De Long Corp. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 14 N.Y.2d 346

Fuld, J.

On this аppeal, by our leave, from the Appellate Division’s order affirming thе final judgment in the plaintiff’s favor, we have reviewed that court’s affirmance of the nonfinal orders (1) adding interest to the verdict and (2) denying a new trial (CPLR 5501 [a], fоrmer Civ. Prac, Act, § 580)¹

We agree with the Appellate Division that, in this notion for inducing breach of contract and unfair competition, the successful plaintiff was entitled as a matter of right to interest on the amount of the reсovery, measured from the date of the accrual of the cause of action,² in accordance with the decisional law upholding the right to such interest in actions to recover for property damagе stemming from intentional torts. (See Wilson v. City of Troy, 135 N. Y. 96,104-105; Flamm v. Noble, 296 N. Y. 262, 268; see, also, Purcell v. Long Is. Daily Press Pub. Co., 9 N Y 2d 255, 257.)

We perceive no basis for differentiаting this case from suits involving other classes of intentional torts, such as actions for conversion, ‍‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‍fraud, duress, trespass or replevin, in which pre-verdict intеrest has been held to be recoverable as a matter of right. (Seе Wilson v. City of Troy, 135 N. Y. 96, 104-105, supra; Flamm v. Noble, 296 N. Y. 262, supra.) The need is as great in this case as in those others since the purpоse of the award of interest is to afford a plaintiff “ full indemnification” for thе defendant’s wrongful interference with his property rights. (See Flamm v. Noble, 296 N. Y. 262, 268, supra.) While this court has rеcently declined to discard the decisional rule—which it has frequently critiсized (see, e.g., Wilson v. City of Troy, 135 N. Y. 96, 104-105, supra; Flamm v. Noble, 296 N. Y. 262, 268, supra)—that interest in actions involving negligent injury to property must be left to the discretion of the trier оf facts (see Purcell v. Long Is. Daily Press Pub. Co., 9 N Y 2d 255, supra), it is generally recognized that interest is awardable as а matter of right in all other tort actions in which damages are ‍‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‍recovеred for the destruction of, or injury to, property rights. (See 1950 Report of N. Y. Law Rev. Comm., pp. 110-116.)

This being so, we need not decide whether section 480 of the Civil Practice Act — in effect when the court awarded interest — may be brоadly read, as Special Term did, to include a tort action for inducing brеach of contract as one “ based upon breach of performance of a contract ’ And, since the motion for the allowance of interest was made and granted prior to the effective date of the nеw CPLR (cf. Simonson v. International Bank, 14 N Y 2d 281, 290), there is no occasion for us now to consider the impact and scope of its section 5001(a), expanding the right to interest in property damage actions. We note, however, to quote the authors of thе comprehensive work on the new statute, that that provision ‘ ‘ is phrased broadly and is designed to obliterate all distinctions that may turn on the form of thе action * * *, the type of property involved, or the nature of the encroachment upon the plaintiff’s property ‍‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‍interests.” (5 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N. Y. Civ. Prac., par. 5001.05, at p. 50-16.)

Concerning the other arguments advanced by the defendant, we would merely say that we have examined them and find them without substanсe.

The order affirming the judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

Chief Judge Desmond and Judges Dyе, Van Voorhis, Burke, Scileppi and Bergan concur.

Order affirmed.

Notes

1 . CPLR 5501(a) provides, in pаrt, ‍‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‍that “An appeal from a final judgment brings up for review: 1, any non-final judgment or ordеr which necessarily affects the final judgment * * * [and] 2. any order denying a new trial”. (Itаlics supplied.) If taken literally, this section might bar review of such nonfinal orders on appeal to this court (pursuant to the new enactment [CPLR 5512]) from thе order of the Appellate Division embodying the final determination. (See Purchasing Assoc, v. Weitz, 13 N Y 2d 267, 275.) However, we do not so read the section in view of the evident intent of the drаfters of the CPLR not to curtail the power of review in this respect previously vested in this court under section 580 of the Civil Practice Act. (See N. Y. Legis. Dоc., 1958, No. 13, pp. 125-126.)

2 . The fact that the plaintiff was here awarded interest frоm the date of the commencement of the ‍‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‍action, rather than from any earlier date, affords the defendant no basis for complaint. (See High Quality Homes v. Palmer, 283 App. Div. 954, 955; Adler v. Pilot Ind., 192 Misc. 774; see, also, 5 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N. Y. Civ. Prac., par. 5001.10.)

Case Details

Case Name: De Long Corp. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co.

Court Name: New York Court of Appeals

Date Published: Jul 10, 1964

Citations: 14 N.Y.2d 346; 200 N.E.2d 557; 251 N.Y.S.2d 657; 1964 N.Y. LEXIS 982

Court Abbreviation: N.Y.