156 Mass. 435 | Mass. | 1892
The defendant in this case admits its liability to pay the sum of $3,000 under the benefit certificate declared on, but contends that its payment should be made to the beneficiary named in the certificate,.or to the administrator de bonis non of the intestate, appointed by the Probate Court in Maine, and asks that the beneficiary and the administrator de bonis non be summoned into court and made parties to the action, so that their rights may be determined under the St. of 1886, c. 281. The application of the defendant was denied in the Superior Court, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed. The question before us is whether the suit should be brought by the administrator or by the beneficiary, when by the terms of a certificate of this kind payment is to be made to a designated beneficiary. If the beneficiary is the proper party to bring the suit, we cannot, upon the facts presented in this case, and without hearing him, decide that the designation is invalid, and that the beneficiary named in the certificate is not entitled to the fund.
The plaintiff contends that Flynn v. Massachusetts Benefit Association, 152 Mass. 288, in which it was held by a majority of the court that the suit should be brought by the administrator, is decisive of this case. But, while it is an authority in favor of the plaintiff, the case at bar differs from it, and, in view of recent declarations of the Legislature, calls for careful consideration. In the first place, the certificate in the former case was under seal, and considerable stress was laid on that fact in the opinion. The certificate now before us recites a sealing by the Supreme Commander, but no seal was ever impressed upon it or affixed to it. A facsimile of the seal of the corporation was printed upon it, apparently as a part of the printed blank designed to be used by the officers in making contracts. It is held in this Commonwealth that such an imprint on a paper does not make the contract written on it a sealed instrument, even though a sealing is recited. Pub. Sts. c. 3, § 3, cl. 19. Bates v. Boston & New York Central Railroad, 10 Allen, 251. Hendee v. Pinkerton, 14 Allen, 381, 387.
This statute, however, does not directly apply to the case before us, because by its terms it is inapplicable “ to organizations which conduct their business as fraternal societies on the lodge system,” and because the provision quoted is made to apply only to policies issued after the passage of the act. St. of 1885, c. 183, §§ 1, 5. But in most of its features it is almost the same as the amended statute under which the defendant is doing business, and, in this particular, there is every reason to think that it was intended to accomplish the same result in the same way.
The certificate under which the plaintiff claims was issued under the Pub. Sts. c. 115, § 8, which was repealed by the St. of 1888, c. 429. This statute was not enacted until after the death of the certificate holder in Flynn v. Massachusetts Benefit Association, ubi supra, and therefore it was not considered in that case. The last part of § 8 of the last mentioned statute is as follows: “ Such corporation may also provide in its by-laws for the payment, from time to time, of a fixed sum by each member to be paid to the beneficiaries of deceased members, in such amount and manner as shall be fixed by said by-laws and written in the benefit certificate issued to said member, and payable to the husband, wife, children, relatives of, or persons dependent
Many of the persons whom these corporations were expected to benefit have but little property, and in many cases it would be a great hardship to compel a beneficiary to take out administration on the estate of the deceased member, in order to recover the money due him. We think the Legislature intended to make no difference in this particular between the St. of 1888, c. 429, and the similar St. of 1885, c. 183, and that the. beneficiary named in a certificate in the usual form, issued under either of them, may sue in his own name for the money due him on the decease of the member.
Perhaps, on a careful examination of the language of this certificate of membership and of the certificate of incorporation, the same result might be reached if the Pub. Sts. c. 115, § 8, remained in force. But the language of the later statute is slightly different, and that and the St. of 1885, above mentioned, make the meaning of the Legislature clearer than it was before their enactment, even if they do not indicate an intention to change the law materially. The elaborate provisions of the St. of 1890, cc. 341, 421, are also confirmatory of the view we have taken.
The questions raised in Flynn v. Massachusetts Benefit Association have not since been formally considered by the court.
Judgment set aside, and the defendant's petition to summon in the beneficiary granted.