293 F.3d 633 | 3rd Cir. | 2002
ROSENN, Circuit Judge:(cid:13) This appeal raises an important constitutional question(cid:13) of first impression in this circuit. It pertains primarily to(cid:13) the scope of Congressional authority over the nation’s(cid:13) immigration and naturalization laws. Luis Erasmo De Leon-(cid:13) Reynoso (De Leon) appeals the denial by the United States(cid:13) District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania of his(cid:13) habeas corpus petition challenging his deportation.(cid:13) Because the District Court did not err in holding 8 U.S.C.(cid:13) S 1182(h) constitutional and finding De Leon deportable(cid:13) based on his conviction of a crime of moral turpitude in the(cid:13) Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the District Court’s denial(cid:13) of habeas relief will be affirmed.(cid:13) I.(cid:13) De Leon is a native and citizen of the Dominican(cid:13) Republic, and has a spouse and child who are United(cid:13) 2(cid:13) States citizens. He entered the United States as a lawful(cid:13) permanent resident (LPR) on June 18, 1992. On June 12,(cid:13) 1997, De Leon was convicted in the Court of Common(cid:13) Pleas, Northampton County, Pennsylvania, of receiving(cid:13) stolen property. The court sentenced him to probation for(cid:13) two years.(cid:13) The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), S 237(cid:13) (a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. S 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) provides for deportation(cid:13) of an alien convicted within five years after admission into(cid:13) the United States of a crime involving moral turpitude for(cid:13) which a prison sentence of one year or longer may be(cid:13) imposed. The Immigration Service initiated proceedings for(cid:13) his deportation on the ground of the conviction and De(cid:13) Leon appeared for a hearing before an immigration judge.(cid:13) The judge found him deportable. The judge also found him(cid:13) ineligible for adjustment of his status because he was(cid:13) unable to qualify for a waiver under INA S 212(h), as(cid:13) amended by Section 348(a) of the Illegal Immigration(cid:13) Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C.(cid:13) S 1182(h), because he had not been a legal immigrant in(cid:13) the United States for seven years preceding the date the(cid:13) removal proceedings were initiated. The immigration judge(cid:13) also denied De Leon’s request for voluntary departure,(cid:13) finding that he lacked the requisite good moral character.(cid:13) The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the(cid:13) immigration judge’s decision and dismissed De Leon’s(cid:13) appeal. The BIA did not address De Leon’s constitutional(cid:13) challenge because it lacked the authority to hear it. On(cid:13) January 19, 2001, De Leon filed a petition for habeas(cid:13) corpus. The District Court denied the petition and De Leon(cid:13) timely appealed to this Court.1 We exercise de novo review(cid:13) of the District Court’s denial of habeas relief and its(cid:13) interpretation of statutes. Gerbier v. Holmes , 280 F.3d 297,(cid:13) 302 (3d Cir. 2002). Likewise, we exercise de novo review(cid:13) over De Leon’s constitutional challenge. DeSousa v. Reno,(cid:13) 190 F.3d 175, 180 (3d Cir. 1999).(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 1. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 1291 and(cid:13) 2253.(cid:13) 3(cid:13) II.(cid:13) A. Crime of Moral Turpitude(cid:13) De Leon was convicted of receiving stolen property less(cid:13) than a week under five years from the date he was admitted(cid:13) to the United States. The Pennsylvania statute provides(cid:13) that a person is guilty of theft if the person "intentionally(cid:13) receives, retains, or disposes of movable property of another(cid:13) knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it has(cid:13) probably been stolen." PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.S 3925(a).(cid:13) Title 8 U.S.C. S 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) provides for the(cid:13) deportation of aliens convicted of crimes that involve moral(cid:13) turpitude, that are punishable by a year or more in prison,(cid:13) and that are committed within five years of the date of(cid:13) admission to the United States.(cid:13) Whether an alien’s crime is one involving moral turpitude(cid:13) is determined by the statute and record of conviction rather(cid:13) than the alien’s specific act. See Alleyne v. INS, 879 F.2d(cid:13) 1177, 1185 (3d Cir. 1989) ("[T]he nature of an alien’s crime(cid:13) is determined by the statute and record of conviction, not(cid:13) from the specific acts surrounding the conviction."). Thus,(cid:13) merely examining De Leon’s act to determine whether he(cid:13) committed a crime of moral turpitude is insufficient; we(cid:13) instead must look to the Pennsylvania statute.(cid:13) The term "moral turpitude" defies a precise definition. 6(cid:13) CHARLES GORDON, ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE(cid:13) S 71.05(1)(d)(i). Black’s Law Dictionary notes an "honesty"(cid:13) component in its definition of moral turpitude, which(cid:13) includes: "[c]onduct that is contrary to justice, honesty, or(cid:13) morality." BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1026 (7th ed. 1999); see(cid:13) also 37 Op. Att’y Gen. 293, 294 (1933) ("A good and(cid:13) comprehensive statement concerning ‘moral turpitude’ [is](cid:13) . . . . anything done contrary to justice, honesty, principle,(cid:13) or good morals."); In re Serna, 20 I. & N. Dec. 579, 582 (BIA(cid:13) 1992) (citing Attorney General’s definition with approval).(cid:13) Courts have held that knowingly receiving stolen property(cid:13) is a crime of moral turpitude. See, e.g., Michel v. INS, 206(cid:13) F.3d 253, 262-63 (2d Cir. 2000) (applying Chevron(cid:13) deference in concluding BIA reasonably determined(cid:13) 4(cid:13) knowing possession of stolen property is crime of moral(cid:13) turpitude); United States v. Castro, 26 F.3d 557, 558 n.1(cid:13) (5th Cir. 1994) (noting conviction for knowingly receiving(cid:13) stolen property is crime of moral turpitude); see also 6(cid:13) CHARLES GORDON, ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE(cid:13) S 71.05(1)(d)(iii). Indeed, De Leon conceded at oral argument(cid:13) that a person who knowingly receives stolen property has(cid:13) committed a crime of moral turpitude.(cid:13) De Leon argues, however, that the Pennsylvania statute(cid:13) not only criminalizes knowing possession of stolen property,(cid:13) but that it also includes an objective component that(cid:13) criminalizes possession of stolen property if one should(cid:13) have known it was stolen. De Leon therefore claims that his(cid:13) crime was not one of moral turpitude and leans heavily on(cid:13) In Re K, 2 I. & N. Dec. 90 (BIA 1944), as support for his(cid:13) position.(cid:13) In re K involved a German statute providing criminal(cid:13) liability for, inter alia, any person concealing the purchase(cid:13) of goods "which he knows or must assume on the basis of(cid:13) the given conditions . . . have been acquired by means of(cid:13) any criminal act." Id. at 91. The BIA, focusing on the(cid:13) language "or must assume," determined that a"conviction(cid:13) may be founded upon the negligent receipt of property by a(cid:13) person acting in good faith," and that such a crime was not(cid:13) one of moral turpitude. Id. De Leon asserts that the(cid:13) Pennsylvania statute, which not only criminalizes knowing(cid:13) possession of stolen property, but also possession of stolen(cid:13) property when one "believ[es] that it has probably been(cid:13) stolen," is analogous to the German statute.(cid:13) De Leon is incorrect; the Pennsylvania statute is purely(cid:13) subjective and lacks the objective component found in the(cid:13) German statute. The language in the Pennsylvania statute(cid:13) referring to a belief that the property probably has been(cid:13) stolen speaks to the specific defendant’s belief and not the(cid:13) hypothetical reasonable person. The German statute, on the(cid:13) other hand, criminalized possession of stolen property if(cid:13) one "must assume on the basis of the given conditions"(cid:13) that the property was stolen. "Must assume" is objective; it(cid:13) does not require that the defendant assume theft of the(cid:13) property, but merely that he should assume it so. The(cid:13) objective component of the German statute is why the BIA(cid:13) 5(cid:13) held it not to be a crime of moral turpitude. The(cid:13) Pennsylvania statute is, in contrast, subjective, and thus In(cid:13) re K is not apposite.(cid:13) De Leon also argues that the Pennsylvania statute has(cid:13) been interpreted by the Pennsylvania courts as having an(cid:13) objective element. First, he cites Commonwealth v.(cid:13) Matthews, 632 A.2d 570, 573 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), for(cid:13) support. Matthews noted that it is permissible to infer(cid:13) guilty knowledge by the unexplained possession of stolen(cid:13) property. Id. However, and contrary to De Leon’s assertion,(cid:13) Matthews did not hold that there is an objective component(cid:13) to the statute. Inferring guilty knowledge does not mean(cid:13) that a reasonable person would have had such knowledge,(cid:13) but rather that the jury could infer from the circumstances(cid:13) that the defendant actually had such knowledge. As Judge(cid:13) Alito observed at oral argument in this case, "subjective(cid:13) intent is generally inferred from objective facts." The second(cid:13) case De Leon cites, Commonwealth v. Williams, 362 A.2d(cid:13) 244, 248-49 (Pa. 1976), stands for the same proposition as(cid:13) Matthews. Neither case injected an objective element into(cid:13) the Pennsylvania statute.(cid:13) At a minimum, De Leon was convicted of possessing(cid:13) stolen property that he believed probably was stolen, a(cid:13) crime that is barely removed from possessing stolen(cid:13) property with knowledge that it is stolen. Both crimes(cid:13) speak with equal force to the honesty of a person. If(cid:13) knowingly possessing stolen goods is a crime of moral(cid:13) turpitude, it follows that possessing stolen goods that one(cid:13) believes probably are stolen is such a crime, too. It cannot(cid:13) reasonably be argued that a person willing to possess goods(cid:13) believing they were probably stolen exhibits less moral(cid:13) turpitude than a person who actually knows such goods(cid:13) are stolen. Accordingly, the District Court did not err in(cid:13) holding that De Leon committed a crime of moral turpitude(cid:13) subjecting him to deportation pursuant to 8 U.S.C.(cid:13) S 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).(cid:13) B. Equal Protection(cid:13) Deportable aliens who are married to United States(cid:13) citizens can seek relief from deportation by applying to(cid:13) 6(cid:13) adjust their status to that of a permanent resident based(cid:13) on marriage. 8 U.S.C. S 1255. De Leon has a spouse who is(cid:13) a United States citizen. Under the statute, the Attorney(cid:13) General may, in his discretion, adjust the status of an alien(cid:13) in removal proceedings to that of an alien lawfully admitted(cid:13) for permanent residence if: (1) the alien makes an(cid:13) application for the adjustment; (2) the alien is eligible to(cid:13) receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United(cid:13) States for permanent residence; and (3) an immigrant visa(cid:13) is immediately available to him at the filing of the(cid:13) application. Id. S 1255(a).(cid:13) An alien, however, is inadmissible to the United States if(cid:13) he has been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude. Id.(cid:13) S 1182(a)(2)(A)(I)(I). Thus, such an alien cannot satisfy the(cid:13) second requirement of S 1255(a). Because of De Leon’s(cid:13) conviction, he had to apply for a waiver of the moral(cid:13) turpitude ground of inadmissibility under one of the waiver(cid:13) provisions in 8 U.S.C. S 1182(h) to be eligible for an(cid:13) adjustment of status.(cid:13) Under S 1182(h), the Attorney General in his discretion(cid:13) may waive an alien’s inadmissibility for a crime of moral(cid:13) turpitude if the alien is a spouse, parent, or child of a(cid:13) United States citizen or permanent resident alien and can(cid:13) show that denial of admission would cause extreme(cid:13) hardship to the citizen or permanent resident alien. Id.(cid:13) S 1182(h)(1)(B). Congress amended this waiver provision in(cid:13) 1996 to prohibit eligibility if an alien previously has been(cid:13) admitted as a permanent resident and has then either (a)(cid:13) been convicted of an aggravated felony, or (b) not resided in(cid:13) the United States for seven continuous years. Id. S 1182(h).2(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 2. The statute provides, in pertinent part:(cid:13) No waiver shall be granted . . . in the case of an alien who has(cid:13) previously been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully(cid:13) admitted for permanent residence if either since the date of such(cid:13) admission the alien has been convicted of an aggravated felony or(cid:13) the alien has not lawfully resided continuously in the United States(cid:13) for a period of not less than 7 years immediately preceding the date(cid:13) of initiation of proceedings to remove the alien from the United(cid:13) States.(cid:13) 8 U.S.C. S 1182(h).(cid:13) 7(cid:13) Because De Leon had not resided in the United States for(cid:13) seven years, the immigration judge found him ineligible to(cid:13) adjust his status.(cid:13) De Leon argues that S 1182(h) violates the equal(cid:13) protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due(cid:13) Process clause by making an impermissible distinction(cid:13) between two categories of aliens who are not permitted to(cid:13) reside in the United States: those who have not previously(cid:13) been lawfully admitted to the United States (i.e., non-LPRs)(cid:13) and those who have been previously admitted to the United(cid:13) States but have not resided in the United States for seven(cid:13) consecutive years before removal proceedings are initiated(cid:13) (LPRs). See In re Michel, 21 I & N Dec. 1101, 1104 (BIA(cid:13) 1998) ("Section [1182(h)] . . . while specifically precluding(cid:13) waiver eligibility for a lawful permanent resident who has(cid:13) been convicted of an aggravated felony, imposes no such(cid:13) restriction on one who has not been admitted previously as(cid:13) an [LPR]."). De Leon asserts that this distinction allows a(cid:13) criminal alien who has never had permanent resident(cid:13) status in the United States, never acquired equities or(cid:13) familial ties, to secure a waiver, while those who have(cid:13) previously been admitted as lawful permanent residents,(cid:13) but with less than the seven years required residence, will(cid:13) be deported. Thus, he argues, the amendatory 1996(cid:13) legislation is unconstitutional.(cid:13) There is a "limited scope of judicial inquiry into(cid:13) immigration legislation." Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792(cid:13) (1977). " ‘[O]ver no conceivable subject is the legislative(cid:13) power of Congress more complete than it is over’ the(cid:13) admission of aliens." Id. (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v.(cid:13) Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)). The Supreme Court(cid:13) has noted that its "cases ‘have long recognized the power to(cid:13) expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign(cid:13) attribute exercised by the Government’s political(cid:13) departments largely immune from judicial control.’ " Id.(cid:13) (quoting Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953)).(cid:13) In exercising its broad powers over immigration and(cid:13) naturalization, " ‘Congress regularly makes rules that would(cid:13) be unacceptable if applied to citizens.’ " Id. (quoting(cid:13) Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976)). The" ‘power over(cid:13) aliens is of a political character and therefore subject only(cid:13) 8(cid:13) to narrow judicial review.’ " Id. (quoting Hampton v. Mow(cid:13) Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101 n.21 (1976) (citing Fong Yue(cid:13) Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893)).(cid:13) This Court applies rational basis review to equal(cid:13) protection challenges in the area of admission or removal of(cid:13) aliens. Pinho v. INS, 249 F.3d 183, 190 (3d Cir. 2001).(cid:13) Rational basis review does not empower "courts to judge(cid:13) the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices," and(cid:13) legislation subject to rational basis review has a strong(cid:13) presumption of validity. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319(cid:13) (1993) (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508(cid:13) U.S. 307, 313 (1993)). Legislation is constitutional if there(cid:13) is a rational relationship between the disparate treatment(cid:13) and some legitimate governmental purpose. Id. at 320.(cid:13) Moreover, Congress need not justify the purpose or(cid:13) reasoning to support its classification. Id. The legislation(cid:13) must be sustained if any reasonably conceivable state of(cid:13) facts provide a rational basis for the classification. Id.(cid:13) In Song v. INS, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (C.D. Cal. 2000), the(cid:13) District Court addressed the equal protection argument(cid:13) with respect to S 1182(h) in a context where the alien’s(cid:13) aggravated felony rendered him ineligible for a waiver.3 The(cid:13) Court found S 1182(h)’s distinction between legal and illegal(cid:13) aliens irrational and therefore unconstitutional. Id. at 1133.(cid:13) Song found that the legislation creates an incentive for(cid:13) one to be a non-LPR rather than an LPR and punishes(cid:13) those with closer ties to the United States. Id. The Court(cid:13) held that it is irrational to punish aliens more severely for(cid:13) merely having closer ties to the United States. Id. The Court(cid:13) also found that the section rewards those who are guilty of(cid:13) two crimes (i.e., non-LPRs who have committed either a(cid:13) crime of moral turpitude or an aggravated felony are also(cid:13) committing a crime by their very presence in this country)(cid:13) by giving them greater consideration than LPRs who are(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 3. Although most of the cases applying equal protection analysis to(cid:13) S 1182(h) have arisen in the context of waiver ineligibility due to an alien(cid:13) having committed an aggravated felony, the analyses equally apply in(cid:13) situations where alien ineligibility is due to the commission of a crime of(cid:13) moral turpitude.(cid:13) 9(cid:13) guilty only of an aggravated felony or a crime of moral(cid:13) turpitude. Id.(cid:13) Song further rejected the Government’s argument that(cid:13) with the greater privileges bestowed upon LPRs comes a(cid:13) commensurately greater duty to follow the law. Id. The(cid:13) Court ruled that it is irrational to argue that one of the(cid:13) greater duties on LPRs is to abide by the law because all(cid:13) persons in the United States have such a duty, regardless(cid:13) of their status. Id. at 1133-34.(cid:13) In contrast to Song, the Courts of Appeals addressing the(cid:13) issue have held that S 1182(h) is constitutional. In Lara-(cid:13) Ruiz v. INS, 241 F.3d 934 (7th Cir. 2001), the Court of(cid:13) Appeals noted several rational bases for S 1182(h)’s(cid:13) distinction. First, it stated that "[o]ne of Congress’ purposes(cid:13) in enacting reforms . . . was to expedite the removal of(cid:13) criminal aliens from the United States." Id. at 947. The(cid:13) Court held that(cid:13) [w]hile it might have been wiser, fairer, and more(cid:13) efficacious for Congress to have eliminated . . . relief for(cid:13) non-LPR aggravated felons as well, the step taken by(cid:13) Congress was a rational first step toward achieving the(cid:13) legitimate goal of quickly removing aliens who commit(cid:13) certain serious crimes from the country, and as such(cid:13) it should be upheld.(cid:13) Id.(cid:13) The Court also noted that LPRs have rights and privileges(cid:13) based on their status that are not shared by non-LPRs, and(cid:13) that LPRs have closer ties to the United States through(cid:13) work and family. Id. "Therefore, Congress may rationally(cid:13) have concluded that LPRs who commit serious crimes(cid:13) despite these factors are uniquely poor candidates for . . .(cid:13) waiver of inadmissibility." Id.(cid:13) Finally, the Court stated that in making LPRs ineligible(cid:13) for waiver, "Congress might well have found it significant(cid:13) that . . . such aliens have already demonstrated that closer(cid:13) ties to the United States and all of the benefits attending(cid:13) LPR status were insufficient to deter them from committing(cid:13) serious crimes." Id. at 948. Thus, it concluded that LPRs(cid:13) were a higher risk for recidivism and less deserving of a(cid:13) second chance than non-LPRs.(cid:13) 10(cid:13) Both the Eighth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals,(cid:13) when deciding the issue, reached the same conclusion as(cid:13) the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Lukowski v. INS, 279(cid:13) F.3d 644, 647 (8th Cir. 2002) ("[Section] 1182(h) easily(cid:13) passes equal protection muster."); Moore v. Ashcroft, 251(cid:13) F.3d 919, 925 (11th Cir. 2001). The Second Circuit Court(cid:13) of Appeals, although finding equal protection analysis(cid:13) inapplicable, likewise held that S 1982(h) is constitutional.(cid:13) Jankowski-Burczyk v. INS, No. 01-2353 (2d Cir. May 29,(cid:13) 2002).(cid:13) In addition to adopting much of the Court’s reasoning in(cid:13) Lara-Ruiz, Moore also suggested that waiver eligibility only(cid:13) is theoretically available to illegal aliens. "Because illegal(cid:13) aliens are assumably removable at any time regardless of(cid:13) whether they have committed aggravated felonies in this(cid:13) country or not, Congress simply may have seen no need to(cid:13) emphasize in the statute that this class of individuals could(cid:13) not seek a waiver." 251 F.3d at 925. Although relief is(cid:13) theoretically available to non-LPRs, the Court held that it(cid:13) could not conclude that Congress acted arbitrarily or(cid:13) unreasonably in barring LPRs who commit aggravated(cid:13) felonies from seeking discretionary relief. Id. at 926.(cid:13) Because Congress conceivably had good reasons to create(cid:13) the S 1182(h) distinction, we hold that the distinction(cid:13) survives rational basis scrutiny. Although Song was correct(cid:13) in stating that all persons have an equivalent obligation to(cid:13) lead lives within the confines of the law, Lara-Ruiz(cid:13) suggested at least two additional rationales for the(cid:13) S 1182(h) distinction.(cid:13) First, Congress could have concluded that LPRs who(cid:13) commit crimes of moral turpitude, despite rights and(cid:13) privileges based on their status that illegal aliens do not(cid:13) share, are "uniquely poor candidates" for waiver. Second,(cid:13) LPRs with employment and family ties to the United States,(cid:13) who are still willing to commit serious crimes, are a higher(cid:13) risk for recidivism than non-LPRs who commit serious(cid:13) crimes but lack ties to the United States. Although these(cid:13) two rationales do not command enthusiasm, they form a(cid:13) plausible justification for the distinction made by Congress.(cid:13) In legislation aimed at the legitimate government interest of(cid:13) expediting the deportation of immigrants who commit(cid:13) 11(cid:13) serious crimes in this country, we cannot say that the(cid:13) distinction between the two classes of aliens is irrational.(cid:13) Moore’s focus on the theoretical nature of illegal alien(cid:13) waiver eligibility is also cogent. Non-LPRs may always be(cid:13) excluded from the United States, regardless of whether they(cid:13) have committed serious crimes. Moreover, non-LPRs(cid:13) presumably lack the ties to obtain a relative to petition the(cid:13) Attorney General for adjustment of status. Accordingly,(cid:13) Congress may have seen no risk in excluding non-LPRs(cid:13) from the statutory class of persons eligible for waiver. This(cid:13) belief, that non-LPR waiver eligibility is more theoretical(cid:13) than real, is also rational, and could have led Congress to(cid:13) omit non-LPRs in S 1182(h).(cid:13) Our holding that the S 1182(h) distinction survives(cid:13) rational basis scrutiny should not be mistaken for an(cid:13) endorsement of the policy. We urge Congress to reconsider(cid:13) the ramifications of entirely eliminating the Attorney(cid:13) General’s discretion in this area. At times, pathetic, heart-(cid:13) wrenching pain for families and burdensome consequences(cid:13) for employers and taxpayers accompany removal(cid:13) proceedings. De Leon’s wife and child, who are United(cid:13) States citizens, will now become a single-parent family.(cid:13) Whether they can sustain themselves or will be a burden to(cid:13) society remains to be seen. Furthermore, the(cid:13) Commonwealth of Pennsylvania did not believe that De(cid:13) Leon’s criminal act warranted incarceration; the court(cid:13) sentenced him to two years of probation.(cid:13) Although Congress’s goal of expediting the removal of(cid:13) criminal aliens is understandable and even praiseworthy,(cid:13) denying the Attorney General of the United States the(cid:13) discretionary power to adjust the status of a lawful(cid:13) permanent alien who has committed a crime of moral(cid:13) turpitude, regardless of the circumstances of the crime and(cid:13) his familial conditions, can be harsh, self-defeating, and(cid:13) unwise.4(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 4. Judge Alito does not join the final two paragraphs of Part II of this(cid:13) opinion. Having concluded that the challenged statutory provision is(cid:13) constitutional, he expresses no view regarding its wisdom.(cid:13) 12(cid:13) III.(cid:13) In summary, the District Court did not err in concluding(cid:13) that De Leon committed a crime of moral turpitude. The(cid:13) Court also committed no error in determining that 8 U.S.C.(cid:13) S 1182(h) does not violate the equal protection component(cid:13) of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process clause. The order of(cid:13) the District Court will be affirmed. Each side to bear its(cid:13) own costs.(cid:13) A True Copy:(cid:13) Teste:(cid:13) Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals(cid:13) for the Third Circuit(cid:13) 13
