delivered the opinion of the court.
This was an action for the enforcement of a mechanic’s lien, and was tried in the court below upon an agreed statement of facts.
Plaintiffs furnished the brick for the building, and the contractor Smith being indebted to them therefor in the sum of $281.00, they gave notice- to the defendant of the demand, properly and accurately describing the property. Afterwards and in due time a lien was filed with the clerk for the amount so claimed, which described the building as situated on lots 19 and 20 in block 2 in Ashburn’s addition to Kansas city, thus misdescribing the block which should have been twenty instead of two. The petition properly describes the property and asks for the enforcement of the lien on lots 19 and 20 in block twenty.
The court held that the mistake in the number of the block in the paper filed with the clerk was fatal, and gave judgment for the defendant.
It is admitted in the agreed statement that the bricks were furnished by the plaintiffs and placed in the building ; that they were never paid for by the contractor Smith, and that Schell, the defendant, owned no other lots in Ashburn’s addition to Kansas city than 19 and 20, in block 20, and that he never owned any lots in block two.
The statute requires that in order to obtain a lien there should be filed “ a true description of the property, or so near as to identify the same, upon which the lien is intended to apply, with the name of the owner, or contractor, or both.” (Wagn. Stat. p. 909, § 5.)
As to what will be regarded as a sufficient description to sustain a mechanic’s lien the general rule seems now to be, that if there appear enough in the description to enable a party, familiar with the locality, to identify the premises intended to be described with reasonable certainty, to the exclusion of others, it will be sufficient.
There is great reluctance to set aside a mechanic’s claim merely for loose description, as the acts generally contemplate that the claimants should prepare their own papers ; and it is not necessary that the description should be either full or precise. It is
In the case of Matlack vs. Lare (
In Putnam vs. Rose (
The courts at one time were inclined to hold'that enactments for mechanics’ liens were in derogation, of the common law, and their provisions should therefore be construed strictly against those who sought to avail themselves of their benefits. But the better doctrine now is, that these statutes are highly remedial in their nature, and should receive a liberal construction to advance the just and beneficent objects had in view in their passage. Their great aim and purpose is to do substantial justice between the parties, and this should never be lost sight of in giving them a practical construction. In reference to the case now under consideration it must be borne in mind, that there is no contest between independent outside parties. 'Had a third person purchased the
The notice informed him. that the claim was for materials furnished for his brick building, erected by Smith as contractor, and accurately described the lots and block and the addition to the city, and even the corner of the streets on which the same was situated. The lien filed stated that the bricks were furnished by the plaintiffs to Smith who was the contractor with the defendant for the erection of the three-story brick buildings on the rear or west end of the lots described. The lots were properly described, but the block was mis-stated. These were, the only lots on which defendant had a three-story brick building erected, or for which plaintiff furnished material at the instance of the contractor Smith, and clearly, it appears to me, under all the existing circumstances, that the description was sufficient to identify the property and inform the defendant to what the lien was intended to apply, and that the plaintiffs should not be deprived of their rights on account of a mere clerical error, for such the omission of the figure which caused the misdescription in the block, undoubtedly was.
According to these views, the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded ;
