disability Act.11 write expressing acknowledge difficulty co- applying principles is at maximum herent analysis range consequences causation of the the question. quasi-course In the of requires recogni- analysis case, the context of this involving aspect analysis Larson of tion the "claimant’s that independent own conduct as an Compen- intervening Larson, Workmen’s cause.” p 13.11, Law, § 3-502. sation finding no The wcab in this case made plaintiff’s question accident automobile whether might which be caused intentional conduct was prohibited by impliedly regarded expressly or as employer. it did that found her board remark description plaintiff’s of the accident "somewhat testimony taken before From the bizarre.” hearing appears referee, it oc- that accident driving plaintiff west on curred while Eight it Mile Road where intersects north side of Avenue, and divides the cities with Woodward Ste- Police Officer Detroit and Ferndale. Ferndale phen point Eight that LaRowe testified passes Avenue. Plain- Mile Road under Woodward portion Eight Road tiff was not on the Mile passes Avenue, under but rather which was Woodward driving portion Eight Mile on the surface intersects Woodward Avenue. Road which Plaintiff’s vehicle struck a cement barricade portion twenty-five into the a distance of feet fell Eight passes under Mile Road Woodward which could not recall whether Avenue. Officer LaRowe plaintiff drinking, appeared it that had been but police on his he testified that he had indicated drinking. report plaintiff had been From us, clear how it at all record before findings agree may factual 1 I be inferred the board’s necessary. plaintiff’s trip to the doctor was reasonable Mich Boyle, plaintiff’s role in the accident should be character- engaged ized, or whether she in "intentional con- regarded may expressly duct which or im- prohibited pliedly employer.” Id., [her] 13.11(d), p perform 3-543. To allow this Court to " reviewing function, its the wcab 'should indicate adopted, testimony the standard followed and ” reasoning reaching it used in its conclusion.’ Equipment DeGeer Co, v DeGeer Farm (1974). 96, 101; 214 NW2d 794 This Court cannot discharge responsibilities its unless the wcab findings Aquilina makes as to crucial facts. Corp, General 213-214; Motors NW2d 923 I would remand to the wcab.

Case Details

Case Name: Dean v. Chrysler Corp.

Court Name: Michigan Supreme Court

Date Published: May 15, 1990

Citation: 455 N.W.2d 699

Docket Number: 84065, (Calendar No. 7)

Court Abbreviation: Mich.