Dean LOWE and Martha Lowe, Individually and as Trustees of the Demar Revocable Trust, Petitioners v. Joseph C. RICHARDS and Joyce A. Richards, and Hugh E. Hegyi, Trustee of the Herman Hegyi Trust, Respondents.
No. 13-0234.
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Decided April 10, 2014.
763 S.E.2d 64
Submitted March 25, 2014.
Michael L. Scales, Esq., Martinsburg, WV, for Petitioners, Dean and Martha Lowe.
Charles F. Printz, Jr., Esq., Jonathan T. Mayhew, Esq., Bowles Rice LLP, Martinsburg, WV, for Respondents, Joseph C. and Joyce A. Richards.
DAVIS, Chief Justice:
Dean and Martha Lowe, petitioners herein, (“the Lowes“) appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of Berkeley County dismissing their counterclaim and third-party complaint.1 In the actions filed by the Lowes, they sought to obtain real property claimed by respondents Joseph and Joyce Richards (“the Richards“) and Hugh Hegyi as Trustee of the Hegyi Trust (“the Hegyi Trust“). The property in question is situated on the border of West Virginia and Virginia. The circuit court determined that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the Lowes’ claims because they involved a determination of a boundary line between West Virginia and Virginia. The circuit court also found
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This matter began in November 2011 when the Hegyi Trust filed an action against the Lowes seeking a declaratory judgment and injunction.3 The Hegyi Trust owned approximately 29 acres of real estate on the eastern boundary line of Frederick County, Virginia. The Lowes owned approximately 50 acres of real estate on the western boundary line of Berkeley County. The Lowes’ property adjoined the Hegyi Trust property on the north and east. The Hegyi Trust filed its action against the Lowes to obtain a right of way across the Lowes’ property so that it could access its property in Virginia.
In 2012, the Lowes filed a counterclaim against Hegyi Trust and a third-party complaint against the Richards alleging claims for ejectment and adverse possession. The third-party complaint alleged that the Richards owned 9.89 acres of real estate in Frederick County, Virginia, that was adjacent to the Lowes’ property. The Lowes’ third-party complaint alleged that part of the property claimed by the Hegyi Trust and the Richards was, in fact, located in Berkeley County, West Virginia. Consequently, the Lowes sought title to such property through adverse possession.4
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In this proceeding, the trial court granted the Richards’ motion to dismiss the Lowes’ claims against them based upon a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to join indispensable parties, and the failure to state a claim for relief. We have held that “[a]ppellate review of a circuit court‘s order granting a motion to dismiss a complaint is de novo.” Syl. pt. 2, State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 194 W.Va. 770, 461 S.E.2d 516 (1995).6 This same standard applies to our review of statutes and rules relevant to this case. As we held in Syllabus point 1 of Appalachian Power Co. v. State Tax Department of West Virginia, 195 W.Va. 573, 466 S.E.2d 424 (1995), “[i]nterpreting a statute or an administrative rule or regulation presents a purely legal question subject to de novo review.” Mindful of these applicable standards, we will consider the substantive issues raised by the parties.
III.
DISCUSSION
Resolution of the Lowes’ appeal requires this Court to address two dispositive issues. We first must determine whether the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the Lowes’ claims. Then, we must decide whether the States of West Virginia and Virginia are required parties. We will address each issue separately.
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The circuit court granted the Richards’ motion to dismiss under
1. Exclusive jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court over boundary disputes between two or more states.
The circuit court found that any dispute involving the location of a boundary line between two states had to be litigated in the United States Supreme Court. In making this determination, the circuit court recognized that Congress has expressly decided that the United States Supreme Court “shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of (1) all controversies between two or more states.”
The first case decided by the Supreme Court that involved private parties litigating the location of the boundary lines of two states was Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 84 S.Ct. 242, 11 L.Ed.2d 186 (1963).7 In Durfee, two plaintiffs filed an action in a Nebraska trial court against a Missouri resident to quiet title to certain land located on the Missouri River. The main channel of the river formed the boundary between the states of Nebraska and Missouri. The defendant contested subject matter jurisdiction and argued that the disputed land was in Missouri. The trial court found that the land was situated in Nebraska and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed the judgment. The defendant did not petition the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review that judgment. Instead, the defendant filed an action against the plaintiffs in a Missouri trial court alleging that the land was in Missouri. The suit was removed to a federal district court. The federal district court expressed the view that the land was in Missouri, but that the judgment of the Nebraska Supreme Court was res judicata and binding upon the court. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed after concluding that the district court was not required to give full faith and credit to the Nebraska judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the judgment of the Eighth Circuit. In finding that the Nebraska decision was res judicata, the Supreme Court determined that state courts could resolve interstate boundary line property disputes by private citizens but that such determinations are not binding on the affected states. The Supreme Court addressed the issues as follows:
It is argued that an exception to this rule of jurisdictional finality should be made with respect to cases involving real property because of this Court‘s emphatic expressions of the doctrine that courts of one State are completely without jurisdiction directly to affect title to land in other States. This argument is wide of the
mark. Courts of one State are equally without jurisdiction to dissolve the marriages of those domiciled in other States. But the location of land, like the domicile of a party to a divorce action, is a matter to be resolved by judicial determination. The question remains whether, once the matter has been fully litigated and judicially determined, it can be retried in another State in litigation between the same parties. Upon the reason and authority of the cases we have discussed, it is clear that the answer must be in the negative. It is to be emphasized that all that was ultimately determined in the Nebraska litigation was title to the land in question as between the parties to the litigation there. Nothing there decided, and nothing that could be decided in litigation between the same parties or their privies in Missouri, could bind either Missouri or Nebraska with respect to any controversy they might have, now or in the future, as to the location of the boundary between them, or as to their respective sovereignty over the land in question. Either State may at any time protect its interest by initiating independent judicial proceedings here.
Durfee, 375 U.S. at 115-16, 84 S.Ct. at 247, 11 L.Ed.2d 186 (internal quotations and citation omitted). In a terse concurring opinion by Justice Black, he made the following pertinent observation:
we are not deciding the question whether the respondent would continue to be bound by the Nebraska judgment should it later be authoritatively decided, either in an original proceeding between the States in this Court or by a compact between the two States under
Art. I, s 10 , that the disputed tract is in Missouri.
Durfee, 375 U.S. at 117, 84 S.Ct. at 248, 11 L.Ed.2d 186 (Black, J., concurring).8
The issue of a trial court‘s subject matter jurisdiction over the location of boundary lines between two states was addressed again by the Supreme Court in Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 113 S.Ct. 549, 121 L.Ed.2d 466 (1992). The decision in that case started out in federal district court in Mississippi as a dispute between private plaintiffs and private defendants as to the ownership of land that was situated along the west bank of the Mississippi River near Lake Providence, Louisiana. The plaintiffs were Mississippi residents who claimed ownership of the land as being in Mississippi. The defendants were Louisiana residents claiming ownership of the land as being situate in Louisiana. The State of Louisiana intervened in the case and filed a third-party complaint against the State of Mississippi seeking a determination of the boundary between the two states. The district court ultimately ruled that the disputed land was located within the territorial boundaries of Mississippi rather than Louisiana. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address two issues: (1) whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over Louisiana‘s third-party complaint against Mississippi and (2) whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction of the dispute between private parties as to the location of the boundary line between the two states. As to the first issue, the Supreme Court held “that
The District Court is conceded to have had jurisdiction over the claims of the pri-vate
plaintiffs against the private defendants, and in deciding questions of private title to riparian property, it may be necessary to decide where the boundary lies between the two States. Adjudicating such a question in a dispute between private parties does not violate § 1251(a) , because that section speaks not in terms of claims or issues, but in terms of parties. The States, of course, are not bound by any decision as to the boundary between them which was rendered in a lawsuit between private litigants. See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 115, 84 S.Ct. 242, 247, 11 L.Ed.2d 186 (1963).
Mississippi, 506 U.S. at 78, 113 S.Ct. at 553, 121 L.Ed.2d 466.
The issue of litigating in a trial court an interstate boundary line dispute between government officials and private litigants was addressed in People ex rel. Scott v. Dravo Corp., 10 Ill.App.3d 944, 295 N.E.2d 284 (1973). In Scott, various Illinois officials filed an action in state court against three private corporate defendants seeking a declaration that an island called Dog Island was within the territorial limits of the State of Illinois and not the State of Kentucky. The declaration was sought so that the three corporate defendants, which had entered into contracts to perform construction work on Dog Island, would be required to comply with Illinois tax laws. The circuit court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiffs appealed. The appellate court applied Durfee and held that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine whether the property was situated within the state of Illinois:
The State of Illinois is not seeking to tax property or activity in Kentucky, nor is it claiming the power to tax because of some incidence or connection with some activity in Kentucky. Rather, it is asserting judicial jurisdiction over activity wholly within its own boundary. If the plaintiffs succeed in establishing as fact what they allege in their complaint, clearly they will be entitled to the relief they seek. Nothing appears at this juncture that will deprive the Illinois court of jurisdiction. Indisputably, the defendants will not be foreclosed from proof that, as a matter of fact, Dog Island is a part of Kentucky, and the Illinois court is accordingly without jurisdiction to render a valid judgment. But the Illinois court, under the rules of judicial jurisdiction and Res judicata discussed in the Durfee case, may receive evidence regarding the location of Dog Island with reference to the State boundary line, and therefrom make a determination of its jurisdiction.
We do not see this action as an intrusion into the exclusive jurisdiction over disputes between States conferred upon the Supreme Court by
article III, section 2 of the Constitution of the United States . . . . The two States are not in contention here nor are the issues tendered in the complaint sufficient to engage them in controversy.
Scott, 295 N.E.2d at 290. See River Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court of San Bernardino Cnty., 252 Cal.App.2d 604, 612, 60 Cal.Rptr. 665 (1967) (“A state court has the power to determine, as between private contestants, the disputed question whether real property is within its boundaries or is in a neighboring state[.]“); Kissell v. Stevens, 164 Ark. 195, 261 S.W. 299 (1924) (allowing private parties to litigate issue of whether property was located in Arkansas or Tennessee); U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Uhlhorn, 232 F.Supp. 994 (E.D.Ark.1964) (determining private parties could litigate issue of whether property was located in Arkansas or Tennessee).
Based upon the United States Supreme Court decision in Durfee and the other authorities cited, we now hold that the circuit courts of West Virginia have subject matter jurisdiction to resolve an interstate boundary line dispute between private litigants involving the issue of whether real property is located within the State of West Virginia or another state. Under the decision in Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 84 S.Ct. 242, 11 L.Ed.2d 186 (1963), resolution of the boundary line issue by a circuit court is not binding on the affected states.
It is clear from our holding that the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over the Lowes’ claims against the Richards. Insofar as the States of West Virginia and Virginia are not parties to this litigation, the case did not fall within the exclusive jurisdic-tion
2. The West Virginia Boundary Commission.
The circuit court‘s order also found, as an alternative ground for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, that the Lowes’ dispute was required to be resolved under
(a) There is hereby created a boundary commission which shall consist of three members, who shall be residents and citizens of the state, all of whom shall have experience involving map reading or surveying. The commission members shall investigate state, county and municipal boundary disputes when requested to do so by the governor or Legislature. The commission members shall be appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, no later than the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred eighty-seven. No more than two members may belong to the same political party. The commission members shall serve a term concurrent with that of the governor‘s term in office. Commission members may be reappointed to additional terms.
In our review of a statutory provision, it is essential to afford the enactment an interpretation that comports with the intent of the Legislature. We have held previously that “[t]he primary object in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” Syl. pt. 1, Smith v. State Workmen‘s Comp. Comm‘r, 159 W.Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975). In order to ascertain legislative intent, it is necessary to consider the wording of the statute at issue. “Where the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting to the rules of interpretation.” Syl. pt. 2, State v. Elder, 152 W.Va. 571, 165 S.E.2d 108 (1968). Thus, “[w]hen a statute is clear and unambiguous and the legislative intent is plain, the statute should not be interpreted by the courts, and in such case it is the duty of the courts not to construe but to apply the statute.” Syl. pt. 5, State v. General Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, Veterans of Foreign Wars, 144 W.Va. 137, 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959).
Applying these tenets to the statute presently before us, we conclude that the relevant language in
It is obvious from the statute and our holding that even if the Lowes went to the Boundary Commission and made a request for a boundary line determination, as suggested by the circuit court, the statute did not authorize the Boundary Commission to act on the request. Thus, it is clear that the circuit court committed error in finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that the Lowes had to file their dispute with the Boundary Commission.9
The circuit court also granted the Richards’ motion to dismiss under
”
Both the States of Virginia and West Virginia are indispensable parties to the determination of the physical location of the border between the two states. A decree setting the boundary between Virginia and West Virginia would distribute territory between the two states, diminishing the area of one state to the benefit of the other. Any decree of the border without the presence of the states as parties would impair the rights of those states to protect their sovereign territory and thus cannot be made without their presence.
The circuit court‘s ruling is inconsistent with the pronouncements made by the United States Supreme Court in Durfee and Mississippi v. Louisiana, supra. In both cases the Supreme Court recognized that states are not bound by decisions resolving interstate boundary line disputes between private parties. Durfee held that “[e]ither State may at any time protect its interest by initiating independent judicial proceedings here.” Durfee, 375 U.S. at 116, 84 S.Ct. at 247. The decision in Mississippi also held with reservation that “[t]he States, of course, are not bound by any decision as to the boundary between them which was rendered in a lawsuit between private litigants.” Mississippi, 506 U.S. at 78, 113 S.Ct. at 553. Based upon these authorities, we hold that in a real property action involving private parties that requires the determination of the boundary line between West Virginia and another state, neither the state of West Virginia nor the other state are required parties to the litigation.
Therefore, it is clear from our holding that the circuit court committed error in dismissing the Lowes’ action on the grounds that West Virginia and Virginia were indispensable parties.10 Under the authority of the
IV.
CONCLUSION
The circuit court‘s order of February 15, 2013, dismissing the Lowes’ counterclaim and third-party complaint is reversed. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and Remanded.
ROBIN JEAN DAVIS
CHIEF JUSTICE