106 P.2d 301 | N.M. | 1940
The question is whether the trial court erred in refusing to enforce by injunction specific performance of a valid contract, whereby defendant (appellee) agreed to refrain from entering into the business of manufacturing tortillas in the City of Albuquerque and vicinity. The decision (findings of fact and conclusions of law) of the trial court is as follows:
(2) "That on the 3rd day of December 1935 the defendant contracted with the plaintiff herein to sell and did, on that date, sell to the plaintiff the business as established in manufacturing tortillas and associated products.
(3) "That on the 3rd day of December, 1935 the defendant herein entered into an oral contract not to henceforth compete with plaintiff as long as the plaintiff was engaged in the tortilla business in the City of Albuquerque and immediate vicinity.
(4) "That defendant refrained from competing with the plaintiff from the 3rd day of December 1935 until about the 1st day of October, 1939, at which time the defendant opened a tortilla factory in the City of Albuquerque in competition with the plaintiff."
"I. That the defendant entered into a valid oral contract not to compete with the plaintiff as long as the plaintiff was engaged in the tortilla manufacturing business in the City of Albuquerque, and vicinity.
"II. That defendant has refrained from competing with the plaintiff for approximately four years; that plaintiff has been protected in his business for a period of approximately four years; and considering the nature of this business that such period of time has afforded reasonable and fair protection to plaintiff's interests.
"III. That plaintiff is not entitled to equitable relief by way of injunction."
Accordingly an injunction was denied and the complaint dismissed.
As it is apparent from the findings of fact, to which no exceptions were taken, that defendant breached her agreement to not engage in the tortilla manufacturing business "as long as the plaintiff was engaged in said business in the City of Albuquerque, and immediate vicinity," we need only inquire whether the trial court abused his discretion in refusing the injunction sought by plaintiff.
Injunctive relief may, and usually is, granted in such cases if irreparable injury is threatened to prevent a multiplicity of suits, a repeated and recurring cause of action, or upon the ground that the breach is a continuing one.
There is no finding to the effect that plaintiff has, or will be, irreparably injured, or indeed that he will be damaged to any extent by reason of the breach of the contract, or that he has not an adequate remedy at law. We are advised that the contract was breached and nothing more. The testimony is not before us, and properly so, as the case is submitted upon the findings, which we have copied in full.
Courts of equity exercise a sound discretionary power in granting or refusing injunctions. Such discretion is not unlimited. 28 Am.Jur. "Injunctions" Secs. 35, 36, and 326.
The exercise of the trial court's discretion to give or refuse relief will not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears that there has been an abuse of it.
The facts in this case are in effect conceded; and if under the findings the plaintiff is entitled to an injunction as a matter of law, the case should be reversed. Hanover Star Mill Co. v. Allen Wheeler Co., 7 Cir.,
In such case there would be no room for discretion. But such is not the case. The mere fact that the contract was breached is not ground for equitable relief. *567
The court found in Melrose v. Low,
The same can be said of this case. In the absence of a finding that plaintiff was injured, there is no basis for equitable interference.
The decree is affirmed, and it is so ordered.
BICKLEY, C.J., and ZINN, SADLER, and MABRY, JJ., concur.